

**REPORT OF THE
JOINT LEGISLATIVE
AUDIT AND REVIEW COMMISSION ON**

**Security Staffing
and Procedures
in Virginia's Prisons**

**TO THE GOVERNOR AND
THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY OF VIRGINIA**



House Document No. 3

**COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA
RICHMOND
1986**

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PREFACE

The 1983 Session of the General Assembly directed JLARC to review various issues in the Department of Corrections, including the appropriateness of the agency's staffing levels. In 1984, as a legislative response to the escape of six death-row inmates from Mecklenburg Correctional Center, the Commission amended the study's scope to include an assessment of security procedures and security staffing at the major prisons. This report focuses on these two issues: the adequacy of security staffing and the implementation of security procedures and practices.


The report documents a number of flaws in the department's process for gauging security staffing needs. Of special concern is the absence of guidelines for conducting post audits, which has resulted in extensive variations in the staffing of Virginia's prisons. Although some of the security positions requested by wardens appear reasonable, other staffing practices -- such as using security officers as receptionists and storekeepers -- are inappropriate. Thus, the net security staffing level recommended in this report is 25 positions fewer than the number employed during the time the review was conducted (summer 1984).

The most troublesome finding in the report is the lack of comprehensive policies and procedures for ensuring security in the prisons. While wardens obviously need flexibility to administer their facilities, JLARC found wide gaps in DOC security policies and practices which compromise security staffing considerations. These areas are detailed in the body of the report for the system at large and for each major prison.

JLARC staff had many problems with cooperation from some DOC staff during the conduct of this study. These problems were significant and hindered the frank and open flow of information about the operation of State-funded programs. However, I wish to acknowledge the cooperation and assistance of the majority of DOC's administrative and field personnel who participated in the review.


Ray D. Pethtel
Director

July 15, 1985



The primary mission of the Department of Corrections (DOC) is to ensure that criminal offenders are removed from society and housed in a secure environment. The department carries out this mission through a system of adult and youth institutions. Secure confinement of adults requires the greatest proportion of the department's staff, appropriations, and institutions.

In FY 1984 DOC supervised an average daily population of 9,454 adults in a system of 40 principal institutions (14 prisons and 26 field units) located throughout the State. As of June 1984, staffing at the adult institutions totalled 4,924 positions or 62 percent of all positions authorized for DOC in FY 1984. Seventy-three percent of the staff at adult institutions were security positions.

In the 1970s pervasive problems in corrections were cited by the State Crime Commission. Subsequently, increased resources were dedicated to this function of government — with some success but at considerable expense. As corrections came to require a larger proportion of the State budget, the question of operational efficiency — whether the Virginia prison system was too costly and was over-staffed — became more important. In response to these concerns, the General Assembly reduced the 1982-84 nonsecurity appropriation of the DOC by six percent, and asked JLARC to conduct a series of reviews of the agency's staffing.

This study, one in a series on corrections issues, addresses security staffing in the major prisons. This report also includes a review of security procedures at DOC facilities.

A JLARC REPORT SUMMARY

During this study wardens indicated a need for a total of 425 additional security positions. JLARC's review indicates that a portion of the new positions requested for the major prisons appears to be justified. However, DOC needs to improve its methods for determining staffing requirements and update its staffing formula. The department also needs to document its use of overtime more clearly. In the area of security, DOC needs to strengthen and clarify its policies and procedures. It especially needs to ensure compliance with tool control procedures, which were the weakest controls observed in the JLARC review.

Security Staffing Needs and Utilization (pp. 19-62)

The manner in which DOC identifies security needs and deploys staff to meet these needs is crucial to the effective operation of the prisons and field units. However, DOC has not established a process to define these needs.

The process which is customarily followed involves a determination of the

need for staff, a listing of the needs, and the application of a staffing formula. Security staff are usually deployed on the basis of this procedure, called the "post audit".

JLARC found extensive variation, however, in key parts of the process, resulting in inconsistent levels of and justifications for security staffing. Moreover, determining the need for security staff is not a precise science. Security needs tend to evolve as inmates probe for weaknesses and as special needs arise.

Significant amounts of overtime are also worked at the facilities. While some of this overtime is worked to meet basic security requirements, other overtime is worked in response to crises and emergencies — such as responding to an escape or disturbance. Adequate records do not exist, however, to provide an accurate basis for categorizing overtime. As with the post audit procedures, there is so much variation in institutional overtime practices that final decisions on converting overtime into full-time staff probably cannot be made at this time.

Each institution also appears to have some posts that make questionable contributions to security. Such duties as sorting mail and answering the telephone are necessary to operate an institution, but they should not be assigned to security staff.

Post Audit Procedures. A security post is the specific duty assignment of a security staff member during a given work shift. Posts are established based on such factors as the need to monitor and control the level of inmate activity and the movement of inmates. The number of hours and days a post is established generally ranges from an eight-hour, two-day post to a 24-hour, seven-day post. Top managers at each prison and field unit generally determine their security staffing needs by conducting post audits.

JLARC found that most managers were familiar with the general method of conducting post audits and could provide a reasonable description of the process. However, DOC has not provided policies, guidelines, or training for conducting post audits. Therefore, the criteria and procedures used by institutional staff to identify the need for existing and new posts varies from one facility to another.

One outcome of the post audit is a listing of posts at each institution. JLARC found that some institutions' post audit listings do not accurately reflect staffing patterns. Some overcount or undercount post hours; the number of positions needed to perform supervisory functions often varies from one institution to another; and posts that are deemed essential to the institutions' security are not always specified.

Some wardens told JLARC that they have been reluctant to request additional security positions in recent years because they have felt constrained by perceptions of the Governor's or General Assembly's propensity to fund new staff positions. Thus, their post audits may have indicated a need for more or fewer positions (even if the institution's security needs did not measurably change), depending on their assessment of the political environment.

Recommendation (1). DOC should develop a uniform statewide procedure for conducting post audits. Institutional staff should be trained in the procedure, and periodic checks should be employed to ensure compliance. The procedure should specify the frequency with which audits should be conducted and the criteria to be used when determining the need for a post. Possible criteria could include the extent of inmate movement, the custody levels of inmates within the post's area of observation, and other factors that bear on security of an institution. Overall institutional responsibility for the post audit should be vested in the warden. Products should be reviewed by the regional administrator and central office.

Recommendation (2). Post audit listings should be prepared in a consistent fashion by staff at all facilities and according to a uniform format. Part-time posts should be counted in a similar fashion at all facilities. DOC should determine the minimum tour of duty that will be listed as a separate security post on the post audit listings, and review all listings for compliance with the minimum. Post audits should then be conducted in accord with the new guidelines to eliminate the listing of any

posts that do not comply with the requirements. Regional staff should ensure that the policy is being followed by institutional staff.

Recommendation (3). DOC should determine whether using utility officers is an acceptable solution to the problem of filling essential security posts that are vacant. If so, all facilities should have a number of utility posts, tied to the number of essential posts.

Recommendation (4). DOC should develop guidelines for determining which security posts are essential to facility security. The guidelines should specify what duties and posts are essential to maintaining security during an emergency situation, and for which overtime may be paid if necessary to fill these posts.

Recommendation (5). DOC should require all requests for new posts or additional staff to be supported with written justification of the need, specifying the criteria used to justify the need. Such documentation should include, but not be limited to, a post audit listing which clearly identifies current and requested security posts, a listing of serious incidents and the types and number of incidents reported by inmates but unobserved by staff, any tangible consequences of leaving a particular post unfilled, and the security risks that would be involved if the post were not established.

Recommendation (6). Facility staff should submit staffing requests consistent with facility needs regardless of department-wide or statewide budget constraints. Staff in DOC's central office should then be responsible for balancing staffing needs and budget requests within the agency.

Recommendation (7). The regional review of post audits should be spelled out in department guidelines. The review should focus on whether staffing needs identified at the facilities are reasonable, and whether adequate justification has been presented. Regional staff should in turn document their review of facility staffing requests.

Recommendation (8). Key managers in the adult services division – specifically the deputy director and assistant director for statewide support and operations – should play a stronger role in shaping the criteria used to determine the need for security staff. In addition, they should be involved in the development of training programs in the post audit procedures for facility managers.

Staffing Formula. DOC uses a formula called the Sharp formula to estimate the number of hours available for work by security personnel. The formula requires an accurate count of the number of security posts at each facility to provide an estimate of security staffing needs.

The formula starts with the total number of work hours in a year ($365 \times 8 = 2,920$) and subtracts the hours that employees do not work. For example, every employee receives two rest days off per week (weekends). Hours are also subtracted for annual leave, sick leave, training leave, and holidays.

JLARC replicated the analysis based on the actual leave experiences of a random sample of 604 security personnel during FY 1984. JLARC also included three categories of leave which the DOC formula excludes: military leave, leave taken due to workman's compensation, and leave without pay. An adjustment was also made to ensure that each security employee was provided sufficient time to take required training.

Even with the additional categories of non-working hours, JLARC's calculations resulted in more available work hours – an average of 1,771 hours during FY 1984 instead of the 1,736 used in the DOC staffing formula. Aggregated across 1,138 posts at the major institutions, this difference amounts to a need for 56.04 fewer FTE positions to operate the facilities.

DOC lacks guidelines on the application of the Sharp formula. A review of post audit listings indicates that some locations apply the formula to administrative posts such as training officer and security chief, and some do not. The formula should be applied only to posts that the warden would fill if the normally assigned employee were absent.

Recommendation (9). DOC's staffing formula should be updated annually or biennially. System-wide averages should be used for each of the following factors: sick leave, annual leave, training time, workman's compensatory time, military leave, rest days, holidays, and leave without pay.

Recommendation (10). Until DOC completes the necessary update, the results of the JLARC analysis should be used. Thus the staffing formula should use 1,771 available work hours as the basis of the formula. The required personnel at all post assignments should be correspondingly reduced – for example, 4.95 positions should be assigned to each 24-hour, 7-day post instead of 5.05.

Recommendation (11). DOC should determine which ranks of security staff, and which security posts, the staffing formula should be applicable to. Posts such as training officer and security chief, which are not usually relieved by other staff or filled on an overtime basis when the incumbent is absent, should not be covered by the formula. Post audits submitted by facilities should then be reviewed for consistent application of the formula.

Use of Overtime. Security staff at the prisons and field units worked a total of 632,063.4 hours in addition to their regularly scheduled assignments in Fy 1984 (362,900.5 hours of paid overtime, and 269,162.9 hours in exchange for compensatory leave). On an hour-for-hour basis this was equivalent to an additional 356.9 FTE positions, based on 1771 hours per FTE.

However, equating an hour of overtime with an hour of needed staff time, as suggested by the Board of Corrections' Mecklenburg study committee, may not be valid system-wide. JLARC found that facility managers exercise considerable discretion in deciding when to use overtime. This discretion is used inconsistently from one facility to another. For example, a warden at one location may prefer to pay overtime in order to provide recreation for inmates, while another warden may discontinue recreation rather than pay overtime.

Another reason not to convert overtime into full-time positions is that overtime usage varies dramatically from month to month at most institutions. Granting staff to these locations would result in surplus positions in some months, and not enough in other months. Mecklenburg, for example, reported no overtime in March 1984 and over 11,000 hours in June of the same year.

Potentially, using additional full-time staff at some locations may be more economical than paying overtime. However, it is not currently possible to tell whether overtime was worked for an emergency – which is the most appropriate reason – or whether it was worked to fill an essential security post. When DOC improves its overtime reporting system to identify separately overtime hours worked in these two categories, a staffing request to convert overtime for essential posts should be considered.

Recommendation (12). DOC should modify its overtime reporting system to separately identify – whether compensated by payment or by leave time – overtime worked for emergencies and overtime worked to cover essential security posts. The General Assembly can then consider whether a staffing request based upon overtime worked to ensure coverage of essential security duties is justified.

Utilization of Security Staff. Each institution appears to have some posts which are not fully utilized for direct security services. Each facility has some security posts that are quasi-security in nature, performing some security duties and some administrative duties. These include such positions as training officers, adjustment committee officers, inmate grievance officers, count officers, and operations supervisors.

JLARC's review showed that although each facility requires some of these functions to be carried out, not all locations have staffed them in a comparable manner. These positions are part-time at some locations and full-time at others, and the rank assigned also varies.

Each location also has some security posts which are essentially nonsecurity in nature, including some which make a questionable contribution to security. Several wardens

pointed out that in most cases these duties are generally necessary for operating an institution, but need not be carried out by security employees. For example, some security staff now serve as telephone receptionists. This function must be performed, but nonsecurity staff could do the job at less cost.

Finally, a few institutions have posts the functions of which appear unnecessary or inefficiently located. Some use a correctional officer to take meal tickets in the employees' mess hall. Six employ security staff as full-time dog handlers, who train dogs used to track escapees. There is a need to employ some personnel to train dogs, but the number of dog handlers in a given area does not appear to be tied to the number of escapes in the area.

Recommendation (13). For the functions performed by count officers, adjustment committee officers, training officers, and inmate grievance officers, DOC should establish a policy or staffing standard which would link objective indicators of workload – such as the number of grievances filed by inmates, or the number of adjustment committee hearings held – to the need for full-time personnel to perform these duties. The policy or standard should also specify what ranks of security officers should be assigned. Greater uniformity should be the objective of the standard.

Recommendation (14). DOC should review the assignment and use of transportation staff at adult facilities. Staffing standards should be developed which take into account such factors as distance from medical and classification centers, and the number of inmates at each facility. DOC should also review the scheduling of trips between services and facilities in order to identify any additional efficiencies which may be available by routine scheduling of daily trips.

Recommendation (15). DOC should review the assignment of security personnel as mailroom officers at the major institutions. DOC should staff this function, which is nonsecurity in nature,

with an employee classified as a clerk or clerk-messenger. The number of positions assigned should be based on a workload measure such as the number of inmates at the facility. This may mean adjusting the number of such positions at some locations.

Recommendation (16). Where such duties amount to a full-time job, DOC should assign the job of purchasing, pricing, stocking, and dispensing merchandise to nonsecurity staff. A storekeeper supervisor or store manager may be more appropriately assigned these duties.

Recommendation (17). At all facilities, DOC should assign nonsecurity personnel, such as a clerk or a receptionist, to the duties of switchboard operator and communications operator.

Recommendation (18). DOC should use a less staff-intensive means of collecting employees' meal tickets. Consideration should be given to implementing Staunton's method at all locations.

Recommendation (19). DOC should replace the personal property and clothing room security staff with nonsecurity positions – store managers or storekeeper supervisors.

Recommendation (20). DOC should use nonsecurity staff such as highway equipment operators to drive sanitation vehicles, instead of using full-time security staff for this function.

Recommendation (21). Security staff assigned to work with and train tracking dogs should be located closer to where most of the demand for their services occurs – the field units. DOC should review the number and location of dog handler positions to determine whether the activity could be carried out more economically. Consideration should be given to regionalizing these positions, and relocating them if necessary.

Staffing at the Major Institutions. The JLARC review found a near-unanimous

opinion among prison wardens that their facilities are not adequately staffed. The wardens stated that a total of 425 additional security staff are needed to properly staff existing facilities. The JLARC review employed several analytic methods to assess the need for additional security staff.

JLARC staff visited each major institution, asked wardens and their staffs to specify the number and purpose of the additional security personnel they needed, and toured each facility thoroughly. JLARC staff also reviewed an extensive amount of information about each location, and interviewed numerous individuals at the institutions.

The wardens' staffing requests were analyzed using nine system-wide criteria. Each facility's request was also considered in light of its post audit listing, the use of security staff to perform nonsecurity duties, and other factors.

JLARC agreed with the need for some of the 425 requested positions. Overall, JLARC recommends adding 93.34 security positions and eliminating 165.46 security positions. The net change, system-wide (see table),

would be a loss of 72.12 security positions. Sixty-seven nonsecurity positions should be added to handle duties previously assigned to security personnel.

These changes are due to adjustments incorporated in the JLARC recommendations, including a decrease in the number of security staff performing essentially nonsecurity duties (-89.20), a correction for misapplication of the Sharp formula (-10.50), and an overall reduction in the number of security positions due to the revision of the formula (-54.15).

Recommendation (22). The security staffing level of the major institutions should total 2,795.96. A total of 67 nonsecurity positions should be added to handle duties now assigned to security staff but more appropriately carried out by nonsecurity personnel. No additional staff should be allocated for overtime until DOC can determine the extent to which it is used for emergencies and to cover essential security posts.

Security Procedures (pp. 63-94)

Prison security procedures focus on two principal aspects of confinement: perimeter security, which includes fences, walls, towers, and gates; and internal security and control, which includes procedures such as head counts and contraband control.

Although DOC has implemented many positive changes during the last several years, policies and procedures concerning security must be strengthened and clarified, and the role of the regional offices needs to be more structured. Training, supervision, and oversight are also critical to the maintenance of adequate security.

Departmental Policy. DOC has established policies and procedures to provide general guidance to the institutions on security matters. Facility managers have four principal sources for guidance: DOC policy, division guidelines, DOC Standards for Adult Institutions, and regional policy.

Although there are multiple sources of policy guidance, the overall thrust of policy development has been to permit wardens and superintendents a large degree of flexibility in administering their facilities. JLARC

STAFFING AT THE MAJOR INSTITUTIONS	
SECURITY STAFF	POSITIONS
Staffing at time of review	2,868.08
Recommended Changes	
Impact of revised Sharp formula	-54.15
Conversion from security to nonsecurity	-89.20
Correction for Sharp formula misapplication	-10.50
New security positions	+93.34
Deleted security positions	-11.61
Total changes	-72.12
Recommended security staffing Subtotal	2,795.96
NONSECURITY STAFF*	
FY 1985 funded nonsecurity positions	1,074.25
Recommended conversion of security posts into nonsecurity positions**	+67.00
Nonsecurity staffing subtotal	1,141.25
TOTAL STAFFING	3,937.21
FY 1985 FUNDED STAFFING LEVELS***	
Funded security positions	2,888.00
Funded nonsecurity positions	1,074.25
Total funded positions	3,962.25
DIFFERENCE BETWEEN JLARC TOTAL & FUNDED LEVEL	-25.04
<p>*Nonsecurity staff scheduled for review in 1985. **Reflects conversion of 89.20 security positions, less application of the Sharp formula in most instances. ***Funded levels as of November 30, 1984. Source: JLARC analysis of DOC staffing data.</p>	

found, however, that gaps and inconsistencies exist in some DOC security policies, and that some practices are carried out with only minimal departmental guidance. For example, each warden and superintendent is permitted to decide how to assign inmates to work crews, how to staff towers, and how to communicate changes in operating procedures to staff.

Without a specific system-wide policy covering key security practices, their implementation may vary to an excessive degree — sometimes in a fashion that could jeopardize public safety. A gap in DOC policy about work assignments for "C" custody inmates, for example, apparently contributed to the escape of two inmates from the Penitentiary in June 1984.

DOC has established the position of Inspector General, who is to assess security practices at the facilities. To bolster the independence and objectivity of this position, the Inspector General should report to either the Board of Corrections or the Secretary of Transportation and Public Safety, instead of to the Director of DOC as is currently the case. The current reporting relationship may compromise the Inspector General's objectivity.

Recommendation (23). *DOC should undertake a thorough review of department policy to ensure that all security-related activities are covered. As part of the review, DOC should eliminate contradictions or inconsistencies among the various sources of centralized guidance to the facilities and develop a single body of policy.*

Recommendation (24). *Each institution should have a complete and up-to-date set of institutional operating procedures. The procedures should cover all important security functions performed at the facilities. Regional staff should review the procedures for thoroughness, completeness, and technical accuracy.*

Recommendation (25). *DOC should develop comprehensive and detailed security policy and procedures concerning security in functional areas such as the medical and housing units. Priority for policy development should be given to areas where inmates are employed, such*

as enterprises, maintenance, and food services. Security audits should include these areas to ensure compliance with departmental policy.

Recommendation (26). *The Inspector General should have no line operations responsibilities. The General Assembly may wish to establish the position of Inspector General in statute, with the responsibilities of the position carefully detailed. In addition, while the Inspector General may submit reports to both the Director and the Board of Corrections, he should be hired by and responsible to either the Board or the Secretary of Transportation and Public Safety. The salary of the Inspector General should be set in the Appropriations Act.*

Institutional Security Management. Policy and procedure are transmitted to the front-line staff of DOC facilities through a combination of training, supervision, and post orders. JLARC found deficiencies in each.

In the aftermath of the May 1984 escape from Mecklenburg, consultants from the National Institute of Corrections reviewed the adequacy of training available to DOC security staff. They concluded that the training programs at the Academy for Staff Development were sound. They also suggested some improvements, such as concentrating on policy in basic training rather than on para-military tactics.

JLARC found that security personnel may not consistently be receiving the quantity of training required by the Department of Criminal Justice Services. In a random sample of 604 security employees, the amount of training received in FY 1984 was 15 hours short of the amount expected, given the distribution of the various ranks of officers in the sample.

JLARC found weaknesses in supervisory processes. First, correctional officers are sometimes assigned to supervisory posts with responsibility for supervising other officers and as many as 75 inmates. This weakens supervision, since officers do not receive supervisory training and lack the authority to make decisions that are binding on personnel of the same rank.

Second, the ratio of supervisors to their subordinates varies widely among DOC insti-

tutions and suggests that supervision at some facilities may be weaker than at others. The ratio appears to be unrelated to factors that should be important, such as the number of "C" custody inmates.

Third, JLARC found that the quality of post orders (the job descriptions for security posts) varies from one facility to another. JLARC found a lack of consistency in the level of detail, types of information included, and procedures for updating the orders. In a review of post orders from 32 locations, 88 percent were found to lack basic information on emergency procedures. Almost all wardens and superintendents were in agreement that post orders should say what to do in case of various emergencies.

Recommendation (27). DOC should ensure that all security staff receive the required amounts of training. A review should be conducted on the content of the Basic Correctional Officers training course and the minimum passing requirements. Additional consideration should be given to the frequency and quantity of in-service training required of certified security staff.

Recommendation (28). DOC standards and guidelines should specify the contents of post orders. Categories of information which should be included in post orders include chronologically organized duties of each shift, information about what to do in hostage-taking incidents, fire evacuations, and other emergency situations.

Recommendation (29). DOC should review institutional practices regarding the highest-ranking officer on duty during each shift, and determine which rank is the most appropriate. The department should ensure that each facility conforms to this policy.

Recommendation (30). DOC should establish staffing standards specifying the desired ratio of security supervisors to subordinate staff. These standards should take into account differing population mixes, incident levels, programs, and activities at the facilities as well as the number of subordinate employees. In addition, DOC should set a minimum number

and lowest rank of supervisory staff to be on duty at any time in a major institution.

Recommendation (31). Correctional officers should not be used to fill supervisory posts. DOC should establish a policy on the appropriate rank of security personnel who should be assigned to the different levels of supervision. As part of the policy, the department should formulate standards for the appropriate ratios of security supervisors to subordinate staff positions.

Recommendation (32). DOC should ensure that all security employees are notified of any changes to policy or procedures that impact them. At a minimum, changes should be communicated orally during shift changes, and a copy included with each employee's paycheck.

Recommendation (33). The role of the regional offices should be clarified and defined. A clear delineation between advisory and management functions and the regions' oversight and evaluation functions should be specified.

Institutional Security Practices. JLARC staff reviewed the implementation of selected security procedures at the prisons and field units to test their compliance with formal division policy and accepted correctional practices. Several potential breaches in security were identified.

Tool control was the weakest security practice observed during the JLARC review. Of all the items that inmates have access to, tools probably have the greatest potential for use in violent incidents and in escape attempts. Even though division guidelines are quite specific on tool control, only one of the 15 major institutions followed the guidelines. The majority of institutions had systems which were in gross violation of policy.

Security procedures observed by JLARC in the medical services area were generally sound, with a few exceptions. Control of hypodermic needles varied among institutions. No audits of medical units have been conducted, even though such audits have been required by DOC guidelines since 1981.

Recommendation (34). DOC should take steps to improve security at tool rooms at all major institutions and field units. Consideration should be given to the procedures used by the Federal Bureau of Prisons. At no location should an inmate be in charge of dispensing or inventorying tools.

Recommendation (35). Medical audits should assess the security of the medical facilities at each prison, as well as the quality of health care. The audits should commence immediately.

Recommendation (36). The major institutions and field units should comply with the DOC guideline which requires a documented security audit of perimeter and internal security controls on each shift every day. Weekly documented institutional inspections should be conducted by

a team of operations managers (such as the food service manager or the medical unit administrator) and a written report of the findings made to the warden. The inspections should be done on a randomly chosen day and should review compliance with security procedures, officers' knowledge of security procedures, facility sanitation, and facility maintenance.

Profiles of the Major Prisons (pp. 95-284)

Chapter Four of this report contains detailed findings and recommendations for each of the 15 major institutions. Each section of the chapter profiles a facility, describes its operations and programs, and summarizes the results of the JLARC review of staffing and security procedures. A total of 57 recommendations for improved staffing and operations are presented.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

	Page
I. INTRODUCTION	1
Development of the Virginia Prison System	2
The Adult Correctional System Today	8
Methodology and Report Overview	15
II. SECURITY STAFFING NEEDS AND UTILIZATION	19
DOC's Determination of Security Staffing Needs	20
DOC's Security Staffing Formula	31
Use of Overtime at DOC Facilities	37
Utilization of Security Staff	44
Security Staffing at the Major Institutions	56
III. PRISON SECURITY PROCEDURES	63
DOC Security Policies	63
Institutional Security Management	72
Institutional Security Practices	89
IV. PROFILES OF THE MAJOR PRISONS	95
Bland Correctional Center	96
Brunswick Correctional Center	109
Buckingham Correctional Center	122
Deerfield Correctional Center	138
James River Correctional Center	147
Marion Correctional Treatment Center	158
Mecklenburg Correctional Center	169
Nottoway Correctional Center	188
Penitentiary	202
Powhatan Correctional Center	214
St. Brides Correctional Center	226
Southampton Correctional Center	233
Staunton Correctional Center	257
Women's Correctional Center	267
Youthful Offender Center	277
APPENDIXES	285

I. INTRODUCTION

The primary mission of the Department of Corrections (DOC) is to ensure that criminal offenders are removed from society and housed in secure environments. The department carries out this mission through a system of adult and youth institutions. Secure confinement of adults requires the greatest proportion of the department's institutions, employees, and appropriations.

In FY 1984 DOC supervised an average daily population of 9,454 adults in a system of 40 principal institutions located throughout the State. These institutions include 26 field units (each headed by a superintendent) and 14 prisons (each headed by a warden). In addition, DOC has three specialized facilities that are each headed by an assistant warden. Finally, the department has three separate facilities that are entirely devoted to inmates in work release programs.

Of the total DOC appropriation of \$253.5 million for FY 1984, \$142.2 million or 56 percent was allocated for adult services. Of the total 7,901.5 positions budgeted for DOC in FY 1984, 5,062.5 or 64 percent were budgeted for the adult institutions. Additional administrative positions in the central and regional offices are involved with the daily operations at the adult institutions.

Since the mid-1970s, Virginia's adult correctional system has experienced a period of rapid growth and modernization. Increases in the number of inmates requiring secure confinement has been accommodated through an aggressive prison construction program, which resulted in the opening of ten new facilities between 1976 and 1984. A decrease in escapes - from 512 in FY 1974 to 96 in FY 1984 -- reflects a major improvement in the security of DOC facilities despite several recent dramatic escapes. Increased professionalism of the staff, mandatory minimum training, and heightened educational requirements for newly hired staff also have been part of the department's effort to upgrade the correctional system.

In the 1980s, operational efficiency of Virginia's prisons became a prominent issue. Some comparisons suggested that Virginia's facilities were staffed at a significantly higher level than other state prison systems. In response, the General Assembly adopted provisions in the 1983 and 1984 Appropriations Acts requiring a study of several aspects of DOC's operations. An interim report, completed in May 1984, reviewed staffing at the central and regional offices of the department. This report focuses on security staffing at the prisons operated by DOC.

DEVELOPMENT OF VIRGINIA'S PRISON SYSTEM

Virginia has provided for confinement of lawbreakers since early colonial times. Legislation establishing a penal system was adopted as early as 1635. The "publick gaol" constructed in 1701 at Williamsburg was later used to confine prisoners who could not be held safely in other jails throughout the new colony. When Richmond became the capital of the Commonwealth in 1779, the Henrico County jail was enlarged for State use.

The need for a larger, more secure State facility soon became clear. In 1796 the General Assembly established the Penitentiary at the location which is still in use. Construction of the facility, based on a solitary confinement approach recommended by Thomas Jefferson, began in 1797. The building remained in use until the 1920s.

During the twentieth century, the size and mission of the State prison system expanded substantially. At the turn of the century, Virginia had only two penal facilities -- the Penitentiary and the State Farm for Men, which had been established in Goochland County in the 1890s. By the late 1930s, 31 movable camps which housed more than 2,600 male inmates had been established. The camps housed inmates who worked in the State Convict Road Force, which was instituted under joint authority of the State Highway Commission and the Prison Board in 1906. These "stick camps" were usually located near the road projects on which the inmates were employed.

A hallmark of the Virginia penal system, according to a 1939 study, was its emphasis on keeping able-bodied inmates employed. Many inmates in Virginia prisons were employed in industries, agriculture, or on the roads. In many other states, inmate idleness was the chief feature of prisons.

Other aspects of the Virginia system were also noted in the 1939 report. Prisoners were segregated by race in most of the facilities -- 11 road camps were designated for "white" prisoners, 19 for "colored" prisoners, and one housed inmates of both races. A variety of security practices were also reported, with recommendations for change:

A large percentage of maximum-security prisoners are sent to the road camps. The maximum security men, when locked up at night, are fastened to a cell chain extending the length of the barracks and secured to the floor. The prisoner can walk about to some extent. The use of chains, stocks, and the lash can have no place in a modern penal program. A good classification system would not send to the road camps such prisoners as require chains to hold them. The stocks and the lash are thoroughly discredited modes of disciplinary punishment which cannot be too quickly abandoned.

In the decades following this report, extensive changes were made in the Virginia prison system, including the construction of 26 field units to replace the stick camps, establishment of the Parole Board, desegregation, sentencing reforms, and organizational changes.

Crime Commission Findings

Beginning in the early 1970s the Virginia State Crime Commission undertook an extensive review of correctional topics in the Commonwealth. One of the Crime Commission's first reports concerned the Penitentiary. After a study of the facility, the Commission concluded that "the institution was simply out of control." Commission findings included a long list of problems:

- Internal security was negligible.
- Illicit drugs circulated almost openly, homosexual rapes were commonplace, and weaker inmates lived in fear of stronger prisoners, who ran prison affairs almost at will.
- Guards were untrained and in many cases were afraid to patrol the cell tiers. Inmates served as guards in the cell blocks. A shakedown netted almost 800 weapons.
- Medical procedures resembled those of the 19th century. Inmates served as ward attendants and at times performed medical services without supervision.
- The record-keeping system was a shambles. Boxes of records were scattered over the floor, and neither escapes nor assaults were recorded properly.
- Other conditions included overcrowded cell blocks, no rehabilitation programs, few vocational shops, and a lack of written administrative guidelines (none covered emergency procedures).

Other reports issued by the Crime Commission in 1974 and 1975 identified many additional problems with the system. The Commission reported that the escape rate from correctional facilities had increased "an incredible 268 percent" between fiscal years 1971 and 1974, peaking at 512 escapes in the latter year. The Commission also found a variety of abuses and problems with the stick camps, and recommended the units be closed and replaced with more modern facilities. One field unit, deemed by the Commission to be "the most glaring example of how a system should not be run," was closed immediately after Commission members visited.

Based on these and other similar findings, the Crime Commission recommended sweeping changes in Virginia's correctional program, including:

- separation of the corrections function from the Department of Welfare and Institutions, and establishment of a separate agency;
- creation of a separate Rehabilitative School Authority to oversee academic and vocational programs for inmates;
- addition of new medium and maximum security facilities, and reception and diagnostic centers;
- increased counseling, education, and medical facilities;
- improved inmate classification, providing for classification and assignment to facilities based on security considerations; and
- increased educational requirements and better training for correctional officers.

Legislative Response

The General Assembly implemented all of the Crime Commission's major recommendations (listed above), and began a more active role in shaping the corrections program. Its activism resulted in increased funding and an extensive program of building and renovating correctional facilities.

Increased Funding. In the last decade, appropriations for DOC have steadily increased. Biennial appropriations have grown from about \$292 million in 1978-80 to \$539 million in 1984-86. The greatest increases in appropriations were in the early 1980s. Growth in appropriations has slowed recently, as shown in Table 1.

Table 1

APPROPRIATIONS FOR THE DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS
FY 1978-86

<u>Fiscal Years</u>	<u>Appropriations</u>
1978-80	\$292,649,605
1980-82	\$452,039,000
1982-84	\$504,545,665
1984-86	\$539,644,645

Source: Appropriations Acts.

New Facilities. The 1977 Correctional Facilities Bond Act authorized the issuance of \$21,525,000 in bonds to provide funds for constructing and equipping correctional facilities. The electorate subsequently approved the bond issue by a 64% affirmative vote.

The Act provided that the funds be used with other available monies to acquire, construct, and equip the following capital projects:

- construction of a medium-security facility (\$12.5 million),
- completion of Mecklenburg Correctional Center (\$2.925 million),
- construction of medical facilities at Powhatan Correctional Center (\$2 million),
- construction of agricultural and industries facilities at adult facilities (\$1.8 million),
- construction of Intensive Treatment (Oak Ridge) Learning Center for juveniles (\$1.3 million), and
- construction of Youthful Offender Center (\$1 million).

Two new adult facilities and one new youth facility were constructed from these funds. This act provided nearly all of the funding for the Southampton Youthful Offender Center and the Oak Ridge Learning Center. It provided about 60 percent of the costs for Brunswick Correctional Center, a medium-security facility.

The General Assembly has also authorized several major capital outlay projects from the general fund. For example, it authorized the renovation of the forensic unit at Southwestern State Hospital for conversion to Marion Correctional Treatment Center, and the renovation of the Norfolk Jail Farm to St. Brides Correctional Center. Three more medium-security facilities have been built with mostly general funds -- the correctional centers at Buckingham, which opened in 1982; Nottoway, which opened in 1984; and Augusta, which will open in 1986.

Improvements Since 1974

Important improvements are evident in a series of major strides. These include opening ten new prisons, upgrading educational standards and training for correctional officers, increasing the number of jobs for inmates and improving educational opportunities available to inmates, curbing the independence of wardens and their tendency to establish "fiefdoms," establishing a middle level of field management with the authority to make many

administrative decisions, and improving the overall level of professionalism in the system.

During a period when many southern states saw massive intervention in their prison systems by federal courts, Virginia's system remained relatively free from court-ordered changes. As recently as 1983, a federal magistrate dismissed a suit alleging unconstitutional conditions at a major institution in Virginia. Three facilities, however, are under court order or consent decree.

Perhaps the most persuasive evidence of an improved prison system is the dramatic decrease in the rate of escapes: in a five-year period the rate fell from 87.2 escapes per 1,000 inmates (FY 1974) to 10.1 escapes per 1,000 (FY 1978) -- an 88 percent decrease. Despite several recent escapes which captured national headlines, DOC has maintained this lower escape rate. In FY 1984 the escape rate was 9.45 per 1,000 inmates.

Recent Legislative Interest

As the correctional system came to require a larger proportion of the overall State budget, the question of operational efficiency became more important. Studies completed in the early 1980s suggested that the Virginia prison system was too costly and was over-staffed.

The high relative cost of the Virginia correctional system was reported in a 1980 survey conducted for the Southern Legislative Conference. This report indicated that Virginia had the second highest annual budgeted cost per inmate among the 15 southern states.

Subsequent reports to the Conference confirmed Virginia's high ranking on cost and other efficiency indicators. In 1981, Senate Finance Committee staff reported that, among 25 states, Virginia had the second highest ratio of inmates to correctional officers. Committee staff later reported that among the 15 southern states, Virginia had the highest annual operating cost per inmate and the highest ratio of inmates to correctional officers in FY 1982.

Legislative Activities. The 1982 Session of the General Assembly took several actions which affected staffing at correctional facilities. In 1982, a consulting firm was retained by the House Appropriations Committee to review the design and staffing of Buckingham and Brunswick Correctional Centers. The firm recommended changes which reduced the level of staffing required in the housing units at Buckingham and at two major institutions which were then being designed (Nottoway and Augusta).

Another important action of the 1982 Session was a requirement (Item 528) in the 1982 Appropriations Act for the Secretary of Public Safety to:

conduct a comparative study of overcrowding, staffing, operating costs, and construction costs for Virginia's correctional system, and report the findings, along with recommendations for cost containment, to the Chairmen of the House Appropriations and Senate Finance Committees by December 1, 1982.

The department responded to this requirement by conducting a comparative study of operating costs and practices. DOC staff traveled to ten facilities in other states, and spent several days on-site studying staffing practices and operations. Based on this study, the Director of DOC reported to the 1983 Session that:

when individual facilities in Virginia are compared with similar institutions in other states, Virginia is quite comparable in terms of overcrowding, operating costs, construction costs, and to a lesser degree, inmate/staff ratios. Not all of Virginia's institutions compare favorably with their counterparts on all of these factors. Across all facilities, however, Virginia's institutions are equivalent to the out-of-state facilities on all of the factors considered.

The director also pointed out several key differences between the prison systems operated by Virginia and by other southern states. Eleven southern states have had extensive intervention by federal courts. Portions of their prison systems have been declared unconstitutional or have been operated under court order. Also, differences in system characteristics -- such as the proportion of inmates housed in walled versus field institutions, and whether the system houses misdemeanants as well as felons -- made difficult a fair comparison between prison systems.

DOC also pointed out that the size of a prison is an important factor in determining its operational efficiency. A single institution which houses 2,000 inmates, DOC noted, may have per capita costs substantially below those of a 500 inmate facility. This occurs because administrative overhead costs and certain other costs are roughly equal regardless of size. For example, the number of wardens or tower guards would probably not be higher for a large prison.

During 1983 DOC explored the possibility of constructing a 2,400-bed prison. The Department's principal reasons for selecting this size were to achieve lower operating costs and an improved ratio of inmates to staff. Although the proposal was eventually shelved, DOC drew up rough plans and contacted several counties regarding possible sites.

1983 Events. In the 1983 Session, the Public Safety Subcommittee of the Senate Finance Committee reported that Virginia's

correctional institutions appeared to have more staff per inmate than other states. Even excluding the highly staffed program at Mecklenburg Correctional Center, Virginia still had an overall security ratio of 2.7 inmates per officer -- the second highest staffing level (after Massachusetts) in a comparison with 25 other states. The Subcommittee also reported that Virginia's operating costs per inmate were the highest in the region, and were probably above average for the nation.

The Secretary of Public Safety and the Director of the Department of Corrections presented a vigorous defense of DOC's staffing, and criticized the Subcommittee's cost analyses and comparisons. They suggested that the Subcommittee's recommendations for an across-the-board cut would "dismantle" the existing system. One theme of the Director's response was that the large number of relatively small prisons in Virginia reflects a policy decision made in the mid-1970s, and small facilities dictate a higher staffing ratio than large facilities.

The 1983 Session finally agreed to exempt security staffing from an across-the-board six percent cut in State agency budgets, and directed JLARC to review DOC's manpower utilization.

1984 Events. DOC proposed to the 1984 General Assembly cuts of 201 positions systemwide. These cuts included 144 positions at the adult facilities, of which 37 were security and 107 were nonsecurity positions. The Assembly made these cuts, and also changed the way in which security staff posted in enterprise shops are funded. These positions are now paid out of enterprise revenues, since they provide an essential service to the enterprise function.

The 1984 General Assembly also continued and expanded the JLARC study mandate. A requirement to review the community diversion program was added, as was a provision to consider the Department's method of projecting local jail populations.

Several major incidents occurred in the prison system during 1984. A riot at Buckingham, hostage incidents at several facilities, and escapes from Mecklenburg, the Penitentiary, and Nottoway focused greater attention on DOC's basic mandate to separate dangerous offenders from society. Three consultants reviewed the Mecklenburg program in detail. The Board of Corrections formed a special subcommittee to study management practices at Mecklenburg. The incidents also led JLARC to direct its staff to include a review of security procedures as part of the security staffing project.


THE ADULT CORRECTIONAL SYSTEM TODAY

The adult correctional system consists of 40 prisons and field units which exert varying degrees of supervision over inmates. Figure 1 shows the location of adult correctional facilities

Figure 1

Department of Corrections Adult Facility Locations

October, 1984



Source: JLARC Staff Graphic of DOC Information

throughout Virginia. Some facilities have special missions, such as confining mentally disturbed or young inmates. The institutions range in size from Pulaski and Culpeper Field Units, each with an average daily population of 62 in FY 1984, to the Powhatan Complex with an average daily population of 913 in FY 1984.

Security Staffing

Virginia's prisons, field units, and work release centers had 3,680 security positions in FY 1984 (See Table 2). This number is an approximation because DOC could not provide JLARC with the number of funded positions for each field unit. For the field units, JLARC used the number of filled rather than funded positions in Table 2. Security staff represented 72% of all staff in the prisons and field units. The level of security staff in the prisons ranged from 85 funded positions at the Virginia Correctional Center for Women to 445 funded positions at the Powhatan Complex. In the field units, the number of filled security positions ranged from 22 at Harrisonburg to 58 at Halifax.

Types of Positions. DOC considers its security force to consist of all uniformed officers. These consist of the positions classified as shown in Table 3. The total number of security positions shown in Table 3 is slightly different from the total number in Table 2 because Table 3 reflects staffing on one day (June 30, 1984). Correctional officers comprise the single largest classification.

Correctional officers and corporals are called "blue shirts" -- they wear blue shirts as a part of their duty uniform. Officers and corporals directly supervise inmates, and are the "front line" staff of the department.

The sergeants, lieutenants, captains, and majors are called "white shirts." They serve as institutional supervisors or administrators, but are sometimes called upon to fill security posts. They have met the basic custodial training requirements of the department, and have usually served previously in the lower ranks.

The wardens and superintendents are the top administrators of the prisons and field units, respectively. The assistant wardens for security of the prisons are responsible for overseeing security operations and staff. In the field units, the assistant superintendents supervise security operations.

Adult Institutions

A major goal of state correctional agencies has always been to protect society by housing adult criminals. In its approach to this goal, Virginia is characterized by a large number of relatively small prisons, and by extensive use of field units, which are smaller, less secure residential facilities.

