

**REPORT OF THE BOARD OF EDUCATION ON
THE FEASIBILITY OF DIFFERENTIATING COMPENSATION
FOR OUTSTANDING PERFORMANCE IN TEACHING
TO
THE GOVERNOR
AND
THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY OF VIRGINIA**



**HOUSE DOCUMENT NO. 24
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RICHMOND
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COMMONWEALTH of VIRGINIA

BOARD OF EDUCATION

RICHMOND 23216

January 13, 1983

TO: The Honorable Charles S. Robb
Members of the General Assembly

FROM: State Board of Education

SUBJECT: House Joint Resolution 93

House Joint Resolution 93, agreed to in part by the 1982 session of the Virginia General Assembly, requested that the Board of Education determine the feasibility of differentiating compensation for outstanding performance in teaching.

In reviewing this issue, the Department of Education examined research studies conducted by several well-known organizations: namely, the Educational Research Service, the Southern Regional Educational Board, and the National Institute of Education. Further, the Board requested and heard presentations from school divisions currently engaged in some form of reward compensation for teachers. Studies reviewed included evidence that compensation plans based exclusively on performance for outstanding teaching were almost nonexistent, and that attempts at such plans when made were short-lived and lacked the support base upon which effective compensation plans have sustained acceptance.

The Board did, however, examine plans which had research support and participant acceptance. These plans included a broad spectrum of compensation or pay incentives that extended beyond teaching performance alone.

House Joint Resolution 93 called for a review of compensation related to outstanding teaching performance only. But because limited evidence is available in support of restricting the criteria for compensation to teaching performance, the Board of Education recommends that local school divisions examine the appropriateness of compensation plans that include multiple incentives with realistic rewards.

Further, the Board will assume the responsibility for making available to school divisions information related to possible incentives and encourages divisions to consider adopting those which it deems appropriate.

bcw

House Joint Resolution 93

DIFFERENTIATED PAY FOR CLASSROOM TEACHERS

A study prepared for the Governor and the
General Assembly by the
Virginia Board of Education

January, 1983

Appreciation is expressed to Mr. G. Ronald Brown who was
largely responsible for the content of this study.

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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

.....and therefore be it
RESOLVED by the House of Delegates, the Senate
concurring, that the Board of Education is re-
quested to determine the feasibility of imple-
menting a differentiated compensation system
for outstanding performance in teaching.....
Virginia General Assembly
February 20, 1982

As Ben prepared for work, he could feel his energy building.

Today, he was going to put into action his plan to increase the number of small engine parts he could assemble in a day. The secret had been in a small nutdriver needed for assembly. By slightly altering the design, he would now be able to complete several more engines per day, making him eligible for extra pay.

The company was very clear about awarding extra pay beyond certain quotas. He had not shared the details of the plan, but his supervisor and some of his colleagues were aware that he was about to make a breakthrough. Not only would this increase his pay check each week as he used the tool and exceeded quotas, there could be an incentive award for this little invention.

While Ben had not benefited from education beyond high school, he seemed to have an unusually analytical mind. He had approached the problem by saying to himself, "Is the goal reasonable? Can it be done?" Given were the precision made quality controlled parts that had been carefully arranged in order of assembly. Tolerances were at the near zero level. The company seemingly had done all possible to make the chore easy and fast. They had worked on lighting, climate control, height of assembly table and just about any other environmental problem that could possibly slow a worker. His initiative had to be applied beyond

the company effort.

Mary, a friend of Ben's, was a school teacher. She, too, had the opportunity of working for merit pay. She felt that, while the extra money would be very helpful in paying the ever increasing stack of bills, the goal was probably beyond reach.

She was an excellent teacher. Mary was generally recognized as one of the most effective teachers in the school. This very excellence in performance might just be the real reason why merit pay would not become a reality for Mary. With her years of experience as a teacher, she had been quick to see the soft signs and, perhaps, even strong signs that the son of a principal from another school in the division had need of special services. It was generally known that the family rejected any consideration of this possibility, and Mary's principal had refused to bring the matter before the school screening committee. In his discussion concerning the student, he had seemed irritated.

The principal's ability was, perhaps, marginal, and Mary had frequently been at odds with him as his incompetency was exposed.

At the same time, the criteria for merit pay was supposed to be objective. Consideration was given to pupil progress. Mary wasn't certain how this part of the program was to work. It somehow seemed unfair because Mary always felt that she had been assigned the most challenging students. These students were purposely placed with her because of her strong discipline. It was difficult to show progress with such a challenging group.

It had also occurred to Mary that at least one of her colleagues, who usually had the better students, had been teaching the standardized test which was given all pupils at that grade level. It was not difficult to understand how that teacher's students could score so much higher than

any others in the building. Mary was sure that she had seen the vocabulary words used on the test in the teacher's lessons.

For several years, this fellow teacher had received merit increases while Mary had not. It didn't seem fair. Mary was hoping for one this year and had altered her approach somewhat to better her chances. She smiled more at the principal. She no longer recommended students of the "right kind of family" for special education testing. She, too, had begun to sort of "teach the test."

What really discouraged Mary most was the fact that she had a roommate who taught the same grade in another school in the same school division. They seemed to get along so well, probably because their philosophies of education were almost identical. Her roommate would have followed the same course in almost every issue that Mary was involved with at school. The roommate's principal was more secure and actually encouraged the same sort of behavior that Mary's principal rejected. Mary's roommate had received merit increases for the past three years.

Scenario Reactions

The opening scenario is just one more attempt to analogize merit pay pitting industry and education vis-a-vis. Many contrasts could be drawn, but the more obvious seem to best fit our present purposes.

First, there are no precision parts in education. Students are a synthesis of their total life experiences when they enter the classroom. There is no guarantee that our tools, no matter how special the design, will fit their peculiar shape. There is no guarantee that, if the tools selected are proper, they will turn the student onto learning. Unlike students, the unassembled parts of education, nuts and bolts do not need inspiration, motivation or human feeling. In other words, the

key to the success of a teacher might just be the pupil, the most unpredictable of all the components for success of the teacher.

The goals in industry, as illustrated in the opening, can be clearly set. Accomplishment can be measured quickly and accurately. Quality of work is immediately obvious, and the lasting quality can be warranted. In education, meaningful and fair goals are difficult, if not impossible, to set. In order for competition to be fair, all goals would have to be the same for all teachers, and yet they would be furnished non precision parts with which to work. Even a clear goal such as raising each student's reading level one year, as measured by a certain specified standardized test, is unfair for the same reason. Students learn in differing levels at particular unpredictable stages of their development. It may be the teacher that makes the difference and keys up one of these stages, or it may have absolutely nothing to do with school. It may simply be that a child, for some unknown reason, has decided that it is time to make the effort to do well.

And then there is Mary's roommate. This situation where two people perform the same services in about the same way causing one to be chided while the other is rewarded, is bound to lead to low morale. If a parallel were drawn for a roommate in Ben's case, there would be less chance or reason for disgruntled employees. At any other small engine plant operated by the same company, quotas would be the same and measurement for extra pay could also be the same. To carry this further, the precision made parts to be assembled would be the same, and the environments could be made comparable. In Mary's case, not only is it impossible to have the same measurement between plants or buildings, it is almost equally as difficult to have comparable standards, students, etc. in the same building.

Also to be considered is the idea of sharing. If one is in competition with someone, there is less chance that innovative ideas will be shared. It would seem that education would profit from encouraging teachers to work together cooperatively, and that merit pay would greatly reduce that end.

Probably, the most important point is that Ben would be rewarded for good or rather better work. Mary, in order to receive merit pay, would be forced to lower her standards and perform at a less efficient level.