Table 2

POPULATION AND STAFF IN THE ADULT FACILITIES

<u>Major Institutions (Prisons)</u>	<u>Average Daily Population FY 1984</u>	<u>Funded Security Staff FY 1984⁴</u>	<u>Funded Total Staff FY 1984</u>
Bland	445	157	242
Brunswick	651	278	362.5
Buckingham	548	275	362.5
Deep Meadow ¹	383	172	215.5
Deerfield	282	150	189
James River	311	93	158.5
Marion	143	112	155
Mecklenburg	283	259	346
Penitentiary	869	333	445
Powhatan Complex			
Correctional Center ²	685	354	578.5
Reception and Classification Center	228	91	133
St. Brides	421	136	175
Southampton Complex			
Correctional Center	473	128	197
Reception and Classification Center	109	38	66
Youthful Offender Center	79	50	91
Staunton	514	207	305
Virginia Correctional Center for Women	329	85	146
Subtotal	6,761 ³	2918	4167.5
<u>Field Units</u>			
Pulaski*	62	25	30
Caroline	124	34	43
Nansemond*	89	27	32
Baskerville	99	28	33
White Post	83	24	29
Harrisonburg	88	22	27
Rustburg	95	26	31
Greenville	82	26	31
Culpeper	62	24	29
Fluvanna*	76	25	30
Pocahontas	204	42	51
Chatham	90	24	29
New Kent*	91	26	32
Haynesville	83	24	29
Wise	85	27	32
Capron*	85	26	31
Stafford	88	28	33
Tidewater	87	25	30
Halifax	178	58	68
Smith Mt. Lake*	84	24	29
Botetourt*	86	25	30
Haymarket*	87	26	31
Dinwiddie	88	23	29
Patrick Henry	97	26	31
Fairfax	144	43	53
Tazewell	92	25	32
Subtotal	2,539	733	885 ⁶
Work Release Subtotal	154	29	86
GRAND TOTAL	9,454	3,680	5,139.5 ⁷

¹Closed in September 1984.

²Includes Powhatan West (closed October 1983).

³Includes eight inmates in the MCV security ward.

⁴Funded staffing levels for security personnel as determined by the Division of Adult Services. DOC Employee Relations Unit.

⁵DOC could not provide JLARC with the number of budgeted positions for each field unit, so the numbers in the two columns are the filled security positions in the field units on June 30, 1984.

⁶The total number of budgeted positions for the field units was 808 in FY 1984.

⁷The total number of budgeted positions for the adult institutions was 5,062.5. The 5,139.5 represents 1) total budgeted positions for prisons; plus 2) total filled positions for field units.

*Stick Camps.

Source: DOC Population Summary - June 1984.

Table 3

DOC SECURITY POSITIONS BY CLASSIFICATION
(Filled Positions as of June 30, 1984)

<u>Position</u>	<u>Number of Filled Positions</u>
Officer	2,634
Corporal	617
Sergeant	224
Lieutenant	95
Captain	39
Major (Security Chief)	11
Assistant Superintendent	27
Superintendent	26
Assistant Warden	25
Warden	<u>12</u>
TOTAL	3,710

Source: PMIS report.

The total of 40 adult facilities -- 14 prisons and 26 field units -- places Virginia second among the states, behind only North Carolina, in having the most adult correctional facilities. This stems from a State policy that smaller prisons should constitute the core of Virginia's correctional program. Many corrections experts have argued that prisons which are small and close to the offender's home facilitate the reintegration of inmates into the community. Virginia's approach contrasts with that of states such as California, which has 12 prisons for nearly 30,000 inmates. New Jersey, which has about the same number of inmates as Virginia, has a total of seven institutions.

Classification of Adult Population. The adult inmate population housed in the prisons and field units is classified by the Department into three classes or levels of custody. "A" level, or minimum security, permits activity on institutional grounds without constant supervision, and eligibility for occasional furloughs. "B" level, or medium security, is assigned to inmates who require continuous custodial supervision by a correctional officer but do not pose a constant security threat. "C" level, or maximum security, is assigned to inmates who pose a constant security threat. Most institutions house a mix of inmates from each of the three levels of custody.

Inmates also receive medical classifications which may affect their institutional placement. An alphabetic scale of A through H indicates whether an inmate has any medical restrictions, while a numeric scale of 1 through 17 specifies the medical problem.

For example, a medical classification of "A" means there are no work restrictions. "D-9" indicates an inmate is unable to work due to a coronary or circulatory problem.

Prisons. The major adult institutions are secure residential facilities with a high degree of supervision by correctional officers. Perhaps the most distinguishing feature of the major institutions is the concern for security, reflected by the wall or fence and guard towers on the perimeter of each institution. While most DOC facilities house fewer than 750 inmates, two facilities can handle more. The largest is the Powhatan Complex, which has a budgeted capacity of 933 for FY 1985. Table 2 lists the average daily population in the major institutions for FY 1984. Table 4 profiles the key characteristics of the major prisons.

Table 4

**Profile of
Virginia's
Major
Prisons
FY 1984**

Population:	Budgeted Capacity: 6,551	"A" Custody: 12.4%	White: 40%
	Avg. Daily Pop.: 6,572	"B" Custody: 44.1%	Nonwhite: 60%
		"C" Custody: 38.9%	Avg. Age: 27
Ratios:	Inmates per Budgeted Security Position:	2.47-to-1	
	Inmates per Total Budgeted Staff:	1.71-to-1	
	Total Expenditures per Inmate:	\$17,087	
Budgeted Staff:	Security: 2,877	Officers: White: 50%	Avg. Age: 35
	Nonsecurity: 1,230.75	Nonwhite: 50%	Turnover: 26%
	Total: 4,107.75	Female: 18%	
Serious Incidents:	Assaults on Inmates: 239	Escapes: 36	
	Assaults on Staff: 270	Total Incidents: 1,058	

See Appendix B for sources.

The prisons typically consist of several residential buildings (which are often joined), recreational facilities, a dining hall, administrative buildings, utility buildings, a school, and other support facilities within the perimeter fence. The residential quarters usually are either open dorms or cell houses. Open dorms may house as many as 60 beds. Cell houses contain several galleries, or tiers, each of 15 or more cells. Cells usually range in size from 40 to 75 square feet and house one or two inmates.

Some institutions have specialized missions. Staunton Correctional Center, for example, houses older inmates and some mentally retarded inmates. Southampton and St. Brides Correctional Centers primarily house younger inmates and have programs and staff tailored to their needs. Marion Correctional Center houses inmates with mental problems. Mecklenburg Correctional Center houses inmates who have caused serious problems at other prisons and also contains death row (inmates who have been sentenced to death).

Virginia's prisons offer a variety of employment and educational opportunities for inmates. Inmates at eight institutions can work in an enterprise operation. All prisons use inmates for institutional work, such as in maintenance and farming. The Rehabilitative School Authority, a separate agency, offers academic programs at all the institutions and vocational programs at most of them.

Each prison is supervised and directed by a warden, who usually has an assistant warden for operations and security, and an assistant warden for programs and administration. Security staff usually comprise about 70% of all staff at the major institutions. Other staff provide functions such as accounting, maintenance, medical services, food services, and counseling services.

The chain of command for security personnel flows from (1) the warden to (2) the assistant warden for operations and security to (3) the security chief. At most prisons the security chief holds the rank of major. At the smaller institutions the chief may be a captain. Captains and lieutenants serve as shift commanders. They supervise the sergeants and corporals, who in turn serve as line supervisors. The sergeants and corporals oversee the correctional officers, who directly supervise inmates.

Field Units. Field units originated from the use of inmates for highway construction. Beginning in 1906, temporary residential quarters were established to house inmates assigned to work on local roads. As the State highway system in an area was completed, these temporary quarters or "stick camps" were disassembled, hauled to a new site, and rebuilt to provide inmate housing at the new location.

This network eventually grew into the current system of eight "temporary" units (they were perpetuated in the 1940s and 50s, but department personnel still refer to them as stick camps) and 18 "permanent" field units. The permanent units fall into three types -- large permanent (six); small permanent (eight); and unique design (four). The field units housed an average daily population of 2,539 inmates in FY 1984. The largest is Pocahontas, with an average daily population of 204 in FY 1984 (Table 2).

Field units provide less security than major institutions. Consequently, inmates housed in field units are usually those classified as requiring minimum or medium custody. Units typically house inmates in open dormitory sleeping quarters, with adjacent day rooms and recreational facilities. A single mesh fence encloses the perimeter, sometimes with guard towers along the fence line.

Most field units provide 30 to 60 inmates daily for highway maintenance in adjacent areas. Inmates who do not work on the road may have another job, such as doing maintenance or kitchen work or working in the farming operation. In addition, two field units have enterprises. The RSA offers night programs at most field units. At

one unit, Harrisonburg, RSA offers a full schedule of daytime academic and vocational programs to the young inmates who are confined there.

A superintendent directs and supervises the operations of each field unit. Most units also have designated an assistant superintendent, who is usually a lieutenant or a sergeant. All units have an officer-in-charge (usually a sergeant or corporal) whose duties are to directly supervise the officers.

The proportion of security staff at field units tends to be higher than the proportion at prisons (70% in FY 1984). Most field units (83% in FY 1984) have a very small number of nonsecurity staff -- typically, a nurse, counselor, and a secretary.

METHODOLOGY AND REPORT OVERVIEW

This report is the fourth in a series of JLARC studies on the Department of Corrections. The team used a variety of methods to assess the two principal issues of this study: the adequacy of security staffing and procedures in the adult correctional facilities of Virginia.

JLARC did not review security staffing or procedures in the two reception and classification centers because these institutions have different purposes from the prisons and field units. The reception centers serve as temporary holding facilities for inmates who are entering or reentering the system. Staff at the reception centers test inmates and review their records, and inmates await their institutional classification and placement. The reception centers have a relatively high proportion of nonsecurity staff compared to the prisons and field units.

JLARC visited ten field units as a part of this study, interviewing staff and conducting reviews of security procedures. However, JLARC did not assess the adequacy of staffing levels in the field units because the prisons have a far greater proportion of the DOC budget and staff. A more thorough review of field unit staffing may be included in a later JLARC report.

JLARC included the Youthful Offender Center in its analysis because it is very similar in function to the other adult facilities. In addition, the *Code of Virginia* requires the department to establish a facility to house and treat youthful offenders. The department has chosen to assign an assistant warden to manage the facility on a day-to-day basis, under the overall supervision of the warden at Southampton Correctional Center.

Study Methodology

The team used several major methods to address the issues of this study. These methods included interviews with staff at the facilities, a review of DOC's staffing formula (called the "Sharp formula"), an audit of certain procedures at each facility visited, observation of security posts during inspection tours, and a review of numerous documents about staffing at the facilities.

Interviews. JLARC interviewed top personnel at all the adult prisons and at ten field units. The interviews with wardens, superintendents, assistant wardens, security chiefs, and watch commanders were designed to learn about the adequacy of their current levels of security staff, how they conduct post audits, how they manage overtime, the impact of facility design on staffing, and other areas.

Sharp Formula Analysis. The purpose of this analysis was to determine the accuracy of the department's method of calculating manpower needs. The Sharp formula is used by the department to determine how many positions are needed to fill posts which have been established for a certain number of days and hours.

For the analysis, JLARC drew a sample of records on 605 security personnel from all the facilities. The purpose was to examine all the leave time that the sampled employees took (annual, sick, military, workmen's compensation, training, and other) during FY 1984. By analyzing this sample, JLARC determined if the number of hours that they were available for work corresponded with the number that DOC currently uses to determine staffing requirements.

Observation of Security Posts and Audit of Security Procedures. During the visits to the prisons and field units, JLARC staff observed security staffing practices and security posts, and examined the adequacy of procedures that each institution uses to control maintenance tools, kitchen knives, certain kitchen ingredients, and medical items. The purpose of this review was to determine if security procedures at each facility were in accordance with department guidelines, regional and institutional operating procedures, and department standards.

Post Order Review. JLARC examined all the post orders of the prisons and field units. Post orders are detailed job descriptions for each security post. The review had two purposes: (1) to compare the clarity and detail of post orders from one institution to another, and (2) to identify posts that have nonsecurity functions.

Post Audit Review. JLARC reviewed the post audits of all the prisons and field units. Post audits are conducted periodically by each institution to determine if any security posts should be added, deleted, or changed. The completed post audits contain information about how many hours and days each post is supposed to be

staffed. The purpose of JLARC's review was to compare the number of days and hours that similar posts are staffed among the adult institutions, and to identify posts whose hours or days may be exaggerated.

Reliability of DOC Interviews

JLARC's research workplan for evaluating security staffing was designed to provide a reliable basis for assessing staffing needs. The research effort was prejudiced somewhat, however, by inconsistent cooperation from the department. Particularly affected were research methods which depended on candid feedback from departmental employees. Efforts on the part of the department to ensure that employees told JLARC staff "one story" or the "department line" degraded the credibility and reliability of some information collected in interviews. Therefore, while the reported opinions of departmental staff should be taken into consideration, they cannot be considered fully credible.

Although JLARC staff carried out this study in accord with statutorily-mandated oversight duties, difficulties were initially encountered with some DOC staff. These problems slowed the progress of the study and may have affected the validity of some of the findings. At one point problems became such a concern that the JLARC staff director and division chief met with the previous director of DOC and senior DOC officials and informed them that the study could not proceed under existing conditions. Subsequent to the meeting, the director of DOC issued a memorandum to regional and facility employees asking for better cooperation with JLARC in its conduct of the study, and cooperation then generally improved.

Examples of problems with cooperation were numerous, including statements from management such as "this is war" and "JLARC is the enemy." Efforts were also made to inhibit staff access to employees by attempting to record meetings or by requiring the presence of supervisors in the room. Such efforts could not have promoted candor on the part of DOC staff. For example:

An assistant warden apparently surreptitiously tape recorded an entire interview with JLARC staff. The tape recorder was hidden from view in a waste basket. A JLARC staffer noticed an electrical cord running into the trash can and heard the machine click off during the interview. After the interview a staffer looked into the wastebasket and saw the recorder.

After initially agreeing that private interviews were acceptable, another warden insisted on sitting in on a JLARC interview with the assistant warden at the facility. When told by JLARC staff that under those conditions the

interview would be terminated, the warden told the assistant "this is war," and indicated that the assistant's job was "on the line."

Labeled "the enemy," "pseudo pundits." and such, JLARC staff encountered numerous roadblocks to the completion of the effort. While relations improved after the director's memo was sent to the field, some problems continued. A clear example of the continuing hostility is found in a memorandum from a warden to his regional administrator. In a memo given to JLARC, the warden stated:

It is most unfortunate that organizations like JLARC exist. Not only are their results, as I have witnessed, a great detriment to the long-term goals of the Commonwealth but a tremendous waste of Commonwealth funds. The lack of expertise and administrative talent of the JLARC staff can only lead this writer to the conclusion that they wish to please the hand that feeds them, not complete their obligation to their legislative mandate ... One must ask why does there even need to be a JLARC?

While many DOC staff cooperated readily and fully with JLARC in the conduct of this study, outright hostility displayed by some staff made compliance with the statutory mandate unusually difficult. In this study, at times, basic cooperation was lacking and some study findings must be considered in this light.

Report Overview

This chapter has provided an historical overview of the Virginia prison system, and presented background information about the adult correctional institutions in Virginia today. Chapter Two focuses on the staffing process and security staffing needs of the adult system. Chapter Three reviews the security policies and procedures currently in use. Chapter Four provides a description and analysis of each prison, focusing on security staffing and procedures.

II. SECURITY STAFFING NEEDS AND UTILIZATION

The manner in which DOC identifies security needs and deploys staff is crucial to the effective and efficient operation of the major institutions and field units. DOC has not, however, established a policy or a process to define these needs.

The customary process -- which is not always followed -- includes some form of determination of need for staff, a listing of the needs, and application of a staffing factor to calculate full time equivalents. Security staff are then deployed, subject to periodic adjustments for changing needs.

Because DOC has not established a policy for determining the need for security positions and the process which is customarily used is inconsistently implemented, variation exists in almost every step of the process. A consistent level of documentation about staffing at DOC facilities is lacking. This has made it difficult to accurately assess staffing needs at the individual institutions.

The key components of DOC's staffing process as it exists on paper are the "post audit" and the application of the staffing factor -- called the "Sharp formula." The post audit is a process which determines where security staff are needed -- a post. The Sharp formula is basically a mathematical factor for determining how many full time equivalent employees (FTEs) are needed to staff the post for 24 hours a day, 365 days a year, or any part thereof. Thus, theoretically one could multiply the number of posts times the staffing factors (which derive from the Sharp formula) and know how many security staff would be needed at a given institution.

As might be expected, however, it is not a simple process. Security needs tend to evolve as inmates probe for weaknesses or as special needs arise. In addition, a significant amount of overtime is worked at the facilities. Some of this overtime meets basic institutional security requirements and may circumvent the staffing process. Other overtime is of an emergency nature -- responding to an escape or disturbance, for example. Records do not exist, however, to provide an accurate basis for categorizing overtime in this manner. As with the post audit procedures, there is so much variation in institutional overtime practices that final decisions on overtime conversion probably cannot be made at this time.

-- A close look at DOC's post audit process, the Sharp formula, and overtime illustrate the variations that exist and suggest steps that should be taken to determine accurate staffing at the institutions.

DOC'S DETERMINATION OF SECURITY STAFFING NEEDS

The determination of security staffing needs at the facilities is supposed to involve a detailed analysis of institutional needs for security staff. The need determination should also assess whether the current staffing level and deployment are adequate and appropriate.

The process generally involves all top-level managers at a facility. It focuses their attention on individual security posts and results in a determination about whether new security posts should be established, and whether existing posts should be retained, dropped, or modified.

The outcomes of the process -- called the "post audit" process because of its focus on security posts -- include a determination of the hours and days each security post should be filled, and a listing which indicates this information. This listing is generally considered to define the security staffing needs of the institution.

Security Posts

A security post is the specific duty assignment of a security staff member during a given work shift. Examples of posts include:

- a tower guard watching the perimeter of the institution or observing inmate activities in the vicinity of the tower,
- a front gate officer controlling and monitoring access to the compound,
- a housing unit officer patrolling the tiers of cells, or walking through a dormitory to ensure order, and
- a yard officer monitoring activities in an open commons area or in a recreation yard.

DOC has established several classes of security employees. Correctional "officers" are the rank-and-file classification and are the employees most likely to be carrying out the duties listed above. During 1984, there were approximately 2,600 correctional officers working at the various facilities. Corrections "corporals" are the next level up from the officers; they usually supervise several officers and may have significant responsibilities -- corporals are sometimes the "officer-in-charge" of a housing unit at major institutions.

Officers and corporals comprise the ranks of the "blue shirts," so-called because of their shirt color and to distinguish them from the higher-ranking "white shirts" or security supervisors.

Security supervisors are sergeants, lieutenants, captains and majors. The latter three titles sometimes perform primarily administrative duties, and are often in charge of an entire shift of security staff.

Security posts are sometimes grouped into two categories: posts essential for institutional security and control, and posts essential for welfare, health, and maintenance. Institutional security and control posts are based on the number of posts needed to operate an institution during a complete "lock-down," when all inmates would be confined to their cells or dorms except for mandatory exercise periods. Posts essential for control are necessary to provide adequate protection to the public and to protect the safety of the inmates and staff at the institutions. Posts required for welfare, health, and maintenance are required for special programs and activities.

Posts are generally established based on the need to monitor and control the level of activities and the movement of inmates. The number of posts vary during a day, reflecting changes in the level of inmate activity as inmates attend school or go to jobs, the mess hall, recreation, and the like.

The number of hours and days a post is filled is also keyed to employee work shifts. Table 5 illustrates how posts reflect a mix of work shifts and institutional needs. The 24-hour, 7-day posts are assignments where someone is always on duty, typically in housing units or perimeter towers. Five-day posts are filled during weekdays, and the two-day posts are usually assigned to visiting rooms, which are open on weekends.

Table 5

SECURITY POST SHIFTS
AT MAJOR INSTITUTIONS

<u>Type of Post (Hours/Days)</u>	<u>Number of Posts</u>
24/7	320
16/7	128
8/7	293
8/5	340
8/6	10
8/2	47
Other	<u>44</u>
TOTAL	1,182

Source: Institutional post audits supplied during 1984.

The day shift (usually 8:00 a.m. to 4:00 p.m.) generally has the largest number of security staff on duty, because most activities usually occur during normal business hours. At some institutions this shift may account for up to 50 percent of the total security staff. The evening shift (generally 4:00 p.m. to midnight) often sees a great deal of recreational activity and inmate movement on the facility's recreation yard, and will have proportionately more staff in these areas and few if any staff in medical or school areas. The night shift (usually midnight to 8:00 a.m.) requires the fewest security staff, since the least amount of activity generally occurs during these hours.

The procedure for specifically determining manpower needs on a post-by-post basis is called the post audit process.

Post Audit Procedures

Conducting an audit of security posts is a complex process on which all security manpower allocations rest. However, there are no DOC policies, guidelines, or training relating to this process. Staff at each location follow their own procedures, based on their own experiences and institutional "customs".

JLARC found that, despite the lack of DOC policy, most institutional management staff describe the overall method in relatively consistent terms. However, extensive variations in staffing practices exist at the institutions and field units.

No written procedures describing how to conduct a post audit were provided to JLARC despite numerous requests. This lack of written procedures means that the process for determining need for a security post varies from one facility to another, and from one manager to another within the same facility. This is apparent in the differing knowledge of participants, and in the criteria of need used in the process. The Board of Corrections study committee on Mecklenburg noted that the key to the post audit process is the subjective judgement of institutional managers in determining the need for posts.

Wardens, assistant wardens for security, and security chiefs (the highest ranking security officers at major institutions) are generally the principal decision-makers about the need for posts. Other staff are also included at some locations. Watch commanders (a security supervisor who assigns individual security employees to specific posts) are frequently included due to their intimate knowledge of staff assignments. Some wardens routinely include other staff as well, in an attempt to include a wide range of knowledge about the operations at the facility.

JLARC found that knowledge of participants about the post audit process varied greatly. Although most participants were able to provide a reasonable description of the process, two wardens were

unable to answer any questions about how post audits are conducted. They said they do not participate in audits, but delegate this task to lower levels. One of these wardens simply told JLARC staff: "I'll be ----- if I know how they're done." He had delegated the preparation of post audits to his assistant warden, and only reviewed the final product. The effectiveness of his review is questionable, however, since he apparently does not understand the process.

The steps in the post audit process are fairly straight-forward and could easily be standardized. Based on the cumulative responses from institutional staff, JLARC developed Table 6, which shows the steps generally used in the post audit process. In the absence of a policy or standard, steps may be skipped, others may be added, and there is no assurance that staffing needs are determined in a reasonably uniform way at the various facilities.

Table 6

CUSTOMARY STEPS IN THE POST AUDIT PROCESS

1. Review post orders to determine current duties and responsibilities of the post.
2. Review any changes in programs and activities to assess impacts on posts.
3. Conduct an on-site evaluation of each post, interviewing the officer on duty.
- 4 Determine the number of hours and days the post should be filled.
- 5 Determine whether the post is essential to security or essential to the health, welfare, or maintenance of the facility.
6. Meet with other participants to discuss findings and to reach a consensus about the need for any changes.
7. Prepare an updated post audit listing, and forward it to regional office for review.

Source: JLARC interviews with participants in process.

Determination of the Need for Posts

Although there is a consensus among institutional staff on the steps in conducting a post audit, the method for identifying and classifying individual posts is left to the particular participants at the facilities. As described by one participant, "Everyone has his own perception of what's needed." DOC has done little to reduce

this discretion and to structure judgements about the need for security staff.

One result of the lack of policy has been a proliferation of criteria used by institutional staff in evaluating the need for existing and new posts. Table 7 indicates the responses by institutional managers about the criteria used in judging the need for posts. Five institutional managers could identify only one or two criteria they use in identifying need. A total of 19 different criteria were mentioned by at least one respondent. Based on these responses, there would appear to be little consistency about which criteria are used, or how they are applied in the determination of security staffing need.

Table 7

CRITERIA USED TO DETERMINE NEED FOR SECURITY STAFF

<u>Criteria</u>	<u>Number of Respondents Mentioning Each Item*</u>
Post's ability to see inmate movement	16
Number of inmates post should observe or control	19
Custody status of inmates the post should observe or control	14
Capacity, use, design of the building where post is located	17
Past incidents in the area	3
Potential for future incidents	3
Other	15

*Total number of respondents = 40. Multiple responses were possible from each respondent.

Source: JLARC interviews with major institution managers.

This variation in criteria has led to some inconsistencies in determining the need for security posts. These include variations in the rank and number of officers assigned to similar duties, in the hours and days that comparable posts are filled, and in workload indicators. These and other problems are discussed later in this chapter, under "Utilization of Security Staff."

Post Audit Listings

A key outcome of the post audit process is the post audit listing -- a roster of each security position at the facility showing the hours and days it is filled, and the number of employees required

to ensure that the post is filled as needed. An illustrative post audit listing is shown in Table 8.

Two of the 15 post audit listings from the major institutions show "essential security posts." The remaining 13 listings simply show all posts in tabular fashion as in Table 7. Whether the wardens of these 13 institutions have identified essential posts is uncertain. Not all post audits show rank (corporal or officer, for example), nor do all show the number of employees needed to fill the listed posts. Separate calculations are then necessary to determine the necessary staffing level.

A review of post audit listings indicates that they do not always accurately reflect staffing patterns. Some, for example, over-count security posts.

Post audit listings from Brunswick and the Women's Center show some posts that are "absorbed" by other posts. These are mostly visiting room posts that are 8-hour, 2-day (weekend) duties. These posts may be filled by staff normally assigned to transportation. In this case, transportation would be shown as an 8-hour, 7-day post when it is really an 8-hour, 5-day post. The extra two days would be spent in the visiting room.

Listing posts as "absorbed" by others creates the potential for miscounting staffing needs. Brunswick's post audit, for example, lists 21 more security staff than needed to fill the posts because of double-counting "absorbed" posts.

* * *

Listings at five facilities show "utility officer" posts, which are generally officers assigned to fill in for posts that are unfilled. Listings from the other 10 major institutions do not show utility posts, although all facilities have the same need to fill posts that are vacant.

DOC should determine whether using utility officers in this fashion is an acceptable solution to the problem of ensuring that posts are filled.

Post audit listings may also understate the number of security posts actually needed at an institution.

The Youthful Offender Center has post orders for commissary and clothing officer duties, and in fact an officer performs these duties part-time. These posts are not shown on the post audit listing, even though they require some time daily.

Table 8

INSTITUTIONAL LISTING OF POSTS

<u>Post No.</u>	<u>Post Description</u>	<u>Position Level</u>	<u>Hours</u>	<u>Days</u>	<u>Required Positions</u>
1	Chief of Security	Captain	8	5	1.00
2	Training Officer	Sergeant	8	5	1.00
3	Watch Commander	Lt./Sgt.	24	7	5.05
4	Shift Supervisor	Sergeant	16	7	3.36
5	Building 3 Supervisor	Cpl.	24	7	5.05
6	Building 3 Officer	Ofc.	24	7	5.05
7	Utility Corporal	Cpl.	8	7	1.68
8	Control Room	Sgt.	16	7	3.36
9	Storeroom	Cpl.	8	5	1.20
10	Grounds Work Crew	Ofc.	8	5	1.20
11	Grounds Work Crew	Ofc.	8	5	1.20
12	Laundry	Cpl.	8	5	1.20
13	Laundry	Cpl.	8	5	1.20
14	Canteen	Cpl.	8	5	1.20
15	Staff Cleaning	Ofc.	8	5	1.20
16	Warehouse	Cpl.	8	5	1.20
17	Transportation	Cpl.	8	7	1.68
18	Transportation	Ofc.	8	7	1.68
19	Transportation	Ofc.	8	7	1.68
20	Mail Room	Cpl.	8	7	1.68
21	Building 1-1	Cpl./Ofc.	24	7	5.05
22	Building 1-2	Cpl./Ofc.	24	7	5.05
23	Building 2-1	Cpl./Ofc.	16	7	3.36
24	Building 2-2	Cpl./Ofc.	24	7	5.05
25	Building 4-2	Cpl./Ofc.	24	7	5.05
26	Building 5-1	Cpl./Ofc.	24	7	5.05
27	Building 5-2	Cpl./Ofc.	24	7	5.05
28	Building 6-1	Cpl./Ofc.	24	7	5.05
29	Building 6-2	Cpl./Ofc.	24	7	5.05
30	Visiting Room	Ofc.	8	2	Time absorbed from post 7
31	Visiting Room	Ofc.	8	2	Time absorbed from post 8
32	Visiting Room	Ofc.	8	2	Time absorbed from post 17
33	Visiting Mail Room	Ofc.	8	2	Time absorbed from post 18
34	Visiting Utility #1	Ofc.	8	2	Time absorbed from post 19
35	Visiting Utility #2	Ofc.	8	2	Time absorbed from post 20
36	Yard Officer #1	Ofc.	24	7	5.05
37	Yard Officer #2	Ofc.	8	7	1.68
38	MCV Officer	Ofc.	24	7	5.05
39	Front Gate	Ofc.	24	7	5.05
40	Paint Crew	Ofc.	8	5	1.20

TOTAL -- 103.66

Source: Post audits.

DOC should take several steps to improve its post audit process.

Recommendation (1). DOC should develop a uniform statewide procedure for conducting post audits. Institutional staff should be trained in the procedure, and periodic checks should be employed to ensure compliance. The procedure should specify the frequency with which audits should be conducted and the criteria to be used when determining the need for a post. Possible criteria could include the extent of inmate movement, the custody levels of inmates within the post's area of observation, and other factors that bear on security of an institution. Overall institutional responsibility should be vested in the warden. Products should be reviewed by the regional administrator and central office.

Recommendation (2). Post audit listings should be prepared in a consistent fashion by staff at all facilities and according to a uniform format. Part-time posts should be counted in similar fashion at all facilities. DOC should determine the minimum tour of duty that will be listed as a separate security post on the post audit listings, and review all listings for compliance with the minimum. Post audits should then be conducted in accord with the new guidelines to eliminate listing any posts that do not comply with the requirements. Regional staff should ensure that the policy is being followed by institutional staff.

Recommendation (3). DOC should determine whether using utility officers is an acceptable solution to the problem of filling essential security posts that are vacant. If so, all facilities should have a number of utility posts, tied to the number of essential posts.

Recommendation (4). DOC should develop guidelines for determining which security posts are essential to facility security. The guidelines should specify what duties and posts are essential to maintaining security during an emergency situation, and for which overtime may be paid if necessary to fill these posts.

Weak Documentation of Need

At some locations the need for security posts, and thus the need for security staff, has changed in the last several years. At some facilities, such as Mecklenburg, the staffing need has been consistently increasing. The Board of Corrections study committee on Mecklenburg noted this trend at that facility, and reported:

Not only has the number of necessary posts apparently increased during the past two years, (from 79 in a May 1982 post audit, to 93 in a January 1984 audit, to 101 in a September 1984 audit) but the requested coverage for particular posts also varies significantly. This inconsistency extends to individual buildings, and

illustrates the inconsistencies which can occur when a post audit is conducted only by institutional personnel.

JLARC found a similar pattern of changing needs at other institutions. Buckingham, for example, identified a need for 108 security posts in a March 1984 post audit, a need for 98 security posts in a July 1984 post audit, and a need for 103 posts in an August post audit. A post audit submitted by James River in July 1984 showed a need for 106.35 FTE security staff, and one submitted in September showed a need for 115.52 FTEs. Mecklenburg post audits identified a need for as few as 257 positions and as many as 318.34 positions in 1984.

Based on the documentation which accompanies these post audit listings it is not always possible to tell whether or why changing numbers of posts and security staff are required at these facilities. Interviews with wardens and other staff at facilities indicated that they have often felt constrained by perceptions of the Governor's or General Assembly's propensity to fund new staff positions. One warden commented, "we were expressly told during this period (FY 1982-84) that we could not request additional security positions." Past experience also has constrained facility managers from submitting documentation which would support increases in staffing, because such requests have frequently been turned down.

The Board of Corrections study committee, noting this tendency at Mecklenburg, recommended that institutional staff submit staffing requests that accord with facility needs regardless of departmental or statewide budget considerations. This appears to be an appropriate recommendation. Staff in DOC's central office are responsible for determining how to balance staffing needs and budget requests with other agency priorities.

Poorly documented staffing requests are one result of this variation in the basic need determination. Of the staffing requests collected at 24 facilities by JLARC during this study, only five institutions provided documentation other than post audits alone. Consequently, the higher levels of DOC management may be provided too limited an amount of information about staffing needs at the facilities. Decisions about whether facility requests are reasonable would have to be based on some other source of information.

Recommendation (5). DOC should require all requests for new posts or additional staff to be supported with written justification of the need, specifying the criteria used to justify the need. Such documentation should include, but not be limited to, a post audit listing which clearly identifies current and requested security posts; a listing of serious incidents and the types and number of incidents reported by inmates but unobserved by staff; any tangible consequences of leaving a particular post unfilled; and what security risks would be involved if the post were not established.

Recommendation (6). Facility staff should submit staffing requests consistent with facility needs regardless of department-wide or statewide budget constraints. Staff in DOC's central office should then be responsible for balancing staffing needs and budget requests within the agency.

DOC Review of Post Audits

After preparation by facility staff, post audit listings are submitted to regional staff for review. The regional administrator and the regional manager of operations and training review the request and may ask for a revised post audit, or may approve the audit and forward it to the deputy director of adult services in DOC's central office.

Regional Review. According to all five regional administrators, their role tends to be participatory, working with institutional administrators to arrive at a consensus about the need for new positions. Consequently regional administrators generally know which positions will be requested by wardens prior to seeing the post audit and other documentation through which the wardens actually request positions.

The participation of regional staff in determining needs at the facilities may help assure that positions which are eventually requested are in fact justifiable and needed. Thus, the regional review of position requests is not an independent assessment of need so much as a formal agreement with requests that have already been informally agreed to.

An important problem with the regional review role is that the review process occurs without benefit of any guidelines or policies that could help structure the review process. Due to the lack of policy or procedure, criteria applied in reviewing positions may vary from one region to another.

One regional administrator stated that he tends to defer to a warden's judgement about whether a position is needed, if the warden has a strong opinion and can find the necessary funding.

Another regional administrator emphasized that he made the final decision about the need for positions in his region: "If I agree with the warden he'll get the position; if I don't, he won't." This RA then cited an instance where he had overridden a warden's decision to staff a particular post.

Although these statements are not necessarily inconsistent, they illustrate possible consequences of the lack of a review policy. Because a major justification for DOC's regional level of

management is that it can improve uniformity and consistency of operations at the facilities, the regional review of post audits should be spelled out in departmental guidelines. The review should focus on whether staffing needs identified at the facilities are reasonable, and whether adequate justification has been presented. Regional staff should in turn document their review of facility staffing requests.

Central Office Review. The deputy director of adult services has supervisory and review authority over the regional staff, and ultimately over the adult institutions staff. The assistant director for statewide support and operations also reviews post audits and staffing requests from facilities. In addition, a manpower committee chaired by the deputy director for resource management plays a review role regarding staffing requests from the facilities.

The Board of Corrections study committee on Mecklenburg found that the central office review is limited to (1) whether posts listed as essential are, in their judgement, essential to security at the facility; (2) whether the staffing formula was properly applied; and (3) other DOC priorities. They rarely go on-site to review a particular facility's post audit listing or examine individual posts.

Interviews with the former deputy director and assistant director indicated that they routinely act on requests for new posts or for changes in posts without clearly established procedures or guidelines for evaluating posts.

Conclusions. The extensive variation observed in key parts of DOC's process for staffing facilities reflects a lack of central management direction and control. The determination of staffing needs is carried out by mid-level managers at each institution, using a variety of self-developed criteria. Post audit listings which document the needs process do not always accurately reflect staffing patterns, and at some facilities appear to be little more than rote repetition of past practices. The changing needs for security positions exhibited in some post audit listings appear to reflect little more than a warden's opinion of the acceptability of requesting new positions rather than a rigorous or systematic assessment of the staffing needs of an institution.

Recommendation (7). The regional review of post audits should be spelled out in department guidelines. The review should focus on whether staffing needs identified at the facilities are reasonable, and whether adequate justification has been presented. Regional staff should in turn document their review of facility staffing requests.

Recommendation (8). Key managers in the adult services division -- specifically the deputy director and assistant director for statewide support and operations -- should play a stronger role in shaping the criteria used to determine the need for security

staff. In addition, they should be involved in the development of training programs in the post audit procedures for facility managers.

DOC'S SECURITY STAFFING FORMULA

DOC uses a formula to estimate the number of hours available for work by security personnel. The formula requires an accurate count of the number of security posts at each facility to provide an estimate of security staffing needs. The number of posts and available work hours are equal parts in an equation that yields the security staffing requirements for DOC's institutions. The post audit process is therefore part of the foundation for calculating the number of security staff needed at each institution.

Current Form

The Sharp formula was developed in 1975 by Dr. E. Preston Sharp, a faculty member of Virginia Commonwealth University who served as a consultant to DOC. The formula combines five elements that directly affect the number of hours every security employee will be available for work.

The formula arrives at the estimate by subtracting the hours that every employee, on average, will not work. For example, all security staff receive two rest days (e.g., Saturday and Sunday) off per week. DOC can expect this number for everyone and therefore includes this as an element in the formula. Likewise for annual leave, but with one difference: annual leave accrues and is taken by individuals at different rates. To be included in the formula, an average must be developed. DOC developed this average for annual leave based on the amount of time the "majority of employees" were accruing in 1975. This number was then included as an element in the overall calculation of available work hours.

The five elements included in the calculation are shown in Table 9. The first three elements -- annual, sick, and training leave -- are estimates of individual behavior across the system. Holidays and rest days are standard requirements for each employee. Starting from a base of 365 days, the Sharp formula subtracts 148 days, leaving 217 days available for each security employee. Multiplying 217 days by 8 hours provides an estimate of 1,736 available work hours.

The final step in the process is to estimate the number of full-time positions needed to fully staff a security post. As an example, a security post that must be filled 24 hours a day for each day of the year requires 8,760 hours of staff time (365 days multiplied by 24 hours). This product (8,760 hours) divided by the available work hours of security personnel (1,736 hours) produces the

Table 9

SHARP FORMULA ELEMENTS

Annual leave*	15 days
Sick leave*	11 days
Training leave*	7 days
Holidays	11 days
Rest days (weekends)	<u>104 days</u>
TOTAL	148 days

365 days minus 148 days = 217 days available for duty.

217 days times 8 hours per day = 1,736 hours per FTE.

*Estimate.

Source: DOC documentation on Sharp formula.

manpower needs of that post -- 5.05 FTEs. Table 10 provides a breakdown of the different types of posts in the system.

While the formula was initially developed in 1975, in 1982 the formula was reviewed and updated. One extra day of sick leave was added and one day of training leave was subtracted. The result of the update was that the overall number of available work hours remained at 1,736.

Table 10

MANPOWER NEEDS FOR SECURITY POSTS
BASED ON DOC SHARP FORMULA

<u>Type of Post</u> <u>(Hours/Days)</u>	<u>Hours</u> <u>Needed</u>	<u>Manpower</u> <u>(FTE's)</u>
24/7	8760	5.05
16/7	5840	3.36
8/7	2920	1.68
8/6	2496	1.44
8/5	2088	1.20
8/2	832	0.48

Source: DOC documentation.

Assessment of Current Formula

There are mixed views of the numbers that are used in the current form of the formula. During fieldwork for this report, JLARC staff found that half of the wardens, assistant wardens, and chiefs of security interviewed agreed that the current formula accurately calculated their staffing needs. Forty-five percent stated that the formula did not accurately calculate their needs -- usually stating that it was too low. The remaining five percent had no opinion.

There are several possible explanations why the current Sharp numbers may be inadequate. First, the formula calculates a system-wide average for available work hours. That is, the calculation applies to all major adult institutions and field units. Institutions that fall at the system-wide average should have adequate staff to provide security. However, institutions that are above or below the mean could be either overstaffed or understaffed, respectively.

A second explanation is that the formula may be outdated. Although it was last amended in 1982, the number of hours available for work was left in the same form as when it was developed in 1975.

Third, DOC does not have a written policy for updating and validating those elements in the formula which can change over time. Training requirements, for example, have changed in recent years as standards for security personnel have increased, but the formula has not been adjusted to take the changes into account. Also, the behavior of personnel in taking sick leave and annual leave are elements that should be systematically reviewed on a periodic basis.

Finally, the formula does not account for all the elements that contribute to the work availability of security staff. Many DOC staff interviewed felt that there were important omissions from the formula. The most frequently mentioned omissions were workman's compensation leave, leave without pay, and military leave. Because these factors are important considerations at particular institutions, the formula can inaccurately state work availability. Even considering these deficiencies, however, a system-wide staffing formula accurately maintained can serve as a reasonable basis for staffing decisions.

JLARC Evaluation

The Sharp formula is a key ingredient in the security staffing process, and it is a reasonable and systematic approach to the assessment of security staffing. Because it is so important, JLARC recalculated the basic formula with FY 1984 data and tested it statewide. The purpose of the analysis was to determine the accuracy of the numbers used in the formula. JLARC used several additional variables -- military leave, workmen's compensation leave, and leave without pay -- recommended by various facility staff. Each variable has the effect of reducing the number of available work hours.

These additional variables should help the formula produce a more complete and accurate product, because more factors that contribute to the availability of staff are explicitly accounted for in the calculation. Furthermore, all of the data have been updated, so the behavior of recent DOC security personnel is reflected in the revision.

The building block of JLARC's analysis was a random sample of the leave records of 604 of the approximately 3600 security personnel (correctional officers through captains) at the major institutions and field units in FY 1984. The sample was designed to be representative of all security staff, and not necessarily representative by region or institution (the details of the sample design are included in Appendix A). All major institutions and field units (except Deep Meadow which closed in September 1984, and Nottoway which opened in August 1984) are represented in the sample results.

Results

The fundamental result of the replication is a slight increase in the available work hours per security officer. The current number used by DOC is 1736 hours; JLARC's analysis produced a slightly higher number of hours available for assignment -- 1771 hours -- despite using more variables in the calculation. This difference of 35 hours, while not especially important for an individual post, is very important for institution-wide and system-wide staffing, where there are hundreds of posts. Table 11 compares DOC's variables with the variables used by JLARC.

Associated with the estimate is a sampling error of 14 hours. Use of this sampling error yields a system-wide estimate for personnel at all DOC institutions. Table 12 compares DOC's Sharp calculation with JLARC's revision for eight types of posts.

The system-wide impact of the estimate is shown in Table 13. In this table the JLARC revision is compared with the current formula for all the posts at the major institutions. Overall, there is a difference of 56.04 FTE's between the JLARC version and the DOC version.

This assessment shows that an updated and expanded version of the Sharp formula will reduce the number of personnel needed to fill approved posts. The exact numbers of needed staff depends on the post audit process accurately assessing the number of security posts in the system. If post audit listings are inaccurate, then the result of the analysis cannot be expected to correspondingly increase or decrease the level of staffing at DOC facilities.

Table 11

COMPARISON OF SHARP FORMULA CALCULATIONS
OF HOURS UNAVAILABLE FOR WORK

<u>Variables</u>	<u>DOC</u>	<u>JLARC</u>
Holidays	88	88.0
Sick days	88	74.7
Training	56	33.2
Rest days	832	832.0
Annual	120	87.8
Military leave	-	4.2
Workman's compensation	-	8.0
Leave without pay	-	6.1
Subtotal hours	<u>1184</u>	<u>1134.0</u>
Training Adjustment*	_____	<u>+15</u>
TOTALS	1184	1149

DOC: 2920 Hrs. - 1184 Hrs. = 1736 available work hours.

JLARC: 2920 Hrs. - 1149 hrs. = 1771 available work hours.

*15-hour training adjustment to ensure each post incorporates sufficient time for employees to receive required training. This adjustment is discussed fully in Chapter 3.

Source: JLARC Analysis.

Table 12

COMPARISON OF DOC AND JLARC PERSONNEL CALCULATIONS

<u>Type of Post (Hours/Days)</u>	<u>Hours Needed to Fill Post</u>	<u>FTE's</u>	
		<u>DOC</u>	<u>JLARC</u>
24/7	8760	5.05	4.95
24/5	6264	3.61	3.54
16/7	5840	3.36	3.30
16/5	4176	2.41	2.36
8/7	2920	1.68	1.65
8/6	2504	1.44	1.41
8/5	2088	1.20	1.18
8/2	840	0.48	0.47

Source: JLARC analysis.

Table 13

SYSTEM-WIDE COMPARISON OF REVISED SHARP FORMULA
WITH DOC'S CURRENT VERSION FOR MAJOR INSTITUTIONS

<u>Type of Post (Hours/Days)</u>	<u># of Posts</u>	<u>DOC</u>	<u>JLARC</u>	<u>Difference</u>
24/7	320	1,616.00	1,584.00	32.00
16/7	128	430.08	422.40	7.68
8/7	293	492.24	483.45	8.79
8/5	340	408.00	401.20	6.80
8/6	10	14.40	14.10	6.30
8/2	47	22.56	22.09	0.47
TOTALS	1,138	2,983.28	2,927.24	56.04

Source: JLARC analysis.

Application of Formula

The formula is intended to be applied to security positions. However, DOC has several ranks of security staff and does not distinguish between ranks or functions when calculating staffing need. It is clear that essential posts -- for example, a post that the warden would always have filled, even if it required paying overtime or pulling an officer from another assignment to do so -- should be included.

Administrative posts, for which the warden would probably not pay overtime or pull someone off another assignment, or which require specialized skills and abilities, should probably not be covered by the Sharp formula. Applying the formula to these positions suggests that relief staff are used for these duties when in fact they are not, and inflates the total number of security positions needed by the facility.

Most facilities have several administrative security posts. These typically include a training officer, a security chief, adjustment committee members, and grievance officers. Some institutions have included these in their post audits and thus applied the Sharp formula, while other facilities have not done so. The effect is to show a need for 1.20 security employees to fill a training officer post, for example, when there is only one training officer at the institution. This practice inflates the need for security staff at some facilities.

JLARC reviewed post audits of the 15 major institutions and identified 58 administrative positions where the formula had been applied. Because of this misapplication, a need for 81.16 positions

was shown on post audits when in fact only 54 employees were needed. These positions at the institutions are described in Chapter Four.

Recommendation (9). DOC's staffing formula should be updated annually or biennially. System-wide averages should be used for each of the following factors: sick leave, annual leave, training time, workman's compensatory time, military leave, rest days, holidays, and leave without pay.

Recommendation (10). Until DOC completes the necessary update, the results of the JLARC analysis should be used. Thus, the staffing formula should use 1,771 available work hours as the basis of the formula. The required personnel at all post assignments should be correspondingly reduced -- for example, instead of 5.05 positions for a 24-hour, 7-day post, the number should be 4.95.

Recommendation (11). DOC should determine which ranks of security staff and which security posts the staffing formula should be applicable to. Posts such as training officer and security chief, which are not usually relieved by other staff or filled on an overtime basis when the incumbent is absent, should not be covered by the formula. Post audits submitted by facilities should then be reviewed for consistent application of the formula.

USE OF OVERTIME AT DOC FACILITIES

Overtime, which may be compensated by either payment or leave time, is frequently used to supplement the number of staff authorized for a facility. Although the Department's total spending for overtime has declined in recent years, DOC remains a heavy user of overtime. At some facilities overtime is an essential element of staffing.

DOC security staff worked 632,063.4 hours of overtime in FY 1984 (362,900.5 hours of paid overtime, and 269,162.90 hours in exchange for compensatory leave). On an hour-for-hour basis this was equivalent to an additional 356.9 FTE positions, based on 1771 hours per FTE. However, equating an hour of overtime with an hour of staff time needed by a facility, as suggested by the Board of Corrections' Mecklenburg study committee and others, may not be valid system-wide.

JLARC found that facility managers exercise considerable discretion in deciding when to use overtime. This discretion is used inconsistently from one facility to another. In this situation, the basis for equating system-wide overtime with needed staff positions appears unsupported. DOC needs to specify more precisely when overtime should be used, and to develop a more detailed reporting mechanism before overtime can be used as a basis for calculating staffing needs. Otherwise, the correctional system could be unnecessarily staffed to fill unique emergency situations as if they

occurred daily. This would result in perpetual and substantial overstaffing.

FY 1984 Overtime

The amount of paid overtime in FY 1984 was down from previous years. Department-wide expenditures for overtime (including staff in the Youth Services and Resources Management Division as well as in the Adult Services Division) declined from \$6.70 million in FY 1982, to \$5.02 million in FY 1983, to \$4.48 million in FY 1984.

Most of DOC's overtime is worked at the adult institutions and field units (Table 14). Staff at these locations were paid a total of \$3,823,899.71, or 85 percent of all DOC expenditures for overtime, in FY 1984.

Although total overtime averaged 14,699 hours per location, the actual distribution was quite uneven. Three facilities (the Penitentiary, Powhatan, and James River) accounted for 55 percent of all FY 1984 paid overtime, although they had 22 percent of all security positions.

The distribution of overtime on a month-by-month basis makes it clear that a simple conversion of overtime into FTEs would permanently staff some facilities for temporary emergencies. The amount of overtime used at Mecklenburg and Buckingham, for example, varied monthly as shown in Table 15. At Mecklenburg, almost one-third of all overtime was worked during June 1984, the month after the death row escape. But in August 1983, and March and April 1984, the hours of overtime worked were 0, 18, and 292.5, respectively.

Total overtime at Buckingham varied almost without regard to the fact of a major inmate disturbance in March 1984. In March and April, 1,077 total overtime hours were worked, compared to the high of 6,352 hours reported in November 1983.

A closer review of how overtime is earned throughout the year also indicates that a straight hour-for-hour conversion of overtime into the need for full-time positions would not match the need of some locations. For example, in FY 1984 Marion reported no overtime during one month and Buckingham reported no overtime in two months, and several institutions reported less than 100 hours of overtime in various months. Granting full-time positions to these facilities in FY 1984 would have resulted in excess staff during those months.

--- Routine Use of Overtime. Several institutions appear to routinely use extensive amounts of overtime. Depending on employees to work overtime in order to fill security posts places those employees in fatigue-inducing situations, which may jeopardize the security of the institution. In addition, this practice in effect

Table 14

**OVERTIME WORKED AND PAID
(FY 1984)**

	<u>Paid Overtime Hours Worked</u>	<u>Amount Paid</u>	<u>Compensatory Time Earned</u>	<u>Total Addt'l Hrs. Worked</u>	<u>FTE Equivalent</u>
<u>Major Institutions¹</u>					
Penitentiary	125,287.0	\$1,269,854	21,557.0	146,844.0	82.9
Powhatan	62,299.75	593,027	16,435.0	77,724.75	43.9
Mecklenburg	12,623.75	170,082	23,036.0	35,659.75	20.1
Bland	14,174.0	147,247	15,534.5	29,708.5	16.8
James River	25,007.0	228,292	3,832.0	28,839.0	16.3
Buckingham	5,117.5	53,459	23,380.0	28,497.5	16.1
Brunswick	4,308.5	58,335	21,697.25	26,005.75	14.7
Deep Meadow	24,772.25	235,472	(²)	24,772.25	14.0
Powhatan R & C	16,507.25	153,396	4,972.0	21,479.25	12.1
Southampton	4,796.5	54,225	14,856.75	19,653.25	11.1
Staunton	2,120.25	26,774	17,048.0	19,168.25	10.8
Deerfield	5,268.75	62,820	12,818.6	18,087.35	10.2
St. Brides	8,089.25	83,200	9,192.3	17,281.55	9.8
Marion	743.5	9,745	8,661.0	9,404.5	5.3
Women's Center	1,822.5	14,210	5,719.5	7,542.0	4.3
Youthful Off. Ctr.	592.25	9,175	4,602.75	5,195.0	2.9
Southampton R & C	936.75	10,457	3,266.25	4,203.0	2.4
Sub-total	314,466.75	\$3,179,770	206,608.90	520,075.65	293.7
<u>Field Units</u>					
Northern Region	13,875.5	\$ 161,471	18,761.0	32,636.5	18.4
Central Region	10,478.0	160,685	20,734.0	31,212.0	17.6
East Central Region	13,454.5	172,444	7,529.0 ³	20,983.5	11.8
Southeastern Region	9,388.25	115,162	6,745.5	16,133.75	9.1
Western Region	2,237.5	34,358	8,784.5	11,022.0	6.2
Sub-total	49,433.75	\$ 644,119	62,544.0	111,987.75	63.2
GRAND TOTAL	363,900.50	\$3,823,891	269,162.40	632,063.40	356.9

¹Excludes Nottoway which was not open in FY 1984.

²Deep Meadow compensatory time not supplied to JLARC.

³Includes Chesterfield Community Corrections Unit.

Source: DOC overtime report; institutions.

bypasses the limit on staffing that is set by the funded level of security positions.

The Penitentiary, Powhatan, and James River routinely use extensive overtime. In FY 1984, the least amount of monthly overtime at the Penitentiary was 9,315 hours, or the equivalent on an annualized basis of about 61 FTEs. At Powhatan, the smallest monthly amount of overtime was 2,753 hours, which approximates an annualized 18.6 FTEs. James River's smallest monthly amount was 1,176 hours, or about eight FTEs. This was the only month that James River worked less than about 2,000 hours of paid overtime, or approximately 13.5 FTEs on an annualized basis.

The fact that these locations routinely staff at levels significantly above their funded security levels illustrates the

Table 15

MONTHLY OVERTIME AT TWO INSTITUTIONS
(FY 1984, in hours)

	Mecklenburg			Buckingham		
	<u>Paid</u>	<u>Comp</u>	<u>Total</u>	<u>Paid</u>	<u>Comp</u>	<u>Total</u>
July 83	0	1,992	1,992	0	1,592	1,592.0
Aug	0	0	0	0	0	0
Sept	0	2,040	2,040	36.5	1,864	1,900.5
Oct	0	1,984	1,984	0	2,064	2,064.0
Nov	0	6,096	6,096	0	6,352	6,352.0
Dec	0	3,012	3,012	118.5	2,964	3,082.5
Jan 84	0	4,016	4,016	177.5	4,408	4,585.5
Feb	11.25	2,032	2,043.25	443.5	2,088	2,531.5
March	18.0	0	18	0	0	0
April	292.5	0	292.5	1,077.0	0	1,077.0
May	877.5	1,864	2,741.5	165.0	2,048	2,213.0
June	<u>11,424.5</u>	<u>0</u>	<u>11,424.5</u>	<u>3,099.5</u>	<u>0</u>	<u>3,099.5</u>
TOTALS	12,623.75	23,036	35,659.75	5,117.5	23,380	28,497.5

Source: DOC overtime reports.


limitation of using funded levels to restrain staffing. As long as extensive overtime is approved and the expenditures are made to staff, in effect, at these higher levels, the funded level is relatively meaningless.

The variation in the use of overtime at different facilities is illustrated in Figure 2. While the Penitentiary consistently made use of extensive overtime in FY 1984, Mecklenburg's usage varied from almost no overtime in several months to more than 11,000 hours in one month. This graphic also illustrates that even if many additional positions were granted the Penitentiary, some overtime would still be worked.

The amount of additional staff time needed at the Penitentiary should diminish as it closes. However, DOC added positions to the Penitentiary in January 1985, and the regional administrator has indicated that it may be refilled with inmates in the balance of FY 1985. The JLARC assessment of staffing at the Penitentiary is based on conditions and staffing levels in place in the fall of 1984.

The level of recommended security staff at James River, Powhatan, and the Penitentiary does not incorporate any positions that are currently filled through routine use of overtime. Although these locations may be filling essential security posts through the routine use of overtime, DOC's overtime reporting system does not provide sufficient information to determine exactly how many FTEs may

Figure 2



be needed. Staffing at these locations should be closely linked to the recommended improvement in DOC's overtime reporting system. They should also be assigned a first priority for review when the system is implemented

Compensatory Time Conversion. A significant amount of compensatory leave accrued for working overtime was converted into cash payments to employees in June 1984. In that month, DOC paid employees \$312,928.15 for 41,213.75 hours of compensatory leave time.

This was a somewhat unusual procedure in that the decision was made to pay cash for overtime after the overtime had been worked. The normal procedure is for management to offer employees the option of compensatory leave or payment before the extra time is actually worked.

Although it was unusual, the payment appears to have been in accord with statewide policy on overtime. The paid overtime column in Tables 14 and 15 presents data for each facility with this compensatory leave payment subtracted out since the hours worked are already shown in the compensatory leave column, and the amount paid is included in that column.

Reasons for Overtime. Interviews with wardens helped clarify some of the non-emergency reasons why overtime is necessary. The most frequently-mentioned reason for the use of overtime was to fill security posts that were vacant due to leave-taking or absenteeism. Some posts, such as transportation, may routinely work overtime.

Several wardens also indicated that transporting inmates to facilities in or near Richmond for medical treatment or for other services requires overtime. A transportation run from Marion or Bland, for example, could easily require more than eight hours just to make the round trip. Because two officers are normally required for a trip, the amount of overtime paid may mount quickly. To reduce this expense, facility staff try to schedule several inmates for each trip.

DOC's Overtime Policy

The department's overtime policy provides that it shall be allowed only for bona fide emergencies (the policy mentions escapes and disturbances as examples) or for ensuring coverage of security posts. The policy also sets out categories of employees who are eligible in differing ways for time-and-a-half compensation, straight-time payment, or compensatory leave.

Basically, correctional officers and corporals (and higher ranking security staff upon authorization of the Director) may earn time-and-a-half payment if they physically work time in excess of 40 hours per week, not counting any holidays or other leave taken during the week. Consequently, if a work week includes a holiday, a security employee must work the holiday plus 40 hours before he begins to collect time-and-a-half. Up to that point he collects regular or straight time. Compensatory leave may be granted in lieu of monetary payment when authorized by the deputy director.

Another important feature of DOC's overtime policy is that employees may be "drafted" and required to work overtime in bona fide emergencies or if necessary to ensure a security shift is covered. Failure to comply with this draft is grounds for disciplinary action in accordance with the State's Standards of Conduct.

The use of this draft feature is sometimes extensive and difficult. Twenty-six individuals, for example, were drafted to work at James River Correctional Center over Labor Day weekend in 1984. In this case, the watch commander stated that he knew some people had avoided the draft by not answering their home telephone or by leaving their home altogether.

Two problems with the overtime policy are: (1) the extent of discretion about and variation in what constitutes a "security shift" for which overtime may be paid; and (2) a monitoring mechanism

which does not identify overtime worked due to emergencies separately from overtime worked to fill essential security posts.

Discretionary Overtime

DOC's policy provides that all overtime allowed must be either for emergencies or for covering security shifts. Ostensibly, any overtime worked to cover security shifts is time "needed."

Each warden appears to have broad discretion in determining whether a given post is essential to security for purposes of paying overtime. Some wardens have attempted to minimize their use of overtime, while others have expressed a willingness to pay "whatever it takes" to fill security posts they deem essential. The following examples illustrate this discretionary use of overtime.

Two towers at St. Brides had not been staffed on the day shift until the summer of 1984. At that time the warden determined, partly in response to the department's renewed emphasis on security, that he would pay employees overtime in order to fill these posts.

The warden at James River told JLARC that he recently began filling seven new posts either through use of overtime or by pulling officers off other posts. These actions were in response to DOC's renewed emphasis on security, he said. One post (assigned to accompany an "A" custody inmate who delivers milk to a number of locations in central Virginia) filled through overtime had previously been filled with a nonsecurity employee -- a farm manager.

The Southeast regional administrator told JLARC in mid-1983 that he had insisted that facilities in his region reduce or eliminate overtime. He had charted regional overtime, and discussed it at staff meetings. Overtime declined substantially under this regional practice.

As noted in the post audit review, not all facilities have developed post audits which specify the essential security posts. It also appears that posts which are considered essential to security at one location may be considered nonessential at another location. Because this variation exists, the potential also exists for one warden to authorize overtime for a specific job when a different warden might decide not to use overtime for the same job.

Some overtime that is worked apparently is not reported. For example, the Staunton warden told JLARC that she had been able to persuade security staff to work additional time but not to expect any compensation.

Other wardens keep their overtime down in other ways. Staff at two major institutions (Buckingham and Marion) told JLARC that the wardens preferred to close down an activity and the corresponding security posts rather than pay overtime.

Monitoring Overtime

The current overtime monitoring mechanism within DOC does not distinguish the purposes for which overtime is worked. Each facility provides payroll and summary information about overtime to the regional and central offices. However, these reports do not specify why overtime was worked. Consequently the central office does not know how much overtime was worked because of emergencies, and how much was required to ensure that routine but essential security posts were covered. The fact that essential security posts are not always identified on post audits, as discussed previously, further clouds the question of whether overtime was used appropriately.

Overtime that is worked in an emergency situation, such as for an escape, disturbance, or urgent medical treatment, appears to be the most appropriate use of overtime. The unpredictable nature of such contingencies precludes assigning positions sufficient to cover all such situations. Additionally, emergency-related overtime tends to be completed within a month or so of the event, meaning that converting such overtime into FTEs would be inappropriate.

By reporting overtime worked due to emergencies separately from overtime worked to fill permanent security posts, DOC could develop the kind of information necessary to support a staffing request. DOC should develop and implement clear criteria for the use of overtime at the adult institutions. Overtime that is used to cover emergencies or that is used for nonessential duties should be identified specifically on reports prepared by facilities. This overtime should not be included when converting hours worked into hours of needed staff time. The General Assembly can then consider whether a staffing request based upon overtime worked to ensure coverage of essential security duties is justified.

Recommendation (12). DOC should modify its overtime reporting system to separately identify overtime worked for emergencies and overtime worked to cover essential security posts (whether the overtime is compensated by payment or by leave time).

UTILIZATION OF SECURITY STAFF

Most of DOC's security staff are assigned to posts requiring extensive face-to-face contact with inmates. Duties in housing units, recreation yards, mess halls, support services units, and the like are clearly front-line security functions.

Each facility also has some security posts that are quasi-security in nature, performing some security duties and some administrative duties. These include such positions as training officers, count officers, adjustment committee officers, inmate grievance officers, and operations supervisors. A review of these positions found that although each facility requires some of these functions be carried out, not all locations have staffed them in a comparable manner. In addition, the rank assigned to these positions may vary from one facility to the next.

Each location also has some security posts which are essentially nonsecurity in nature, such as canteen or mail officers. Some other posts make a questionable contribution to security. Several wardens pointed out that in most cases these duties are generally necessary for operating an institution, but need not be carried out by security employees. The Board of Corrections study committee on Mecklenburg also commented on the extent of this practice, and noted that in some cases it has a negative impact on the morale of correctional staff.

In some instances security staff are being used for basically nonsecurity duties because the nonsecurity employees previously performing the duties were cut in recent staff reductions. There appears no compelling reason for correctional officers to perform some of these tasks. Nonsecurity staff could be used to perform some of the duties at less cost. In addition, the number of posts assigned these duties appears to vary without regard to workload.

Administrative Posts

A review of post audit listings at 15 major institutions found that certain administrative duties, such as serving on adjustment committees or counting inmates, are performed by personnel of differing ranks and that the duties are staffed by varying numbers of employees. Table 16 shows the results of the review. At some prisons, the post audit listings show no posts for some of these administrative duties. In these cases, an officer from another post is apparently pulled off temporarily to carry out the function. The function is thus performed, but a full-time post has not been established to carry out the duties.

The fact that so much variation exists in whether these tasks are full-time or part-time may reflect the discretion permitted each warden in determining security staffing needs. For each function, DOC should establish a policy or staffing standard which would link objective indicators of workload -- such as the number of grievances filed by inmates, or the number of adjustment committee hearings held -- to the need for full-time personnel to perform these duties. Greater uniformity should be the objective of each standard.

Count Officer. This position is responsible for coordinating counts done of inmates at various times during the day,

Table 16

SECURITY STAFF ASSIGNED TO ADMINISTRATIVE POSTS
IN MAJOR INSTITUTIONS

	<u>Count Officer</u>	<u>Hearing Officer¹</u>	<u>Training Officer</u>	<u>Inmate Grievance Officer</u>
Bland	--	1 lt.	1 lt.	1 lt.
Brunswick	--	--	1 sgt.	--
Buckingham	1 c.o.	1 sgt.	1 lt. 1 cpl.	--
Deerfield	--	1 lt.	1 lt.	--
James River	1 c.o.	--	1 sgt.	1 c.o.
Marion	--	1 lt.	1 lt.	--
Mecklenburg	--	--	1 lt.	2 c.o.
Nottoway	--	1 lt.	1 lt.	--
Penitentiary	1 cpl./c.o.	1 lt.	1 sgt.	2 c.o.
Powhatan	1 sgt.	1 lt. 1 c.o.	1 lt.	--
Southampton	--	1 lt./capt.	1 lt.	--
St. Brides	1 c.o.	1 lt. 1 sgt. 1 c.o.	1 lt.	2 c.o.
Staunton	1 cpl.	1 capt.	1 lt.	1 cpl.
Womens Cntr.	--	--	1 sgt.	--
YOC	--	1 c.o.	--	1 sgt./cpl.

Key: c.o. = corrections officer
 cpl. = corporal
 sgt. = sergeant
 lt. = lieutenant
 capt. = captain
 -- = filled on a part-time basis

¹Also called adjustment committee post.

Source: Institutional post audits.

and often for keeping track of where each inmate is assigned during the shift. This function is performed at all facilities, but it is not always a full-time post.

At six of the 15 institutions the count officer is assigned full time to one security post. At the other nine facilities, the function is picked up on a part-time basis by other security staff.

The rank of personnel assigned to count inmates varies from a correctional officer (at four locations) to a corporal (two locations) and a sergeant (one location).

Hearing Officer. These posts chair or sit on adjustment committees which hold hearings on charges against individual inmates for infractions of institutional rules. In the July 1984 reduction of 201 positions department-wide, one inmate hearing officer position was eliminated at each adult institution.

The four facilities without full-time security positions assigned this duty are at locations where the need for the duty is probably higher than some facilities which retained hearing officers. These include Mecklenburg and Brunswick, where the number of hearings held each year is high.

Training Officer. All but one facility has full-time security positions to coordinate all training for security staff, and often to perform the institutional training. The facility which lacks a full-time training officer draws on nearby major institutions for this function. The rank of training officer varies from sergeant (at four locations) to lieutenant (ten locations).

Grievance Officer. DOC has established an elaborate grievance procedure for inmates. A federal judge has ruled that the steps in this procedure must be exhausted prior to hearing the grievance in court.

The process is heavily used. Between January and June 1983, 11,245 grievances were filed by inmates. Of this total, 9,854 or 88 percent were resolved within the institution where the grievance originated. Clearly, dealing with inmate grievances is a major task at all locations.

Seven major institutions have assigned this task to full-time security staff. The other locations assign the duty either on a part-time basis to security personnel, or to nonsecurity staff.

Recommendation (13). For the functions performed by count officers, adjustment committee officers, training officers, and inmate grievance officers, DOC should establish a policy or staffing standard which would link objective indicators of workload -- such as the number of grievances filed by inmates, or the number of adjustment committee hearings held -- to the need for full-time personnel to perform these duties. The policy or standard should also specify what rank of security officers should be assigned. Greater uniformity should be the objective of the standard.

Transportation Staffing

Eighty security posts at major institutions are involved in some type of transportation duties, according to post audits submitted to JLARC. As Table 14 indicates, 81.84 FTEs at the major institutions primarily transport inmates.

Due to the emergency nature of much inmate transportation, these posts may understate the amount of staff time spent

transporting inmates. Additional staff are frequently pulled from other duties in order to drive or escort inmates to a medical facility or other correctional institution.

Perhaps because each warden is permitted a relatively free hand in determining the need for posts and staff, the distribution of transportation staff appears unrelated to the distribution of inmates. While there is without question a substantial requirement for transportation within DOC's network of facilities, it does not appear that the department has attempted to operate its transportation services in a consistent fashion.

As Table 17 indicates, the ratio of inmates to transportation posts ranges from a low of approximately 47-to-1 at Deerfield and Mecklenburg, to a high of 421-to-1 at St. Brides. Even excluding Deerfield and the Penitentiary, which operate transportation pools for other facilities, the range of transportation staffing appears excessive.

There also appears to be limited consistency between facilities in the hours and days transportation staff are available. Three facilities -- Southampton, Buckingham, and the Women's Center -- have staffed transportation as a 7-day per week post, while the remaining 11 facilities have staffed this duty as a 5-day per week post. It is not clear what distinguishes the transportation needs of the two groups of facilities. One facility (Buckingham) has staffed its transportation duties as 16-hour, 7-day posts, giving it the most complete coverage of any facility. However, there appears no reason why transportation needs at Buckingham require a higher staffing level than at other facilities. Similarly, Southampton has two 8-hour, 5-day transportation posts as well as two 8-hour, 7-day posts, thus providing a higher staffing level than at other locations without a clear rationale.

Distance from Richmond, where many centralized functions (such as major medical care at MCV, or the principal reception and classification center at Powhatan) are located does not appear to be a key factor in explaining the wide variation in transportation staffing. Thus Bland, the most distant major institution at more than 275 miles from Richmond, has about the same inmate-to-transportation post ratio as Buckingham, which is about 60 miles from Richmond. St. Brides has the fewest staff for transportation, although it is more than three hours from the central facilities in the Richmond area.

Recommendation (14). DOC should review the assignment and use of transportation staff at adult facilities. Staffing standards should be developed which take into account such factors as distance from medical and classification centers, and the number of inmates at each facility. DOC should also review scheduling of trips between services and facilities in order to identify any additional efficiencies which may be available by routine scheduling of daily trips.

Table 17

TRANSPORTATION POSTS AT MAJOR INSTITUTIONS

	<u>Number Posts</u>	<u>Hrs./ Days</u>	<u>Positions¹</u>	<u>Inmates per Post²</u>
Penitentiary	2 officers	8/5	2.40	(435) ³
St. Brides	1 officer	8/5	1.20	421
Powhatan	1 supervisor	8/5	1.20	189
	2 officers	8/5	2.40	
Bland	1 supervisor	8/5	1.20	148
	2 officers	8/5	2.40	
Buckingham	1 supervisor	16/7	3.36	137
	3 officers	16/7	10.08	
Southampton	4 officers	2-8/5	2.40	118
		2-8/7	3.36	
Women's Center	3 officers	8/7	5.04	110
Staunton	5 officers	8/5	6.00	103
Brunswick	1 supervisor	8/5	1.20	93
	6 officers	8/5	7.20	
Youthful Offender Center	1 officer	8/5	1.20	79
James River	1 supervisor ⁴	8/5	1.20	78
	3 officers	8/5	3.60	
Nottoway	1 supervisor	8/5	1.20	77
	6 officers	8/5	8.40	
Marion	2 officers	8/5	2.40	72
Mecklenburg	6 officers	8/5	7.20	47
Deerfield	<u>6 officers</u>	8/5	<u>7.20</u>	<u>(47)³</u>
TOTALS	58 posts		81.84	Average = 119

¹Staffing needs as shown on the facility's post audit.

²Average daily population (FY 84) divided by total transportation officer and supervisor posts. Excludes three trash truck and 19 escort posts. Nottoway population of 539 as of mid-December, 1984.

³Operates a transportation pool for other major institutions. See text.

⁴Position also assigned other duties.

Source: Institutional post audits.

Mailroom officers

Every major institution assigns a correctional officer or corporal to screen and deliver mail to inmates. According to DOC staff these mailroom positions must be certified correctional officers because they screen incoming inmate mail for contraband, as specified in division guidelines, and often deliver mail directly to inmates.

The workload of the mail officers, measured by the number of inmates per officer, varies across a wide range. As Table 18 indicates, the highs are 473 inmates per mail post at Southampton and 445 inmates per mail post at Bland. The lows are 79 at the Youthful Offender Center and 142 at Mecklenburg.

Some facilities have assigned additional duties to their mail officers, but this practice does not appear to vary based on the size of the inmate population. For example, Bland also has the mailroom officer handling inmates' personal property, although the number of inmates for this officer is the second highest in the system. Similarly, the mailroom officer at the Youthful Offender Center, at the low end of the range, also handles the facility's armory.

The rank of officer assigned to handle mail varies from correctional officer to correctional corporal, as shown in Table 18. At one location (the Women's Center) a corporal is assigned to mailroom duties. At four locations corporals are assigned to supervise either one or two officers in the mailroom. At the remaining locations, officers handle mailroom duties. At the Penitentiary a correctional officer and three clerk C's are assigned to the mailroom.

The shifts worked by mailroom officers vary as well. At five locations this duty is assigned to an 8-hour, 7-day post, even though the U.S. Postal Service operates only six days a week. At six facilities, mailroom duties are assigned to an 8-hour, 6-day post, and at five correctional centers the job is carried out by an 8-hour, 5-day post.

The mailroom function could be performed in a less costly manner by nonsecurity staff. At least one major institution (the Penitentiary) uses nonsecurity personnel under the supervision of a corporal to handle mail. Using clerks or clerk messengers (at pay grade 2, \$8,853 - 12,102) instead of correctional officers (at pay grade 6, \$12,644 - 17,273) to handle mail would achieve a significant savings in personnel expenditures.

Recommendation (15). DOC should review the assignment of security personnel as mailroom officers at the major institutions. DOC should staff this function, which is nonsecurity in nature, with an employee classified as a clerk or clerk-messenger. The number of positions assigned should be based on a workload measure such as the

Table 18.

MAIL OFFICERS AT MAJOR INSTITUTIONS

	<u>Number Posts</u>	<u>Rank</u>	<u>Hrs./ Days</u>	<u>Employees</u> ¹	<u>Inmates per Mail Room Post</u>
Southampton	1	c.o.	8/6	1.44	473
Bland	1 ²	c.o.	8/7	1.68	445
St. Brides	1	c.o.	8/6	1.44	421
Women's Center	1	cpl.	8/7	1.68	329
James River	1	c.o.	8/5	1.20	311
Powhatan	3	2 c.o. 1 cpl.	8/6	4.32	304
Deerfield	1 ²	c.o.	8/5	1.20	282
Buckingham	2	c.o.	8/7	2.88	274
Staunton	2	c.o.	1-8/5 1-8/6	2.64	257
Brunswick	3	2 c.o. 1 cpl.	8/7	5.04	217
Penitentiary ³	1	c.o.	8/5	1.20	217
Nottoway ⁴	3	1 cpl. 2 c.o.	8/7	5.04	180
Marion	1	c.o.	8/6	1.44	143
Mecklenburg	2	1 c.o. 1 cpl.	8/6	2.88	142
Youthful Offender	1 ²	c.o.	8/5	1.20	79
TOTALS	24			35.28	Average = 272

Key: c.o. = corrections officer
 cpl. = corporal
 sgt. = sergeant
 lt. = lieutenant
 capt. = captain
 -- = filled on a part-time basis

¹Staffing needs as shown on the facility's post audit.

²Additional non-mail duties are assigned to this post.

³This post supervises three nonsecurity employees who handle mail. All four are included in the workload calculation.

⁴Nottoway population of 539 (as of mid-December 1984) used in calculation.

Source: Institutional post audits supplied during 1984; JLARC analysis.

number of inmates at the facility. This may mean adjusting the number of such positions at some locations.

Canteen Officers

Nine facilities have security staff working full time in the inmates' canteen (sometimes called commissary). They dispense merchandise to inmates, stock items, and record transactions. There is a legitimate need for security staff to monitor inmates standing in line at the canteen, but the use of officers to actually stock and dispense items appears to be unnecessary. Nottoway, for example, uses the nonsecurity positions of store manager and storekeeper supervisor to operate its canteen.

Eight facilities with full-time commissary posts staff them with one correctional officer or corporal. Powhatan has two full-time posts.

Practices vary, but a review of the post orders of canteen officers indicates that monitoring inmate behavior is not the primary duty of these officers. The post orders typically emphasize purchasing, stocking, pricing, and accounting activities, not inmate management duties. Nonsecurity positions such as storekeeper supervisors or store managers (pay grades 5 and 3, respectively) are more appropriate for these duties than correctional officers (grade 6, \$12,644 - 17,273) or corporals (at grade 7, \$13,826 - 18,886).

Recommendation (16). Where such duties amount to a full-time job, DOC should assign the job of purchasing, pricing, stocking, and dispensing merchandise to nonsecurity staff. A storekeeper supervisor or store manager may be more appropriately assigned these duties.

Switchboard Operator

At three major institutions correctional officers are assigned to work primarily as telephone receptionists. In some cases these duties involve only receiving calls from outside and relaying them to the requested employee inside, and in other cases these duties are combined with others such as supervising a small nearby armory, or placing calls for inmates and keeping track of who the inmates are calling.

St. Brides, for example, combines its mail clerk with switchboard duties, and assigns both jobs to a correctional officer in an eight-hour, six-day post. Powhatan has assigned two 24-hour, seven-day posts the duties of operating the command and communications center. According to the post order, the Powhatan posts:

operate telephone consoles, telecopiers, and the radio base station; dispatch security and general

use vehicles; and insure security of the command center in the absence of the command center sergeant.

The command center at Powhatan is located in the administration building, outside the institution's perimeter fence.

Some facilities use nonsecurity employees for these same duties. Staunton, for example, has a temporary (P-14) receptionist who handles all incoming phone traffic. The Penitentiary uses a clerk "C" to answer telephones.

Where these duties occupy a significant portion of an officer's time, a nonsecurity employee such as a clerk or receptionist could handle the duties in a less costly manner. A clerk "C", for example, is at pay grade 4 (\$10,587 - 14,454), whereas a correctional officer is at pay grade 6 (\$12,644 - 17,273).

Recommendation (17). At all facilities DOC should assign nonsecurity personnel, such as a clerk or receptionist, to the duties of switchboard operator and communications operator.

Employees' Mess Hall

Each correctional center has an employees' mess hall, separate from the mess hall used by the inmates. Employees may purchase a meal for \$1.30, generally by paying the cash in the business office and receiving a meal ticket.

How meal tickets are taken in employees' mess halls varies significantly. JLARC staff observed correctional officers assigned this duty during visits at James River, Southampton, and the YOC. Powhatan uses a 24-hour, seven-day post (the equivalent of approximately 5 FTEs) to take meal tickets. At the other extreme, Staunton simply has a clipboard where employees leave their meal tickets and sign in. An assistant warden at Staunton remarked, "If an officer wants to risk his job for a \$1.30 meal ticket, then that's his business."

Between these extremes, JLARC staff observed various classifications assigned to take meal tickets. Buckingham assigned a secretary to take tickets for about two hours during the busiest period. Bland and Brunswick had inmates taking employees' meal tickets.

Although officers are sometimes used to take employees meal tickets, this appears to be an unnecessary duty. The chief purpose of issuing and collecting meal tickets is to ensure that each employee's meal is properly paid for. This objective does not appear to be achieved in a cost-effective manner. The extreme case is probably Powhatan. All 380 security positions at Powhatan could be provided a free meal every day for an annual cost of approximately

\$128,440. Currently the cost of taking meal tickets is \$105,000 (5 x \$21,000, the midpoint of the correctional officer salary + benefits range). Consequently, at Powhatan an estimated \$105,000 is being spent in order to collect no more than \$128,440. Actually, the collected revenue may be less than this amount because many employees do not purchase lunches.

Even using an officer for a few hours every day seems unnecessary, since employees should present no security threat.

Recommendation (18). DOC should use a less staff-intensive means of collecting employees' meal tickets. Consideration should be given to implementing Staunton's method at all locations.

Personal Property and Clothing Officers

At 12 prisons, one or more full-time posts are established to oversee the inmates personal property. These posts' duties are carried out by security staff -- most often by correctional officers. In many cases, the property staff also issue institutional clothing to inmates. In two prisons, a full-time post is also established to operate the clothing room.

The duties of the personal property officers are to inventory and search all new inmates' property, search property which arrives during the inmates' terms, and keep records on these items.

Most prisons have one full-time personal property post. However, some variations exist -- the Youthful Offender Center has no full-time post for this function; the Penitentiary has three posts. Variation also exists in the number of days per week that these posts are filled. Five prisons have eight-hour, seven-day property posts; and seven have eight-hour, five-day posts.

Most institutional staff interviewed by JLARC stated that security staff are needed in these positions because the property must be searched for contraband. However, nonsecurity staff could be trained to search for contraband and could be employed at less expense to the State.

Recommendation (19). DOC should replace the personal property and clothing room security staff with nonsecurity positions -- store managers or storekeeper supervisors (pay grades 3 and 5, respectively).

Truck Operators

Four prisons employ security staff to drive trucks, usually for the purpose of transporting garbage. Of the four posts, two are eight-hour, seven-day and two are eight-hour, five-day posts. The security staff assigned to these posts are usually responsible for

picking up trash from the institution, hauling it to a landfill or other facility, and maintaining their vehicles. The officers do not normally supervise inmates on these posts.

This function should be carried out by nonsecurity staff such as highway equipment operators. The State could achieve savings by hiring nonsecurity staff. The highway equipment operator classification, for example, starts at pay grade 3.

Recommendation (20). DOC should use nonsecurity staff such as highway equipment operators instead of security personnel to drive sanitation vehicles.

Dog Handlers

Seven security staff at six separate facilities (Powhatan, James River, Buckingham, St. Brides, Bland (2), and Southampton) are assigned to work with bloodhounds and other tracking dogs. In addition, at least one field unit (Halifax) has assigned an officer to work part-time with dogs.

The primary duty of dog handlers is to train and work with tracking dogs used in locating escapees. Security staff are needed for this job, in the department's view, because they are trained in handling weapons and in how to deal with the escaped inmate when apprehended.

JLARC found that the amount of time officers actually spend on a daily basis working with dogs varies. For example, the dog handler at James River was observed picking up the institution's daily mail on the day of the JLARC visit. These officers are also used to make transportation runs as well as a variety of other security duties, as at Southampton:

According to the post order, Southampton's dog handler performs other duties until mid-afternoon, at which time he begins to work with the animals. On the other hand, Bland's two dog handlers apparently work virtually full-time with the dogs, working other duties only if they happen to be assigned to work weekends, when they work in the visiting room.

Recommendation (21). Security staff assigned to work with and train tracking dogs should be located closer to where most of the demand for their services occur -- the field units. DOC should review the number and location of dog handler positions to determine whether the activity could be carried out more economically. Consideration should be given to regionalizing these positions and relocating them if necessary.

SECURITY STAFFING AT THE MAJOR INSTITUTIONS

Adequate staffing and security are key ingredients in the operation of a prison. The JLARC review found a near-unanimous point of view among prison wardens that their facilities are not currently staffed at adequate levels. Wardens at the 15 major institutions told JLARC that a total of 425 additional security positions are needed to adequately staff existing facilities - a 14 percent increase over current levels.

JLARC staff reviewed the wardens requests position by position. Every major institution was visited, and each warden and his staff was asked to specify the number, purpose, and location of each requested security position. Each facility was thoroughly toured, and an extensive amount of information was collected and reviewed about each institution.

Requests at all locations were assessed in accord with nine criteria. Additional facility-specific factors were also considered. Each facility's request was considered in light of its post audit listing, comparisons with staffing practices at other major institutions, and DOC's 1984-86 Supplemental Amendment (budget) Proposal.

The JLARC staff concludes, based on this review, that some new security positions for the major institutions are justified. although the major prisons are by and large adequately staffed. Some new security positions may be warranted to offset use of overtime by several institutions. However, as discussed earlier, DOC's current overtime reporting system does not distinguish overtime worked for emergencies from overtime worked to routinely fill essential security posts. When the department corrects this problem, the need for additional positions based on use of overtime may be clearer.

Institutional Staffing Analysis

The JLARC review focused on existing mission, programs, and activities at each institution. No attempt was made to assess the numerous changes in mission and programs that were recently proposed at many facilities. Some of these proposals related to department-wide staffing practices, and others appeared to have no clear staffing impact.

Many wardens wanted to increase the number of inmate work crews which work outside the institution. Because this relates to a system-wide policy question about the nature and extent of inmate employment, JLARC identified each position requested for additional work crews, but did not recommend these positions be approved. If the General Assembly wishes to increase inmate

employment at the institutions, then the additional security staff identified in each facility description should be considered.

Other changes may impact staffing, but wardens could not always say how. For example, several facilities were assigned to handle parole violators in 1984. One warden said this would increase his need for staff, yet did not request additional staff for this purpose. Another warden said adding parole violators would not affect staffing.

The JLARC review assessed the level of security positions existing at the time of the review as well as the wardens' new requests. Existing positions were assessed using several methods, including:

- comparison with staffing practices at other locations,
- analysis of post audits,
- analysis of how posts are currently utilized,
- observation of many posts, and
- determination of whether technological alternatives could be used in place of staff.

These methods were used to determine whether there was convergence about the appropriateness of current staffing levels at the institutions.

JLARC also undertook a careful position-by-position review of the requested new positions, using several approaches. First, wardens, assistant wardens, security chiefs, watch commanders, and other institutional staff were interviewed and specifically questioned about their security staffing needs. Second, each prison was toured extensively, focusing specifically on the requested posts. Third, post audit listings, post orders, personnel and payroll records, and numerous other documents were reviewed for each location. Fourth, a set of nine criteria were applied systematically to each requested position. Each criterion was considered in determining whether a particular requested position should be recommended. Additional facility-specific criteria were also considered where appropriate. Finally, comparisons were made between institutions based on common practices observed at the institutions.

Adjustments made to the staffing level included applying the revised Sharp formula to the recommended posts, converting security staff performing nonsecurity duties into nonsecurity positions, and correcting misapplications of the Sharp formula. The final result was the recommended security staffing level.

Interviews. JLARC staff interviewed each of the top management-level individuals involved in security at each prison. Lengthy interviews were held with the warden, the assistant warden for security and operations, and the chief of security. The watch or shift commander was interviewed at most facilities, along with other staff such as the head nurse, the food services manager, and the maintenance foreman. Corrections officers and corporals were also interviewed at many locations.

The key interviews were with the the warden and assistant warden. They were asked numerous questions about their current and recommended security staffing levels. Questions included:

- whether they believed the current level of security staffing was adequate,
- the number and rank of additional security staff necessary to bring the facility up to an adequate staffing level,
- whether any new security posts should be established, and what duties these new posts would perform,
- whether they expected to request any additional security staff in the 1985 Session of the General Assembly,
- what procedures and criteria they used to determine that the new positions and posts were needed, and
- whether technological alternatives could be used instead of any existing or proposed staff.

The information gathered in the interviews was used as a basis for the analysis of each institution.

Tours. Each facility was toured extensively and for several purposes. The tours focused on existing security posts, on specific new security posts the warden was recommending, on design problems that contributed to the need for staff (whether current or proposed staff positions), and on specific security procedures. Escorted generally by an assistant warden or chief of security, JLARC staff went into housing units, perimeter towers, kitchens and mess halls, recreation and support service facilities, enterprise shops, tool rooms, and numerous other areas at each institution.

Utilization Review. The use of security staff was reviewed at each location. In several cases, wardens or other facility managers identified specific security positions which were, in their views, primarily performing nonsecurity duties. These activities included managing canteens, answering telephones, performing clerical duties, and handling mail. Post audit listings and post orders for every facility were then reviewed to identify other positions performing administrative or nonsecurity activities. Observation of current staffing was also important in assessing

utilization and in comparing staffing practices at different locations.

Document Review. Post audit listings, post orders, duty rosters, overtime and leave records, position requests, memoranda, and other documents were acquired and reviewed for every major institution. These were used to compare staffing practices and patterns across institutions, as well as to better understand the details of operations at each facility.