CHAPTER 2

LITERATURE REVIEW

An extensive review of the literature on merit pay has been done by Educational Research Services. The ERS data includes an equal distribution of pros and cons regarding merit pay. One such list was outlined by the San Diego City Schools. The list included 17 advantages and 17 disadvantages. The same was true of the Merit Pay Study Committee of the Iowa Education Association. In 1969, they listed 15 pros and 15 cons. Adding to the dilemma of one attempting to decide the advisability of the plan was a portion of this same ERS report discussing "Why Merit Pay Programs Succeed" contrasted with "Why Merit Pay Programs Fail."¹⁴

The idea of merit pay for teachers was introduced in the early 1900's. One of the first programs introduced was in Newton, Massachusetts Public Schools in 1908. Since that time, other plans have been developed, many of which were subsequently abandoned. The reasons for discontinuing plans were listed by 30 school systems in cities of 30,000 or more. Most often listed were the problems of evaluation (36%) and dissension (36%).

The literature contains work on whether or not teachers are motivated by money. Deci conducted a test where subjects were assigned intrinsically interesting puzzles.¹⁰ Each member of the first group was paid the same amount just for participating. Contrastingly, a second group of subjects was paid according to successful completion of the puzzles or the avoidance of an obnoxious buzzer. In the first case, Deci found subjects working beyond the required time which seemed to prove intrinsic motivation. In the latter case, subjects "had less

inclination to continue working on the puzzles voluntarily."

According to Lathan, most supporters of merit pay use a MBO approach much like industry or business. Lathan goes on to state that MBO is "misapplied in education. Schools are not factories or businesses. Teaching and learning remain open and uncertain. What counts cannot be so easily specified or quantified."⁷ It seems that goal setting holds the least promise when jobs are complex and performance difficult to measure precisely.

There are cases where merit pay was mandated by a state legislature. Such a program in Alabama in 1969 was repealed before the legislation became effective.⁹ The Virginia General Assembly passed legislation in 1982 requiring the Department of Education to do a feasibility study possibly leading to a merit pay program.

In all plans and writings on the subject, there seems to be a rejection of norm referenced tests being used to evaluate pupil progress and subsequent teacher ratings. If tests were to be used, criterion-referenced was the better choice. This feeling was strongly stated by Pophan. "In short, I believe that teachers should be evaluated chiefly by the results they produce. But those results will not be properly detected through the use of norm-referenced achievement tests, and teachers should rebel against the use of such tests in any teacher appraisal system. Criterion-referenced tests, in contrast, are a genuinely just measure of teacher effectiveness and have a rightful place in any defensible teacher evaluation system."²²

The key in this statement is "defensible." All plans devised will come under fire, almost upon inception. Both the AFT and NEA have taken positions opposing merit pay. Past president and present director of special activities of the AFT, Carl Megel, lists seven

reasons why merit ratings are educationally unsound.¹⁰ They are:

1. Cannot fairly evaluate the true effectiveness of teaching
2. Merit ratings reward conformity
3. Merit rating puts a premium on absence of teacher problems
4. Fosters a competitive rather than a cooperative spirit
5. Strikes at the security of the teacher
6. Disregards the type of environment in which a teacher teaches
7. Merit ratings cannot improve the quality of education

A somewhat different attitude was expressed by the Ontario Secondary Teachers Federation. This Canadian union rescinded a policy against merit pay. In its new policy, it recognized the desirability of "additional allowances (above the basic schedule) to teachers who are deemed superior or exceptional teachers."²⁴ The catch, however, was the provision that the evaluation system be acceptable to the teachers. The group also appointed a study committee at the same time. This committee reported on programs both in Canada and in the United States. One of the successful programs reported, the Etobicoke Master Plan, was more or less staff differentiation which, in effect, is more pay for more responsibility.