Criteria. Nine criteria were applied to staffing requests presented by wardens. The criteria, shown in Table 19, were applied in a systematic fashion at all institutions, and were carefully weighed in coming to a conclusion about each request. Facility-specific criteria were also used where they were applicable. For example, the review of Mecklenburg's staffing request took into account the four studies of that facility conducted since June, 1984.

Overview of Staffing Recommendations

The JLARC review occurred during the most security-conscious period in the history of the DOC system. Numerous actions to strengthen security were taken by DOC during 1984 in response to escapes and other emergencies. Nonetheless, the overall JLARC finding is that the system is, in general, adequately staffed. Although additional posts are recommended at some locations, a net reduction of 92.04 security positions below FY 1985 funded levels is recommended. This reduction results largely from the conversion of 89.20 security positions to nonsecurity classifications and a reduction of 54.15 positions as a result of a revision to the Sharp Formula. The net change is within four percent of the existing staffing level.

The results of the JLARC analysis are shown in Tables 20 and 21. Table 20 shows the system-wide security staffing level at the time of the review, the changes made in accord with the analysis (detailed in Chapter 4), and the level of security staffing recommended by JLARC. The difference between total staffing (security and nonsecurity) and the FY 1985 funded staffing level is also noted.

Table 21 shows the recommended change at each facility. Of the requested 425 additional security positions, the JLARC staff agreed that some were needed, although staffing at other locations could be reduced. A net reduction of 95.50 security positions can be achieved at nine facilities while still granting a total of 23.38 additional positions at six institutions. Overall, there would be a system-wide net loss of 72.12 security positions and an increase of 67 nonsecurity positions.

The wardens also requested numerous positions to reduce the amount of overtime at their facilities. JLARC does not recommend

Table 19

CRITERIA USED IN THE
ANALYSIS OF WARDENS' REQUESTS

1. Whether the requested positions are essential to facility security, as shown for example in documentation supporting the warden's request or by the warden's decision to fill the post immediately and pay overtime to do so.
2. Whether facility staff indicated that the level of serious incidents (assaults, robberies, escapes, etc.) occurring in the vicinity of the requested new position was sufficient to justify the position, and whether the new position could be expected to reduce the level of incidents.
3. Whether a broader, system-wide policy issue is addressed by the requested positions, such as the enhancement of security on work crews which go outside the perimeter or the reduction of overtime at the facility.
4. Whether the position is requested to compensate for a deficiency in the physical design of the facility.
5. Whether the nature or size of the inmate population has changed, or has shifted to consist more heavily of "C" custody cases or of inmates with special psychological or behavioral problems.
6. Whether a more balanced staffing pattern would be achieved by adding the requested positions, such as bringing the security staffing level in one housing unit up to the same level already in use at a comparable unit.
7. Whether the position is requested to perform duties which are not essentially security in nature.
8. For a requested supervisory position, whether the facility is toward either extreme of the range of the supervisor-to-subordinate ratio.
9. Finally, whether the additional positions appear to reasonably enhance facility security.

Source: JLARC analysis.

such action at this time but suggests continuing to use overtime to fill posts which DOC considers to be essential for security until better information on overtime practices is available. At that time, DOC should submit a request for additional positions based on overtime usage.

Table 20

STAFFING AT THE MAJOR INSTITUTIONS

<u>Security Staff</u>	<u>Positions</u>
Staffing at time of review	2,868.08
Recommended changes:	
Impact of revised Sharp formula	-54.15
Conversion from security to nonsecurity	-89.20
Correction for Sharp formula misapplication	-10.50
New security positions	+93.34
Deleted security positions	<u>-11.61</u>
Total changes	<u>-72.12</u>
Recommended security staffing subtotal	2,795.96
<u>Nonsecurity Staff</u>	
FY 1985 funded nonsecurity positions*	1,074.25
Recommended conversion of security posts into nonsecurity positions**	<u>+ 67.00</u>
Nonsecurity staffing subtotal	<u>1,141.25</u>
TOTAL STAFFING	3,937.21
<u>FY 1985 Funded Staffing Levels***</u>	
Funded security positions	2,888.00
Funded nonsecurity positions	<u>1,074.25</u>
Total funded positions	3,962.25
DIFFERENCE BETWEEN JLARC TOTAL & FUNDED LEVEL	-25.04

*Nonsecurity staff scheduled for JLARC review in 1985.

**Reflects conversion of 89.20 security positions, less application of the Sharp Formula in most instances.

***Funded levels as of November 30, 1984.

Source: DOC; JLARC analysis.

Table 21

SECURITY POSITIONS AT MAJOR INSTITUTIONS

<u>Institution</u>	<u>Security Positions at Time of Review</u>	<u>Total Adjustments</u>	<u>JLARC's Recommended Security Positions</u>
Bland	152.10	+ 0.44	152.54
Brunswick	277.44	+ 9.66	287.10
Buckingham	271.83	-11.60	260.23
Deerfield	144.22	- 6.13	138.09
James River ¹	92.00	- 7.22	84.78
Marion	131.23	- 1.41	129.82
Mecklenburg ¹	257.00	- 4.02	252.98
Nottoway	268.01	-14.81	253.20
Penitentiary	306.44	-16.56	289.88
Powhatan ²	362.49	-31.07	331.42
St. Brides	129.36	+ 3.33	132.69
Southampton ²	129.00	+ 2.83	131.83
Staunton	206.63	+ 6.69	213.32
Womens Center	88.92	+ 0.43	89.35
Youth Offender Center	<u>51.41</u>	<u>- 2.68</u>	<u>48.73</u>
TOTALS	2,868.08	-72.12	2,795.96

¹Higher levels of staffing at time of review were used in previous versions of this table due to problems with the post audits from these locations. See individual facility case studies in Chapter Four for more detail.

²Excludes security positions assigned to Reception & Classification Centers.

Note: For detailed discussions see Chapter Four.

Source: DOC; JLARC analysis.

Chapter 4 details the findings and recommendations of the JLARC review at each major institution.

Recommendation (22). The security staffing level of the major institutions should total 2,795.96. A total of 67 nonsecurity positions should be added to handle duties now assigned to security staff but more appropriately carried out by nonsecurity positions. No additional staff should be allocated for overtime until DOC can determine the extent to which it is used for emergencies and the extent to which it is used to cover essential security posts.

III. PRISON SECURITY PROCEDURES

In addition to a review of institutional staffing, JLARC directed the staff to give high attention to security procedures at the adult institutions. The JLARC review of security focused on policies, the department's structure to carry out policies, and the actual implementation of security procedures.

In a prison environment, most activities and actions are related to institutional security. Prison security procedures focus on two principal aspects of prison confinement: (1) perimeter security -- the network of fences, walls, towers, and gates intended to define the limits of the prison compound; and (2) internal security and control. Internal security is a broad category that includes almost all actions taken inside the perimeter which control and direct inmate behavior, and lead to a safe environment for staff and inmates. Internal security procedures include such items as the taking of head counts, cell searches, control of contraband, and inmate observation.

Although the department has implemented many positive changes during the last several years, it has become clear that policies and procedures concerning security must be strengthened and clarified; that the role of the regional offices needs to be better defined; and that training, supervision, and oversight are critical to the success of the department.

This chapter reviews DOC's security policy and procedures, and the administrative processes for formulating both. It also includes a review of specific security problems noted during facility reviews.

DOC SECURITY POLICY

To accomplish its mission of providing appropriate supervision to inmates, DOC has established policies and procedures which guide prison operations. DOC policy is intended to provide each institution with general guidance concerning important topics, while providing institutional managers the flexibility to respond to changing circumstances and inmate populations. Staff at each facility then develop specific operating procedures which apply department policy to their own operations.

JLARC's review indicates that DOC policy is under-developed and may not provide adequate guidance to institutions.

Sources of DOC Policy

Policy comes from both the department and the Board of Corrections, creating a sometimes complicated and confusing body of policy for institutional managers to implement.

Department Policies. The Department of Corrections has several layers of policy applicable to the institutions. The broadest is departmental policy, which applies to all units including the Youth Service Division and Community Corrections, as well as the Adult Services Division. These departmental policies cover a variety of basic administrative areas.

The next level of policy for the Adult Services Division is referred to as Division Guidelines (DGLs). DGLs are the main body of operating policies for the major institutions and field units. DGLs cover such topics as inmate discipline, personal property and checking accounts, emergency situations, and institutional records management.

Board-Initiated Standards. Code of Virginia §53.1-5 authorizes the Board of Corrections to make rules and regulations governing the operation of the prison system. In November 1983, the Board promulgated "Operational Standards for Adult Institutions." Many of the standards cover topics identical to the department's Division Guidelines, such as:

- segregation, isolation, and detention practices;
- legal and programmatic rights of inmates;
- use of the mail, telephone, and visiting;
- inmate classification;
- work programs; and
- release preparation and temporary release.

Problems With Multiple Sources. Having multiple sources of policy creates the potential for incomplete and inconsistent policy statements. It can also lead to confusion, especially when the different sources duplicate each other, contradict each other, or refer to non-existent policy. In some instances, the DGLs and Standards are somewhat redundant, although in a confusing manner:

Standard 4.9-6 states that there should be a formal count system within the institution which provides for at least one inmate count per shift.

DGL 411 states that during a shift change, a mandatory "major" count shall be accomplished by a correctional officer on the oncoming shift and by

a correctional officer on the shift being relieved.

Thus it is not clear whether the count done during a shift change is sufficient to meet the Standard.

In some cases, DGLs and the Standards actually contradict each other.

Standard 4.13-3 states that "to ensure the quality of medical care, each institution shall have documentation that a Medical Care Evaluation by the Office of Health Services has been performed every other year."

Department Policy 13-8.2 states that "The Office of Health Services shall require and oversee at least one medical care units [sic] per year in each major institution."

Although the intent of this sentence is apparently to require at least one medical care audit per year, the uncorrected typographical error further confuses the policy.

DGL 853 states that "except in emergencies such as institutional disorders, inmates are allowed to present their views to the public through the communications media."

Standard 4.14-3 reads that institutional operating procedures shall "provide that inmates are allowed to present their views to the public through the communications media, unless prohibited by security requirements."

In other cases, both the Standards and DGLs refer to policies which do not exist.

Standard 4.8-9 states that "furnishings in inmate living areas, including cleanable, non-toxic and flame retardant mattresses and pillows, are selected based on known fire safety performance characteristics and in conformance with departmental policy."

A check of both departmental policy and DGLs indicates that no policy exists. (The standard also cites several other sources, including the Code of Virginia, the American Correctional Association, the Life Safety Code, and the Federal Bureau of Prisons' Standards for Jails and Prisons.)

* * * *

DGL 411 restricts inmates in "B" and "C" custody institutions from using tools inside the security perimeter. However, no source defines the meaning of a "B" or "C" custody institution.

Having two separate sources of policy creates administrative problems for those who must implement the policies. In addition, in the case of litigation, it would be unclear which policy legally represents the official stance of the Commonwealth. One of the consultants who investigated the Mecklenburg escape noted:

It is critically important that all policies relating to security and custodial practice be drawn together into a comprehensive guide for staff throughout the system. The manual needs to detail policy and procedure in important areas such as key control, tool control, inmate accountability, transportation of prisoners, use of restraints, use of force, use of chemical agents, and many other related topics. Rather than simply recording and reorganizing what is being done at the present time, this is a prime opportunity to analyze the true needs of the system and its various elements.

This recommendation appears to be a reasonable response to problems with DOC's multiple policy sources.

Inadequate Policy

Although there are multiple sources of policy guidance within DOC, the overall thrust of policy has been to permit institutions a significant degree of flexibility in the administration of the facilities. JLARC's analysis of DOC security policy, however, indicates the number of specific written policies is minimal.

A review of the DGLs on security and control revealed that the institutions are operating with a minimal amount of division-wide or department-wide policy. Consequently, many vital security and security-related practices are carried out at the institutions without benefit of guidance from higher levels within DOC. Examples of these activities include:

- correctional officers' conduct,
- extent of inmate movement,
- custody level of inmates on outside work crews,
- use of progressive housing units,

- methods used to communicate changes in policy, and
- issuance of radios to security officers.

As a result, practices vary across institutions. Often, JLARC staff were told simply that "this is the way it is done at this institution."

DOC has no policy on who shall be issued a radio. At some institutions the majority of staff having contact with inmates carry radios. At other facilities it is common to find housing unit staff who do not carry radios.

The same is true with work crews. When a work crew consists of "B" custody inmates, the crews are accompanied by a correctional officer when they work outside the perimeter wall. In most cases, the officer has a firearm. Some gun gang officers do not have radios in their vehicles. In the event of an escape, they would first have to round up the other inmates and then would have to either use a public phone or return to the facility to report an escape.

This practice however, varies. At James River, officers in charge of outside work crews are in the opposite situation. They are issued radios rather than guns, and can only radio when an escape occurs. The warden said that the officers are not issued guns to protect the officers from any possible uprising of an inmate work crew against a lone correctional officer. The warden did not say how the officer would protect himself without a gun.

Without specific system-wide policies covering these practices, the implementation of important security procedures may vary to an excessive degree - sometimes in a fashion that may jeopardize public safety.

On June 29, 1984, two "C" custody inmates escaped from a paint crew that was working outside the perimeter wall of the Penitentiary. In the discussions which followed the escape there was confusion about whether the department's policy permitted inmates convicted of serious felonies, or inmates in "C" custody status, to work outside the perimeter. Two prison officials said that the use of maximum security felons clearly violated State policy. A check of DOC policies, guidelines, standards, and the Code of Virginia,

however, did not reveal any statement concerning the appropriate types of work assignments for inmates.

** * * **

At Smith Mountain Lake Field Unit an officer is normally assigned to a control room outside the perimeter when inmates move from the dorm to the mess hall. Inmates coming in from work crews outside the perimeter check in at the control booth on their way into the facility for meals. When JLARC visited the facility, the officer was assigned a rifle, the door to the control room was unlocked, and incoming inmates were stepping inside the room to check in. The inmates were within a few steps of the rifle, and potentially could have seized it and taken control of the institution. No policy or procedures prohibited inmate access to such control rooms outside the perimeter.

Such policy inconsistencies reflect inadequate central office direction. In some cases, wardens do not appear to have exercised proper independent judgement, potentially endangering their staff and the public.

Other Areas of Policy Concern

The review of department policy and DGLs revealed that there are a number of activities which occur on a daily basis for which there is no formal guidance. These activities occur in all the functional areas, and concern inmate movement. As a result, many procedures and activities are carried out according to local tradition, not department policy. While the procedures developed may be appropriate to the situation, they should also be reflected in the written policy of the Department.

For most inmates, the majority of their waking hours are spent either at work, in school, in recreation, or in other "functional areas" such as the infirmary or housing units. While at these locations, inmates are often under the general supervision of a correctional officer as well as the direct supervision of a nonsecurity employee. Such employees include enterprise and maintenance foremen, food services supervisors, RSA teachers, and nurses. No general body of policy has been developed outlining security practices to be followed in some of these functional areas.

There are no Division Guidelines regarding the security in the medical areas of the institutions. Common practices at the institutions which could be covered by security policy include (1) whether

inmates waiting to see the nurse should be kept in a locked waiting area, (2) whether the nurse should have an officer escort her through the compound when she makes rounds to isolation and segregation cells, and (3) who should be responsible for physically removing used needles from the medical area -- a nurse or a correctional officer.

** * * **

Division Guidelines state that tools must be controlled. The guidelines are fairly specific on how the tools should be handled, yet the policies do not provide any additional assistance to the maintenance foreman, who may understand woodworking or sewing but not security practices. JLARC staff observed that some foremen work closely with security staff to set up a security system, which might include the foreman in routinely shaking down inmates, and the officer in directing inmate activity. Not all foremen appear to be so security conscious, however. JLARC staff, for example, observed enterprise (and maintenance) areas where large piles of scrap metal and other materials were allowed to accumulate in areas where inmates worked.

Neither department policy nor DGLs provide guidance on inmate movement within the institutional perimeters. As a result, there is a wide variation in the amount of liberty an inmate has in moving about an institution. Many institutions have developed different strategies to control and direct inmate movement. These include:

- use of a pass system,
- internal fences to direct movement and prevent inmates from going into unauthorized areas,
- requiring inmates to return to their cells prior to going to the mess hall, and
- allowing cell doors to be unlocked for short pre-set times.

Although a number of institutions use some or all of these methods, inmates may still be allowed to move and gather about the institution in an unrestricted manner.

At the Brunswick Correctional Center, 93% of the inmates are "B" and "C" custody. They are allowed to move freely about the yard areas because there are not enough work assignments to keep most of the inmates employed for more than three or so hours a day. As a result, it is not uncommon to

see 200 to 300 inmates congregate in the small yard between buildings and another 100 or more in the recreation field at the same time.

* * * *

In contrast to the major institutions, most field units have inmates who are solely "A" and "B" custody. Inmate movement at most field units, however, is fairly restrictive. At Fluvanna Field Unit, for example, inmates who are not involved in a work assignment are confined to the facility's dormitory except for meals, recreation periods, and any special night-time activities.

When inmates at Fluvanna, Smith Mt. Lake, Halifax, and other field units move from the dorm to the kitchen facility, the dorm doors are unlocked and the inmates move to the mess hall under the observation of an armed officer. The kitchen door is then locked while the inmates eat their meal. After the meal, inmates as a group, move back to the dorm where they remain unless they have a work assignment, school, or a special night program or recreation.

Recommendation (23). DOC should undertake a thorough review of department policy to ensure that all security-related activities are covered in policy. As part of the review, DOC should eliminate contradictions or inconsistencies among the various sources of centralized guidance to the facilities and develop a single body of policy.

Recommendation (24). Each institution should have a complete and up-to-date set of institutional operating procedures. The procedures should cover all important security functions performed at the facilities. Regional staff should review the procedures for thoroughness, completeness, and technical accuracy.

Recommendation (25). DOC should develop comprehensive and detailed policies concerning security in functional areas such as the medical and housing units. Priority for policy development should be given to areas where inmates are employed, such as enterprises, maintenance, and food services. Security audits should include these areas to ensure compliance with department policy.

Role for Inspector General

The National Institute of Corrections consultants brought in to evaluate security procedures following the death row escape of May 31, 1984, made a strong recommendation for a semi-autonomous security specialist or inspector general who would oversee the security of the

institutions. However, what the consultants envisioned and what both the Board and Department of Corrections propose differ significantly.

Consultants' Recommendations. One of the consultants noted a number of items considered to be deficiencies at the Mecklenburg Correctional Center. Among these problems were a lack of supervision, inattention to detail and security procedures, and the lack of formal security audits and self-evaluations.

The consultant recommended that a system of agency and internal audits be developed to annually evaluate institutional quality, control, and compliance with policy. The consultant further recommended that the audits be conducted by a semi-autonomous security specialist or Inspector General:

The position will be a pivotal one in the development of policies, procedures and auditing practices, and in a great measure will determine the continued success of institutional functioning.

This specialist should develop policies and general procedural information for use in the field, but should not directly supervise field staff. To do so would circumvent the chain of command and deprive the warden of command authority over his or her own institution.

This position is seen as the prime mover in establishing the security manual recommended -- as well as the principal auditor of security activities in each institution. In auditing, this individual and any associated staff should report to the Director who will in turn convey the information to the Warden.

View of the Board. In its report on Mecklenburg, a Board of Corrections study committee stated that the Board, not the Department, should house and oversee the activities of the Inspector General. To support its view, the Board cited *Code of Virginia* §53.1-5, which gives the Board policy-making powers and charges the Board with the responsibility "to monitor the activities of the Department and its effectiveness in implementing the standards and goals of the Board."

The Board's study committee, in its report, also noted that Board membership consisted of part-time appointees, and that the Board had only a single full-time clerical employee. The Committee charged that the Board did not have sufficient help to fulfill its statutory responsibilities:

The key to successful Board oversight in the future is access to reliable information, the

availability of necessary staff, and an adequate, independent budget. The [Board's] study therefore believes strongly that the newly-created Inspector General position for DOC should be included in the Board's budget and should report directly to the Board.

Department's Plans. The Department has established the position of Inspector General as an Assistant Director who reports to the Director of Corrections. The Inspector General has three units to oversee and manage: the Corrections Investigation Unit, the Standards Development Unit, and the Internal Auditing Unit. The position was filled in January 1985.

The Standards Development Unit and the Internal Audit Unit previously reported to separate assistant directors. They were brought under the Inspector General because they perform review functions similar to the new section.

According to the position's job description, the new responsibilities call for the Inspector General to conduct inquiries into staff discipline and morale, and into departmental efficiency and economy by conducting inspections, investigations, audits, surveys, and studies as ordered by the director. The Inspector General is intended to maintain a liaison with the office of the Secretary of Transportation and Public Safety.

The Inspector General should play a key role in inspecting and auditing security practices and procedures at the adult facilities. The principal duties of the position should be limited to identifying breaches of security and gaps and problems in policy and procedure.

Recommendation (26). The Inspector General should have no line operations responsibility. The General Assembly may wish to establish the position in statute, with the responsibilities of the position carefully detailed. In addition, while the Inspector General may submit reports to both the Director and the Board of Corrections, he should be hired by and responsible to either the Board or the Secretary of Transportation and Public Safety. The salary of the Inspector General should be set in the Appropriations Act.

INSTITUTIONAL SECURITY MANAGEMENT

Policy and procedure are transmitted to the front line staff of DOC's facilities through a combination of training, past orders, and supervision. In the area of training, DOC has established a complex system intended to equip each correctional officer with the knowledge and skills necessary to effectively supervise inmates. One of the consultants called in after the Mecklenburg escape reviewed the department's centralized training program, and concluded that:

It is the view of this evaluator that DOC's Academy for Staff Development is one of the top few correctional training programs in the nation. The problems that have been identified are seen more in terms of "fine tuning" the Academy and should not be interpreted to imply that there is a need for extensive change in their current practices.

Although the consultant found the training program to be among the top programs nationally, suggestions were made to correct some deficiencies in training. JLARC's review of training identified several problems as well.

Post orders were found to vary considerably in terms of format, level of detail, and provisions for updating. DOC standards and guidelines need to better specify the contents of post orders.

Inadequate visibility of supervisors inside the facility and an inadequate number of supervisors were problems cited by another Mecklenburg consultant. A JLARC review of the ratio of supervisors to subordinates found that some institutions have relatively few supervisors, and others appear to be richly staffed. The locations with few supervisors deserve careful attention.

Training

The NIC consultant reviewed the overall adequacy of training available to the department. The consultant concluded that of all the factors relating to the Mecklenburg escape, training was secondary to management, saying that "no amount of training of staff, can by itself correct or overcome problems that arise from inadequate supervision." While training may not overcome all security problems, not all DOC staff receive the required minimum training.

Current Training Programs. The NIC consultant assessed the training program at the Academy for Staff Development in Waynesboro. The consultant found that the Academy, which has been in existence since 1977, was not only in compliance with the Department of Criminal Justice Services training standards but that:

The effort that has gone into developing such a wide range of fully documented training programs with sufficient logistical and financial support to conduct them, as planned, is a very significant accomplishment for correctional training programs. There are probably less than 10 correctional agencies in the nation that would have training programs of comparable variety, scope, quality, and quantity.

Several concerns were raised, however, by both the consultant and the Board of Corrections over the content of the material and the level of knowledge required to pass the examinations. The NIC-consultant investigating training stated that the Basic Correctional Training course must concentrate less on paramilitary tactics and more on basic policy. Further, the consultant stated that, to prevent complacency, the academy needs to take an active stance in encouraging critical thought among institutional staff. Correctional officers, according to the consultant, need to be taught to question authority, procedures, and policies.

The Board of Corrections raised additional concerns about the adequacy of the training of correctional officers. In the Board's report on Mecklenburg it was noted that:

Although basic training is a written prerequisite to an officer retaining his or her job, in practice few employees are screened out as a result of training at the Academy. In 1983-84, 97% of the officers attending basic training received passing grades. Of the 20 who failed, 16 successfully repeated the program.

In addition, the study committee raised questions concerning the minimum level of in-service training required of certified correctional personnel. The current requirement sets a minimum of between 24 and 40 hours of training (depending on rank) to be completed sometime during a two-year period. The study committee stated that:

Litigation involving institutions throughout the corrections system all appear to support the need for more frequent and substantive (in-service) training in the future.

The impact of any change should take into account the capacity of the Academy and any additional staffing requirements at the institutions.

Compliance with Minimum Requirements. According to §9-170 of the *Code of Virginia*, the Department of Criminal Justice Services is required to establish minimum training requirements to assure proper training of DOC security staff.

Two types of training apply to DOC security personnel -- basic and in-service training. Basic training must be completed within one year of employment. This consists of 80 hours of institutional training, and 120 hours of basic correctional officer's training, including weapons certification, at the Academy.

In-service training applies to individuals who are beyond the basic level. According to rank, different minimum requirements are established for security personnel. For example, the level of

required training for certified correctional officers, corporals, and sergeants is 24 hours once every two years. Security staff above the rank of sergeant are required to take 40 hours of training every two years.

A review of FY 1984 training records for a random sample of correctional staff, however, indicates that not all staff may be receiving the required minimum training. Taking into account the different levels of training required for different ranks, the number of staff at each level, and the turnover rate among correctional staff, the average annual time that sampled employees spent in training would be expected to be 48 hours. A review of the sample of security personnel found that the average annual training received was 33 hours, a difference of 15 hours. This means that training of security staff fell below the minimums set by the Criminal Justice Services Board.

For DOC to bring security staff up to the minimum training standards will require a strong management emphasis and the allocation of additional personnel hours, since the minimum required training is not currently reflected in historical data used to calculate the Sharp formula. An estimated 46,800 hours of training may be required to bring all staff up to minimum training requirements. This translates into the equivalent of 26 FTEs.

DOC should make a concerted effort to see that all staff receive the minimum required training. The JLARC revision to the Sharp formula was explicitly adjusted to ensure that adequate training time was provided in calculating staffing needs.

Recommendation (27). DOC should ensure that all security staff receive the required amounts of training. A review should be conducted on the content of the Basic Correctional Officers training course and the minimum passing requirements. Additional consideration should be given to the frequency and quantity of in-service training required of certified security staff.

Post Orders

Maintaining an appropriate level of security at the institutions depends primarily on how knowledgeable the "front line" officers are about their duty assignments. Post orders are a principal means by which these officers are informed about their detailed daily assignments as well as what to do in emergencies.

A post order is a specific job description that details the particular duties and responsibilities assigned to a security post. It provides information that guides the officer in most situations that could occur during a duty assignment. One of the consultants retained to study the Mecklenburg escape stated:

Staff cannot be expected to perform at their fullest potential unless performance expectations are clearly communicated to them. Given the nature of a correctional facility, this is best done through individual post orders that describe general routines of each post, as well as specific requirements on selected job tasks.

Post orders must be developed that are definitive, instructional, and specific, and staff must be trained in them and supervisors regularly assess their familiarity with them. They should contain specific chronologically organized information about the duties of each shift, as well as universally applicable information on such issues as hostage-taking, fire evacuation principles, and other critical correctional duties.

When this kind of information is in place, new or relief staff are in a much better position to operate the post, without having to rely on informal direction from peers, inmate suggestion, or pure intuition.

JLARC collected and reviewed post orders from each major institution and field unit. JLARC also interviewed key institutional staff about the contents of post orders and the measures they take to ensure compliance with the orders. On-site inspections of post orders were conducted to determine the accessibility of the orders to line staff.

Although DOC has general guidelines requiring post orders, the guidelines lack specifics on what should be included in the post orders. JLARC found that the types of procedures and the level of detail in post orders varied significantly from one institution to another.

Guidelines. Two general guidelines exist concerning post orders. Division Guideline 411, entitled "Correctional Posts and Procedural Orders," requires every institution to identify and have a set of procedural orders as well as a specific job analysis for every correctional post in the institution. The guidelines further state that the orders should include a list of emergency procedures.

The "Standards for Adult Institutions," adopted by the Board of Corrections in November 1983, also set out guidelines for post orders. Standard 4.9-2 requires that:

There is a written post order for each security post and a requirement for post officers to read and be familiar with the order before they assume the post.

It is important to note that the desired contents of post orders are not specified in the Standards or in the Division Guidelines, except for the requirement that emergency procedures be listed. As the consultant made clear, this minimal requirement is not sufficient for a job description which should convey an extensive amount of detailed information to a security officer.

Despite the lack of explicit guidelines about the contents of post orders, a review of post orders found that most adhere to a fairly standard format. Typical contents include the post's title, supervisor, location and area of control, equipment and weapons assigned, job summary, and specific duties.

As Table 22 shows, several categories of information are not consistently included in post orders. Emergency procedures and

Table 22

CONTENTS OF POST ORDERS

	<u>Percent With Information Indicated</u>
<u>Major Institutions (N = 12, N/A = 3)</u>	
Rank of officer	67%
Shift assignment	75
Emergency procedures	17
Important phone nos.	75
Weapons-special equipment	83
<u>Field Units (N = 20, N/A = 6)</u>	
Rank of officer	15
Shift assignment	50
Emergency procedures	10
Important telephone nos.	5
Weapons-special equipment	75
<u>All Facilities (Total) (N = 32, N/A = 9)</u>	
Rank of officers	34
Shift assignment	59
Emergency procedures	12
Important phone nos.	31
Weapons-special equipment	78

Note: N = Number of facilities providing post orders
 N/A = Number of facilities not providing post orders

Source: JLARC analysis of institutional post orders.

important telephone numbers, for example, are not consistently listed even though the Mecklenburg consultants thought these were very important.

The level of detail communicated by post orders also varies significantly. Under specific duties, for example, the specifications included statements such as "must be clean and trustworthy" and "must have the ability to prepare administrative reports, and communicate orally and in writing".

Some post orders convey little about the routine of the facility; others spell it out on almost a minute-by-minute basis. Where post orders say little about the normal routine, as in Exhibit 1, an officer transferred in on temporary assignment would find it difficult to know what to expect.

Post orders may also need to specify problem areas in the posts:

At Nottoway a post order for the tower at the front gate did not include any instructions to compensate for an apparent design defect in the tower. When JLARC staff toured the facility in April 1984, the warden pointed out the limited view from the tower. An escape which occurred on Thanksgiving evening, November 22, 1984, was due in part to the limited view afforded the officer on duty in the tower.

After the escape, the warden amended the post order to require the officer on duty to look out and down at the perimeter fence every ten minutes. This change in the post order could have led to detection of the escape had the warden implemented it sooner.

Post orders such as those shown in Exhibit 2, on the other hand, provide a detailed listing of what to expect during a shift.

That all post orders should reflect current duties would appear to be a minimum requirement. However, there does not appear to be uniform assurance that current duties are in fact shown in post orders. Of the 32 facilities which submitted post orders to JLARC, 20 (or 63 percent) contained dates indicating when they were last revised. At four of the 32 facilities, post orders were revised most recently in 1981 or earlier. Post orders should be reviewed by facility managers on a regular basis to ensure that the orders reflect current activities and assignments.

Completeness of Post Orders. JLARC interviewed institutional staff directly involved with the development and approval of post orders. Wardens, superintendents, and their assistants were asked about the importance of post orders to the

A. POST ORDER CONTAINING LITTLE DETAIL
ABOUT NORMAL ROUTINE

Date ___/___/___

TO: WISE CORRECTIONAL UNIT #018
FROM: UNIT ASSISTANT SUPERINTENDENT
SUBJECT: POST INSTRUCTIONS

TITLE: Post No. 3: Dormitory Control Space

SUPERVISOR: Shift Leader

AREA OF CONTROL: Segregation cells, control space and dormitory gates.

EQUIPMENT: Necessary keys and flashlight.

JOB SUMMARY: Observe officers and inmates in dormitory and inmates in segregation.

SPECIFIC DUTIES: Check solitary cells every hour and maintain a log of the time and by whom it was checked, if anyone is in detention or segregation.

Assist the nurse or shift leader in dispensing medications after 6:00 p.m.

NORMAL ROUTINE: Check segregation cells when coming on duty if anyone is in segregation or detention.

Wake inmates at 7:30 a.m. each morning.

Insure that beds are made properly.

Remain on your post at all times unless you have permission to leave or have been relieved.

Remain alert and observant at all times.

In case of fire or any unusual incident not covered by these instructions notify the officer in charge immediately.

APPROVED BY: _____
Assistant Superintendent

Exhibit 2

B. POST ORDER SHOWING DETAILS OF NORMAL ROUTINE

DEERFIELD CORRECTIONAL CENTER

POST ORDER #13

TITLE: Module Housing Unit Control Station 1 and 2
POST RANK: Correctional Officer
DUTY HOURS: Seven (7) days - Twenty-four (24) hours
OFFICER(S) PER POST: Two (2)
SUPERVISOR: Module Unit Housing Supervisor - Corporal
AREA OF CONTROL: Control station 1 and 2; Maintain surveillance of toilet area and trailers #1-#6 and all areas that are within sight of your post.
EQUIPMENT: Fire hose, 1-fire extinguisher, flashlight, keys, and telephone

IMPORTANT TELEPHONE NUMBERS:

Watch Commander ----- 220
Control ----- 224
Unit Manager ----- 220
Chief of Security ----- 456

JOB SUMMARY:

To keep visual contact with all areas of your post. To maintain constant surveillance for security infractions or rules and regulations. Report all incidents or unusual conduct of inmates to the module supervisor. Assist with counts and designated duties and assignments assigned to the module with full cooperation given to the module unit supervisor.

1. Man unit control station 1 and 2; keeping it secure and permitting no inmate access.
2. Provide constant surveillance over housing units within your sight.
3. Assist the module housing unit supervisor during count time, not permitting any inmate movement in your areas of control until count is completed.
4. Be constantly alert, observe inmate behavior and activities and report unusual movement or behavior to the Module Supervisor.
5. Permit no inmate or group of inmates to distract or block your vision from the areas of your responsibilities.
6. Immediately report any infractions of Module Unit rules and regulations to the Module Supervisor, and take necessary action in accordance with Division Guideline #861.

Exhibit 2
(continued)

7. Always pass on information to the Relieving Officer of your post in addition to advising other staff members when it is appropriate.
 8. Check with the Module Housing Unit Supervisor on problems that are beyond your area of ability.
 9. Cooperate with the Unit Manager when necessary to assist him.
 10. Enforce all security procedures in your area of responsibility.
 11. Comply with all Division Guidelines, Institutional Operating Procedures, and Administrative Policies of this institution.
-

GENERAL ORDERS:

1. Report all disturbances, incidents, fights, and acts of homosexuality immediately to the Module Housing Unit Supervisor.
 2. Log all unusual occurrences, file a written report stating date and time, and the procedure recommended in Division Guideline #861 for report writing: who, what, where, when, how, and why.
 3. Module Housing Unit keys shall remain in the possession of a certified correctional officer.
 4. Control Station A-1 will be kept neat and clean and meet all sanitation requirements by the correctional officers assigned to this post during their tour of duty.
 5. Perform any additional duties assigned by the Module Housing Unit Supervisor.
 6. Take no orders from any person under duress.
 7. If injured on post, contact the Watch Commander immediately for further instructions.
 8. Assist other correctional officers in emergency situations, such as fights, fires, escapes, unruly behavior, or injury.
-

NORMAL ROUTINE:

07:45 hours	Report for duty as scheduled, sign in, stand muster and inspection, and receive briefing from Watch Comander.
07:55 hours	B-shift relieves A-shift. Verify count, equipment, check all locking devices, and exchange information with your relief.
11:45 hours	Assist Module Supervisor with count.
12:00 hours	General population goes to lunch.
13:15 hours	All inmates will be in their respected areas.
15:45 hours	C-shift reports for duty as scheduled, sign in, attend muster, and inspection. Receive briefing from Watch Commander.

Exhibit 2
(Continued)

15:55 hours	C-shift relieves B-shift, verify count, equipment, check all locking devices, and obtain or exchange information.
16:00 hours	Count, C-shift relieves B-shift when count is cleared.
16:30 hours	General population goes to supper.
18:00 hours	Count time. Subject to change due to seasonal hours of daylight.
23:00 hours	Lights out.
23:45 hours	A-shift reports for duty as scheduled, sign in, attend muster and inspection, receive briefing from Watch Commander.
23:55 hours	A-shift relieves C-shift, verify count and check all locking devices. Pass on all information to Relieving shift.
24:00 hours	Make regular tours of assigned trailers.
02:00 hours	Assist with count.
06:00 hours	Assist with count.
06:15 hours	Awaken inmates.
07:00 hours	General population goes to breakfast, and sick call commence until 08:30 hours.
07:00 hours	Final call until 07:30 hours.

POST ORDERS THAT RELATE TO OTHER POSTS:

1. Maintain a positive open communication with all personnel and inmates assigned to your area of control.
2. Work in conjunction with Module Housing Unit Control Station A-2. Between these two posts, a constant observation must be provided within the Module Housing Unit.
3. Check and observe those areas of supervision in your area of responsibility.
4. Conduct yourself as a professional at all times.
5. Do not leave your post until properly relieved.

JOB SPECIFICATIONS:

The officer assigned to this post must cooperate and work in conjunction with other officers assigned to the Module Housing Unit. Must be constantly observant and be able to communicate with inmates on an impersonal basis. Must be familiar with Divisional Guidelines, Institutional Operating Procedures, and Administrative Policies of this institution.

officers in the performance of their duties. All 40 respondents agreed that post orders were very important for officers in the performance of their duties. Several emphasized the importance of post orders when new personnel are filling a post, or when officers are on loan from another location.


The lack of uniform procedures on the format, varying levels of specific detail, inconsistencies in instructional information, and lack of uniform procedures for updating these orders all tend to indicate that the orders are not reliable sources for providing needed guidance to correctional staff manning these posts.

Recommendation (28). DOC standards and guidelines should specify the contents of post orders. Categories of information which should be included in post orders include chronologically organized duties of each shift, information about what to do in hostage-taking incidents, fire evacuations, and other contingency situations.

Institutional Supervision

The Adult Services Division of DOC is organized into a hierarchical structure (Figure 3), where wardens of major institutions and superintendents of field units report to a regional administrator, who in turn reports to the deputy director of adult services. Within each institution, a chain of command is used to exercise supervision over line officers, who are the primary security force.

Figure 3



As the former Director stated, the warden or superintendent is responsible and accountable for everything that occurs, or doesn't occur, at each facility. Within major institutions, supervisory staff consist of the warden, assistant wardens, chief of security (usually with the rank of "major"), and captains, lieutenants, and sergeants. Sometimes corporals are also in charge of significant areas, such as housing units.

Supervisors have day-to-day responsibility for operating an institution. They interact routinely with correctional officers and corporals who have the most extensive contact with inmates.

Institutional Supervisors. Problems and weaknesses with supervisory staff were identified by the Mecklenburg consultants, and by the Board of Corrections study on the same facility. The Board's report noted:

- Decisions are often passed up the line, instead of being made by the appropriate ranking officers -- the sergeant, for example, in charge of the building.
- The line supervisors with the most day-to-day contact with inmates and direct supervision of officers (sergeants) receive the least amount of supervisory training in the correctional training program.
- Captains, and particularly lieutenants, often have more administrative than operational duties, which causes them to spend more time in the central administration building than as supervisors in the five housing units.
- Manpower shortages often place supervisors in positions for which they have little experience or training. For example, sergeants occasionally have served as shift commanders, and a corporal is sometimes a building supervisor. These functions should normally be performed by captains (or lieutenants) and sergeants, respectively.
- Many of the supervisors interviewed seemed unaware of basic supervisory requirements -- visibility in the buildings, limited knowledge of major security procedures, and few could explain their specific responsibilities and authority with regard to security.
- Performance evaluations are not used as an effective management tool. Performance goals are general and easily attained.

JLARC found that some of these problems are not unique to Mecklenburg. A review of duty rosters (listings of individual employees assigned to security posts for each shift) indicated that at other facilities, correctional officers are sometimes assigned to supervisory posts, responsible for supervising other officers and for the entire floor of a housing unit. At still other locations, corporals are usually assigned to supervise each housing unit, including the supervision of officers.

Recommendation (29). DOC should review institutional practices regarding the highest-ranking officer on duty during each shift, and determine which rank is most appropriate. The Department should then ensure that each facility conforms to this policy.

Supervisory Staffing. The span of supervisory control is a key to the exercise of effective supervision, because there is a limit to the number of subordinates one person can effectively supervise. Span of control is also a standard way of assessing the need for supervisors, widely used in industry and the public sector.

A review of this measure at DOC adult institutions indicates a diversity that suggests supervision at some locations may be stronger than at others. Ratios of supervisors to their subordinates at DOC facilities are shown in Table 23.

An aggregate measure of supervisory control is afforded by the ratio of all security supervisors to corporals and officers -- the line staff. As Table 23 indicates, among the major institutions Mecklenburg and Marion are relatively leanly staffed for security supervision, while the Youthful Offender Center and the Women's Center are relatively richly staffed for supervision. The distribution in Table 23 appears uncorrelated with average population of the facilities, with the number of "C" custody inmates, or with the level of serious incidents.

The ratio of correctional officers to corporals also indicates a wide variation, from a minimum of 2.6 officers per corporal at the Penitentiary, to a maximum of 7.8 officers per corporal at Staunton. One warden told JLARC that there was a general "rule of thumb" that the number of corporals should be about one-fourth the total number of correctional officers, for a span of 4 officers per corporal. While several facilities are close to this standard, the wide range suggests that no standard has been applied uniformly across the system.

Similarly, the range of corporals to sergeants (a "white shirt" supervisory position) is very broad, from 1.0 at the Youthful Offender Center to 5.7 at Mecklenburg. Although not all sergeants supervise corporals, it is difficult to see why Mecklenburg would be the institution chosen for the leanest ratio of corporals to sergeants, or why the Youthful Offender Center would have the richest ratio.

Table 23

RATIO OF SUPERVISORS TO STAFF
(June 30, 1984)

	Blues to <u>Whites</u> ¹	Correctional Officers <u>To Corporals</u>	Corporals <u>To Sergeants</u>
Mecklenburg	11.4	3.1	5.7
Marion	10.9	4.2	4.6
Brunswick	9.9	4.1	2.9
Bland	9.8	2.8	5.1
Nottoway	9.7	4.5	3.1
Southampton	9.4	3.5	3.5
Powhatan	9.2	6.7	2.0
Buckingham	9.0	4.8	2.6
Staunton	8.3	7.8	1.8
James River	8.2	3.8	2.8
St Brides	7.7	2.7	3.6
Deerfield	7.4	6.4	1.7
Penitentiary	5.9	2.6	2.8
Women's Center	4.8	2.7	2.0
Youthful Offender Center	4.0	7.0	1.0
Average	8.4	4.4	3.0
(Standard Deviation)	(2.1)	(1.7)	(1.3)

¹Calculated as the number of filled officer and corporal positions ("blue shirts") divided by the number of filled sergeant, lieutenant, and captain ("white shirt") positions. Excludes posts that are primarily administrative, not supervisory, in nature: training officers, count officers, hearing officers, etc.

Source: DOC agency staffing patterns, June 30, 1984; institutional post audits.

Recommendation (30). DOC should establish staffing standards specifying the desired ratio of security supervisors to subordinate staff. These standards should take into account differing population mixes, incident levels, programs, and activities at the facilities as well as the number of subordinate employees. In addition, DOC should set a minimum number and lowest rank of supervisory staff to be on duty at any time within a major institution.

Recommendation (31). Correctional officers should not be used to fill supervisory posts. DOC should establish a policy on the

appropriate rank of security personnel who should be assigned to the different levels of supervision. As part of the policy, the Department should formulate standards for the appropriate ratios of security supervisors to subordinate staff persons.