An example of true community dedication to the cause of merit pay for teachers was a plan devised by a Minnesota businessman. This individual, with his own resources, rewards teachers for up to \$4,000.00 per year. In the plan, teachers can be recommended by parents, students, administrators and former students. A teacher must be recommended by at least three groups. All recipients agreed that it was important that the judgment about quality of work was made from outside.⁶

CHAPTER 3

DEFINITION OF MERIT PAY

In any consideration of merit pay, it would seem important to understand what exactly is included or excluded from this category. In the literature, there exists quite a bit of latitude in the definition. The range is from a one time award for excellence in teaching to extra pay for extra duty.

There are several ways in which teachers receive extra pay above the scale. Some are for excellence, some for incentive and others for extra duties. The most common are:

1. Extra pay for extra duties. Examples would involve assuming duties beyond the regular teaching day or using assigned planning time to perform other duties such as coaching, heading a department, bus duty, hall duty or sponsoring student activities.
2. Working toward or receiving advanced degrees. Some plans include a set number of hours beyond the baccalaureate receiving extra yearly payments and most include a scale for master degrees and beyond.
3. Special assignments. Included here would be such things as teaching in a critical subject area where there is a shortage of teachers. In the Second Mile program in Houston, teachers are paid extra for accepting assignments in "High Priority Locations."
4. Merit Pay.

Merit pay cannot so easily be categorized, as all of the above are sometimes included. For the purpose of this discussion, merit pay will be considered as monetary reward for performing the contracted teaching services, but in a manner recognized by the administration as superior to others contracted for the same services.

From this definition, we would exclude extra pay for extra duties except in a case where two or more teachers might receive extra pay for extra duty and one was rewarded for performing better than the other. In a sense, a portion of a salary for head coach could be meritorious in that the coach was promoted from among others receiving extra pay for extra duties to a position paying more. This would be merit pay as long as more responsibility and perhaps hours of work were not included.

This definition seems to fit the Resolutions of the Virginia Education Association in their position on economic security. The Association clearly states support for experience index ratio, recognition of advanced education, equal percentage of dollar increase for all personnel, career service/longevity steps, automatic cost of living adjustments and extra duty supplement. At the same time, the Association clearly rejects performance-based compensation. The resolution does, however, leave a door open for a possible plan approved by the personnel affected.⁴

CHAPTER 4

WHY MERIT PAY?

The subject of merit pay seems to be a recurring consideration as an alternative to lock step pay scales for teachers. The issue is a current one. It also received a great deal of attention in the 1960's. A more thorough investigation might prove a relationship between community interest in merit pay and the economy.

There could be many basic reasons for the introduction of a merit pay plan. All would most likely relate to improvement of instruction. This is and rightly should be the reason indicated by educators. Under improving instruction might be reasons such as rewarding excellence and its counterpart punishing incompetence. Motivation is often listed along with attracting good teachers, retaining good teachers and improving teacher morale.

There are a few proponents that feel merit pay would save money. A 1966 study listed among its conclusions that "pressure from various sources for the establishment of merit salary schedules can be expected to continue as base salaries for Texas teachers increase and additional tax revenue is needed."²² If this was true in 1966, it is even truer now as school budgets suffer in relationship to the general economy.

There probably exist other reasons why merit pay is often considered. It would seem important to deal with this concern of why in each case. If the expected outcome can be determined then research can be gathered to see if merit pay will, in fact, accomplish the desired effect.

As an example for those interested in saving money with merit pay, the results would be disappointing. The successful program will most

likely cost more money, not less. The reportedly successful Second Mile Program had estimated costs of \$11 million. Considering the challenge to retain teachers, perhaps even those performing marginally, it would be foolish to reduce basic pay schedules. This means that budgets would have to increase for merit pay. Any other plan that would save teacher salary budget money, such as fewer but better teachers with larger classes and perhaps extended days, would essentially be more pay for more work.

If saving money is not a good reason for considering merit pay, then rewarding excellence/punishing incompetence must be a good one. This issue seems directly related to improving instruction. But can the issue be so isolated? Surely everyone would agree to punishing incompetence and rewarding excellence. Everyone except those who are perhaps judged to be "good" or "very good" but not quite "excellent." Teachers so judged will most likely feel as punished as the incompetent. This rewarding of one group and perceived punishment of all others may just be the reason why there is usually a reported morale problem associated with merit pay plans.

Related to the reward idea is motivation. The very basic question is, "Does money motivate teachers?" This issue has been dealt with by Edward Deci of Rochester University who reports that if we make pay the important goal, then intrinsic interest in performing the task diminishes.² In other words, there is a shift in focus, and it would appear that there would be a reliance on continued rewards for continued success. This would not be true if we relied on self motivation and self satisfaction. A quiz in a recent secondary principal's magazine had as its first question, "Merit pay is an ideal solution to the problem of motivation." The proper answer, according to this research, is no.²⁴

It may be that merit pay plans imply that competition is good for

teachers. Contrary to this, Meyer feels that merit pay places employees in a win-lose situation. These win-lose situations seem to generate the following types of reactions:

1. Competitors are seen as enemies and thus hostility develops toward them.
2. Perceptions of one's self become distorted positively while perceptions of competitors become distorted negatively.
3. Interaction and communication with competitors are decreased.¹⁷

If in considering the adoption of a merit pay plan for teachers one was to base the decision on a literature review, the plan would most likely be abandoned. Merit plans have just not been reported as successful. With the apparent lack of success, the question becomes, "Why does this issue still keep coming up?" The answer is that, perhaps, there is a continued interest in rewarding excellence.

CHAPTER 5

THE SEARCH FOR A MODEL

Indications from the literature review are that merit pay plans for teachers should be avoided. And yet there seems to be a continuous search for a model that works. Looking outside the field for a model in industry, business or other professions has not been fruitful. There is probably good reason for this. All in the teaching field are considered professionals. All work at about the same level. The organizational chart is very flat with little chance for advancement to another level.

All teachers are expected to be experts in their own field. It is like having 35 to 50 dentists working for one senior dentist. This analogy comes close to explaining the relationship between the administration and teachers. There is a fine line between how to accept each person's professional expertise and, at the same time, direct their activities toward teaching children with some sort of similarity of technical competencies. It is a quasi professional model that sometimes behaves as if in the quagmire of the shop floor sub-culture.

Merit pay must be dealt with in this setting. Education is a unique profession in that would be professionals, working to be thought of as one thinks of doctors, often punch a time clock and have little control over their own destiny. At the same time, these professionals are paid a salary instead of setting fees.

This uniqueness makes it difficult to generalize, draw comparisons or set up analogies about education. Already we have drawn comparisons with industry in the opening scenario. To analogize with another profession such as physicians, we find no merit pay. A physician may

make more money than a colleague, but it is because he/she has either been in the profession longer or has been extremely successful and has raised fees to keep the traffic down. It would be difficult to use this model for education. While the years in practice resulting in perhaps a better fee will compare to salary longevity steps, there still remains the factor that the physician has control of the fees. The physician works for the patient while the teacher works for the public.

And yet models have been developed that seem to work. Such is the Second Mile plan in the Houston Independent School District. By their own and by the definition established for this paper, the program is more rightly called an incentive plan as opposed to merit pay. It does, however, have one part that could be considered merit but with a little different approach.

In the Houston plan, awards are made in six categories for which school personnel may apply after meeting certain baseline requirements. The categories are:

1. "High-priority location. Teachers willing to teach in schools with high concentrations of educationally disadvantaged students are eligible for \$2,000 stipends.
2. Critical staff shortage. High school mathematics and science teachers are eligible for \$800 stipends. Stipends for special education teachers range from \$600 to \$900. Bilingual education teachers may earn an extra \$1,000.
3. Outstanding teacher attendance. Teachers who are absent five or fewer days during

the year may trade in their unused leave days at a rate of \$100 per day.