Communicating Changes in Policy. An important function of institutional supervisors is to communicate changes in policy and procedure to the "front line" officers who often must carry out the new practices. A review of how such changes are communicated found that most security employees are notified orally.

Staff at 12 of the 15 major institutions indicated that changes in institutional procedures are orally communicated to officers at brief meetings which occur at every shift change. At four locations, a copy of the change is included with each employee's paycheck, and staff at one location reported that a letter discussing the change is distributed to each employee.

At other facilities, effective communication of change is less certain to occur. At one location, a copy of any change is posted in the chief of security's office. An assistant warden at another major institution said that the communication of procedure changes "stink" at his institution. He acknowledged that he and his staff had improvements to make in this area, but he had not yet taken action at the time of JLARC's visit.

Recommendation (32). DOC should ensure that all security employees are notified of any changes to policies or procedures that impact them. At a minimum, changes should be communicated orally during shift changes, and a copy included with each employee's paycheck.

Regional Office Supervision

When DOC reorganized in 1978, the Department established five regional offices with the intent that regional management would provide oversight to major institutions and field units in their respective regions. Among other things, according to the former director, the regions have the responsibility to improve compliance with the department's policies and uniformity in carrying out procedures. Reviews by the NIC Consultants, the Board of Corrections Study Committee, and JLARC found deficiencies in the supervisory role played by the regional offices due to poorly defined responsibilities and weak oversight.

The role of the regional office is both vague and uncertain. In one region, for example, the Board of Corrections Study Commission report found that the regional staff was oriented to operations (e.g., food service) and training support but not administrative oversight. As a result, the Board study felt that "it is not clear whether the primary objective and mission of the regional office is oversight or managerial support to institutions."

In addition, the NIC Consultants found that the regional office provided weak oversight to Mecklenburg Correctional Center. One of the NIC Consultants found that there were no records of any formal security review done at the Mecklenburg facility by the regional or central office. JLARC's review found this to be true throughout all five regions.

JLARC staff interviewed personnel from all five regions and found that inspections of security procedures are apparently conducted, but documentation of findings from these inspections is almost non-existent. The Board of Corrections study committee report concurred, saying that field visits by the regional administrator:

did not seem to have a clear purpose. For example, no specific activities or data are reviewed, buildings rarely inspected [sic], and line officers have little opportunity to talk with the administrator and his staff.

Furthermore, JLARC field visits have shown that the regions have not enforced compliance with department policy on the development of institutional operating procedures. Division Guideline 1 states:

Upon issuance of Division Guidelines, each institution shall develop Institutional Operating Procedures.... These will be submitted to the respective Regional Administrators for approval.... Upon approval of an Institutional Operating Procedure by the respective Regional Administrator, the procedure will be implemented by the institution concerned.

Institutions were in various stages of complying with this requirement when visited by JLARC staff in 1984. Compliance was under way primarily as a result of the standards and certification process, and not directly as a result of regional office oversight. In many cases, institutions were previously operating without a complete set of institutional procedures. In at least one case, the regional office purposely halted the development of institutional policy:

One field unit superintendent indicated that the regional administrator had discouraged the development of institutional operating procedures. A federal judge was said to have told the RA that the judge would hold correctional administrators responsible for their operating procedures. Consequently, the regional administrator decided that although facilities should comply with the Division Guidelines, they should not in most instances take the time to write institutional operating procedures.

Recommendation (33). The role of the regional offices should be clarified and defined. A clear delineation between advisory and management functions and the regions' oversight and evaluation functions should be specified.

INSTITUTIONAL SECURITY PRACTICES

JLARC staff reviewed the implementation of selected security procedures at all 15 major institutions and 11 of 26 field units. The purpose was to test the facilities' compliance with both formal division policy and accepted correctional practices.

JLARC staff found numerous breaches or potential breaches in security at a majority of the facilities reviewed. Many of the observed situations could contribute to serious incidents if an inmate chose to take advantage of circumstances. Areas reviewed included tool control, enterprise areas, maintenance shops, medical facilities, and food service areas.

Tool Control

Tools can be found at every institution. They are used in enterprise shops, hobby shops, farms, and by inmate maintenance crews. Tool control is an essential part of institution security. Of all the items that inmates have access to, tools probably have the greatest potential for use in violent incidents and in escape attempts.

During fieldwork for this report, several facilities were in the process of revamping their tool control procedures. Some were using as a model a procedure developed by the Federal Bureau of Prisons.

By far, tool control was the weakest security practice observed during the JLARC review. Although Division Guidelines are fairly specific on tool control, only one institution explicitly followed the guidelines. Several institutions had alternative tool control systems which appeared to be sound, although they were in technical violation of the DGLs. The majority of institutions however, had systems which were in gross violation of policy and, as a result, are a rich source for potential weapons. As shown below, the guidelines are virtually ignored at some institutions.

Division Guidelines state that under no circumstance shall tools be used within the security perimeter or compound of a "C" or "B" custody institution or housing area except under close employee supervision.

At the wood shop at the State Penitentiary (the Pen has 73% "C" and 24% "B" custody inmates), inmates work in a basement area unsupervised and with unrestricted use of woodcutting machinery and tools.

In Staunton's RSA vocational shop (Staunton has 70% "B" custody and 4% "C" custody inmates), inmates were observed using a grinding wheel while the RSA instructor was down the hall in a different room. The inmates verbally informed the instructor that they were going to use a grinding wheel. The instructor gave them verbal permission to go ahead. The inmates proceeded to use the grinding wheel in the absence of the employee.

JLARC found inmates had access to, or were in charge of, tool rooms in maintenance areas at 10 out of 15 institutions reviewed. This poses an obvious threat to security at these locations.

Division Guideline 411 states that: Each tool room shall be provided with shadow boards with outlines to indicate what type of tool belongs in a particular place. All tools shall be registered at the tool control rooms and tools shall be checked out only to employees. All tools shall be accounted for each day and stored in such appropriate ways as in a secure metal box with a secure lock or placed on a shadow board.

At James River Correctional Center, an inmate was in charge of keeping the tool room for the main maintenance shed. The tool room had the outline of two or three tools on the wall, but several of the tools belonging there were lying on the workbench. The wooden door stood open. There were tools lying all around. The foreman said that there was no inventory of the equipment. He also said that the inmate in charge of the tool room wrote down who took out the tools when the inmate remembered.

At Halifax field unit, a tool shed outside the perimeter was observed in disarray. Lying outside the tool room were pick axes, shovels, and gasoline cans.

At Baskerville field unit, several unsupervised inmates were in the tool shed, which is outside the perimeter. All sorts of tools were located in the shed.

It was apparent from the review that Division Guidelines were not being followed at most facilities. A number of institutions have recently begun to install shadow boards and control systems as part of their compliance with the new standards. The DGL requirements however, have been in effect since 1977. It is not surprising, therefore, that inmates are able to make and acquire weapons.

Recommendation (34). DOC should take steps to improve security at tool rooms at all major institutions and field units. Consideration should be given to the procedures used by the Federal Bureau of Prisons. At no location should an inmate be in charge of dispensing or inventorying tools.

Medical Services

All DOC facilities have medical services available for inmates. All locations have medical staff (usually nurses) who perform medical triage, provide limited treatment, and dispense medications. Physicians and dentists, with some exceptions, tend to be on contract, working several hours a week at the facilities. Medical services are coordinated out of the Health Services Administrator's office in Richmond.

During a tour of each facility, JLARC staff assessed control over hypodermic needles and the overall security of the medical area.

Needle Control. Because hypodermic needles can be used with illegal drugs and as weapons, their control is important. Control over such important items is also an indicator of security in the medical units.

Control of hypodermic needles varied among institutions. Although neither the Division Guidelines nor the Adult Services Standards require that needles should be securely locked or inventoried, some institutions have such a system. These precautions were not universal, however.

At Southampton Correctional Center, needles and syringes in bulk supply are kept in a locked storeroom. A small supply is periodically removed from the storeroom to the pill room for daily needs. The transfer of the needles is duly recorded in the log books.

The day that the JLARC staff visited Southampton, an inmate was observed mopping the floor of the pill room unsupervised. The nurses were on their lunch break in a separate room. While working unsupervised in the pill room, the inmate had

access to an unlocked and slightly ajar cabinet which contained the daily supply of needles and some medication.

* * * *

At Deerfield needles for weekly use were removed from a locked storage cabinet and placed in a cigar box which was kept in the lab area. Although unescorted inmates would not normally be in the lab area, the unsecured cigar box could easily be pilfered. The head nurse had recently developed an inventory log book for needles and other supplies, but she stated that she wasn't sure the nurses were properly using the log when they used needles.

* * * *

At Brunswick JLARC staff observed an inmate in the dental area with access to sharp dental instruments, novocaine, and hypodermic needles, none of which were kept in locked storage. The inmate appeared to be assigned to assist in the area as a matter of routine.

* * * *

At Marion, cabinets containing medical and surgical instruments, medications, and other supplies were unlocked on the day of JLARC's visit. The head nurse indicated that the practice of locking the cabinets was not consistent -- sometimes the cabinets were locked, and sometimes they weren't. The room was used for treatment, so inmates would often be in the room accompanied only by a nurse.

Medical Audits. According to Department Policy 13-8, the Office of Health Services is required to conduct at least one medical care audit per year in each major institution. Although this requirement has been a department policy since at least 1981, no audits had been conducted by mid-1984.

DOC's chief medical administrator plans to begin conducting these reviews in the near future. The medical audits, according to policy, should focus on the quality of health care delivered to the inmates. The security of the medical units should also be reviewed when the audits are conducted.

Recommendation (35). Medical audits should assess security of the medical facilities at each prison, as well as the quality of health care. The audits should commence immediately.

Food Service

The food service area of each facility presents several security concerns. Careful control must obviously be maintained over use and storage of such potential weapons as kitchen knives. Certain food items are considered contraband and require a higher degree of control than other food stuffs. Control over both knives and food items appeared reasonable at most facilities, despite vague policies concerning storage security.

Knife and Equipment Control. According to DGL 411, "kitchen knives and other kitchen tools shall be accounted for at all times." All facilities had locked storage areas to secure kitchen knives, though one facility had just installed a knife control system one week prior to the JLARC visit. Facilities for storing knives varied from fixed metal wall boxes to a filing cabinet. In one facility, knives were removed to the arsenal every night. Staff authorized to check knives out to inmates ranged from the correctional officer on duty to any of the food services supervisors.

Inmates were observed using kitchen knives without supervision at several locations. At each of two field units, for example, an inmate was cutting meat in a basement food preparation area, out of view of the correctional officer on duty in the upstairs kitchen. Although the knives were properly accounted for, as the guidelines require, unsupervised use of knives could clearly contribute to serious incidents.

Control over such other equipment as kitchen serving utensils appeared to be virtually non-existent except for an annual inventory done for the State Comptroller. Security practices concerning such items as serving utensils and machine cutting blades also varied. Most facilities did not keep track of these items on a daily basis. A few facilities locked up serving utensils daily. Several institutions locked up machine cutting blades.

Control of Food Items. While most food items are subject to pilferage, certain items such as yeast and sugar have security implications. Yeast and sugar are primary ingredients in the making of mash and other alcoholic beverages. Other items, such as nutmeg, are smoked to simulate a drug "high".

Division Guideline 411 states that only under the constant supervision of a qualified employee are inmates allowed to use vinegar, yeast, sugar, and baking soda. The guideline does not specify that these items require secure storage, only close supervision.

All facilities appear to have taken reasonable precautions to secure yeast. Most facilities also provide the same level of security for sugar, generally locking both in a separate storeroom under multiple locks. Several facilities also keep nutmeg and coffee separate from the general storeroom areas. These areas are generally

but not always kept locked. Inmates sometimes have access to these areas without the supervision of a DOC employee.

Conclusion

The extent and nature of security breaches observed by JLARC staff were sufficient to indicate that inmates may have unacceptable access to weapons, drugs, and other contraband. DOC should tighten security in the specific areas noted in this chapter, and at the specific locations detailed in the next chapter.

Recommendation (36). The major institutions and field units should comply with the DOC guideline which requires a documented security audit of perimeter and internal security controls on each shift every day. Weekly documented institutional inspections should be conducted by a team of operations managers (such as the food service manager or the medical unit administrator), and a written report of the findings should be made to the warden. The inspections should be done on a randomly chosen day and should review compliance with security procedures, officers' knowledge of security procedures, facility sanitation, and facility maintenance.

IV. PROFILES OF THE MAJOR PRISONS

The two previous chapters assessed security staffing needs and security practices of Virginia's correctional system as a whole. This chapter constitutes a compendium of detailed information on each of the 15 major prisons.

Each section profiles one of the 15 prisons, describing its mission, population, and physical plant. Each section also includes an analysis of security staffing at the prison and an assessment of security practices. Recommendations on staffing and security practices conclude each section.

CHAPTER INDEX

<u>Institution</u>	<u>Page</u>
Bland Correctional Center	96
Brunswick Correctional Center	109
Buckingham Correctional Center.	122
Deerfield Correctional Center	138
James River Correctional Center	147
Marion Correctional Treatment Center.	158
Mecklenburg Correctional Center	169
Nottoway Correctional Center.	188
Penitentiary.	202
Powhatan Correctional Center.	214
St. Brides Correctional Center.	226
Southampton Correctional Center	239
Staunton Correctional Center.	257
Women's Correctional Center	267
Youthful Offender Center.	277

BLAND CORRECTIONAL CENTER

Bland Correctional Center, which is located on 2193 acres in Giles County, began operations in 1946. Bland runs an extensive farming operation, raising beef and dairy cattle as well as corn and other vegetables. It also operates a sawmill, a cannery, and a slaughterhouse.

Compared to other adult prisons in Virginia, Bland falls about the middle in the number of inmates it confines, with an average daily population of 445 in FY 1984. In terms of the ratio of inmates to funded security staff, Bland was higher than most other prisons in the State in FY 1984 -- it was less heavily staffed.

Facility Overview


Bland provides certain work and educational opportunities to the inmates. Inmate jobs are mainly in agriculture and other activities that are conducted outside the perimeter fence. However, Bland does not have enterprises, so work opportunities are more limited than at many other prisons.

Since Bland was built, the department has had to construct some new buildings to accommodate the increased inmate population.

Mission and Population. The mission of Bland Correctional Center is to confine adult felons and to provide programs to promote positive behavioral change in the inmates. Bland does not have a special purpose, as the prisons at Mecklenburg, Marion, and other locations have.

Many inmates at Bland are from the western area of Virginia or from other states such as North Carolina and West Virginia. Many of these inmates are closer to home than they would be if they were confined in other prisons in the State.

Programs. Because Bland has no enterprises, work opportunities are more limited than at some other prisons. Inmates can work on the farm during the warm months. Other institutional jobs are in the sawmill, power plant, cannery, slaughterhouse, the sewage treatment plant, and the kitchen. The warden believes that the shortage of jobs causes problems because many inmates who work on the farm during the summer are idle during the winter. He reports that the number of violent incidents at Bland increases during the winter.



Profile of Bland Correctional Center FY 1984

<u>Population:</u>	Budgeted Capacity:	440	"A" Custody:	16.4%	White:	68.7%
	Avg. Daily Pop:	445	"B" Custody:	48.2%	Nonwhite:	31.3%
			"C" Custody:	33.8%	Avg. Age:	28.1

<u>Ratios:</u>	Inmates per Security Position:	2.80-to-1	[10]
	Inmates per Staff (total):	1.82-to-1	[8]
	Total Expenditures per Inmate:	\$18,280	[6]

<u>Budgeted Staff:</u>	Security:	157	<u>Officers:</u>	White:	96%	Avg. Age:	39
	Nonsecurity:	85		Nonwhite:	4%	Turnover:	15%
	Total:	242		Female:	2%		

<u>Serious Incidents:</u>	Assaults on Inmates:	14	[6t]	Escapes:	3	[4t]
	Assaults on Staff:	0	[14]	Total Serious Incidents:	44	[8]

See Appendix B for sources.

Numbers in brackets [] indicate ranking of this facility compared to other major institutions. [t] indicates a tie with other facilities.

[1] has the most staff per inmate or highest number of reported incidents.

The Rehabilitative School Authority provides adult basic education and general education development classes, vocational programs, and library services. The vocational classes are small engine repair, masonry, building trades, food services, and wastewater treatment. In FY 1984, an average of 110 inmates were enrolled in RSA classes every month. About 100 students were on waiting lists to enter RSA classes in September 1984.

Through the RSA, inmates have additional opportunities. They can enroll in classes offered by Wytheville Community College, and they can enroll in apprenticeship programs.

Physical Facilities. The original physical plant at Bland included six major buildings. The department recently constructed two new buildings at Bland.

The buildings inside the compound as it was originally laid out are the four housing units, the administration building (which straddles the fence), and the kitchen and mess hall. These buildings are arranged in a rectangle and surround an open yard. Two new buildings (the medical building and the school) sit directly outside the original compound to the east. All these buildings are surrounded by a double fence topped with razor wire. The new buildings are separated from the original compound by a single fence.

A laundry building and a recreation yard sit directly outside the compound on the west side. Each is surrounded by a single fence topped with razor wire.

Seven towers are placed around the perimeter of the compound. One of these is currently a temporary structure which will be taken down when a permanent tower is completed.

Several other buildings are scattered outside the fences. These include the maintenance shops, classrooms for two RSA vocational classes, sewage treatment plant, slaughterhouse, sawmill, power plant, and the cannery.

Approximately 65% of the inmates at Bland are housed in open dorms in two housing units. Each inmate has about 86 square feet of living space in the dorms. The other inmates are housed in the two other housing units, which have single rooms. They are all 70 to 79 square feet in size. The warden sees the scarcity of single rooms as causing a problem for inmate management. In the colder months when many inmates stay in the dorms for long periods, they tend to become involved in violent incidents. The warden has instituted a progressive housing system, whereby an inmate can move from a dorm to a room if his behavior record is good. The warden would prefer to have even more single cells at Bland.

SECURITY STAFFING AT BLAND

Bland has 239.5 funded positions, of which 157 are security and 82.5 are nonsecurity. The budgeted capacity of Bland in FY 1985 is 440. This makes the ratio of inmates to staff 1.84-to-1, which places Bland in the bottom half of the major institutions -- it is relatively lightly staffed.

In FY 1984, Bland lost 17 positions, including three correctional officers and one corrections cannery supervisor. The other positions were nonsecurity in function.

In determining the number of security staff at Bland, JLARC considered the warden's request for additional positions, the latest post audit, staffing practices at other major institutions, the criteria listed in Chapter Two, and DOC's 1984-86 Supplemental Amendment Proposal for additional resources.

Post Audit

The post audit shows a need for about 44 more security positions than the current funded level at Bland. As at most other prisons, Bland has a few security positions which should not have been included in the staffing formula calculations.

Current Security Level. The post audit submitted to JLARC shows a need for 71 security posts, and for 201.42 employees to fill these posts. This number includes supervisors as well as correctional officers and corporals. Bland has considerably fewer funded security positions than this, with 157 in the current fiscal year.

According to the warden, the present level of security staff at Bland is inadequate. He told JLARC that Bland "gets by" by leaving some posts unfilled and by requiring some staff to work overtime. He reported that he leaves about 14 posts unfilled a majority of the time. The warden is concerned that leaving some posts unfilled makes the institution vulnerable and that overtime overtaxes his staff.

In order to ascertain Bland's staffing level at the time of review, JLARC subtracted the 14 posts (49.28 positions) which are not filled a majority of the time from 201.42, leaving 152.14 positions.

Misapplication of Sharp Formula. Although DOC has no policy about the proper application of the Sharp formula, posts which are not filled to cover absenteeism should not be included in Sharp calculations. The Bland post audit applies the Sharp formula to four posts which do not meet this test.

These posts, which include the chief of security, training supervisor, staff grievance coordinator, and inmate hearings officer, should each be counted as requiring one employee. Through misapplication of the formula, the security staffing needs of Bland are overstated by 0.72 positions (based on the revised Sharp formula). These excess positions should be subtracted from the staffing level shown on the post audit. The JLARC recommendation for security staffing at Bland includes an adjustment for this misapplication.

Warden's Request

The warden is requesting 17.29 additional correctional officers. The requests are described in a memo to the regional administrator dated September 18, 1984. These positions would be used to fill seven posts. The warden maintains that the filling of these posts would better enable them to reduce the potential for assaults, deter escapes, maintain order, and control contraband. He is not currently filling any of the requested posts through overtime.

In a memo to the regional administrator dated September 13, 1984, the warden requested 55 additional security positions. The additional positions would have put Bland slightly over the number that the September 1984 post audit and the current staffing formula indicate that Bland needs. The warden told JLARC that the R.A. asked him to submit a new request requiring fewer positions, so he reduced his request to 17.29 positions. JLARC is reviewing the September 18 request because information about the 55 positions was not detailed enough to evaluate.

School. One eight-hour, five-day post would be established in the RSA building during the school day. There are no security staff currently assigned in or around the school. The warden believes that this situation is dangerous because (1) inmates can move unobserved outside the classrooms, (2) the inmates use dangerous tools in two of the vocational classrooms, and (3) inmates can obtain contraband in the school.

The principal of the RSA school concurs with the warden on the need for staff in the school. He is concerned that non-student inmates can walk into the school at any time, that inmates are not shaken down for contraband when they leave the school, and that an officer is not immediately available if a violent incident occurs.

The request for the school officer appears to be reasonable. The inmates know that if they committed a violent act in the school, no officer could respond for several minutes. Although these inmates are volunteers who usually want to attend school, they are still capable of violence. Moreover, almost all other RSA schools visited by JLARC either had an officer in the school or one in the immediate vicinity.

Building #1 Basement. One five-day, 16-hour post would be established to patrol the basement on the day and evening shifts. The basement is now staffed by nonsecurity personnel. It has a high volume of inmate traffic going to and from the treatment offices, law library, and weight room on the 4-12 shift. It is used for inmate organization meetings on the same shift. The warden is concerned that a hostage could be taken in this area and that unobserved activities could take place here. The number of violent incidents here has not increased recently, but the warden is concerned about the potential for problems.

A portion of this request appears to be reasonable. The potential is high for contraband transfer and other unauthorized activities in this area. However, since most of the inmate traffic occurs on the 4-12 shift, a post on this shift appears to be more necessary than on the 8-4 shift. Thus, the request for one five-day, eight-hour post in building #1 basement appears to be warranted. The new post would provide a reasonable enhancement of security.

Building #4 Top. This housing unit has two floors, which are currently monitored by one officer. The new post would be established on a 24-hour, seven-day basis. The warden believes that the inmates can carry out various activities, including obtaining contraband, under the present conditions. The number of violent incidents here has not increased recently, but the warden is concerned about the potential for problems.

A portion of this request appears to be reasonable. Adding another eight-hour, seven-day position on the 4-12 shift (when many inmates are in the housing units) and on the 8-4 shift (when the inmate count is high, particularly in the colder months) would provide a reasonable enhancement to security in building #4. An additional officer on the 12-8 shift does not appear to be as necessary because inmate activity in the housing unit is considerably less on this shift compared to the day and evening shifts.

Building #2 Basement. This post would be established on a 16-hour, five-day basis. The basement is an isolated area that has a high volume of inmate traffic to the library, barber shop, recreation area, and other areas. Currently, no security staff are assigned here. The warden believes it is an ideal location for assaults, transfer of contraband, and other unauthorized activities. The number of violent incidents has not increased here recently, but the warden is concerned about the potential for violence in this area.

The establishment of a 16-hour, five-day post in building #2 appears to be warranted. Even though the number of violent incidents has not increased in the basement, the posting of a guard in this isolated area could prevent the transfer of weapons and other contraband among inmates, which could ultimately enhance security in other parts of the prison.

Infirmary. The infirmary, which is a small, one-story building, is staffed primarily by nonsecurity staff. One officer is currently assigned here on the day shift. The warden would establish another seven-day, eight-hour post here on the day shift. The warden points out that the infirmary gives inmates access to weapons and drugs, and it presents opportunities to take hostages. The number of violent incidents has not increased here recently.

The current number of security staff on this shift appears to be reasonable. Another officer could enhance security, but the impact would probably be negligible. If the nonsecurity and security staff continue to ensure that all drugs and medical instruments are properly locked up and accounted for, then another security position is not essential.

Food Service. The warden wants to establish another five-day, eight-hour post in the kitchen and mess hall during the day shift. Currently, two officers are assigned to the kitchen on this shift. The warden points out that a large number of inmates work in the kitchen, and they have access to an unlimited supply of weapons and contraband. The number of violent incidents in the kitchen has not increased recently, but the warden is concerned about the potential for violence.

The current number of officers stationed in the kitchen on the day shift appears to be adequate. The current staffing level is equal to that observed in other prisons' kitchens.

Relief/Utility. This position would be established on the evening and night shifts as a seven-day, 16-hour post. The officer would fill in for the tower, ballfield, and yard personnel while they take their dinner breaks. These shifts do not currently have relief officers. The day shift does not have a relief officer, either, but it is probably easier to find an officer to temporarily fill a post during the day because the shift has several security staff who do not usually fill posts.

The establishment of this post may be reasonable, but these positions should not be funded until DOC studies the utility post concept system-wide, as mentioned in Chapter Two.

Questionable Posts

Bland has three security staff who are performing duties that are essentially nonsecurity in nature. These duties could be carried out at less expense by nonsecurity employees. Bland also has two dog handlers; this level may be excessive. Table 24 lists these positions.

Canine Handlers/Trainers. Bland has one sergeant and one corporal who serve as dog trainers. Their primary duties are to train and work with tracking dogs used in locating escapees. In the

department's view, security staff are needed for this job because they are trained in handling weapons and in how to deal with an inmate when he is captured. The dog handlers at Bland work with dogs all day on weekdays. They assist with supervising the visitation areas on weekends. Law enforcement officials from surrounding localities and correctional units in the area have used the dogs to assist them in their duties. The assistant warden for operations told JLARC that having the dogs available to loan to localities was "good public relations" for Bland.

Table 24

QUESTIONABLE SECURITY POSTS
AT BLAND CORRECTIONAL CENTER

Number of Posts	Title	Type of Post	Positions	
			DOC Formula	JLARC Formula
2	Canine Handler/Trainer	8 hours, 5 days	2.40	N.A.
1	Personal Property/ Mail Room	8 hours, 7 days	1.68	1.65
1	Clothing Room	8 hours, 5 days	1.20	1.18
1	Canteen	8 hours, 5 days	1.20	1.18
TOTAL			6.48	4.01

Source: September 1984 post audit.

The need for two eight-hour, five-day posts for this function is highly questionable. First, eight major institutions have no dog handler posts, and the other five prisons have one dog handler each. Second, Bland had only three escapes in FY 1984, so the amount of time that the dogs were actually used for Bland Correctional Center was minimal.

There is a need for some dog handlers in the department, but their placement in DOC institutions should be tied to the past experience with escapes in the area. As recommended in Chapter Two, the department should review the current number and placement of dog handlers in the institutions to determine (1) if they correspond with the number of escapes in the prisons and field units of the area, and (2) if the dog handlers are sufficiently dispersed around the State.

Until the department completes its study, Bland should assign one of its dog handlers to another security post, as two dog handlers are more than any other Virginia prison has. One person would likely be sufficient to handle the canine chores. When DOC completes its study, one dog handler post should be abolished at Bland if the workload does not justify two of these positions.

Personal Property/Mail Room. The mail and personal property officer screens incoming and outgoing inmate mail for contraband, receives and inspects personal clothing that is sent to inmates, and searches belongings of new inmates and inmates who are being discharged from the institution. The officer does not supervise inmates on this post.

The department could realize savings in personnel expenditures if a nonsecurity staffer were cross-trained as a clerk messenger (pay grade 2) and store manager (pay grade 3). These functions should be transferred to a new nonsecurity position and 1.65 security positions should be deleted.

Clothing Room Officer. This officer distributes the weekly issue of clothing to inmates, issues clothing to new inmates, records all clothing transactions, and supervises two "B" custody inmates who work in the clothing room.

Personnel at Bland contend that this position should be filled by a security staffer because the position involves inmate supervision. However, nonsecurity staff supervise inmates in other jobs in some institutions. Furthermore, the department could realize savings in personnel expenditures by hiring a store manager or storekeeper supervisor (pay grades 3 and 5, respectively) to fill the clothing room position. The clothing room security post (1.18 positions) should be abolished and replaced by one nonsecurity position.

Canteen. Bland's canteen officer carries out duties that are primarily nonsecurity in nature. He or she takes inventory, orders and stocks supplies, serves employees and inmates, and keeps records on canteen transactions. The officer supervises one inmate.

These duties could be performed at less cost by a store manager or storekeeper supervisor. The number of security positions should be reduced by 1.18, and one nonsecurity position should correspondingly be added to operate the canteen.

Overtime

Security staff at Bland worked a total of 29,708.5 additional hours in FY 1984, which was the fourth highest of all the major institutions. Using the 1771-hour standard developed in Chapter Two, this was equivalent to 16.8 FTEs. Of these total hours, the staff received overtime pay for 14,174 hours, at a cost of \$147,247. The staff obtained compensatory time for the remaining hours (15,534.5).

According to the warden and assistant warden for operations, most of the overtime was worked to fill posts for which Bland has no staff, and for annual and sick leave, absenteeism, and unanticipated transportation runs. The warden emphasized, however, that he has succeeded in cutting down overtime by limiting the number of security

staff who can take vacation leave at any one time, by firing staff who abuse sick leave, and by taking other measures.

DOC needs to develop the overtime monitoring mechanism discussed in Chapter 2 before a request for full-time staff to reduce overtime should be considered.

DOC's Budget Request

The 1984-86 Supplemental Amendment Proposal submitted by DOC requests 8.40 additional officers for Bland, for the purpose of reducing overtime now worked by full-time staff. Bland would use the new full-time positions in housing units one and two and in tower five, in lieu of using overtime.

Housing Unit One, a dormitory, houses the highest risk inmates. By using overtime, Bland currently provides three officers on each of the two floors on the day and evening shifts. DOC wants to add 3.36 officers to reduce overtime worked in unit one.

Housing Unit Two is also a dormitory, but it holds inmates who pose less risk than the unit one inmates. By using overtime, Bland stations two officers on each of the two floors on the day shift; and three on the top floor and two on the bottom floor on the evening shift. DOC wants to add 3.36 officers to reduce overtime worked in unit two.

Tower #5 is located next to the perimeter fence of the recreation field. Bland staffs this tower on the evening shift by using overtime. DOC is requesting 1.68 additional positions to reduce this overtime.

The 17.29 positions requested by the warden in September would be used to carry out duties different from those of the 8.40 positions requested by the DOC in the amendment proposal. Since JLARC reviewed only the positions originally requested by the warden, JLARC cannot assess the need for the additional 8.40 positions.

Recommended Staffing at Bland

As shown in Table 25, JLARC recommends a security staff level of 152.54 positions for Bland Correctional Center. The following changes are encompassed in this recommendation:

- addition of two eight-hour, five-day posts (for the RSA school and building #1 basement),
- addition of one 16-hour, five-day post to building #2 basement,
- addition of one 16-hour, seven-day post for building #4 top,

Table 25

STAFFING AT BLAND CORRECTIONAL CENTER

<u>Security Staff</u>		<u>Positions</u>
Staffing at time of review		152.10
Recommended changes		
Impact of revised Sharp formula	-2.85	
Conversion from security to nonsecurity	-4.01	
Correction for Sharp formula misapplication	-0.72	
New security positions	+8.02	
Deleted security positions	<u>0.00</u>	
Total changes		<u>+0.44</u>
Recommended security staffing subtotal		152.54
<u>Nonsecurity Staff</u>		
FY 1985 funded nonsecurity positions*	82.50	
Recommended conversion of security posts into nonsecurity positions	<u>+3.00</u>	
Nonsecurity staffing subtotal		<u>85.50</u>
TOTAL STAFFING		238.04
<u>FY 1985 Funded Staffing Levels</u>		
Funded security positions	157.0	
Funded nonsecurity positions	<u>82.5</u>	
Total funded positions		239.50
DIFFERENCE BETWEEN JLARC TOTAL & FUNDED LEVEL		-1.46

*Nonsecurity staff scheduled for review in 1985.

Source: DOC; JLARC analysis.

- reduction of 2.85 positions as a result of the JLARC analysis of the Sharp formula,
- conversion of the personal property/mailroom, clothing room, and commissary posts from security to nonsecurity positions. This represents a deletion of 4.01 security positions, and
- addition of three nonsecurity positions, and reduction of .72 security positions because of misapplication of the Sharp formula.

SECURITY PROCEDURES

JLARC examined the adequacy of control over maintenance tools, the food service area, and the medical area at Bland. Control over the kitchen and medical items appeared to be satisfactory. However, tool control needs to be improved.

Tool Control

Control of maintenance tools was unsatisfactory. The garage which contained the main tool room was disorderly. Several small metal objects and tools were scattered around the garage. Inmates were observed working in the garage without supervision.

An inmate was responsible for dispensing tools from the tool room. The foreman in the garage periodically took informal inventories of the tools, but he did not compare the results to a master list. The board on which the tools were hung did not have shadows or numbers painted on it, so an observer could not tell if the number and type of tools on each hook was correct. The foreman said that he knew what tools he had, so a shadow board was not necessary. Maintenance staff could come into the tool room on weekends to use the tools, and there was no system to ensure that these tools were properly accounted for.

It is important that tool control at Bland be improved. Under the present system, an inmate could take a tool and the foreman might not realize that it is missing. Moreover, if the foreman were absent, tool control would be almost totally lacking.

CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

The JLARC review of Bland Correctional Center indicates that a portion of the warden's request for additional security positions should be approved. Bland is one of a small number of major institutions which is staffed substantially under the number of

security positions that the post audit and the current staffing formula show it needs. However, the documentation submitted to justify the 44 new positions needed under this post audit was not detailed enough to be fully evaluated. The warden is requesting 17.29 more positions, which would still be about 30 under the level indicated by the post audit.

The department should transfer certain duties now performed by security personnel to nonsecurity personnel. Bland should also use one of its two dog handlers in a different post until the department completes a study on the placement of dog handlers among Virginia's prisons.

Finally, Bland should improve its present tool control system.

Recommendation (37). The level of funded security positions at Bland Correctional Center should be set at 152.54 (compared with the current funded level of 157). Three nonsecurity positions should be added to perform the personal property/mailroom, clothing room, and canteen duties.

Recommendation (38). Bland should improve its tool control system by following revised division guidelines on tool control.

BRUNSWICK CORRECTIONAL CENTER

Opened in 1982, Brunswick Correctional Center was the first of the four new "medium security institutions" (MSIs) constructed by the Department of Corrections. The design of the other MSIs was substantially modified after DOC staff learned that Brunswick's design was not optimal for managing an increasingly violent adult population.

Brunswick, located on 759 acres near Lawrenceville, was constructed primarily with funds raised from general revenue bonds. The bonds were issued under the Correctional Facilities Bond Act, which was passed by the 1977 session of the General Assembly and approved by the voters in the general election that year. The Act specified that \$12.5 million of the \$21.5 million bond issue be used to construct a "medium security facility."

Brunswick was initially designed to be a 500-bed, single cell facility that would hold minimum and medium security inmates. However, DOC decided in 1982 to double-bunk portions of this facility as a temporary measure, because the adult inmate population was increasing system-wide. Brunswick is also housing "harder" inmates (those with long sentences and violent crimes) than envisioned by the planners.

Facility Overview

The average daily population at Brunswick in FY 1984 was 651. About one-half of Brunswick's cells are double-bunked. Staff at Brunswick have expressed concern about the number and custody level of inmates housed here and about the design of the facility.

Mission and Population. Brunswick holds a general population of inmates. It does not currently have a special mission or population, although it soon will. It will hold parole violators, who will be housed in a housing unit separate from the rest of the population.

The proportion of "C" custody inmates here (53%) is much higher than envisioned by Brunswick's planners. According to a top official at Brunswick, the inclusion of many high risk inmates with lower risk inmates at this facility is a "prescription for chaos." This concern appears warranted, as Brunswick had the highest number of assaults on inmates, assaults on staff, and total serious incidents of any institution in the State in FY 1984.

Programs. Inmates at Brunswick work in various institutional jobs such as farming, maintenance, and sanitation.



Profile of Brunswick Correctional Center FY 1984

<u>Population:</u>	Budgeted Capacity: 500	"A" Custody: 7.0%	White: 30.7%
	Avg. Daily Pop: 651	"B" Custody: 39.8%	Nonwhite: 69.3%
		"C" Custody: 52.2%	Avg. Age: 27.1
<u>Ratios:</u>	Inmates per Security Position: 1.79-to-1 [2]		
	Inmates per Staff (total): 1.38-to-1 [5t]		
	Total Expenditures per Inmate: \$14,015 [11]		
<u>Budgeted Staff:</u>	Security: 278	<u>Officers:</u> White: 36%	Avg. Age: 33
	Nonsecurity: 84.5	Nonwhite: 64%	Turnover: 16%
	Total: 362.5	Female: 23%	
<u>Serious Incidents:</u>	Assaults on Inmates: 45 [1]	Escapes: 1 [6t]	
	Assaults on Staff: 61 [1]	Total Serious Incidents: 200 [8]	

See Appendix B for sources.

Numbers in brackets [] indicate ranking of this facility compared to other major institutions. [t] indicates a tie with other facilities.

[1] has the most staff per inmate or highest number of reported incidents.

Brunswick also has one enterprise -- the school bus renovation center, in which 59 inmates were employed in FY 1984.

Compared to other adult institutions that hold general populations, Brunswick has one of the highest proportions of its available population enrolled in school. Enrollments are high because the former warden increased the number of classes held by the Rehabilitative School Authority (RSA) and decreased the length of the class periods. The average monthly enrollment in RSA programs in FY 1984 was 206. RSA offers adult basic education and general education development classes, library services, and vocational classes. Its vocational classes are auto mechanics, auto body repair, business machines maintenance, and building maintenance. Through the RSA, inmates can also enroll in community college and apprenticeship programs.

Physical Facilities. The major buildings at Brunswick are the five housing units, the school, the bus barn, the infirmary, the mess hall and kitchen, the administration building, and the maintenance shop. The main complex is surrounded by a double fence topped with razor wire, and three towers are located around the perimeter. A power plant sits outside of the main complex.

Each of the cells in the five housing units are 70 square feet in size. Figure 4 illustrates the general layout of the housing units. Housing unit A has single cells. It is currently the honor housing unit, but it will hold parole violators in the near future. Unit B also has all single cells and holds the highest risk inmates at Brunswick. The first floor contains the segregation, isolation, and protective custody cells. The second and third floor hold troublesome inmates. All the cells in housing unit C are double-bunked. A portion of the cells in the D and E units are double-bunked.

Top officials at Brunswick expressed concern about several aspects of the physical facilities. First, the stairwells and some cell windows are glass rather than another material that would be less breakable. Second, the locks on the general population cells are a minimum security type -- the same type of locks that two learning centers have -- and the doors are hollow metal. The doors could be easily kicked out by the inmates. Third, the bathroom fixtures in the cells are porcelain rather than stainless steel, so the inmates can damage them easily.

Finally, the housing units are very poorly designed for observation of inmates. Each of the housing units has four corridors off a central area that contains a control room. The officer in the control room cannot see into the corridors. (see Figure 5). The officer who patrols the corridors can observe only the corridors he is in; he cannot see into the other three corridors. Officials at Brunswick told JLARC that the poor design of the housing units contributed to several serious attacks by inmates on officers who were patrolling the units.

Figure 4

Layout of Housing Units at Brunswick





Figure 5



SECURITY STAFFING AT BRUNSWICK

Brunswick Correctional Center currently has 350 funded positions -- 274 security positions and 76 nonsecurity positions. Brunswick's inmate to (budgeted) staff ratio in 1984 was 1.38-to-1, which tied it with Buckingham as the fifth most heavily staffed of the major institutions in the State.

During design phases, the consultant retained by the House Appropriations Committee to review staffing at Brunswick recommended 356.16 total staff positions -- 273.16 security positions and 83 nonsecurity positions. The General Assembly, however, funded Brunswick at 362 positions -- 275 security positions and 87 nonsecurity positions.

In the July 1984 system-wide reduction of staff, 12 positions were deleted from Brunswick's maximum employment level (MEL). Of those positions, three were security positions (two lieutenants and one sergeant). The other nine deleted were nonsecurity positions.

In determining the number of security staff needed at Brunswick, JLARC considered the most recent post audit, the warden's request for additional staff positions, the use of overtime, comparisons to staffing practices at other institutions, the criteria listed earlier in Chapter Two, and the DOC's 1984-86 Supplemental Amendment Proposal for additional staff.

Post Audit

Brunswick's October 1984 post audit shows a security staffing level of 277.44. Unlike most other prisons in the State, Brunswick does not apply the Sharp formula to its security positions that are primarily administrative in nature, so its post audits do not overstate the number of security positions that it needs.

Current Security Level. At the time of JLARC's review on October 23, 1984 the warden provided a master roster and post audit that showed 143 posts and a security staffing level of 277.44.

Application of the Sharp Formula. Brunswick is one of three institutions that does not currently apply the Sharp formula to administrative positions. Consequently, no adjustments were made by JLARC in this category.

Warden's Request

On September 17, 1984, the warden issued a post audit which showed a need for 306 security staff. Based on this post audit, he made a request for about 28 additional security staff. JLARC later found an error in these computations. The post audit should have shown a need for 311.04 positions, and the request should have been for 34.85 new positions.

The warden amended the September request in a memorandum dated October 4, 1984. He changed the September post audit so that he requested only 17 security positions. The warden told JLARC that DOC regional staff asked him to write the October memo after they rejected the September 17 request. The warden told JLARC that DOC staff informed him that 17 positions would be granted to Brunswick. The warden was instructed to develop a plan to use the 17 positions for outside work crews.

The September 17 post audit reflects the warden's original assessment of the posts that he believed to be necessary, so JLARC's analysis focuses on the September rather than the October request.

The warden wants to increase the level of security at the institution to reflect changes in the inmate population, and to compensate for continued deficiencies in staffing that have existed since the institution was first opened. The warden maintains that Brunswick was not designed to handle the number or the types of inmates it presently houses.

The warden would add 34.85 additional security personnel. This request includes 20.20 positions in four housing units, 5.05 positions for yard patrols, 8.40 positions for work crews, and 1.20 positions to operate the canteen.

Housing Units. The warden is primarily concerned about the number of security personnel in the housing units. The number of personnel in each unit varies, as do the number of posts. Housing unit A, which houses honor inmates, requires the least number of security personnel. Consequently, the warden would not add additional staffing for this unit.

Housing unit B is the "special purpose building" and houses higher risk inmates. The warden would add four additional security posts during the 8 a.m.-to-4 p.m. shift, which will require 6.72 additional FTEs. During the 4 p.m.-to-midnight shift the warden would delete two posts. The midnight-to-8 a.m. shift would be increased by one security post. The net effect of these changes in "B" building is an increase of 5.05 FTEs.

Housing units C, D, and E have similar staffing patterns. For these units the warden would add nine posts, three for each housing unit. To fill these additional posts, 15.15 FTEs would be required. During the 8 a.m.-to-4 p.m. shift the warden would add a "floater" officer and a unit supervisor. The 4 p.m.-to-midnight shift would remain at its present staffing level. During the midnight-to-8 a.m. shift the warden would add one floater officer.