4. Professional growth. Teachers who complete college courses in curriculum areas related to their teaching assignment or who voluntarily attend inservice classes operated by the school system are eligible for stipends. For each six-hour block of college coursework (or 72-hour block of approved inservice training), the stipend is \$300.
5. Outstanding educational progress. Test score averages for each school site are predicted on the basis of previous academic achievement and a number of other factors. If the school's average score exceeds the predicted score, each eligible teacher receives an \$800 stipend.
6. Unique campus assignment. Teachers who teach at a campus for which no test data are available--either because the students have not been at the school long enough to be tested or because the students are not able to be tested using standardized tests--are eligible for stipends ranging from \$450 to \$750."²⁰

All of these six would be considered an incentive plan except Number 5, educational progress. This very interesting concept is merit pay, but applied to a whole school as opposed to individual teachers. This concept lessens the opposition usually expressed against individual teacher plans.

A report after three years of this carefully developed program shows success in improving academic achievement, reducing teacher vacancies (613 to 376), decrease in critical staff shortages (251 to 186), reduced teacher turnover in high priority schools (18.2 to 15.1) and decreasing teacher absences (9 days to 7.6). The average stipend per teacher was reported as \$936 for a two year total of \$11 million.

In order to develop a plan that works, one needs to understand what prevents most programs from working. It appears that, as illustrated in the Second Mile venture, there must be a large monetary commitment to the plan. Rewards of \$100.00 or even \$500.00 probably won't make much difference in today's economy. In today's market, it is felt by Kidwell that \$1,000.00 would "make the program much more attractive to teachers."⁵

Who does the rating and the details of the plan for rating are probably the greatest problems. If this concern is to be solved, there needs to be a much lower ratio than is now present between evaluatee and evaluator. The span-of-control must be lowered. While it was difficult to establish a definite figure, the literature does support a reduction. It would seem reasonable to expect a principal to fully evaluate no more than five to seven teachers if other principal type duties are not changed.

The seemingly insurmountable problem expressed so often is that of a real or perceived favoritism and differing standards of evaluation between schools in a same school district. It is very unlikely that this concern can ever be satisfied. The only way it can be improved is by intensive training of observers. At the same time, complete objectivity is a very remote possibility. There will always be a subjectiveness about teacher evaluation.

Tied closely to the above point is the need for the program to be developed through professional leadership. As stated by Mitchell, it must "be based on sound educational objectives and be accepted by a majority of those who will be most directly affected through its implementation."²¹

There is some support for lump sum payments as opposed to adding to a salary and then being partialled out with the regular pay check. In a report in Small Business, there was a statement favoring this plan. The illustration used was the seemingly large difference in receiving a check for \$2,000.00 as opposed to including about \$40.00 per week in the pay check.¹³ In our case, when merit increases would more than likely be at about \$1,000.00, the weekly or monthly payment would seem even more insignificant.

In order to budget for such a merit program, the JUMPS system developed by the Justice Department provides a possible answer.²⁷ This program was awarded the Ribicoff-Percy Award for excellence in the Civil Service Reform Act. The Department has a merit pool of a certain amount of dollars. Employees earn points throughout the year. At the end of the evaluation period, all points are divided into the pool to establish a point value and the dollar amounts are then computed.

The Department was contacted for an up-date on this program and while it appeared to still be a model for other agencies, there had been only one pay-off to date. According to the present Chief of Position and Pay Management, Mr. Val Talofero, there was not enough money in the pool for a pay-off due to some funding changes by Congress. He also hinted at the possibility of negative effects of a merit pay system.

In summary, the following need to be met before success can be realized:

1. The plan must be very well developed with teachers having had a great deal of input.
2. A large majority of the teachers must agree to the idea.
3. The criteria for evaluation must be as objective as possible.
4. Evaluators should have special training.
5. The ratio of evaluator to evaluatee must be small.
6. There must be a considerable commitment of fiscal support to the program. Some sources have estimated as high as an 18% increase in instructional budget is needed for merit pay to work.
7. Lump sum payments should be made rather than salary add-ons.
8. Before considering merit pay, an expected outcome should be established. Data should be gathered to see if merit pay will really deliver the expected outcome.