The design of Brunswick's housing units is acknowledged by DOC staff to be inadequate. Recent memoranda between DOC and the architect of the facility further supports this assertion. Because of these design problems and the nature of the inmate population, the warden's request for additional housing officers appears reasonable and would aid security at the institution.

Yard Patrols. The warden would add three additional eight-hour, seven day yard posts requiring 5.05 FTEs. Currently three yard posts are established during the day and evening shifts. The warden has indicated that the present number of posts is not adequate to supervise the number of inmates that move about the yard. According to institutional staff, a number of assaults by inmates on officers and on other inmates have occurred in the yard.

During JLARC's two-day visit at Brunswick, large numbers of inmates were loitering in the yard; they apparently had nothing to do. The warden confirmed that inmates have limited job opportunities. Moreover, a serious incident occurred in the yard during JLARC's visit. As the JLARC group was escorted across the compound by the warden and security chief, an inmate threw a rock at the group. The rock hit the warden.

The warden's request for additional yard posts could offer a reasonable enhancement to the security of the institution. The

policy of permitting many inmates to congregate on the yard should also be reviewed, as it appears to contribute to problems at the facility.

Work Crews. The warden's post audit indicates a need for five additional work crews to supervise inmates who work outside the institution. The five posts would require 8.40 FTEs. The chief of security indicated that 527 jobs are presently available for inmates, but a large percentage are makeshift assignments that only require a few hours of work. Consequently, a large segment of the inmate population is idle during the day. Increasing the number of work crews, according to staff, would help eliminate some idleness, and hopefully would decrease the number of inmate assaults.

Inmate idleness, a high number of "C" custody inmates, and a lack of inmate work assignments all suggest the need for additional work crews. However, this request should be linked to the system-wide policy issue of whether to increase the number of crews, and to increase security on existing crews which operate outside of the institution's perimeter. If an increase is desired by the General Assembly or the Governor, this request should be considered.

Canteen Post. The warden wants to add one eight-hour, five-day canteen post, which would require 1.20 FTEs. The primary duties of the canteen officer would be to operate the cash register, inventory and order supplies, and monitor inmate and other financial records.

Even if this post is necessary, it does not appear that its duties are security in nature. They could be performed by nonsecurity staff at a savings to the State. At other institutions, JLARC has questioned using security personnel for operating canteens and has recommended deleting security and adding nonsecurity positions in instances where security staff are used. Therefore, the request for this position should not be approved.

Questionable Posts

Six existing posts have functions that are primarily nonsecurity in nature. The duties (shown in Table 26) are necessary, but there is no apparent reason for security personnel to perform these tasks. DOC should use nonsecurity staff to perform these duties at less cost.

Garbage/Sanitation Detail. The primary duty of the garbage/sanitation officer is to collect refuse within the institution and haul it to the county landfill. The warden indicated that this officer primarily works alone, and does not supervise inmates. When he is not transporting garbage, the officer washes or performs maintenance on the vehicle.

Table 26

**QUESTIONABLE SECURITY POSTS
AT BRUNSWICK CORRECTIONAL CENTER**

<u>Number of Posts</u>	<u>Title</u>	<u>Type of Post</u>	<u>Positions</u>	
			<u>DOC Formula</u>	<u>JLARC Formula</u>
1	Garbage/Sanitation	8 hours, 7 days	1.68	1.65
3	Mail Room	8 hours, 7 days	5.05	4.95
2	Property Control	8 hours, 7 days	3.36	3.30
TOTAL			<u>10.09</u>	<u>9.90</u>

Source: Post audit.

Garbage collection is a necessary function, but it is not clear why it requires a security officer. Brunswick should delete 1.65 security positions and hire an additional nonsecurity staffer, such as a highway equipment operator (pay grade 3) for this task.

Mail Room. Three security staff work in Brunswick's mail room. Institutional personnel at Brunswick maintain that mail room staff should be trained in security procedures because persons assigned to these posts have to detect contraband that might be included in inmate mail.

Utilizing security personnel to perform this task is unnecessary. Brunswick should abolish 4.95 security positions (according to the JLARC update of the Sharp formula) and employ three clerks or clerk messengers (pay grade 2) to work in the mailroom. This action would save the State costs in salaries. Also, three mail posts at Brunswick may be excessive. Other facilities with similar sizes of inmate populations have fewer mail officers. DOC should develop standards for the number of mail officers for a given size of inmate population.

Property Control. The need for security personnel (a corporal and a correctional officer) to operate the property control room at Brunswick is questionable. According to the orders for the two posts, their primary duties are to store and maintain inmates' clothing and other personal items. These officers also issue institutional clothing and personal hygiene items to inmates.

Institutional staff believe that security personnel should fill these posts because they are trained to intercept contraband. However, nonsecurity personnel (with some training) should be able to perform these duties. Brunswick should hire two store managers or storekeeper supervisors (pay grades 3 and 5, respectively) to run the property control room and abolish 3.30 security positions.

Overtime

During FY 1984, Brunswick's security staff worked 4,308.5 hours of paid overtime and 21,697.25 hours of overtime for compensatory leave. Thus, a total of 26,005.75 overtime hours was reported. Using the 1771-hour standard developed in Chapter Two, this is equivalent to 14.7 FTEs. Over one-half of the total overtime was reported in June 1984, probably due to the Mecklenburg escape.

No additional positions should be awarded to Brunswick to reduce overtime until DOC develops the overtime reporting method recommended in Chapter Two.

DOC's Budget Request

The 1984-86 Supplemental Amendment Proposal submitted by DOC requests 17 additional officers for the purpose of increasing the number of work gangs. The proposal also states that the additional officers would allow Brunswick to reduce overtime. Each gang would have two officers and from nine to 15 "B" custody inmates. The proposal states that the new work gangs would reduce inmate idleness and have a "positive effect upon unrest and tension."

This request would supplement the five personnel currently assigned to work gangs at Brunswick. All of the work gangs would routinely work outside of the institution's perimeter.

Adding work gangs is a system-wide policy decision that does not directly address the security needs inside of the institution. If these work gangs are added, consideration should be given to the specific recommendations of the warden and the recommendations of this report.

Staffing at Brunswick

Table 27 shows Brunswick's security staffing needs at the time of JLARC's review and JLARC's recommendation for security staffing levels. JLARC's recommendation of 287.10 security staff includes the following changes:

- addition of three eight-hour, seven-day posts (4.95 positions) in Building B,
- addition of three eight-hour, seven-day posts (4.95 positions) in Building C,
- addition of three eight-hour, seven-day posts (4.95 positions) in Building D,
- addition of three eight-hour, seven-day posts (4.95 positions) in Building E,

- addition of three eight-hour, seven-day posts (4.95 positions) on the yard,
- reduction of 5.19 positions due to the JLARC revision of the Sharp formula, and
- conversion of the garbage truck operator, three mailroom officers, and two property control officers from security to nonsecurity positions. This represents a deletion of 9.90 security positions and an increase of six nonsecurity positions.

SECURITY PROCEDURES

The JLARC review of security procedures focused on food service, medical supplies, and tool control. Several areas at Brunswick require further attention and corrective action.

Tool Control

The system of tool control at Brunswick appeared to be one of the better established systems observed by JLARC at DOC facilities. All tools were located in a single tool room which was operated by a correctional officer. The officer was responsible for logging in new tools. He could dispense them only to maintenance and security personnel. Only this officer was allowed in the toolroom; other institutional staff were not allowed. A system of control books was available for tracing tool usage.

Tools for the maintenance area were handled in two ways. Tools not used on a daily basis remained in the tool room until a foreman requested the tool. All tools were returned after they were used. Tools signed out for "long-term usage" to the maintenance crews (such as hammers, screwdrivers, and other common tools) were inventoried nightly by the foremen, who documented that they inventoried their equipment. At the end of the week the tools were returned to the central tool room where the officer did an independent inventory of the maintenance tools.

As thorough as the system was designed to be, JLARC observed maintenance personnel checking out an instrument without signing for its use. Also, a review of the log book indicated infrequent entries. When the officer-in-charge attempted to trace a tool by checking the log book, there was no entry for the tool, although someone had checked out one of the inventoried tools. Staff at Brunswick should closely adhere to the institutional tool control system.

Table 27

STAFFING AT BRUNSWICK CORRECTIONAL CENTER

<u>Security Staff</u>	<u>Positions</u>
Staffing at time of review	277.44
Recommended changes	
Impact of revised Sharp formula	-5.19
Conversion from security to nonsecurity	-9.90
Correction for Sharp formula misapplication	0.00
New security positions	+24.75
Deleted security positions	<u>0.00</u>
Total changes	<u>+9.66</u>
Recommended security staffing subtotal	287.10
 <u>Nonsecurity Staff</u>	
FY 1985 funded nonsecurity positions*	76.00
Recommended conversion of security posts into nonsecurity positions	<u>+6.00</u>
Nonsecurity staffing subtotal	<u>82.00</u>
TOTAL STAFFING	369.10
 <u>FY 1985 Funded Staffing Levels</u>	
Funded security positions	274.00
Funded nonsecurity positions	<u>76.00</u>
Total funded positions	350.00
DIFFERENCE BETWEEN JLARC TOTAL & FUNDED LEVEL	+19.10

*Nonsecurity staff scheduled for review in 1985.

Source: DOC; JLARC analysis.

Medical Area

The storage and control of medical instruments and medicines appeared relatively weak. Controls over medical instruments appeared lax. During a tour conducted by the acting head nurse, JLARC staff observed medical instruments stored unlocked in cabinets in the treatment room. During this time an inmate working as a custodian in the building was alone in the treatment room. In fact, when questioned about the storage of medicines, the inmate opened a cabinet door to point out where the novocaine was stored. Controls in these areas need to be tightened.

CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Institutional staff at Brunswick have taken a number of measures to improve security. The warden's requests for additional security staff and for capital outlay improvements reflect some of these measures. A large portion of the warden's request for additional security staff should be approved. Certain other staffing practices which prevail throughout the corrections system are also in evidence at Brunswick and should be altered. These practices include the use of security personnel for nonsecurity purposes. Finally, certain practices that infringe on the facility's security should be discontinued.

Recommendation (39). The level of funded security positions at Brunswick Correctional Center should be set at 287.10 (compared with the current funded level of 274). Six nonsecurity positions should be added at Brunswick to carry out the mailroom, property control, and trash truck duties.

Recommendation (40). Staff need to comply fully with the institution's tool control policy. Supervisory staff should inspect tool logs to ensure full compliance.

Recommendation (41). Control of medical instruments should be improved, and access should be limited. All instruments should be locked in appropriate storage areas away from inmate access. Inmates should not be allowed to work unsupervised in the treatment rooms. A log should be established, and an inventory completed each day on the number of instruments on hand. Access to these instruments should be limited and controlled more tightly than is present practice.

BUCKINGHAM CORRECTIONAL CENTER

Buckingham Correctional Center, first occupied in November 1982, is one of four medium security institutions (MSIs) constructed since 1978. Initially designed as a 512-bed, single-cell facility, the department decided in 1981 to double-bunk the facility by adding beds to cells in several housing units. In FY 1984, Buckingham housed an average daily population of 548 inmates. At the time of JLARC's visit in August 1984, however, the population was almost 700.

While originally intended to provide a medium level of security, 43 percent of Buckingham's FY 1984 inmate population was "C" custody, the status assigned to inmates who pose a constant security threat. With the influx of these inmates and the decision to double-bunk, the facility has become "harder" than originally anticipated.


Facility Overview

Buckingham was intended to serve as a prototype for two other MSIs, Nottoway and Augusta Correctional Centers. The design of all three facilities is nearly identical. Experiences at Buckingham are being used to guide staffing patterns, operating procedures, and detailed designs at the other two locations.

Mission and Population. Buckingham holds a general population consisting primarily of "B" and "C" custody inmates. In mid-1984 Buckingham began to pick up a significant number of parole violators being returned to the prison system. Persons alleged to have violated the terms of their parole agreements are temporarily housed separately from the general inmate population. Most parole violators had previously been held at Deep Meadow Correctional Center, which closed in September 1984.

Programs. Several programs and activities are available at Buckingham. The Rehabilitative School Authority offers library services, vocational training (in electricity, sheet metal, plumbing, and cooking), and GED and adult basic education (ABE) programs. Monthly enrollment in FY 1984 averaged 131 inmates. Inmates can also enroll in courses offered by Piedmont Community College.

Other activities include a variety of sports and recreational opportunities. Work opportunities for inmates include a metal furniture shop operated by enterprises (which employs approximately 50 inmates), cadre assignments (activities such as meal



Profile of Buckingham Correctional Center FY 1984

<u>Population:</u>	Budgeted Capacity:	500	"A" Custody:	10.3%	White:	43.1%	
	Avg. Daily Pop:	548	"B" Custody:	42.6%	Nonwhite:	56.9%	
			"C" Custody:	40.1%	Avg. Age:	27.7	
<u>Ratios:</u>	Inmates per Security Position:	1.82-to-1	[3]				
	Inmates per Staff (total):	1.38-to-1	[5t]				
	Total Expenditures per Inmate:	\$16,741	[7]				
<u>Budgeted Staff:</u>	Security:	275	<u>Officers:</u>	White:	45%	Avg. Age:	30
	Nonsecurity:	87.5		Nonwhite:	55%	Turnover:	25%
	Total:	362.5		Female:	17%		
<u>Serious Incidents:</u>	Assaults on Inmates:	14	[6t]	Escapes:	2	[5]	
	Assaults on Staff:	34	[4]	Total Serious Incidents:	53	[7]	

See Appendix B for sources.

Numbers in brackets [] indicate ranking of this facility compared to other major institutions. [t] indicates a tie with other facilities.

[1] has the most staff per inmate or highest number of reported incidents.

preparation, janitorial duties, and maintenance), work crews which go outside the perimeter, and related activities.

Physical Facilities. The facility is enclosed by a double perimeter fence topped with razor wire. Four towers are stationed along the perimeter to view inmate activity and to observe the fence. One tower is located near a sallyport (an entrance gate through the perimeter), and controls the gates electrically.

Within the perimeter fence are four housing units; a mess hall-kitchen building; a support services building which includes medical, recreational, RSA, and related services; an enterprise building, and the administration building. A recreational yard and other open space is also enclosed by the outer perimeter fence.

Each housing unit or "pod" contains 128 cells, 64 on each of two floors. Each floor is divided into two sides, with a raised central control booth which looks into all 64 cells in the unit. On both sides of the control booth are two tiers, one above the other, each with 16 cells. A dayroom lies between the control booth and the cells. The pods are connected by enclosed mezzanines and stairwells. Thirty-two cells, all in one building, are used for segregation, isolation, and protective custody purposes.

Since Buckingham opened, several changes have been made within the perimeter to the yard areas between buildings. First, fencing was added subsequent to a March 1984 incident when 30 inmates broke up furniture in the mess hall and then entered the nearby support services building, injuring several correctional officers and inmates. Access between the mess hall and the other buildings is now restricted by this addition. Second, fencing was installed at several other locations inside the perimeter, likewise limiting access. Third, numerous other steps have been taken to improve the physical security of the facility.

Double-bunking. Buckingham has a total of 480 cells, each containing 74 square feet. These 480 cells contain a total of 662 beds. This results from a decision to add a second bed to 182 cells, each of which was originally designed for a single bed. Double-bunking occurs in three of the four housing units at Buckingham.

The warden and other DOC staff argue that the double-bunking practice should be discontinued as soon as possible because the facility is neither designed nor staffed to accommodate the increased number of inmates. The JLARC report on forecasting and capacity addresses this issue more fully.

Stairwells. Buckingham staff pointed out the unenclosed area beneath each flight of stairs as a potential hiding place for inmates who want to assault or rob other inmates. During the JLARC visit, an inmate was in fact spotted hiding in the unenclosed area beneath one flight of stairs. The inmate could easily have sprung out and attacked someone on the stairs.

These unenclosed areas also exist at other prisons, notably Nottoway and Mecklenburg. At the time of the JLARC visit to Mecklenburg in November 1984, these areas had been sealed off with cinder blocks. The acting chief of security at Mecklenburg noted that this was an inexpensive yet effective remedy. Buckingham should take similar action to close off the open areas beneath the stairs leading to the mezzanine areas between the housing units.

SECURITY STAFFING AT BUCKINGHAM

Buckingham is staffed more heavily than most of DOC's major institutions. In terms of budgeted inmate capacity and funded staff, the ratio in FY 1984 was 1.38 inmates per staff position -- tied with Brunswick for fifth place among the 14. In FY 1985 Buckingham has 349 funded positions -- 271 security positions and 78 nonsecurity positions.

Before Buckingham opened, its staffing pattern was reviewed by a consultant retained by the House Appropriations Committee. DOC had originally requested 363.37 staff -- 84 nonsecurity and 279.37 security positions. The consultant recommended several changes in the DOC staffing plan, including ways to reduce staffing in the housing units. These changes were incorporated in the total of 338 positions -- 255 security and 83 nonsecurity -- recommended by the consultant. The consultant also noted that 30 additional security and 10 extra nonsecurity positions would be needed to operate for a double-bunked population of 750 inmates.

Several of the consultant's staffing recommendations were incorporated in Buckingham's staffing pattern. The facility was funded, however, at a level close to the original DOC request: 362.5 positions.

Numerous staffing changes have been made since the facility opened. Approximately 13 security posts have been added, other posts have been deleted, and the shifts and duties of additional posts have been adjusted since 1982. According to the warden, these changes have been made as experience with the double-bunked facility has accumulated, and as needs have changed, reflecting the initial expansion of the inmate population.

In July 1984, 12 positions were deleted as a result of a system-wide cut recommended by the Governor. Of the 12 positions deleted, five were security staff: one captain, two lieutenants, one sergeant, and one inmate hearings officer. The seven other positions deleted were nonsecurity in nature.

In determining the number of security staff needed at Buckingham, JLARC considered two post audits completed during the summer of 1984, the warden's request for additional positions, comparisons to staffing practices at other major institutions, the

criteria listed in Chapter Two, and DOC's 1984-86 Supplemental Amendment Proposal for additional resources.

Post Audits

A Buckingham post audit dated July 3, 1984, listed 98 security posts and identified a need for 272.21 security employees to fill these posts. However, correcting for minor errors in arithmetic, the audit should actually show a need for 271.83 FTE positions. In addition, a clerk position is erroneously shown on the post audit. As discussed later, this position is nonsecurity in nature and should not be included in the post audit.

A second post audit, dated August 23, 1984, was also supplied to JLARC. It displayed the warden's requested positions and other changes in staffing. Both post audits were considered in the analysis, although the July 3 audit was taken as listing the base level of staffing.

Misapplication of Sharp Formula. Although DOC has no policy about the proper application of the Sharp formula, posts which are not filled to cover absenteeism should not be included in Sharp calculations. The Buckingham post audit applies the Sharp formula to four posts which do not meet this test.

These posts, which include two training officers, an adjustment committee officer, and a count officer, should each be counted as requiring one employee. Through misapplication of the formula, the security staffing needs of Buckingham are overstated by 0.72 position (based on the revised Sharp formula). The excess positions should be subtracted from the staffing level shown on the post audit. The JLARC recommendation for security staffing at Buckingham includes an adjustment for this misapplication.

Warden's Request

The warden requested 39 additional security positions. He also indicated that he wants to make some significant staffing changes. These changes include adjusting the way staff are deployed as well as adding new posts and staff. The new positions would consist of 36 correctional officers and three supervisory positions -- a sergeant, a lieutenant, and a captain.

As noted in the August 21 memo from the warden,

The 36 additional officer positions will allow the institution to have 24-hour posts in each housing pod. Currently on the 8-4 watch, only one officer is available to work two sections during recreational activities on the yard. The additional sergeant, lieutenant, and captain positions are what this

institution forfeited on July 1, 1984, due to personnel cutbacks. The additional manpower will be used to man additional posts that have been installed since the institution opened. These posts have been created due to the new fences and other security measures that have been added.

The housing unit changes would add 15.15 new positions. The warden also wants to add eight new security posts, which would require 20.41 additional FTEs. Six of these posts, requiring 14.1 FTEs, are responses to the March 1984 disturbance, and represent fortifying security in or near the support services building and mess hall. These include an industrial gate officer, an enterprises officer, a kitchen officer, a transportation officer, a psychology/counseling post, and a library officer. Additional requests include a dog handler and three supervisory positions.

Housing Units. One important change requested by the warden would be to adjust the amount of time that existing housing unit posts are filled, requiring the addition of 15.15 new officer positions. The result would be three 24-hour, seven-day posts on each floor, for a total of 24 such posts. This represents one post in the control booth and one on each side of the pod. The previous staffing pattern used two 24-hour, seven-day posts on each floor, and added a third post on a 16-hour, seven-day basis.

Subsequent discussions with Buckingham staff indicated that this desired level of staffing had already been achieved without adding personnel. By eliminating the need for other posts at the facility, and by changing certain procedures, the assistant warden for operations indicated that sufficient staff were found to place, on each floor of the housing units, one officer in each control booth with an officer on each side. He also indicated that housing unit officers are often pulled for other short-term assignments when few inmates are in the housing units, such as at meal time or during recreation.

Key reasons mentioned by Buckingham staff for this level of staffing in the housing units include the increased number of "C" custody inmates, the practice of double-bunking many cells, the level of serious incidents that occur in these areas, and certain design features inside the pods.

The design problems include several barriers to the control rooms' line-of-sight, such as a stairway to the second tier of cells and walls near the shower area. In addition, the control room looks into both sides of the housing unit, which means that the officer posted in the control room must constantly shift his attention between the two sides. A patrol officer on each side of the pod can ensure observation of activities, according to the warden.

In terms of serious incidents, Buckingham reported the seventh highest number of total incidents and the fourth highest

number of assaults on staff in FY 1984. Staff indicated that a significant proportion of incidents such as robberies and assaults occur in the housing units or in adjacent stairwells and hallways.

For these reasons, three officers on each floor of the housing units appear necessary in order to provide a reasonable level of security, at least as long as the practice of double-bunking a substantial proportion of "C" custody inmates persists. Because the assistant warden has stated that this staffing level can be achieved without additional positions, and during December 1984 the housing units were in fact staffed at this level without requiring additional positions, the request for 15.15 additional positions in these areas appears unnecessary.

Industrial Gate Post. This post, although requested, was already filled at the time of the JLARC visit. This post was created when fencing was installed after the March 1984 disturbance to control access between the "Boulevard," a main concourse near the housing units, and the mess hall, enterprise shop, and warehouses. It was staffed through overtime at the time of the JLARC visit in late August. This appeared to reflect the warden's judgement that the post is essential to facility security.

This post is clearly required if the added fencing is to restrict access between the mess hall and other nearby buildings. The post officer shakes down inmates, and operates a metal detector to screen inmates on their way out of the enterprises metal shop and maintenance tool room. Creation of the post should reduce the flow of metal and potential weapons out of these areas, as well as limit access between the buildings. For these reasons, the post appears to be a reasonable enhancement of security at Buckingham.

Enterprises Post. The warden requested an additional 8-hour, 5-day post in the metal shop operated by Enterprises. This would bring the total staffing level up to three security officers and one enterprises foreman.

The metal shop is an obvious source of potential weapons. It is a large area with many blind spots behind machinery and materials. Approximately 50 inmates are employed in the shop.

The warden stated that the additional officer would help reduce the manufacture of weapons in the shop. Apparently weapons have been made in the shop, despite the presence of two officers and an Enterprises foreman. However, increased shakedowns of inmates and the use of a metal detector, which are currently being done, should also help stem the flow of metal out of the shop.

The additional officer could assist in the control of tools, which JLARC found to be especially weak (an inmate was in charge of dispensing tools in the metal shop). The officer could also assist in maintaining control in the large area of the shop, and in adjacent access areas.

Finally, security posts established in shops operated by DOC's enterprise unit are funded out of revenues generated by the sale of the manufactured items. If revenues are sufficient to cover the cost of this additional post, then it should be established. If revenues are not sufficient, then this post should be filled when revenues permit.

Kitchen Post. Buckingham's kitchen has been the focus of significant security enhancements since the March disturbance. Changes have included expanded metal barriers, more locked doors, an improved knife control system, and increased staff coverage during meals. Part of the beefed-up security for the kitchen includes a new 24-hour, 7-day post to supplement the existing round-the-clock post.

Six food service employees and one correctional officer work in the kitchen during the course of a day, as do 55-60 inmates. Additional security staff are brought into the adjacent mess hall during meals.

The kitchen is not in use on a 24-hour basis. According to the previous regional administrator, 24-hour kitchen posts are usually pulled for utility or relief duties between the time the kitchen closes (about 9-10 p.m.) and the time it reopens (about 4-5 a.m.). The need for additional staff during these late-night hours should be addressed by establishing a separate post for those duties, not by routinely reassigning a kitchen officer.

It is not entirely clear that an additional officer would significantly improve security in the kitchen. Actions such as the recently installed knife control system and expanded metal grates in various areas may have strengthened security enough to avoid the immediate need for additional officers. The need for this additional kitchen post should be reexamined after experience has accumulated with the new procedures and tighter physical security of the kitchen area.

Transportation Post. The warden's request for an additional 16-hour, 7-day transportation post reflects the increased needs of the larger population planned for Buckingham in FY 1985.

In FY 1984, Buckingham had a staffing level of transportation officers that was slightly below the system-wide average, as discussed in Chapter Two. These calculations were based, however, on an average daily population of 548. When JLARC visited Buckingham in late August, the population stood at close to 700, and the warden anticipated it remaining at about that level during FY 1985.

Although the population at Buckingham has increased, DOC should complete the system-wide transportation study recommended in Chapter Two prior to adjusting transportation staffing at the institutions.

Counseling/Psychology Officer. An additional eight-hour, five-day post is requested for the counseling area in the support services building. This post was established as a response to the March disturbance. The officer would shake down inmates coming into the area for appointments with counselors and other nonsecurity staff, monitor inmates in the vicinity, and patrol the nearby areas. Buckingham has ten rehabilitation counselor positions, several of which are located at least part-time in quarters on the mezzanines between the housing units.

According to the July post audit there are seven other security officers in the support services building (not counting the chief of security whose office is also located there). The officer assigned to the RSA portion of the building is immediately adjacent to the counseling area, and could readily monitor access to the area. Consequently, this option should be explored prior to filling the new counseling/psychology post.

Library Officer. The warden indicated a need for an officer to patrol the RSA library when inmates are using it. Currently the RSA officer patrols the hallway outside the classrooms and the library, and enters when problems become apparent. This is the staffing pattern at most other institutions with libraries the size of Buckingham's.

It may be possible to address the need for security staff in the library on an as-needed instead of full-time basis. Although the additional position would clearly strengthen security in the area, the need for the added security is limited to the hours of the library's operation and further to the number of inmates using the library at any given time. The assistant warden indicated that the RSA officer can usually provide adequate coverage of the library, and short-term needs are addressed by pulling an officer from other assignments. Consequently, the need for a full-time library officer does not appear warranted.

Dog Handler. Buckingham has one dog handler already on the security staff, and the warden is requesting an additional position for this function. This request appears questionable, and is addressed under "Questionable Posts," below.

Additional Supervisors. The warden is requesting the return of several supervisory positions trimmed from Buckingham's payroll in 1984. These include a captain, a lieutenant, and a sergeant. The justification for these positions noted in the warden's memo is "The additional sergeant, lieutenant and captain positions are what this institution forfeited on July 1, 1984, due to personnel cut backs."

Buckingham is already staffed for security supervisors at near average levels. A review of the ratio of corporals to sergeants, sergeants to lieutenants, and lieutenants to captains shows that Buckingham is within one standard deviation of the system-

wide average for each of these indicators. Consequently the need for additional supervisory positions is not compelling on this basis.

The rationale for restoring positions cut in July 1984 is unclear. According to correspondence from the prior Director, positions cut at that time were "painful" but carried out selectively "to avoid weakening programs without deference to their priorities or to the maintenance of essential functions." Consequently, restoring recently eliminated positions, such as the sergeant at Buckingham, appears unnecessary.

If the requested supervisory positions are intended to perform duties that can not be carried out by the lower ranking supervisors already assigned to Buckingham, then consideration should be given to using or promoting some lower ranked personnel currently on the staff. This was recommended in the Board of Corrections study committee's report on Mecklenburg, and may be practical at Buckingham as well. For example, the August 21 post audit submitted by the warden shows three new security supervisors, although it also indicates that two new lieutenant positions could alternatively be assigned to sergeants.

Questionable Posts

Five posts appear to make a questionable contribution to security at Buckingham. These duties (shown in Table 28) are necessary, but there is no compelling reason for correctional officers to perform these tasks. DOC should use nonsecurity staff to perform these duties, and should also reduce coverage of the front gate post.

Table 28

QUESTIONABLE SECURITY POSTS
AT BUCKINGHAM CORRECTIONAL CENTER

Number of Posts	Title	Type of Post	Positions	
			DOC Formula	JLARC Formula
2	Mail Room Officer	8 hours, 6 days	2.88	2.82
1	Dog Handler	8 hours, 5 days	1.20	N.A.
1	Reception/Entry	24 hours, 7 days	5.05	1.65
2	Property Control	8 hours, 7 days	3.36	3.30
1	Clerk Typist C	8 hours, 7 days	1.00	1.00
TOTAL			13.49	8.77

Source: Buckingham post audit, July 3, 1984.

Mail Room Officers. The two mail room positions should be certified correctional officers, according to DOC staff, because they screen incoming inmate mail for contraband, as specified in Division Guidelines. However, this function could be performed in a less costly manner by nonsecurity staff. The Penitentiary uses clerks (pay grade 2, \$8,853-12,102) to sort mail. If a clerk or clerk messenger (pay grade 2) were trained to search for contraband, DOC would realize a significant savings in personnel expenditures, since the correctional officers currently sorting mail are at pay grade 6 (\$12,644 - 17,273).

Property Control Officers. Two security posts are assigned to the personal property room. Each eight-hour, seven-day post is primarily responsible for inventorying inmates' personal property, obtaining clothes for inmates, and censoring incoming packages.

Two nonsecurity positions such as store managers or storekeeper supervisors (pay grades 3 and 5, respectively), could carry out these duties at less cost than using security officers. This change should be made, and is reflected in the JLARC recommendation for Buckingham staffing.

Reception/Entry. The need for a 24-hour post at the entry gate to Buckingham appears questionable. First, TV cameras linked to the main control booth are already in use, permitting the officer in the main control booth to monitor and control incoming traffic. The entrance building contains a sally port through which all incoming personnel must pass, and the doors are controlled by the officer in the main control booth at the present time. A tower officer is located directly above this gate and can observe anyone coming in.

Second, very few visitors are permitted into the facility after working hours, and between 9 or 10 p.m. and sunrise the only people using the entrance are employees. The need for round-the-clock staffing of this post is questionable. An eight-hour, seven-day post could probably handle most traffic. Thus, this post should be reduced from a 24-hour to an eight-hour post.

Dog Handler. The primary duty of Buckingham's dog handler is to train and work with tracking dogs used in locating escapees. Security staff are needed for this job, in the department's view, because they are trained in handling weapons and in how to deal with the escaped inmate when he is apprehended. However, the amount of time officers spend working with dogs varies. These officers are often used for various errands or to make transportation runs.

One dog handler post was established in 1984, and an additional dog handler is requested. This will require an additional 1.20 employees on an eight-hour, five-day basis, according to the August post audit. This would result in two dog handlers at Buckingham, more than any other major institution except Bland. This new position should not be approved until DOC completes the review of

dog handler positions recommended in Chapter Two. The number and location of dog handlers and dogs should be tied to where escapes are most likely to occur -- and most escapes occur at field units, not prisons.

Security clerk. A clerk typist position performs typing and other secretarial duties which are necessary in support of security staff. The practice at most institutions is to use secretarial positions for various clerical duties related primarily to security needs. It is clear that such clerical functions are necessary, but it is not clear why this position is shown on the facility's audit of security posts. No other major institution lists a clerk on its post audit in this manner.

Because it appears to be a technical error, this position should be removed from Buckingham's post audit and carried as a non-security position instead. The effect would be to shift one position from security to nonsecurity.

Overtime

During FY 1984, security staff at Buckingham worked a total of 28,497.5 hours of additional time. This total, which was the sixth highest in the system, consisted of 5,117.5 hours of paid overtime and 23,380 hours of overtime for which compensatory leave was granted. Based on the 1771-hour standard developed in Chapter Two, this is equivalent to 16.1 FTEs. However, during two months of FY 1984 no overtime was reported at Buckingham.

No additional positions should be awarded to Buckingham to reduce overtime until DOC develops the overtime reporting method recommended in Chapter Two.

DOC's Budget Request

The 1984-86 Supplemental Amendment Proposal submitted by DOC requests 17 additional officers for Buckingham, for the purpose of adding seven new work gangs. Each gang would have two officers and 9-15 "B" custody inmates, according to the proposal. The proposal states that the new work gangs would reduce idleness among the inmate population, with "positive effects upon unrest and tension attributable to an over populated institution". The gangs would work in forestry programs and farming activities on land surrounding the facility.

This request would supplement the three current work crews operated at Buckingham. All of these crews would routinely work outside the security perimeter of the institution.

Adding work crews is a system-wide policy decision that does not directly address the security needs inside the institution

identified by the warden. If these crews are added, consideration should still be given to the specific recommendations of the warden and the recommendations of this report.

Staffing At Buckingham

The staffing level shown on Buckingham's July 3, 1984, post audit, which represents actual staffing during the JLARC review, was 271.83 FTE security positions. Based on the review, staffing changes in the housing units shown in the August 21 post audit should be implemented, and the following changes should also be made:

- addition of one eight-hour, five-day industry post (1.18 positions) to be funded by enterprises,
- addition of one 16-hour, seven-day industrial gate post (3.30 positions),
- reduction of 0.72 positions as a result of eliminating four administrative posts from the Sharp formula,
- conversion of two mail handlers, two property control positions, and one clerk from security to non-security positions. This represents a deletion of 7.12 security positions and an increase of five nonsecurity positions, and
- reduction of the front gate post from a 24-hour, seven-day post to an eight-hour, seven-day post, for a deletion of 3.30 security positions.

These changes, which are shown in Table 29, result in a recommended 260.23 FTE security positions at Buckingham. Five nonsecurity positions should be added to the current level of nonsecurity staff (78 positions).

SECURITY PROCEDURES

The JLARC review of security procedures at Buckingham focused on the control of tools, medical items, and the food service area. Several areas were identified which need closer attention.

Tool Control

The control of tools can only be described as weak. In the enterprise area, the tool room was operated by an inmate, who was responsible for dispensing tools to other inmates on request. The only inventory of tools used in the enterprise area was done by the inmate when he was initially assigned to this duty. As a result,

Table 29

STAFFING AT BUCKINGHAM CORRECTIONAL CENTER

<u>Security Staff</u>	<u>Positions</u>
Staffing at time of review	271.83
Recommended changes	
Impact of revised Sharp formula	-4.94
Conversion from security to nonsecurity	-7.12
Correction for Sharp formula misapplication	-0.72
New security positions	+4.48
Deleted security positions	<u>-3.30</u>
Total changes	<u>-11.60</u>
Recommended security staffing subtotal	260.23
 <u>Nonsecurity Staff</u>	
FY 1985 funded nonsecurity positions*	78.00
Recommended conversion of security posts into nonsecurity positions	<u>+5.00</u>
Nonsecurity staffing subtotal	<u>83.00</u>
TOTAL STAFFING	343.23
 <u>FY 1985 Funded Staffing Levels</u>	
Funded security positions	271.00
Funded nonsecurity positions	<u>78.00</u>
Total funded positions	349.00
DIFFERENCE BETWEEN JLARC TOTAL & FUNDED LEVEL	-5.77

*Nonsecurity staff scheduled for review in 1985.

Source: DOC; JLARC analysis.

inmates could potentially take or hide tools to use as weapons without detection by staff.

A separate tool room was used for the maintenance department. This tool room was equipped with steel doors, shadow boards, and log books as required by department guidelines. However, access to the area was basically unlimited. The respective foremen, not correctional officers, issued tools to inmates. When the foremen were called away from the tool room, as happened frequently, inmates had unlimited access to the tools. An inventory was made, but routine logging out of tools appeared inconsistent. Again, this presented the potential for an inmate to take or hide a tool for later use as a weapon without detection by staff. Tool control needs to be tightened.

Food Service

The methods used to secure and control the use of kitchen knives appeared adequate. However, it was pointed out that these methods had been in place for less than two weeks at the time of the JLARC visit. The food service manager stated, "Previously, knives had been strewn about the kitchen randomly, with no control whatsoever." Clearly, the new procedures are a significant improvement.

Other Security Procedures

Several other factors were in evidence during JLARC's visit. All inmates traveling to the enterprise area or to the maintenance tool room had to pass through a gate, where a permanent, door-type metal detector was installed. During the JLARC visit, the metal detector was not operating. Inmates occasionally were searched by an officer using a hand-held metal detector.

An inmate was performing some locksmithing services for the institution during evening and weekend hours, when the building and grounds superintendent (who normally provides these services) was off duty. Although a correctional officer accompanied the inmate when he worked on locks, the warden described this situation as "completely unsatisfactory." If the inmate were transferred or paroled, Buckingham would be left with no one readily available to repair locks. But more importantly, permitting an inmate to repair locks is a clear breach of security procedures, and represents a significant risk that the inmate may use his skills to assist in an escape or a disturbance.

The warden pointed out that primary security locks, such as those on the perimeter and those used for the main doors to housing units, were serviced by an outside vendor, as they were special purpose locks requiring specialized training by the manufacturers.

Consequently, the principal locks controlling access into and out of Buckingham appeared to be serviced in a satisfactory manner.

DOC employees or outside vendors, not inmates, should service and repair such items as metal detectors and locks.

CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Based on the JLARC review of Buckingham Correctional Center, the institution appears to have taken a number of measures in the last six months to tighten security. The warden's request for additional security positions reflects some of these measures. Certain other staffing practices which prevail throughout the corrections system, which are also in evidence at Buckingham, should be altered. These practices include the use of security staff for nonsecurity duties. Finally, some specific practices which infringe on the overall security of the facility should be terminated.

Recommendation (42). The level of funded security positions at Buckingham Correctional Center should be set at 260.23 (compared with the current funded level of 271). The positions of mail handler, property control, and clerk should be dropped from security staff and five positions should be added to nonsecurity staff levels.

Recommendation (43). Control of, and access to, tools in the enterprise and maintenance areas at Buckingham should be improved by following division guidelines on tool control.

Recommendation (44). A DOC employee or outside vendor under contract, not an inmate, should periodically repair and service all equipment such as metal detectors and internal locks.

Recommendation (45). The areas beneath the stairs which lead to the mezzanine levels in the housing units should be sealed off.

DEERFIELD CORRECTIONAL CENTER

Deerfield Correctional Center is located near Capron in Southampton County. It sits directly adjacent to, but is not part of Southampton Correctional Center.

Deerfield is the only adult correctional institution in Virginia that consists primarily of trailers rather than permanent structures. Deerfield and Deep Meadow Correctional Centers (the latter also a trailer prison) were built as temporary facilities in 1976. Deep Meadow, however, was closed in September 1984.

Facility Overview


Deerfield's average daily population was 282 in FY 1984, which was 13th of the 15 major institutions. It holds a general population of inmates as well as two other groups of offenders. The physical structures at Deerfield have led to some special problems for inmate control.

Mission and Population. In addition to the general population, Deerfield houses two other types of inmates. One group consists of the transients who have been classified at Southampton Reception and Classification Center and are awaiting assignment and/or transportation to another prison. The second group are parole violators. The transients and parole violators are usually housed in the same trailer.

Deerfield provides transportation for all the prisons and field units in the southeastern region except for two. It has six security staff assigned to transportation.

Programs. Deerfield has fewer programs available to inmates than most other major institutions. It has no enterprises. The proportion of the available inmate population enrolled in classes offered by the Rehabilitative School Authority was under thirty percent in every month in FY 1984. Average monthly enrollment was 52 in FY 1984. Inmates can enroll in adult basic education and general education development classes; and a few inmates are transported to Southampton Correctional Center every weekday for vocational classes. RSA also offers library services at Deerfield. Various institutional jobs are available to the inmates, such as working on the correctional farms in the area and in the kitchen.

Physical Facilities. The trailers which comprise most of the structures at Deerfield were obtained as surplus property from the U.S. government. The major structures inside the perimeter fence



Profile of Deerfield Correctional Center FY 1984

<u>Population:</u>	Budgeted Capacity: 290	"A" Custody: 14.7%	White: 37.7%
	Avg. Daily Pop: 282	"B" Custody: 60.0%	Nonwhite: 62.3%
		"C" Custody: 21.8%	Avg. Age: 26.6
<u>Ratios:</u>	Inmates per Security Position: 1.93-to-1	[4]	
	Inmates per Staff (total): 1.53-to-1	[6]	
	Total Expenditures per Inmate: \$15,439	[9]	
<u>Budgeted Staff:</u>	Security: 150	<u>Officers:</u> White: 25%	Avg. Age: 32
	Nonsecurity: 39	Nonwhite: 75%	Turnover: 19%
	Total: 189	Female: 18%	
<u>Serious Incidents:</u>	Assaults on Inmates: 18 [5]	Escapes: 0 [14t]	
	Assaults on Staff: 10 [7]	Total Serious Incidents: 56 [6]	

See Appendix B for sources.

Numbers in brackets [] indicate ranking of this facility compared to other major institutions. [t] indicates a tie with other facilities.

[1] has the most staff per inmate or highest number of reported incidents.

are the kitchen and mess hall, two trailers for the RSA classes and library, a trailer which houses the law library and is used for visitation, another visitation trailer, and the medical unit. A building which houses the isolation and segregation cells is located next to the medical unit. Four buses for crafts and recreation and a recreation yard are also located within the perimeter. An administration trailer and a maintenance building are located outside the perimeter fence.

The inmates are housed in four trailers, called "modules" by the staff. Each module can house 72 inmates and provides about 64 square feet per inmate.

Since the trailers are not sturdy structures, Deerfield is highly dependent on perimeter security to ensure that inmates do not escape. However, rather than using two double fences spaced closely together as many other prisons have, Deerfield has internal fences and one perimeter fence. The internal fences control inmate movement inside the compound and keep the inmates a certain distance away from the perimeter fence. The perimeter fence is a small distance from heavy woods, so perimeter security is complicated even further. Six towers are established around the perimeter to view inmate activity.

SECURITY STAFFING AT DEERFIELD CORRECTIONAL CENTER

In FY 1985, Deerfield Correctional Center has 177.5 funded positions, of which 148 are security and 29.5 are nonsecurity. The ratio of inmates to security staff in the current fiscal year is 1.96-to-1.

Over the past four years, Deerfield has experienced numerous staffing changes. From 1980 to 1984, 15 positions were abolished, of which ten were security positions.

In determining the number of security staff needed at Deerfield, JLARC considered the post audit dated July 10, 1984, the warden's request for additional positions, the use of overtime, comparisons of practices at other major institutions on the utilization of security staff, the criteria listed in Chapter Two, and DOC's 1984-86 Supplemental Amendment Proposal for additional staff.

Post Audit

Deerfield's post audit shows a current staffing level of 144.22 security positions. As at most other prisons, Deerfield has a few security posts that should not have been included in the staffing formula calculations.

Current Staffing Level. The post audit submitted to JLARC shows a current staffing level of 144.22 security positions. The post audit includes seven supervisory positions.

Misapplication of Sharp Formula. Although DOC has no policy about the proper application of the Sharp formula, posts which are not filled to cover absenteeism should not be included in Sharp calculations. The Deerfield post audit applies the Sharp formula to three posts which do not meet this test.

These posts, which include the training officer, the chief of security, and the adjustment committee officer, should each be counted as requiring one employee. By misapplying the formula, the security staffing needs of Deerfield are overstated by 1.01 positions (based on the revised Sharp formula). These excess positions should be subtracted from the staffing level shown on the post audit. The JLARC recommendation for security staffing at Deerfield includes an adjustment for this misapplication.

Warden's Request

The warden would add 14.64 correctional officers, all of which would be used to offset the amount of overtime at the institution. The warden identified five posts that are presently being manned through the use of overtime:

- three housing unit posts, requiring 10.08 positions,
- one sally port post, requiring 3.36 positions, and
- one treatment building post, requiring 1.20 positions.

Although Deerfield was originally designed to provide temporary housing for recidivist inmates, its lifespan now seems more permanent. The expansion of programs and facilities within the institution since 1976 may justify increased security. Furthermore, Deerfield's inmate population has become more hardened and violence-prone.

However, the requested positions which Deerfield would use to offset overtime should not be considered until DOC has developed a reporting method for determining the utilization of overtime, as recommended in Chapter Two.

Questionable Posts

JLARC's review of Deerfield's post audit, and observations on visits to the institution revealed two posts that appear to make a questionable contribution to security at the institution. These functions are necessary, but JLARC questions the use of security personnel to perform the duties. DOC should utilize nonsecurity personnel to perform these duties at less cost.

Mail Room/Commissary Officer. A correctional officer works in the mail room and in the commissary. The officer assigned to the mail room sorts mail, checks postage, delivers mail to inmates, and performs a number of other nonsecurity tasks. The post order indicates that the officer must also search the mail for contraband. In the commissary, the officer conducts inventories, handles inmates' purchases, and records all transactions by inmates.

The duties of this post are nonsecurity in nature. A nonsecurity employee who has the combined skills of a clerk messenger (pay grade 2) and a store manager (pay grade 3) should be assigned to perform the mailroom and commissary duties. One nonsecurity employee should be added and (using the JLARC revision of the Sharp formula) 1.18 security positions should be deleted at Deerfield to accomplish this change.

Property Control. One security staff member is assigned to the property control room. The need for security personnel to operate the property control room, however, is questionable. According to the post order, the officer's main responsibilities are to store, inventory, and maintain inmates' personal clothing and other items. The officer also issues institutional clothing and personal hygiene items to the inmates.

Institutional staff indicate that security personnel are needed in this position to ensure that contraband does not enter the prison. However, a nonsecurity staffer could be trained to search for contraband and could also be hired at less cost to the State. A store manager or storekeeper supervisor (pay grades 3 and 5, respectively) should be hired to operate the property control room. The security staffing level should be reduced by 1.18 positions and the number of nonsecurity staff should be increased by one to accomplish this change.

Overtime

Compared to other institutions, security personnel at Deerfield worked a relatively small amount of overtime during FY 1984. In that year, security staff worked 5,268.75 hours of paid overtime and 12,818.6 hours of overtime for compensatory leave. Deerfield's total overtime of 18,087.35 hours, using the 1771-hour standard developed in Chapter Two, is equivalent to 10.21 FTEs.

An analysis of overtime hours worked by security staff at Deerfield on a monthly basis in FY 1984 indicates that during the first eleven months, overtime averaged 234.8 hours, or 1.6 FTE. During that period, overtime ranged from 54.8 hours per month to 820.4 hours per month. In June, overtime increased to 2728.5 hours. This increase in overtime, according to the warden, was due to the Mecklenburg escape.

No additional positions should be awarded to Deerfield to reduce overtime until DOC develops the overtime reporting method recommended in Chapter Two.

DOC's Budget Request

The 1984-86 Supplemental Amendment Proposal submitted by DOC includes no requests for additional security or nonsecurity positions at Deerfield Correctional Center.

Staffing at Deerfield

JLARC's recommendation for Deerfield's staffing level is shown in Table 30. The specific changes encompassed in the JLARC recommendations are:

- reduction of 2.76 positions as a result of the JLARC analysis of the Sharp formula,
- reduction of 1.01 positions as a result of excluding three administrative posts from the Sharp formula, and
- conversion of one mail room/commissary officer and one property control officer from security to nonsecurity positions. This represents a reduction of 2.36 security positions and an increase of two nonsecurity positions.

The recommended level of security positions is thus 138.09. Two additional nonsecurity employees should be employed to handle the nonsecurity duties now assigned to security staff.

SECURITY PROCEDURES

The JLARC review of security procedures at Deerfield Correctional Center focused on control over maintenance tools, medical supplies, and hobby shops. Overall security at Deerfield appeared reasonable. There were areas, however, which were of concern to the JLARC staff.

Medical Area

Not long before the JLARC visit, the head nurse established a usage log for hypodermic needles. However, the head nurse said she was not sure that her nurses were following correct procedures -- recording their actions in the log book when they used a needle. Thus it was not possible to take an accurate inventory of needles based on the records. In addition, needles used for novocaine in the dental office were left in an unlocked drawer where inmate patients would have access to them when the dentist stepped out of the office.

Deerfield's medical staff should closely adhere to the inventory system set up to log needle usage. In addition, needles

Table 30

STAFFING AT DEERFIELD CORRECTIONAL CENTER

<u>Security Staff</u>	<u>Positions</u>
Staffing at time of review	144.22
Recommended changes	
Impact of revised Sharp formula	-2.76
Conversion from security to nonsecurity	-2.36
Correction for Sharp formula misapplication	-1.01
New security positions	0.00
Deleted security positions	<u>0.00</u>
Total changes	<u>-6.13</u>
Recommended security staffing subtotal	138.09
<u>Nonsecurity Staff</u>	
FY 1985 funded nonsecurity positions*	29.50
Recommended conversion of security posts into nonsecurity positions	<u>+2.00</u>
Nonsecurity staffing subtotal	<u>31.50</u>
TOTAL STAFFING	169.59
<u>FY 1985 Funded Staffing Levels</u>	
Funded security positions	148.00
Funded nonsecurity positions	<u>29.50</u>
Total funded positions	177.50
DIFFERENCE BETWEEN JLARC TOTAL & FUNDED LEVEL	-7.91

*Nonsecurity staff scheduled for review in 1985.

Source: DOC; JLARC analysis.

and dental instruments should be kept locked at all times when not in use by the dentist.

Maintenance

The maintenance shops are located outside the perimeter in an old pig barn. The barn was divided into various maintenance shops -- electrical, carpentry, and others. According to Deerfield staff, prior to the summer of 1984, no tool control system existed. When JLARC staff visited the maintenance area, Deerfield staff and inmate maintenance crews were in the process of establishing tool rooms with shadow boards for each shop.

Other Observations

Deerfield was built in 1976 as a temporary structure, so no inside recreation area was built. Instead, four broken-down buses parked in the yard are used as space for hobby shops. In these buses inmates make crafts such as reverse glass painting and framing.

The inmates in these shops handle wood, glass, and sharp tools in a largely unsupervised environment. Only inmates with recreation passes may use the buses. Other inmates, however, loiter around the area. JLARC observed that inmates inside the buses could pass items to other inmates outside the buses. This appeared to be dangerous considering the types of inmates, the materials being used inside the bus, and the general lack of supervision. Steps should be taken to correct this situation.

CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

The JLARC review of Deerfield indicates that none of the requested security positions should be granted. DOC should refine its overtime reporting system prior to submitting requests for new staff based on overtime.

Staff at Deerfield should take steps to ensure that certain practices that infringe on the security of the facility are stopped.

Recommendation (46). The level of funded security positions at Deerfield Correctional Center should be set at 138.09 (compared with the current funded level of 148). Two nonsecurity positions should be added at Deerfield to perform the mailroom, commissary, and property control functions.

Recommendation (47). Staff at Deerfield Correctional Center should tighten controls over hypodermic needles. This should be done by consistently logging usage of needles, and by routinely inventorying needles.

Recommendation (48). Staff at Deerfield should increase supervision of inmates while they are working in the hobby shops. Yard officers should be required to routinely patrol the shops to check for misuse of tools or other instruments by inmates, or hobby buses should be moved within the compound to a more secure location that would control access.

Recommendation (49). DOC should explore the possibility of installing facilities for arts and crafts programs which are more permanent than the buses presently being used at Deerfield.

Recommendation (50). Implementation of the tool control system should be completed in accordance with division guidelines and monitored by DOC.

JAMES RIVER CORRECTIONAL CENTER

James River Correctional Center, located on the north bank of the James River in Goochland County, is one of the oldest prisons in the Virginia system. Previously called the State Farm, it serves as the focus for the chief farming operation in the DOC system. Inmates from James River farm approximately 8,000 acres, and tended more than 2,000 cattle, 600 hogs, and 3,000 poultry in FY 1984.

James River was administered for many years as an adjunct to Powhatan Correctional Center, which is located just across the river. The two institutions are connected by a low-water bridge across the James, and the two remain tied in some other important ways. James River farms the land surrounding Powhatan, for example, and off-duty officers assigned to Powhatan frequently agree to work overtime at James River. An assistant warden from Powhatan was in charge of James River until the late 1970s, when DOC assigned a warden to head the facility and separated it administratively from Powhatan.


Facility Overview

James River first opened in 1894, and the oldest building still in use dates from that era. For many years the facility contained a tuberculosis ward for the treatment of inmates with that disease. The ward was closed when medication became available for tuberculosis.

Mission and Population. The principal mission of James River is to provide work opportunities for inmates. Because the principal employment is farming, James River primarily receives inmates who are classified as "A" medical, with no physical work restrictions.

Through an agreement with Goochland County, the James River Correctional Center houses the county's jail. Men charged with crimes to be tried in the county, and men serving relatively short sentences are housed in a portion of James River's 16-cell isolation and segregation unit. An average of about four to six men are generally housed on behalf of the county.

Programs. Programs and activities available at James River are more limited than at many other facilities due to the emphasis on farming. James River has no enterprises. Academic classes (in adult basic education and general education development) are offered by the Rehabilitative School Authority (RSA). Average monthly enrollment was 41 in FY 1984. No vocational classes are offered on-site, but one group of inmates is bussed daily to Powhatan



Profile of James River Correctional Center FY 1984

Population:	Budgeted Capacity: 321	"A" Custody: 35.7%	White: 39.5%
	Avg. Daily Pop: 311	"B" Custody: 56.3%	Nonwhite: 60.5%
		"C" Custody: 6.1%	Avg. Age: 29.5
Ratios:	Inmates per Security Position: 3.45-to-1 [12]		
	Inmates per Staff (total): 2.02-to-1 [10]		
	Total Expenditures per Inmate: \$18,919 [5]		
Budgeted Staff:	Security: 93	Officers: White: 71%	Avg. Age: 34
	Nonsecurity: 65.5	Nonwhite: 29%	Turnover: 36%
	Total: 158.5	Female: 12%	
Serious Incidents:	Assaults on Inmates: 1 [10]	Escapes: 8 [1]	
	Assaults on Staff: 1 [11t]	Total Serious Incidents: 23 [14]	

See Appendix B for sources.
 Numbers in brackets [] indicate ranking of this facility compared to other major institutions. [t] indicates a tie with other facilities.
 [1] has the most staff per inmate or highest number of reported incidents.

Correctional Center for an RSA welding class. Inmates at James River have initiated a Community Involvement Group, which works with youth groups from Richmond and other areas.

Physical Facilities. Within the perimeter fence are nine housing units, the RSA and medical offices and rooms, and the mess hall. A recreational yard and other open space are also enclosed by the outer perimeter fence. The administration building and warden's offices are located outside the perimeter.

Most inmates at James River are housed in dormitories. Three honor quarters are in use, housing 54 inmates who meet institutional criteria. For example, each inmate must have a "good conduct allowance" classification entitling him to 30 days of good time for every 30 days served, must be classified in "A" custody status, and must be assigned to certain kinds of jobs at the facility. These quarters provide a little more privacy than is generally available in the larger dormitories.

A new mess hall was opened in 1982, replacing an older structure which was destroyed by fire. Located outside the original perimeter of the institution, the new mess hall is enclosed by a fence, and is connected by a sally port to the main compound.

SECURITY STAFFING AT JAMES RIVER

For FY 1985 James River has 157 funded positions, 94 of which are security positions and 63 of which are nonsecurity positions. With a budgeted inmate capacity of 321, the inmate to security staff ratio at James River is 3.4-to-1 (lighter staffing than average for the system). However, the facility actually operates at a security staffing level closer to 115 positions by making extensive use of overtime.

Since FY 1982, seven security posts have been added and three posts have been deleted. Numerous other changes in security staffing have been made, including the loss of a sergeant and three correctional officer positions in FY 1984.

In determining the number of security staff needed at James River, JLARC considered a post audit completed in September 1984, the warden's request for additional positions, comparisons to staffing practices at other major institutions, the criteria listed in Chapter Two, and DOC's 1984-86 Supplemental Amendment Proposal for additional resources.

Post Audit

The September 4, 1984, post audit shows 57 posts, and a need for 115.52 security positions to fill these posts. It also indicates that the then-current level of 92 funded positions left 23.52

positions to be filled through overtime. Apparently James River routinely staffs at a level that is considerably above its funded security level. The level of 92 is used here.

Misapplication of Sharp formula. Although DOC has no policy about the proper application of the Sharp formula, posts which are not filled to cover absenteeism should not be included in Sharp calculations. The James River post audit applies the Sharp formula to six posts which do not meet this test.

These posts, which include the security chief, operations supervisor and an assistant, grievance officer, training officer, and a count officer, should each be counted as requiring one employee. By misapplying the formula, the security staffing needs of James River are overstated by 1.08 positions (based on the revised Sharp formula). These excess positions should be subtracted from the staffing level shown on the post audit. The JLARC recommendation for security staffing at James River includes an adjustment for this misapplication.

The James River post audit also uses an incorrect staffing factor for eight-hour, two-day posts. The audit uses 0.53 FTE for each of nine posts instead of 0.48, which is the correct factor. The effect is to overstate need by a total of 0.45 positions, which is subtracted out in the "correction for Sharp formula misapplication" factor in the JLARC recommended staffing level.

Warden's Request

The warden is requesting an additional 23 security positions above the current funded level. Twenty of these would be correctional officer positions. The warden's request also includes one captain, one lieutenant, and one sergeant.

Officers. The primary purpose of the additional positions is to reduce the amount of overtime worked at James River. The amount of overtime increased in 1984 because two new positions were established, and dormitory staff was added on the day shift. Overtime was used to fill these new positions, which reflects the warden's determination that they are essential to the security of the facility. These positions are addressed below under the "Overtime" section.

Supervisory Positions. The warden is requesting three supervisory positions. One sergeant position, which was cut in the 1984 budget, is requested to be restored. A lieutenant is requested to relieve the day shift lieutenant and serve as adjustment committee chairman. An additional captain is requested to work a swing shift for relief, and to ensure supervision of all shifts.

James River is close to the statewide averages in the ratios of corporals to sergeants and of total security supervisors to

subordinates. Consequently, the need to establish additional supervisory positions is not compelling when compared to staffing practices at other institutions.

The rationale for restoring the sergeant position cut in July 1984 is unclear. According to correspondence from the prior director, positions cut at that time were "painful" but carried out selectively "to avoid weakening programs without deference to their priorities or to the maintenance of essential functions." Consequently, restoring recently eliminated positions, such as the sergeant at James River, appears unnecessary.

The lieutenant position requested to relieve the day shift lieutenant appears unjustified, since the post audit already allocates 5.05 positions to this post. However, because James River has fewer than five lieutenants, the post audit allocation does not appear accurate. As discussed in Chapter Two, DOC should review the practice of having fewer positions of given ranks than post audits specify. Additional ranked security staff, such as this lieutenant position, may be warranted, based on the review.

The highest ranking officer on duty when the chief of security (a major) is absent is a lieutenant, according to the post audits. At least two other major institutions (Marion and the Women's Center) also have lieutenants as the highest ranking officer. Although this practice has been criticized at Mecklenburg, the mission of James River may be more compatible with the practice. As noted in Chapter Three, DOC should review institutional practices regarding the highest-ranking officer on duty during each shift, and determine which rank is the most appropriate. Facilities should then be staffed accordingly.

Overtime

As noted above, the primary reason for the additional requested correctional officers is to reduce the amount of overtime being worked at James River. Security staff at James River worked a total of 28,839 hours of overtime in FY 1984. This included 25,007 hours of paid overtime, and 3,832 hours of overtime compensated by leave time. Based on the 1,771-hour FTE standard developed in Chapter Two, this amount of overtime equals 16.3 FTEs.

Most overtime logged at James River is to fill essential security posts inside the compound, according to the warden and assistant warden. As discussed in Chapter Two, DOC lacks an overtime reporting system that separately identifies overtime worked to fill essential security posts and overtime worked in response to emergencies.

Because so much overtime is routinely worked at James River, the additional requested officer positions are in effect "on board," without having gone through the review process used for new positions at other major institutions. Based on this practice of using

extensive overtime, it appears that James River's request for additional positions may legitimately reflect a need for staff to fill essential security positions. It also clearly illustrates the limited meaning of the "funded security positions" term, since James River routinely exceeds that level.

James River's overtime should be a priority for DOC review and for application of the revised overtime reporting system. Positions which are filled through overtime but which have not been reviewed for need should also be a priority.

Questionable Posts

Four security posts appear to be of questionable value to the security of the institution (Table 31). Three of these posts should be filled by nonsecurity staff.

Table 31

QUESTIONABLE SECURITY POSTS
JAMES RIVER CORRECTIONAL CENTER

Number of Posts	Title	Type of Post	Positions	
			DOC Formula	JLARC Formula
1	Mail Room	8 hours, 5 days	1.20	1.18
1	Canteen	8 hours, 5 days	1.20	1.18
1	Property Control	8 hours, 5 days	1.20	1.18
1	Dog Handler	8 hours, 5 days	<u>1.20</u>	<u>N.A.</u>
TOTAL			4.80	3.54

Source: Post audit.

Mail, canteen, and property control functions are necessary, but they could be performed less expensively by nonsecurity staff instead of by correctional officers. Currently, each activity is an eight-hour, five-day security post. James River should employ a clerk or clerk messenger (pay grade 2) to work in the mail room; and a store manager or storekeeper supervisor (pay grades 3 and 5, respectively) to operate the canteen and property room. When these three nonsecurity positions are hired, 3.54 security positions should be abolished.

James River has one eight-hour, five-day dog handler post. This officer trains dogs, which are used to track escapees from State prisons as well as aid local law enforcement authorities in criminal investigations. However, Powhatan Correctional Center, located perhaps a mile from James River, also has one 8-hour, 5-day dog

handler post. DOC should review this function and determine whether this level of staffing at the two locations is necessary.

DOC's Budget Request

The 1984-86 Supplemental Amendment Proposal submitted by DOC requests 12 additional correctional officers for James River. The principal reason is to "provide full-time staff in lieu of utilizing overtime to provide supervision and security for ten outside "B" custody work gangs."

As the request points out, "if this request is not funded, there will continue to be high usage of overtime to cover posts in non-emergency situations." Based on other documentation from DOC, 12 officers may reduce but not eliminate the overtime being worked at James River.

Staffing at James River

The 20 new officer positions requested by the warden represent overtime necessary to cover most of the gap between the staffing level required by the September post audit and the 94 funded security positions. James River is apparently staffed at close to 115 security positions through the extensive use of overtime.

As noted in Chapter Two, however, overtime cannot be converted directly into hours of needed staff time. However, because overtime is apparently used to fulfill the basic security mission of the institution, DOC may want to continue paying overtime at James River until its overtime reporting system is improved. DOC should closely review the facility's post audit and security staffing prior to awarding any additional permanent security positions to James River.

Table 32 shows the effects of the recommended JLARC changes on security staffing at James River. The JLARC recommendation of 84.78 security positions includes the following changes:

- reduction of 2.15 positions as a result of the JLARC analysis of the Sharp formula,
- conversion of the mail room, canteen, and property control posts from security to nonsecurity positions. This represents a deletion of 3.54 security positions and an increase of three nonsecurity positions,
- reduction of 1.08 positions as a result of excluding six administrative posts from the Sharp formula,
- reduction of .45 positions through correction of an incorrect staffing factor.

Table 32

STAFFING AT JAMES RIVER CORRECTIONAL CENTER

<u>Security Staff</u>		<u>Positions</u>
Staffing at time of review		92.00
Recommended changes		
Impact of revised Sharp formula	-2.15	
Conversion from security to nonsecurity	-3.54	
Correction for Sharp formula misapplication	-1.53	
New security positions	0.00	
Deleted security positions	<u>0.00</u>	
Total changes		<u>-7.22</u>
Recommended security staffing subtotal*		84.78
<u>Nonsecurity Staff</u>		
FY 1985 funded nonsecurity positions**	63.00	
Recommended conversion of security posts into nonsecurity positions	<u>+3.00</u>	
Nonsecurity staffing subtotal		<u>66.00</u>
TOTAL STAFFING		150.78
<u>FY 1985 Funded Staffing Levels</u>		
Funded security positions	94.00	
Funded nonsecurity positions	<u>63.00</u>	
Total funded positions		157.00
DIFFERENCE BETWEEN JLARC TOTAL & FUNDED LEVEL		-6.22

*DOC may need to continue the current overtime policy at James River until the reporting system improvements recommended in Chapter Two are completed and a more accurate assessment of staffing needs can be made.

**Nonsecurity staff scheduled for review in 1985.

Source: DOC; JLARC analysis.

SECURITY PROCEDURES

The JLARC review of security procedures at James River focused on control over tools, medical supplies, food service, housing units, and maintenance items. Several areas of control at James River require further attention and corrective action.

Tool Control

One of the weakest tool control systems observed by JLARC staff was at the James River Correctional Center. Few of the department's procedures on tool control were in place.

All the tool rooms are located outside the perimeter wall. Tools are stored in numerous areas. Some are in a central maintenance area where the maintenance supervisor's office is located. Tools are also located in the individual maintenance shops (plumbing, small motor, and others), as well as in the garage and the farm trucks.

The tool room located in the central maintenance barn was run by an inmate. When JLARC visited the area, the wooden door was left open and unattended. A shadow board was being used, but it was incomplete and many tools were simply lying around. A daily usage sheet was tacked on the door, but it was not properly filled out. According to the maintenance supervisor, the inmate who ran the tool room "writes down who took the tool out, when he remembers to."

Tools were observed in other areas where inmates had unsupervised access to them and where it was not easy to account for the tools at the end of the day.

Because James River inmates farm 8,000 acres, a great deal of trust is put into inmates who work on the farm. But tool control is weak and potentially dangerous. Steps should be taken to establish reasonable control and accountability for both farm and maintenance tools.

Medical Areas

Security in the medical area appeared reasonable. Access to the medical area is restricted. Inmates waiting to see the doctor are kept in a separate locked waiting area. Precautions have been taken to safely secure both nursing staff and medical records in the event of a disturbance. Needles and other controlled substances and instruments are kept under control. Tracing needle usage could be improved by documenting how many needles are returned to the pill room each day to be destroyed. This could then be checked against the number issued to make sure that no needles are missing.

Food Service

Overall control appeared reasonable in the food service area. Knife control was reasonable but could be improved. Inventory and daily usage systems were used to track the knives. The knives, however, were kept in a drawer in a filing cabinet. The filing cabinet had a lock, but when staff entered the office the cabinet was unlocked and several inmates were sitting in the office with the food services manager. The knives should be kept in a more secure, locked area at all times.

Other Observations

Several other items came to the attention of the JLARC staff during the review of James River.

Locks on Gates. In one incident, JLARC observed that an electronic lock on a gate between the main yard and the medical area did not close properly. An inmate closed the gate, but the gate did not lock. The inmate reopened and unsuccessfully closed the gate three or four times. The inmate, with the assistance of another inmate, then tried to fix the lock with what appeared to be a plastic knife.

This appeared to be a questionable practice at best. DOC policy should ensure that inmates do not work on perimeter gates or locks. Inmates should not be permitted to carry plastic knives.

Work Crew Equipment. Another security procedure at James River also appears questionable. At the time of the JLARC visit, facility staff noted that some work crew staff were equipped with radios instead of guns. The reason given was that inmates could overpower a single officer and take the gun, so a radio was the preferred piece of equipment.

This argument appears specious, especially since the practice at all other locations is to assign a gun to one security officer, who then supervises a crew of inmates. Assignment of weapons to security staff should be based on custody level and number of inmates on an outside work crew, in a consistent fashion at all facilities.

CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Based on the JLARC review of James River Correctional Center, the funded level of security positions should be set at 84.78. No additional security positions should be awarded to reduce overtime until DOC improves its overtime reporting system. A staffing practice which prevails throughout the system -- the use of security staff to carry out nonsecurity functions -- should be

stopped. Finally, James River should tighten certain security procedures.

Recommendation (51). The level of funded security positions at James River Correctional Center should be set at 84.78 (compared to the current level of 94). DOC may want to continue paying overtime at James River while developing an improved overtime reporting system. Three additional nonsecurity positions should be funded to cover functions previously assigned to security staff.

Recommendation (52). Tool control should conform to division guidelines.

Recommendation (53). Storage of kitchen knives and cafeteria utensils should be tightened. In addition, accountability should be tightened over used needles.

MARION CORRECTIONAL TREATMENT CENTER

Marion Correctional Treatment Center provides confinement and treatment of inmates who are mentally ill or have other serious behavior problems. It is located on the grounds of Southwestern State Hospital in Smythe County.

The Department of Corrections took over the operation of this facility in 1980. It was previously operated by the Department of Mental Health and Mental Retardation (DMHMR). Some other states assign responsibility for the confinement of mentally ill inmates to the state mental health agency.

Marion is one of the smallest major adult institutions, with a budgeted capacity of 145 in FY 1984. It had the lowest ratio of inmates to total budgeted staff of all the major adult institutions in FY 1984 -- it was the most highly staffed.

Facility Overview


Unlike many other State prisons, Marion is not oriented to providing work or educational opportunities to inmates. Rather, its primary goal is to provide psychiatric treatment to inmates.

Mission and Population. Marion is the only adult correctional facility in Virginia whose primary purpose is to house and treat inmates (called "patients" by the staff) who have been classified as mentally ill or have other serious behavior problems that require psychiatric treatment. A recent study by DOC and DMHMR found that as many as 500 inmates have some type of mental illness that requires psychiatric care.

Most inmates who are confined at Marion were first given psychiatric treatment at the mental health units of Powhatan Correctional Center or the Penitentiary. When the staff at these facilities believe that an inmate should be confined in Marion, they consult with Marion staff to determine if a transfer would be appropriate.

Because of its mission, Marion has extensive treatment staff, including three clinical social workers, two psychologists, and 2.5 mental health physicians.

Marion's average daily population was 143 in FY 1984. In addition to the patients, who make up over 80% of Marion's population, this facility also houses a small number of non-patient



Profile of Marion Correctional Center FY 1984

<u>Population:</u>	Budgeted Capacity: 145	"A" Custody: 9.7%	White: 56.1%
	Avg. Daily Pop: 143	"B" Custody: 39.6%	Nonwhite: 43.9%
		"C" Custody: 46.3%	Avg. Age: 29.3
<u>Ratios:</u>	Inmates per Security Position: 1.29-to-1	[1t]	
	Inmates per Staff (total): .94-to-1	[1]	
	Total Expenditures per Inmate: \$29,307	[1]	
<u>Budgeted Staff:</u>	Security: 112	<u>Officers:</u> White: 99%	Avg. Age: 40
	Nonsecurity: 43	Nonwhite: 1%	Turnover: 6%
	Total: 155	Female: 9%	
<u>Serious Incidents:</u>	Assaults on Inmates: 21 [4t]	Escapes: 0 [14t]	
	Assaults on Staff: 30 [5t]	Total Serious Incidents: 152 [3]	

See Appendix B for sources.

Numbers in brackets [] indicate ranking of this facility compared to other major institutions. [t] indicates a tie with other facilities.

[1] has the most staff per inmate or highest number of reported incidents.

inmates. These are the transients, who are awaiting transfers to other facilities; and the cadre (working) inmates, who hold various jobs in and around the facility.

Some inmates at Marion are formally classified by the staff as being "dangerous" or "very dangerous." Usually about 20 inmates fit one of these categories. Whenever they go anywhere within the facility, two security staff must accompany them.

Programs. Marion has no enterprises. Some patient inmates have institutional jobs, such as kitchen workers and janitors. The cadre inmates have jobs such as farm and maintenance workers.

The Rehabilitative School Authority (RSA) offers library services, daytime academic programs for the patient inmates; and nighttime academic programs for the other inmates. RSA does not offer vocational programs at Marion. In FY 1984, 22 inmates were enrolled in school in an average month.

Physical Facilities. Marion consists of one brick building. It is enclosed by a double fence topped with razor wire. Five towers are located around the perimeter, but only four of them are staffed.

The building contains a medical unit, eight housing wings on two floors, a gymnasium, a small kitchen and mess hall, administrative and treatment staff offices, a school and library room, and a supply storage area.

Marion's housing wings contain individual rooms rather than dorms. A few rooms house more than one inmate. All of the rooms contain 80 or more square feet. One wing contains several isolation/segregation cells as well as individual rooms for inmates. In most cases, the cadre and transient inmates are housed in separate wings from the patient inmates.

Marion places patient inmates in the housing wings according to the nature of their mental illness, rather than their behavior at the institution. Wing 2D contains inmates who are functioning at the highest level; wing 2C contains inmates at an intermediate level; and the other wings contain individuals with the most severe mental problems.

The kitchen facilities are limited because Southwestern State Hospital provides the noon and evening meals at Marion. Staff and inmates at Marion prepare breakfast.

Since the Department of Corrections took over Marion's operations from the DMHMR, it has made extensive renovations to make it a secure correctional facility.

SECURITY STAFFING AT MARION

In the current fiscal year, Marion has 171.5 funded staff positions, of which 135 are security and 36.5 are nonsecurity. In FY 1984 Marion was the most heavily staffed prison, with the fewest inmates per total budgeted staff of all the major institutions (0.94 inmates for every one staff).

During FY 1984 Marion lost seven positions, including two security positions. One was a lieutenant and the other an inmate hearings officer.

In determining the number of security staff at Marion, JLARC considered the warden's request for additional positions, the latest post audit, staffing practices at other major institutions, the criteria listed in Chapter Two, and the 1984-86 Supplemental Amendment Proposal submitted by DOC.

Post Audit

The number of positions called for by Marion's latest post audit is close to its current funded level. As at most other prisons, Marion has a few security posts that should not have been included in the staffing formula calculations.

Current Security Level. The latest post audit (dated April 1, 1984) shows a need for 40 security posts, and for 131.23 security employees to fill these posts. This total includes 11 supervisory positions (sergeants and above).

According to information supplied by the central office, Marion has 135 funded security positions in the current fiscal year. Thus, it has about four more positions funded than the level indicated by the post audit.

Misapplication of Sharp Formula. Although DOC has no policy about the proper application of the Sharp formula, posts which are not filled to cover absenteeism should not be included in Sharp calculations. The Marion post audit applies the Sharp formula to three posts which do not meet this test.

These posts, which include the training officer, security chief, and hearings officer, should each be counted as requiring one employee. By misapplying the formula, the security staffing needs of Marion are overstated by 0.54 positions (based on the revised Sharp formula). These excess positions should be subtracted from the staffing level shown on the post audit. The JLARC recommendation for security staffing includes an adjustment for this misapplication.

Warden's Request

The warden is requesting 16 additional security positions (he needs 16.83 according to the current staffing formula, but he has rounded the number down). The 16 positions would be added to the 131 positions derived from the April post audit. He would use the positions to fill two tower posts and to increase security on two housing wings.

Towers. Five towers are stationed around the perimeter at Marion. Table 33 shows the number of hours that the towers are staffed, and the additional hours that the warden wants to staff two of them. The table indicates that two towers are currently staffed 24 hours a day, seven days a week; and a third tower is staffed only when inmates go out to the recreation yard.

Table 33

TOWER STAFFING AT MARION

<u>Tower*</u>	<u>Current Staffing</u>	<u>Additional Staffing Requested by Warden</u>
1	24 hours, 7 days	0
2	24 hours, 7 days	0
3	Recreation Periods	0
4	Unstaffed	24 hours, 7 days
5	Recreation Periods	24 hours, 7 days

*The tower numbers were designated by JLARC. Marion staff may use a different numbering or naming system for the towers.

Source: April 1, 1984, post audit and warden.

The warden is requesting positions for the remaining (fourth and fifth) towers. One is never staffed, and the other is staffed only when inmates are in the recreation yard. This tower is staffed by pulling an officer temporarily from another post or through overtime. The warden would staff these towers 24 hours a day, seven days a week. In the warden's view, the two tower posts are needed to provide improved perimeter security. He says the inmates know that the weapons used by the officers in the other towers have a limited range, and that they could choose an "uncovered" spot to try scaling the fence.

The additional tower positions appear to be questionable. No inmate has successfully escaped from Marion since DOC took over operations in 1980. Three inmates have tried to scale the fence in the last year, but they were all captured before they succeeded.

Moreover, the inmates who are patients rarely leave the building. When they go out to the recreation yard, they are always accompanied by one or two officers -- the officers assigned to each wing are pulled from the wing to the recreation yard when the inmates from their wings recreate.

Housing Wings. The warden would add more positions to two housing wings -- 2C and 2D. By adding these positions, the warden would achieve his stated goal of having a minimum of two officers on every shift on all wings that hold patient inmates. He believes that the current staffing pattern on wings 2C and 2D is "a highly undesirable and dangerous practice which could lead to serious breaches of security."

Wing 2C contains inmates whose mental illnesses are at an intermediate level. Its capacity is 20 inmates. The warden would add one eight-hour, seven-day post to the night shift. One officer is currently assigned to this shift. The warden argues that if a problem occurred during the night, one officer might not be able to handle it.

Wing 2D contains inmates who are functioning at the highest level. Its capacity is 20 inmates, but more inmates are often assigned here. Some rooms on this wing contain as many as five inmates. The warden would add one more seven-day, 24-hour post to this wing. One 24-hour post is currently established here. The staffing on the 12-8 shift is of special concern to the warden. This wing has no room toilets. If an inmate has to use the bathroom, the officer on duty must unlock the door of the inmate's room and escort the inmate to the toilet, which is located away from the hallway. The warden is concerned that the other inmates in the room could overpower the officer or that they could engage in prohibited activities while the officer is escorting the inmate.

The request for the additional positions on the housing wings appears to be warranted, even though the number of inmates that each officer would supervise is considerably lower than other major institutions. The warden's desire to have two officers on each wing that holds patient inmates on all shifts seems reasonable, given that these inmates are mentally ill and that Marion had the highest per capita rate of assaults (on staff and inmates) of the State's 14 major institutions in FY 1984. Marion also had more serious incidents (45) in which restraint by force was necessary than any other major institution in FY 1984. An alternative which DOC should also consider, however, would be the use of a "floater" officer who could be called on to assist on any wing during the 12-8 shift.

Questionable Posts

As at other prisons in the State, Marion has several security staff who are performing duties that are essentially nonsecurity in function (see Table 34). The duties could be carried

Table 34

QUESTIONABLE SECURITY POSTS AT MARION

<u>Number of Posts</u>	<u>Title</u>	<u>Type of Post</u>	<u>Positions</u>	
			<u>DOC Formula</u>	<u>JLARC Formula</u>
1	Mail Room Officer	8 hours, 6 days	1.44	1.41
1	Commissary Officer	8 hours, 5 days	1.20	1.18
1	Personal Property Officer	8 hours, 5 days	1.20	1.18
1	Storeroom Officer	8 hours, 5 days	1.20	1.18
TOTAL			5.04	4.95

Source: April 1, 1984, post audit.

out for less expense by nonsecurity employees. Marion should abolish the 4.95 security positions now carrying out these functions and replace them with four nonsecurity staff.

One of these positions was previously filled by a nonsecurity staffer. When the nonsecurity position was cut in FY 1984, Marion made the position a security post. Security staff have always filled the other three positions.

Mail Room Officer. A correctional officer handles all the institution's mail. This individual checks incoming inmate letters and packages for contraband and logs all packages and money sent to inmates. No inmates work in the mail room. The post is an eight-hour, six-day post. For a few hours on Saturday, the officer who fills this post is pulled to supervise the visiting area.

With the exception of visitation, the duties of this position are clerical in nature. A clerk or clerk messenger (pay grade 2) should be added to Marion's payroll to operate the mail room, and 1.41 security positions should be abolished. Marion could achieve cost savings in salaries by taking this action.

Commissary Officer. An eight-hour, five-day post is established at Marion to operate the commissary. This correctional officer's duties are similar to those of a clerk and bookkeeper. The officer, for example, determines the selling price of items, operates the cash register, verifies deliveries, orders and stocks items, and prepares financial reports. Inmates occasionally enter the commissary to do janitorial work and to unload items. On the post order, the officer's supervisors listed are the chief accountant and the shift commander.

With appropriate training, a store manager or storekeeper supervisor (pay grades 3 and 5, respectively) could perform these

duties at less cost than a correctional officer. The security chief concurred that this position could be filled by a civilian. Thus, the commissary duties should be transferred to a new nonsecurity position.

Personal Property Officer. This post is filled by a correctional officer and is established on an eight-hour, five-day basis. The officer inventories and searches all new inmates' personal property, issues clothing to inmates, keeps records on all inmates' personal property, and supervises three inmates while they work in this area.

A storekeeper supervisor or store manager should be trained to carry out these duties. One nonsecurity position should be added and 1.18 security positions abolished.

Storeroom Officer. A correctional officer fills this position and carries out duties similar to those described for the commissary officer. The officer orders and stocks all supplies for the institution, maintains records, and performs other bookkeeping duties. The officer was recently given an additional responsibility, tool control. Inmates do not work in the storeroom. The post is filled eight hours, five days per week.

Prior to FY 1984, this position was not a security post. The storeroom was run by a storekeeper supervisor. The storekeeper supervisor was cut in FY 1984, so Marion made the storeroom duties a post and gave the duties to a correctional officer. Even though the position's duties have recently expanded to include tool control, a storekeeper could perform the tool control function as well as the other duties in the storeroom. Nonsecurity employees at several other institutions have responsibility for tool control. This function should be transferred to a new nonsecurity position (a store manager or storekeeper supervisor) and 1.18 security positions should be abolished.

Overtime

Security staff at Marion worked a total of 9,404.5 overtime hours in FY 1984, which was the third lowest of the major institutions that year. The staff received overtime pay for 743.5 of these hours, for a cost of \$9,745. The staff obtained compensatory time for the remaining 8,661 hours.

DOC needs to develop the overtime monitoring mechanism discussed in Chapter Two before a request for full-time staff to reduce overtime should be considered.

DOC's Budget Request

The 1984-86 Supplemental Amendment Proposal submitted by DOC requests ten additional officers for Marion, for the purpose of

staffing the two towers (discussed previously) on a seven-day, 24-hour basis. The proposal does not contain requests for the additional housing wing positions that were also discussed in the "Warden's Request" section.

The supplemental proposal also requests 17.5 additional nonsecurity positions for Marion, including two clinical social workers and eight nurse clinicians. The need for these positions was identified in a recent study conducted by representatives of DOC and the DMHMR. Their investigation, which concerned the problems related to the provision of mental health services to inmates, concluded that the 17.5 positions would greatly improve levels of care. JLARC did not assess the adequacy of current nonsecurity staffing levels or requests for new nonsecurity positions.

Staffing at Marion

Table 35 shows the effects of the recommended changes on security staffing at Marion. JLARC's recommendation of 129.82 security staff includes the following changes:

- addition of 6.60 security positions (one eight-hour, seven-day and one 24-hour, seven-day post) to provide more coverage in housing wings 2C and 2D,
- reduction of 2.52 positions as a result of the JLARC analysis of the Sharp formula,
- conversion of the mail room, commissary, personal property, and storeroom officers from security to nonsecurity positions. This represents a deletion of 4.95 security positions and an increase of four nonsecurity positions, and
- reduction of 0.54 positions as a result of excluding three administrative posts from the Sharp formula.

SECURITY PROCEDURES

JLARC reviewed security procedures in the kitchen, medical areas, and in the maintenance tool room. Procedures appeared to be adequate, for the most part. However, JLARC found one breach of security in the medical unit and one area in which appropriate procedures were only recently initiated.

Medical Area

JLARC found a breach of security in a treatment room in the medical area. A cupboard that contained scissors and other sharp

Table 35

STAFFING AT MARION CORRECTIONAL TREATMENT CENTER

<u>Security Staff</u>	<u>Positions</u>
Staffing at time of review	131.23
Recommended changes	
Impact of revised Sharp formula	-2.52
Conversion from security to nonsecurity	-4.95
Correction for Sharp formula misapplication	- .54
New security positions	+6.60
Deleted security positions	0.00
Other adjustments	<u>0.00</u>
Total changes	<u>-1.41</u>
Recommended security staffing subtotal	129.82
 <u>Nonsecurity Staff</u>	
FY 1985 funded nonsecurity positions*	36.50
Recommended conversion of security posts into nonsecurity positions	<u>+4.00</u>
Nonsecurity staffing subtotal	<u>40.50</u>
TOTAL STAFFING	170.32
 <u>FY 1985 Funded Staffing Levels</u>	
Funded security positions	135.00
Funded nonsecurity positions	<u>36.50</u>
Total funded positions	171.50
 DIFFERENCE BETWEEN JLARC TOTAL & FUNDED LEVEL	 -1.18

*Nonsecurity staff scheduled for review in 1985.

Source: DOC; JLARC analysis.

instruments was unlocked. The warden, who accompanied JLARC staff on the tour, was concerned that the cupboard was unlocked. He reminded the nurse on duty to always keep it locked. Control should be tightened over medical instruments.

Tool Control

The staff at Marion has recently begun to implement a new tool control system. The new system will improve the level of control over the maintenance tools. Until recently, records on inventories and tool check-outs were not maintained and tools were not stored securely. The new system should help to ensure that all tools are accounted for, so that inmates cannot obtain unauthorized access to them.

CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

The JLARC review of Marion Correctional Treatment Center indicates that a portion of the warden's request for additional security positions should be approved. These positions could increase the general level of security in two housing wards. Another staffing practice which prevails throughout the system -- the use of security personnel to perform nonsecurity duties -- should be stopped. The staff should also take measures to ensure that security procedures are strictly followed.

Recommendation 54. The level of funded security positions at Marion Correctional Treatment Center should be set at 129.82 (compared with the current funded level of 135). Four nonsecurity positions should be added to carry out the mail room, commissary, personal property, and storeroom duties.

Recommendation 55. Marion should tighten its oversight system to ensure that all potentially dangerous items in the medical area are secure at all times.

MECKLENBURG CORRECTIONAL CENTER

Mecklenburg, located near Boydton in Mecklenburg County, began operations in 1977. Since the outset of planning for the facility, Mecklenburg Correctional Center has been viewed as having a special mission -- to provide maximum security segregation and treatment for the most disruptive inmates in the Virginia system.

This mission was altered, however, by the department and the Board of Corrections after several serious incidents at Mecklenburg in 1984. These included the escape from death row of six inmates on May 31, disturbances in recreation yards on July 12, and an August 4 incident in which 32 inmates took nine hostages in a 19-hour siege.