It would not be fair to simply state that merit pay for teachers will not work. To do so would be to ignore a part of the literature that says it has worked. These workable cases often, after close examination, either will not fit our definition established for this paper, or they meet the above criterion for success.

CHAPTER 6

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

For the most part, merit pay for teachers has not been successful. In fact, it appears to be counterproductive. The overall effect of rewarding a few could be viewed as punishing the remainder of the faculty. This contributes to low morale.

In a survey by ERS, it was found that 6.4% of the schools responding to a survey reported that they had implemented and then discontinued a merit pay plan. The two dominant reasons given were difficulty of administration (evaluating teachers fairly) and low morale because of teacher unhappiness with the concept.¹¹ Teachers seem to reject the idea, individually and collectively, as both the NEA and AFT unions have policy statements rejecting the notion.

The problem of evaluation running counter to general self-perception is a very difficult enigma. If an employee perceives that the job is well done and it is not judged accordingly, conflict results. A General Electric Company study asked employees to rate themselves compared to others in the company performing the same or similar tasks. The scale used was 100 points with 50 being considered the mid point when the employees felt that they were performing about like others. This would mean about 50% were better and 50% worse. The average rating was the 77th percentile. Only two workers rated themselves below average, and they both chose the 45th percentile. While there were no 100's, there were several 99's.¹⁷ It is suspected that teachers would rate themselves even higher. This self perception needs to be considered in merit pay plans.

Models from business do not transfer well to education. Production of workers can be measured much more objectively in industry. At the same time, industry has some of the same problems with morale and administration. A reluctance on the administration's part to explain to a disgruntled employee why he/she did not receive merit pay was a great factor in merit pay for employees in business. Similar problems are found for administration in education.

The result that we might wish to expect from merit pay is that it would motivate teachers. This could also be disappointing. Teachers who need no extrinsic motivation will probably be the ones to receive merit pay. We then have a situation where dollars are spent to motivate the very teachers who would do a good job with or without merit pay.

The Etobioke Plan and the Second Mile plan by the definition established for this paper are not really designed to give an individual teacher extra pay for just doing the job better than a colleague. Except for a few plans reported but not investigated, we are, therefore, left without a working model.

The feasibility determination of the Virginia Department of Education in response to the 1982 legislation is as follows:

"On the basis of the experiences of school systems over the years, the chances of success of a program of merit pay for teachers are not good. When programs have been successful, the procedures, goals, and objectives of the program were clearly defined, widely accepted, and universally understood. A cooperative climate between teacher and administrator, and evaluator and evaluatee has been an important prerequisite. Successful plans have been flexible, allowing for continual change and growth; financially sound, allowing for large enough increments to provide a real incentive for outstanding service; and guided by strong, dynamic leadership. In school systems where merit pay has been unsuccessful, unsatisfactory evaluations and staff dissension have been major reasons why school systems have abandoned such programs. The trend seems to be away from merit pay for teachers."³

This summarizes the findings concerning merit pay for teachers. It also compliments very well the components needed for a working model established in Chapter 5.

Finally, there is the question raised earlier, "Does money motivate?" The conclusion, according to ERIC, is that it does not. "On the contrary, teachers are less motivated by money than by the intrinsic rewards of teaching."¹¹ While this idea of working better for intrinsic rewards than money may seem strange to some, one needs to consider why teachers enter the teaching field in the first place. Certainly not just for the money. Most were probably warned by families and friends of low salaries in the field, and the lack of chances for advancement. It seems reasonable to assume that someone who purposely chooses the field of education, spends a minimum of four years in college preparing for the work, knowing that the monetary reward will be less than that of other fields requiring an equal amount of education, will not be motivated by money.

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