After these events, three consultants and the Board of Corrections conducted evaluations of various aspects of Mecklenburg's operations and programs, and issued reports. All four reports called for extensive changes at the facility. Major changes in mission, programs, and procedures were announced in January 1985, after research for this study was complete. In addition, Mecklenburg has been operating at a reduced level of efficiency since mid-1984. The new mission needs to be spelled out and stabilized, and should address improved efficiency. Reconsideration of staffing needs will also be necessary in the mission statement.

Mecklenburg's Special Mission

As noted by the Board of Corrections study committee, Mecklenburg was specifically designed to confine the Commonwealth's most disruptive inmates in a single maximum security setting. These inmates took part in a "phase program," which is described in the Board's study:

Essentially, the phase program is structured through a series of levels utilized to reward inmate progress with a corresponding series of increasing "privileges." Theoretically, the increasing privileges associated with each level serve as a reward for an inmate's compliance with institutional rules. [According to a DOC document], it is the commitment to change the behavior of the dangerous and disruptive inmate and return him to a conventional center that sets Mecklenburg apart from the other maximum security facilities.



Profile of Mecklenburg Correctional Center FY 1984

<u>Population:</u>	Budgeted Capacity: 335	"A" Custody: 1.7%	White: 40.2%
	Avg. Daily Pop: 283	"B" Custody: 11.0%	Nonwhite: 59.8%
		"C" Custody: 83.6%	Avg. Age: 24.2
<u>Ratios:</u>	Inmates per Security Position: 1.29-to-1	[1t]	
	Inmates per Staff (total): .94-to-1	[2]	
	Total Expenditures per Inmate: \$29,176	[2]	
<u>Budgeted Staff:</u>	Security: 259	<u>Officers:</u> White: 35%	Avg. Age: 33.5
	Nonsecurity: 87	Nonwhite: 65%	Turnover: 34%
	Total: 346	Female: 31%	
<u>Serious Incidents:</u>	Assaults on Inmates: 21	[4t]	Escapes: 6
	Assaults on Staff: 48	[5t]	Total Serious Incidents: 161
			[2]

See Appendix B for sources.
 Numbers in brackets [] indicate ranking of this facility compared to other major institutions. [t] indicates a tie with other facilities.
 [1] has the most staff per inmate or highest number of reported incidents.

Thus, disruptive inmates ideally progressed through three phases, earning more privileges in each phase as they demonstrated continued good behavior, until they could be returned to general population institutions.

The phase program was a principal feature of Mecklenburg from 1977 until DOC terminated it in early 1985. The program went through numerous changes, which are described in the Board of Corrections' Report of the Mecklenburg Correctional Center Study Committee, issued in November 1984.

The phase program was the focus of litigation filed by the American Civil Liberties Union. A consent decree stemming from the 1983 case Brown v. Procnier affected the program. The changes affected privileges available in each phase as well as the maximum time that an inmate could be in the phase program.

After satisfactory completion of an initial 30-day orientation stage, inmates would normally be assigned to Phase II, according to the decree. (Phase I, which was the most restrictive and had the fewest privileges, was eliminated under the decree.) Inmates in Phase II were permitted higher spending at the commissary, increased visitation, and some out-of-cell activities. Inmates in Phase III were also permitted to take their meals out of their cells, and some work activities. The consent decree provided for an increase in recreation time and for the establishment of a library for inmates in Phases II and III.

Another important feature of the consent decree was a two-year time limit for successful completion of the program, after which the inmate would have to be reassigned to another correctional institution.

Other Populations

The mission of Mecklenburg (prior to the announced 1985 changes) has also included the housing of several other distinct groups of inmates. During JLARC's visit in November 1984, the population consisted of the groups shown in Table 36.

Almost all inmates sentenced to death are housed at Mecklenburg. They are housed in one "pod" of a building. Inmates who are within 15 days of their execution dates are transferred to the Penitentiary, as required by *Code of Virginia* Section 53.1-234.

The mental health unit of Mecklenburg is located in a portion of one pod. Inmates housed here may have been transferred from Central State Hospital for observation and readjustment to a prison setting, or they may have been transferred from another section of Mecklenburg because the staff psychologist believed they could be better dealt with in a separate setting.

Table 36

CATEGORIES OF
INMATES AT MECKLENBURG
(November 1984)

Protective Custody	68
Maximum Security	58
Segregation	55
Phase Program	55
Death Row	26
Mental Health	8
Investigative & Medical Hold	6
Isolation	<u>1</u>
	277

Source: Acting Warden, Mecklenburg Correctional Center.

The segregation unit houses disruptive inmates from other institutions who will not participate in the phase program. According to the Board's study, inmates here are confined separately from inmates in the Phase program, but are treated the same as inmates in Phase I. "The only practical difference between segregation and Phase I is that an inmate is likely to spend a somewhat longer time in segregation than in Phase I before proceeding to Phase II," according to the Board's report.

Protective custody inmates are those who have serious personal security needs, typically because they have "enemies" at other institutions (due, for example, to serving as a State witness or having been assaulted by other inmates). Mecklenburg's population in protective custody is not unique, as several other major institutions also have portions of housing units set aside for these inmates.

According to the Board report, Mecklenburg houses inmates:

who require assignment to a maximum-security setting by virtue of the danger they represent to the community and/or to persons (staff or other inmates) within the correctional system and who either cannot safely be assigned to another maximum security setting or require the maximum degree of security available within the correctional system.

An inmate may be assigned here for several reasons, among them: (1) if his sentence exceeds 50 years and was for a crime of violence, (2) if he attempted escape or is a special escape risk, or (3) if he completed the phase program but cannot be returned to another maximum security facility for any reason.

Inmates may also be moved to Mecklenburg for their own protection or for the protection of others, in the "administrative transfer" category. "Investigative hold" covers inmates being investigated by law enforcement agencies. "Isolation" refers to inmates confined to their cells for a specified time as punishment for violating institutional rules or procedures.

Need for Stable Mission

The recent major changes in the mission of Mecklenburg will impact the number and types of inmates placed in the facility, and thus will impact the remainder of the DOC system. The broader impact was illustrated during the 1985 General Assembly, when DOC sought funding to plan another major institution. The Director of DOC indicated that the new facility would house "C" custody inmates. However, any plans for new construction should be premised on operating Mecklenburg at its operational capacity of 335 inmates.

The facility has been operating well below its capacity due to changes made during 1984. Mecklenburg has operated recently with as many as 145 fewer inmates than its operational capacity, and with the equivalent of 56 FTEs more than its funded level of security staff due to the routine use of extensive overtime. As a consequence, the effective ratio of inmates to staff at Mecklenburg has been approximately 0.5-to-1, or 1.97 employees for every inmate -- significantly less efficient than the 0.97-to-1 ratio which is funded for FY 1985.

DOC should not continue to operate Mecklenburg at such a heavy level of staffing. The department should stabilize and describe the facility's mission, and submit a written mission statement to the Governor and the General Assembly. The statement should include:

- the basic mission of the institution,
- the required level of staffing, which should be consistent with DOC's other maximum security institutions,
- the operational capacity of the facility, and plans to operate it at capacity,
- necessary capital outlay expenditures to implement the mission, and
- plans to operate with no routine overtime.

During the transition to the new mission, the continued payment of overtime may be necessary, and if so, should be continued.

Programs

The principal activities available at Mecklenburg are education programs and some work assignments. Some of the protective custody inmates are employed in the clothing enterprises shop. In FY 1984, 35 inmates worked in the clothing shop. Some inmates in the maximum security unit are permitted to work in the kitchen.

The Rehabilitative School Authority offers academic courses (adult basic education and general education development), library services, and apprenticeship programs. Some small classes are held by the RSA, but most inmates are in "cell study" -- that is, teachers come to an inmate's cell for one-on-one instruction. The average monthly enrollment in RSA programs in FY 1984 was 84 inmates.

Physical Facilities

Mecklenburg consists of seven major buildings -- five housing units, a medical services building, and an administration building. The main compound is enclosed by a double perimeter fence topped with razor wire. Four towers are located on the main compound's perimeter, and another tower is located at the sally port.


The housing units at Mecklenburg are virtually identical in design. Each has a total of 72 cells, with 24 in each of three "pods." In the death row and protective custody pods, a partition subdivides each pod into two sections; each has 12 cells. Each pod has a control booth which looks into both sides of the pod, and from which an officer can see all the cells. Figure 6 illustrates the pod arrangement within each building, and indicates the view that an officer has when stationed in the control booth.

The Board of Corrections study committee reported that because DOC had made no projections about the actual number of bed spaces needed to confine the most disruptive inmates, many more cells were constructed than were needed. Consequently, differing inmate assignments and programs with differing goals and requirements proliferated at Mecklenburg, and caused confusion and frustration for both correctional personnel and inmates.

SECURITY STAFFING AT MECKLENBURG

In FY 1984, Mecklenburg was funded to be the second heaviest-staffed prison in Virginia. In terms of funded inmates per funded staff, Mecklenburg's FY 1984 ratio was 0.97-to-1, second to Marion's ratio of 0.94-to-1. In terms of funded security positions, Mecklenburg's ratio was 1.29-to-1, which tied with Marion for the heaviest staffing. However, since June 1984, the facility has operated as the heaviest-staffed prison, because (as pointed out earlier) the inmate population declined while overtime usage increased.

Figure 6



In FY 1985, Mecklenburg has 335 funded positions (260 security positions and 75 nonsecurity positions) and a funded inmate capacity of 335. Since mid-summer 1984, the effective staffing level has been much higher than the one-to-one funded ratio established for FY 1985. The 145 empty beds reported in February 1985 and the equivalent of 56 FTEs through overtime have driven up the staffing level at Mecklenburg. As noted earlier, the recent effective ratio of inmates to staff at Mecklenburg has been approximately 0.5-to-1, or nearly two employees for every inmate.

In determining the number of security staff needed at Mecklenburg, JLARC considered a variety of information. Sources included four post audits completed in 1984, the former acting warden's request for additional positions, comparisons to staffing practices at other major institutions, the criteria listed in Chapter Two, the Board of Corrections study committee report, the consultants' reports, and DOC's 1984-86 Supplemental Amendment Proposal for additional resources. Reconsideration of staffing needs will be necessary, however, upon stabilization of the institution's mission and population.

Current Security Staffing

As a result of the 1984 events, the staffing picture at Mecklenburg appears to have dramatically changed. Post audits are not consistent in their assessments of Mecklenburg's actual staffing pattern.

JLARC was provided with two post audit listings from Mecklenburg, and with summaries of two additional post audits. One, completed in January 1984, was supplied in response to a May 1984 data request to all institutions. Another was provided to JLARC staff who visited the facility in November 1984. In late December 1984, the assistant warden for operations described to JLARC staff current security staffing in detail. In addition, the Board of Corrections study lists a summary of posts in place during September 1984.

Each post audit shows a need for a different number of security staff. Table 37 indicates the differences, and shows the actual level of filled security positions, which at each point has been significantly less than the identified need for security staff. Table 37 also indicates the effective total manpower at Mecklenburg, including additional manpower due to overtime.

In this report the funded level of 257 security positions is used to define current security staffing at Mecklenburg. This figure

Table 37

SECURITY STAFFING AT MECKLENBURG (Positions, 1984)

	<u>Filled</u>	<u>Overtime*</u>	<u>Effective Manpower</u>	<u>Post Audit</u>
January	249	27.2	276.2	271.25
September	223	N/A	N/A	300.10
November	232	46.7	278.7	257.00
December	238	56.7	294.7	318.34

*Annualized and converted into FTEs. For illustrative purposes overtime is included here and used as if one hour of overtime equaled one hour of needed staff time. As discussed in Chapter Two, this is an assumption which may not be completely valid.

Source: Mecklenburg; Board of Corrections Study Committee report; DOC.

is used since it appears to incorporate the Department's best judgement about how to staff Mecklenburg on a permanent basis, and because the former acting warden provided a post audit to JLARC which indicated a staffing pattern that matched this level. Until security staffing is stabilized and explicitly linked to the new mission, the continued payment of overtime may be necessary. The new mission and staffing level should be premised on the elimination of overtime as a routine practice.

Although institutional staff agree that a level of staffing above the 257 positions is needed, DOC should refine its overtime reporting mechanism as recommended in Chapter Two prior to submitting a staffing request based on overtime reported at any one facility. In addition, the level of security staffing at Mecklenburg should be reviewed by regional and central office staff to ensure that this level of staffing is appropriate.

Recent Staffing Changes

Several changes have been made to security staffing in the wake of the 1984 events at Mecklenburg. Major changes shown on post audits completed since mid-summer include an emergency response team and added tower staffing. Changes in staffing since the appointment of a new warden, and since the decision to alter Mecklenburg's mission, are not addressed in this report.

Emergency Response Team. A 12-FTE Prison Emergency Response (PERT) Team was formed in mid-August. The team escorts groups of inmates to and from recreation, conducts searches, and responds to emergencies. The team has received specialized training, and was used to respond to a hostage incident at Brunswick Correctional Center in September. The former acting warden credited the PERT team with helping restore morale among other security employees, since they can call on the team to assist with crisis situations.

While the PERT team may have been important in restoring morale to a troubled institution, the continued need for the team should be reassessed with the change in Mecklenburg's mission. The need for such a response team may persist, although its addition as a permanent unit should be scrutinized carefully by DOC. The other institutions with "close custody" missions (the Penitentiary and Powhatan) do not have permanent crisis response teams.

If DOC determines to retain a PERT team, consideration should be given to funding it from a central DOC account, which would acknowledge its system-wide usefulness. The team should be housed at the institution where it is most likely to be used.

Towers. Another major staffing change involved the perimeter towers. Mecklenburg was constructed with four main perimeter towers, with a fifth tower located adjacent to the sally

port. The fifth tower is shorter than the main towers, and was not staffed until late 1984. A major reason for staffing this tower stems from the death row escape.

The escapees exited through the sally port, where the nearest staffed tower was approximately 100 yards away. The officer on duty in this nearest main tower mistook the inmates for officers (the inmates were wearing officers' uniforms), and opened the sally port gates.

To avoid this situation's recurrence, the former acting warden assigned a 24-hour, 7-day post to the sally port tower. This post now has to clear every person using the sally port. In addition, two officers are assigned to search each vehicle going through the gate.

Former Acting Warden's Request

The former acting warden's staffing request consisted of two captains, a special investigative intelligence officer, and three correctional officers for a shakedown team. However, the former acting warden indicated that as many as 40 additional security personnel would be needed to adequately staff the facility. He also acknowledged that some security positions seemed to be allocated "according to how convincing you can be with the next level of management." His final request was for a total of six security personnel.

Shift Supervisors. The request for more captains is supported by two of the NIC consultants. They recommended the assignment of two more shift supervisors to provide more complete supervisory coverage. One consultant reported that without these positions, the facility is left:

in charge of a lower graded staff member for a significant number of shifts each week. At least two additional positions should be created for shift commanders in order to provide experienced staff with true command authority on each shift. No staff member below the rank of lieutenant should ever be placed in charge of the institution, except in time of emergency, and only then until someone of higher rank can be called in to assume control.

A second consultant supported the need for additional upper level security staff, and indicated that "at least a lieutenant" should be in charge at all times.

The Board of Corrections study committee reported that sergeants occasionally serve as shift commanders at Mecklenburg. However, a post audit completed in January 1984 indicates that 5.05 positions were allocated for the shift commander post, to be filled

by either a captain or lieutenant. Subsequent post audits do not show sufficient detail to determine how this post was filled.

At the time of the JLARC visit, Mecklenburg had three filled captain positions. The former acting warden confirmed that in the absence of a captain, a lieutenant takes charge of the institution. He also noted that the shift commander or the assistant shift commander now stays outside the perimeter at all times. Failure to do this had contributed to the escape from death row at Mecklenburg.

An analysis of the ratio of security supervisors to correctional officers and corporals (white shirts to blue shirts) found that of all the major institutions, Mecklenburg was the most leanly staffed for supervisors (see Chapter Three). This assessment of filled positions tends to support the finding of the NIC consultants that coverage by security supervisors has been inadequate. It is difficult to justify establishing the leanest supervisory staffing level in the DOC system at Mecklenburg.

Although the Board of Corrections study committee did not explicitly recommend these new positions, the committee's report did conclude that the additional captain positions were among the "appropriate, prioritized steps" being taken by the department.

The rationale for assigning two more captain positions to Mecklenburg appears persuasive. These positions would strengthen the supervision of the facility, and could bring significant experience to bear in managing the security staff.

Intelligence Officer. Establishment of this position was recommended by an NIC consultant, and was among various actions applauded by the Board's study committee as an appropriate step. This position would conduct confidential investigations of inmates and staff, and coordinate these activities with outside law enforcement agencies and prosecutors.

Two other facilities (Buckingham and the Penitentiary) each have a sergeant assigned the duties of an institutional investigator. These positions carry out duties similar to those recommended by the consultant for the new position at Mecklenburg.

Although Mecklenburg has less than half the inmate population of either of the two facilities which already have this position, the nature of the inmate population at Mecklenburg may justify the need for duties of this sort. If Mecklenburg is to retain its function as a "super-maximum" or "close custody security" facility, then DOC should take extra precautions to ensure the security of the facility. For example, an investigative officer could focus on identifying sources of contraband coming into the institution. The fact that in the last year a security officer at Mecklenburg was convicted of bringing marijuana into the facility reinforces the apparent need for an investigative officer.

Shakedown Team. The former acting warden requested a three-member team responsible for conducting searches of inmates and cells on a full-time basis. He maintains that three officers are needed due to the way in which cell searches are conducted. One officer stays outside the cell with the inmate and his personal property while the other two officers search the cell. Two are used inside the cell to improve the chances that contraband will be located, and to double-check each other.

The Board's study committee noted that the request for the shakedown team is among the appropriate steps being taken by the department to implement the consultants' recommendations. Although none of the consultants explicitly recommended a three-member shakedown team, one recommended increasing the frequency of inmate and cell searches. He noted:

Random pat and strip searches should be a familiar event rather than a rarity. Inmates need to know that they cannot evade detection when transporting contraband, as can be done when only fixed search posts are used.

Two other facilities have full-time shakedown posts. Powhatan has a sergeant and an officer assigned these duties. Southampton has one officer assigned shakedown duties. When shaking down cells, these prisons usually pull officers from other posts to make a three-member team.

Although Mecklenburg has fewer inmates than the other facilities with shakedown posts, the mission of Mecklenburg may justify full-time shakedown posts. Three such posts would permit the facility to have this function fully staffed and in operation on an 8-hour, 5-day basis. However, the function should be addressed explicitly in the new mission statement for the facility. The PERT team's role in shakedowns should also be spelled out, since the team assists with some shakedowns.

Other Positions. The six positions requested by the former acting warden are not the only additional security positions recommended by the consultants, or endorsed by the Board's study committee. For example, the committee recommended an increase in the number of sergeant positions to ensure adequate supervisory coverage on evening shifts. The committee stated that the number of sergeants could be increased without increasing total staffing by reclassifying and training several corporals, or by eliminating corporal positions.

Several factors support the Board's recommendation for more sergeants. Mecklenburg has the leanest ratio of supervisory positions to subordinates of all the major institutions. Corporals are now frequently in charge of entire housing units at the facility, which is a problem. Considering the nature of the inmate population and the special programs at the facility, the Board's recommendation for more sergeants provides a solution to the need.

Other Staffing Adjustments

JLARC made several other adjustments to the security staffing level at Mecklenburg. These included a revision of the system-wide staffing (Sharp) formula, and a more precise definition of which positions the formula should be applied to. In addition, most facilities -- including Mecklenburg -- were found to have several security posts which were primarily assigned nonsecurity duties.

Formula Revision. In calculating the impact of the revised Sharp formula, the November post audit showing 257 security positions was used. Applying the revised formula to posts shown in the post audit results in a reduction of 5.37 positions. This adjustment is included in the recommended security staffing level for Mecklenburg.

Misapplication of Sharp Formula. Although DOC has no policy about the proper application of the Sharp formula, posts which are not filled to cover absenteeism should not be included in Sharp calculations. The post audit applies the Sharp formula to three posts which do not meet this test.

These posts, which include the security chief, an administrative officer, and a trainer, should each be counted as requiring one employee. By misapplying the formula, the security staffing needs of Mecklenburg are overstated by 0.54 positions (based on the revised Sharp formula). These excess positions should be subtracted from the staffing level shown on the post audit. The JLARC recommendation includes an adjustment for this misapplication.

Quasi-security Posts. As at other prisons, Mecklenburg has several security staff who are performing duties that are essentially nonsecurity in nature. These are shown in Table 38 and include two mail handler posts, a water truck post, a commissary post, and two inmate property posts.

Two security staff members are assigned eight hours, six days per week to handle inmate mail. No inmates work in the mailroom. The officers pick up incoming mail at the post office, screen it for contraband, and deliver it to inmates. As at other locations, clerk messengers could be trained to search for contraband and to perform mailroom duties at less expense than using officers.

A water truck post has been shown as an eight-hour, five-day post on post audits since at least January 1984. The water truck post, however, is a short-term assignment, according to the former acting warden. A new water well is expected to eliminate the need to haul water to the facility. Consequently this position is deleted in the recommended staffing level.

The commissary officer (an eight-hour, five-day post) reports to the chief accountant and is responsible for supervising

Table 38

QUESTIONABLE SECURITY POSTS
AT MECKLENBURG CORRECTIONAL CENTER

<u>Number of Posts</u>	<u>Title</u>	<u>Type of Post</u>	<u>Positions</u>	
			<u>DOC Formula</u>	<u>JLARC Formula</u>
2	Mail Room	8 hours, 6 days	2.88	2.82
1	Water Truck	8 hours, 5 days	1.20	0
1	Commissary	8 hours, 5 days	1.20	1.18
2	Property Control	8 hours, 5 days	<u>2.40</u>	<u>2.36</u>
TOTAL			7.68	6.36

Source: Post audit.

the commissary operation. Unlike other facilities, inmates at Mecklenburg do not come to the commissary to purchase items. They hand a written order to a correctional officer in the housing unit, who takes the order to the commissary. Another officer then picks up the orders after they are prepared by the commissary officer for delivery to inmates.

The commissary post is clearly nonsecurity in nature. DOC should fill this position with a nonsecurity staff member.

Mecklenburg has two eight-hour, five-day inmate property and supply posts. The security staff who fill these posts are responsible for inventorying, storing, and dispensing inmate property, clothing, and supplies. As at other institutions, these functions could be carried out more economically by nonsecurity personnel. Two store manager positions would be more appropriate than assigning security staff to these duties.

Mecklenburg has several other posts which involve a significant amount of nonsecurity work. These include a law library post and an RSA library post. These posts are often filled by nonsecurity personnel at other facilities. However, at Mecklenburg they involve a high degree of interaction with inmates who are considered the most disruptive in the prison system, and who may pose other significant risks. Consequently, the use of security personnel for these posts is probably appropriate at Mecklenburg.

DOC's Budget Request

The 1984-86 Supplemental Amendment Proposal submitted by DOC requests one additional security position for Mecklenburg, and three

nonsecurity positions. The new security position is for the investigative officer discussed above. The three nonsecurity positions are for switchboard operators, who apparently would be used to relieve correctional officers currently performing switchboard duties. The need for nonsecurity positions was not assessed by JLARC.

Staffing at Mecklenburg

Mecklenburg has been staffed above its funded employment level (set in the Appropriations Act) primarily by the extensive use of overtime. As at other facilities, new positions should not be granted on the basis of overtime. DOC should first improve its overtime reporting system, as recommended in Chapter Two.

The recommended staffing level shown in Table 39 incorporates the following changes from the November post audit:

- addition of two eight-hour, seven-day captain posts (3.30 positions),
- addition of one eight-hour, five-day post (1.18 positions) for investigative intelligence officer,
- addition of three eight-hour, seven-day posts (4.95 positions) for a shakedown team,
- elimination of the water-truck post (1.18 positions),
- reduction of 5.37 positions as a result of the JLARC analysis of the Sharp formula,
- conversion of the mailroom, commissary, and property control officers from security to nonsecurity positions. This represents a deletion of 6.36 security positions and an increase of five nonsecurity positions, and
- reduction of 0.54 security positions as a result of excluding three administrative positions from the Sharp formula.

Total security staffing should be set at 252.98 positions, and five nonsecurity positions should be added to cover duties previously assigned to security staff. In addition, the Board study committee's recommendation to increase the number of sergeants by reclassifying and training or by eliminating corporal positions should be considered.

This recommended staffing level is premised on operating Mecklenburg at its operating capacity of 335 inmates -- about 115 more than it has recently housed. Although at least one housing unit

Table 39

STAFFING AT MECKLENBURG CORRECTIONAL CENTER*

<u>Security Staff</u>	<u>Positions</u>
Staffing at time of review	257.00
Recommended changes	
Impact of revised Sharp formula	-5.37
Conversion from security to nonsecurity	-6.36
Correction for Sharp formula misapplication	-0.54
New security positions	+9.43
Deleted security Positions	<u>-1.18</u>
Total changes	<u>-4.02</u>
Recommended security staffing subtotal**	252.98
<u>Nonsecurity Staff</u>	
FY 1985 funded nonsecurity positions***	75.00
Recommended conversion of security posts into nonsecurity positions	<u>+5.00</u>
Nonsecurity staffing subtotal	<u>80.00</u>
TOTAL STAFFING	332.98
<u>FY 1985 Funded Staffing Levels</u>	
Funded security positions	260.00
Funded nonsecurity positions	<u>75.00</u>
Total funded positions	335.00
DIFFERENCE BETWEEN JLARC TOTAL & FUNDED LEVEL	-2.02

*Final staffing requirements must be considered in conjunction with the recommended establishment of a revised mission statement for Mecklenburg.

**Additional inmates should be assigned to the facility to bring it closer to capacity. Also, the extensive amounts of overtime being worked should be considered in future post audits. Continuation of overtime use may be necessary until Mecklenburg's mission is stabilized.

***Nonsecurity staff scheduled for review in 1985.

Source: DOC; JLARC analysis.

could be closed, with the attendant elimination of the associated staff positions and costs (for a possible reduction of 33 security positions), a preferable solution may be to house more inmates without an increase in security staff. This action should be taken, and incorporated in the new mission.

SECURITY PROCEDURES

Security procedures at Mecklenburg appeared to be adequately implemented. At the time of the JLARC review, Mecklenburg was in a "semi-locked down" situation. Inmates were either confined to their cells during the day, or confined to the day rooms in the pods.

It should be noted that JLARC's review took place after the death row escape. Inmates had been in a "lock down" status for several months. Security practices had been substantially upgraded since the escape. Moreover, the absence of inmates in various places in the institution greatly improves security compared to other facilities.

Enterprise Areas

Security procedures appeared to be followed closely at the two enterprises tailoring shops, where inmate underwear and food service clothing are manufactured. The scissors, which were controlled by a security officer, were blunted after the August hostage incident at the facility. Inmates were not permitted to leave the area unless they were first searched by the officer using a hand-held metal detector.

Food Service

Several aspects of the food service area were unique to Mecklenburg. Unlike most facilities, there was no mess hall at Mecklenburg. Inmates received their meals in their cell areas. In addition, only 10 inmates were employed in the kitchen. Only the food service employees were allowed to handle knives. The knives were kept by a security officer at the secured sally port entrance to the kitchen.

Tool Control and Maintenance

With the exception of the plumbing shop, all maintenance shops are located outside the perimeter wall. Inmates do not work on maintenance crews at Mecklenburg and so do not have access to tools.

Although inmates do not have access to the maintenance areas, tool control in the plumbing shop should be improved. The

maintenance foreman stated that correctional officers did not always sign out the tools they borrowed during off hours. In addition, he told JLARC that a full inventory was taken weekly of the tools, but a review of the inventory sheet indicated that the last inventory had been taken 15 days prior to the JLARC visit.

Although control of tools appeared to be tighter than at other major institutions due to the absence of inmate workers, the weaknesses noted should be addressed because of the nature of Mecklenburg's inmate population.

Medical Areas

Procedures in the medical area are currently being revamped by the head nurse. Improvements are being made in needle control, rotation of medicine stocks and record storage.

CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Based on the JLARC review of Mecklenburg Correctional Center, the former acting warden's staffing request, and the various reports on the facility, some additional security positions appear warranted. It is also clear that a stabilized mission is needed. The new mission should include operating the facility at capacity and should specify other operating characteristics. Staffing should be based on the new mission.

Recommendation (56). Mecklenburg's mission should be stabilized and detailed in a written mission statement distributed to the Governor and to the General Assembly. The statement should: specify any capital outlay expenditures necessary to implement the mission, specify the planned capacity (in terms of both how many beds are available and how many beds will be filled), provide for operating the facility near its capacity, and describe the required level of security and nonsecurity staffing. Staffing levels should be established by rigorous post audits and should be more consistent with DOC's other maximum security prisons.

Recommendation (57). DOC should assign more inmates to Mecklenburg Correctional Center to bring it closer to its operational capacity.

Recommendation (58). The level of funded security positions at Mecklenburg Correctional Center should be set at 252.98 (compared with the current level of 260). Five nonsecurity positions should be added to the staff to perform various inventory and mail functions.

Recommendation (59). During the transition to a new mission, the continued use of overtime at Mecklenburg may be

necessary. However, current amounts may be excessive, based on the low inmate population at the facility. DOC should carefully monitor overtime at Mecklenburg as recommended in Chapter II.

Recommendation (60). Inventory and control of tools in the plumbing shop located inside the Mecklenburg perimeter should be improved by closely adhering to department guidelines. Consideration should be given to moving the shop outside the perimeter walls.

Recommendation (61). Implementation of the recommendations of the various study groups appears to have had a positive effect on institutional security at Mecklenburg. Implementation of these reports should continue.

NOTTOWAY CORRECTIONAL CENTER

Nottoway Correctional Center, located near Burkeville in Nottoway County, is the third of four medium security institutions (MSIs) constructed since 1978. Experiences at Brunswick (the first MSI) led to changes in the design of the other three facilities. Nottoway, which opened in August 1984, is similar in design to the second MSI, Buckingham Correctional Center, which opened in 1982.

As with its predecessors, Nottoway was designed to house 512 inmates. However, the department decided in 1981 to double-bunk the facility by adding beds to cells in most of the housing units. As of December 1984, Nottoway had 539 inmates. Although it was originally designed to provide a medium level of security, 53 percent of Nottoway's December 1984 inmate population was classified as "C" custody.

Facility Overview


The four MSIs were designed to be identical in terms of the number of buildings, security classification, and staffing patterns.

Mission and Population. Nottoway houses general population inmates who were classified primarily as "B" and "C" custody in December 1984. Nottoway was originally intended to house a number of parole violators from Deep Meadow, which closed in September 1984. The department, however, decided to utilize a regional approach to disperse inmates from Deep Meadow, and decided not to use Nottoway exclusively for this purpose.

Physical Facilities. Nottoway, like Buckingham, has pre-stressed concrete buildings. Four towers along the perimeter observe both the internal and external movement of inmates. One tower is located at the front entrance to the institution, and another tower is adjacent to the vehicle sally port entrance and controls that gate electronically. The other two towers are located on either side of the facility.

Nine buildings are located inside the perimeter: four housing units; a mess hall/kitchen building; a support services building which encompasses a medical unit, counseling offices, school, library, gymnasium, and other support functions; an enterprises building; a furniture shop; and an administration building. Open spaces inside the perimeter are used for recreation.

Each housing unit contains 128 cells, 64 on each of two floors. Each floor is divided into two sections, and each section



Profile of Nottoway Correctional Center

(Opened
August 1984)

<u>Population:</u> ¹	Budgeted Capacity: 615	"A" Custody: 6.8%
	Avg. Daily Pop: 539	"B" Custody: 40.2%
		"C" Custody: 52.8%
<u>Ratios:</u>	Inmates per Security Position: 2.36-to-1 [7]	
	Inmates per Staff (total): 1.73-to-1 [7t]	
<u>Budgeted Staff:</u>	Security: 260	
	Nonsecurity: 94.75	
	Total: 354.75	

Based on Warden Interview, December 12, 1984.
See Appendix B for sources.
Numbers in brackets [] indicate ranking of this facility compared to other major institutions. [t] indicates a tie with other facilities.
[1] has the most staff per inmate or highest number of reported incidents.

contains 32 cells. A control room is located at the half level, enabling the control room officer to observe 64 cells from this single post. On both sides of the control room are two tiers, one above the other with 16 cells each. The common space between the control center and the cells is the dayroom. In one building, 32 cells are assigned for isolation, segregation, and protective custody.

The decision to use pre-stressed concrete on facility buildings apparently necessitated the use of 18" by 4' alcoves, a factor which may have contributed to a recent escape. These alcoves on the front gate tower limit the view along the outside down to the base of the tower and along the perimeter fence directly below the tower. The officer in tower #4, east of the front gate tower, has a limited line of sight looking along the front fence perimeter toward the main gate tower. This is especially so during the night because of shadows and limited lighting.

Thanksgiving Escape

On November 22, 1984 (Thanksgiving night) five inmates successfully escaped from Nottoway. The escape route carried them through a number of internal security check points. They eventually exited directly under the front gate tower post. All were recaptured a short time later.

A subsequent investigation by the State Police found that institutional design features as well as "less than adequate alertness" by guards contributed to the escape. The State Police report specifically noted that the escapees hid behind an auxiliary generator, hid in the alcoves, and went through the fence at a point that was not readily visible from the tower.

According to the warden, the officer in the main tower was distracted from her perimeter surveillance to watch an inmate clean the lobby floors that evening. The doors to the front gate are fire exits and, according to the warden, are never locked. Consequently, the officer felt it important to observe the inmate while he performed his cleaning duties.

The warden indicated that institutional staff prefer having the lobby floors cleaned during the evening rather than the day because less traffic uses the front gate at that time. JLARC staff, however, observed inmates cleaning main entrance floors during the day when visiting other institutions, and also on a recent visit to Nottoway.

During a tour of Nottoway in April 1984, the warden pointed out to JLARC staff several institutional design problems, including those at the front gate tower. However, post orders for the front gate post developed prior to the escape did not include specific instructions to compensate for design problems. The post order also did not establish security procedures that would have compensated for

the identified problems of the post. Prior to the escape, interim security precautions were not implemented to compensate for these known design problems.

Since the escape, several new security procedures have been implemented. The new Director of DOC has mandated that all institutions have some form of a roving perimeter post, and the warden recently revised the post order for the front gate tower to compensate for the design problems.

In a memo to the assistant director for capital outlay and maintenance dated March 26, 1984, the warden requested corrective measures to improve some of the institutional design faults. The warden indicated that he went through departmental channels in his attempt to have a "cat walk" constructed around the tower. After his requests for capital improvements were denied the warden apparently did not take necessary actions to correct the identified breach in security at the post.

One reason given by the warden in news reports after the escape was the lack of adequate staff on duty the night of the escape. However, the State Police report noted:

There are no facts to indicate that the number of correctional officers on duty was inadequate or that additional officers would have probably prevented the escape.

Because Nottoway and the new Augusta Correctional Center are similar in design, DOC should study the design problems at Nottoway and identify changes that could improve security at Augusta.

SECURITY STAFFING AT NOTTOWAY

As of December 1984, Nottoway was below its maximum employment level because it was still being staffed and inmates were still being added to its population. For FY 1985, 341.75 positions have been funded -- 254 security positions and 87.75 nonsecurity positions.

Nottoway's staffing pattern was originally intended to be based on the staffing level at Buckingham. However, Buckingham's funded security staffing level for FY 1985 is 271 positions, compared to 254 positions for Nottoway. A number of factors seem to account for this difference. Nottoway has fewer inmate work crews than Buckingham, and staffing in the housing units differs. For example, according to the December 5, 1984, post audit, building "A" at Buckingham requires 40.39 security personnel during a 24-hour period. At Nottoway the identical building "A" (which has the same number of inmates) requires 36.05 staff for the same time period.

The warden at Nottoway attributed the differences in staffing levels to "differences in management styles." He also indicated that the present level of security staff in his "A" building was adequate.

Differences in post assignments can account for differences in total security personnel needed. For example, the lobby to the main entrance (the main gate tower) at Nottoway is manned by a nonsecurity employee who is disabled. This employee is not a certified officer, but he does control entry into the institution. He checks visitors' identification, conducts searches for contraband, and has a radio for communicating with the control room. Nottoway only requires one nonsecurity FTE to perform this duty. By comparison, Buckingham uses a certified correctional officer for this duty, and allocates 5.05 FTEs to fill this post on a 24-hour basis.

Before Nottoway and Buckingham opened, their staffing patterns were reviewed by a consultant retained by the House Appropriations Committee. DOC had requested 363.37 staff -- 279.37 security and 84 nonsecurity positions. The consultant recommended several changes in staffing. These changes were included in the 338 positions -- 255 security and 83 nonsecurity -- recommended by the consultant. To allow for double-bunking cells with 750 inmates (250 over rated capacity), the consultant recommended 30 additional security and 10 additional nonsecurity positions.

In July 1984, as a result of department-wide cuts recommended by the Governor, 12 positions were deleted from Nottoway's original staffing level. Of the 12 positions deleted, four were security positions: one inmate hearings officer, one captain, and two lieutenants. The remaining eight positions were nonsecurity positions. As of December 1984, Nottoway had 245 filled security positions, nine under the maximum security level of 254.

In determining the number of security personnel needed at Nottoway, JLARC reviewed a post audit completed in September 1984, the warden's request for additional positions, the use of overtime, comparisons to staffing at other institutions, the criteria listed earlier in Chapter Two, and DOC's 1984-86 Supplemental Amendment Proposal for additional staff.

Post Audit

A post audit dated September 17, 1984, indicates a need for 133 security posts, and for 297.01 security personnel to fill them. This post audit incorporated a request for an additional 29 positions. A subsequent "Facility Enhancement" document dated November 26, 1984, identified a need for eight more posts (37 security positions).

These two staffing assessments show how staffing needs can change over short periods of time. The JLARC analysis is based on the warden's September 17 post audit.

According to the post audit and master roster provided to JLARC, the staffing level at the time of review was 267.41 positions. However, JLARC's analysis of the post audit indicates a staffing level of 268.01 positions.

Unlike most other prisons, Nottoway includes no administrative-oriented security positions in its staffing formula calculations.

Warden's Request

The warden is requesting 28.80 additional security positions. These new positions include 26.80 correctional officers and two sergeants. The warden indicated in supportive documentation that the 28.80 positions would be appropriate only if the inmate population remained below 600. If the population increased above 600, the warden said he would need 35 additional positions.

The additional correctional officers would be used to fill posts at three doors in the support services building and to supervise additional inmate work crews. One sergeant would be used in training and the other in performing administrative functions as assigned.

Support Services Building. The additional officers in the support services building would require 10.08 positions. The warden would establish posts at three fire doors to prevent inmates from entering or leaving the building through these doors without proper supervision.

The warden indicated that the recent inmate escape was successful, in part, due to inadequate security at these doors. He indicated that the inmates were able to gain entry to the building and then to the perimeter fence by having one inmate in the building open the fire door on the east side to let in the other inmates. The inmates then walked the length of a hallway, opened a fire door on the west side of the building, hid in back of a generator which is behind the support services building, cut the perimeter fence, and escaped.

According to the most recent post audit, security staffing in the support services building includes six full-time and 12 part-time security posts (not including the two assistant wardens, the chief of security, watch commanders, and two operations sergeants whose offices are located in the building). Except for the RSA officer who moves throughout the RSA section of the building, all other post assignments are primarily stationary.

According to staff, inmate activity and movement increases during the evening. The evening recreational activities in the gym, library, and hobby shops require additional control. The warden has compensated by diverting staff from other posts to create the 12 part-time posts during this time period.

The present level of staffing in the support services building seems appropriate for the level of activity during the day and evening shifts. It may be possible to address the increased security control desired by the warden by constructing a fence around the building with gates to control entry. The additional fencing would improve security at less cost than adding 10 new positions. The need for additional officers in the support services building should be appraised only after other control devices, such as fencing, have been considered.

Work Crews. The warden would increase the number of inmate work crews that go outside the institution from five to 10. These additional officers would strengthen security on the work crews by having one armed officer per work crew as well as one unarmed officer per crew. The additional work crews would require 16.72 positions.

According to staff, inmate idleness coupled with a more violent population contributes to an increase of serious incidents. Nottoway has not been open long enough to collect significant data on the rate of serious incidents, so it is not possible to independently review this claim.

Assigning two correctional officers to each work crew of "B" custody inmates reflects a level of staffing higher than required under DOC policy, although it is a common practice at most DOC institutions. The request for these new positions should be linked to the system-wide policy issue of whether to increase security on work crews which operate outside the institution's perimeter. If an increase is desired by the General Assembly or Governor, then this request should be considered. If it is not, then the positions should not be funded.

Additional Supervisors. The warden is requesting the return of the two lieutenant positions abolished in July 1984. However, the warden would substitute two sergeant positions for the lieutenants. One position would be used to assist the training officer. The justification for this position in the warden's post audit is:

The position is needed for back-up training. One trainer is operationally overloaded for in-service and special training, writing post orders, and other administrative tasks would constitute further duties.

However, Nottoway has not had adequate experience to justify the need for additional staff in this area. Buckingham has a larger staff, yet carries out its training program with the assistance of a corporal/officer. The recent surge in the Nottoway training officer's workload may soon subside as new staff become certified officers.

The other sergeant position would be used to perform a variety of administrative support functions as well as conduct investigations and review procedures. Nottoway is already staffed for security supervisors at an above-average level. A review of supervisory to subordinate ratios (discussed in Chapter Three) shows that Nottoway is above the system-wide average. Consequently, the need for the additional sergeant positions does not appear to be justified on this basis.

If the requested supervisory positions are intended to perform duties that cannot be carried out by existing supervisory staff, then consideration should be given to promoting some lower-ranked officers. This was recommended in the Board of Corrections study committee's report on Mecklenburg, and may be practical for Nottoway.

Questionable Posts

Nottoway has six security posts (Table 40) whose functions are primarily nonsecurity in nature. These functions should be assigned to new nonsecurity positions, and the number of security positions should be correspondingly reduced.

Table 40

QUESTIONABLE SECURITY POSTS
AT NOTTOWAY CORRECTIONAL CENTER

<u>Number of Posts</u>	<u>Title</u>	<u>Type of Post</u>	<u>Positions</u>	
			<u>DOC Formula</u>	<u>JLARC Formula</u>
1	Trash/coal	8 hours, 7 days	1.68	1.65
3	Mail Room	8 hours, 7 days	5.04	4.95
2	Property Control	8 hours, 7 days	3.36	3.30
TOTAL			10.08	9.90

Source: Post Audit.

Trash-Coal Officer. This post is established on an eight-hour, seven-day basis. The primary duty of the trash-coal officer is to haul refuse from the institution to the county landfill. The warden indicated that the officer primarily works alone and does not supervise inmates. When he is not transporting refuse, he either washes or maintains the vehicle.

Although these functions are necessary, they could be carried out by nonsecurity staff. Nottoway should employ a highway

equipment operator (pay grade 3) to perform these duties. The department will realize savings by taking this action.

Mail Room. One corporal and two officers are assigned to the mail room. Their duties, which are established on an eight-hour, seven-day basis, are primarily nonsecurity in nature. Institutional personnel maintain that mail room employees should be security staff because they screen incoming inmate mail for contraband.

However, the State could achieve savings in salaries by employing nonsecurity employees who have been trained to search for contraband. Nottoway should hire three clerks or clerk messengers (pay grade 2) to work in the mail room, and should reduce its security staff level by 4.95 positions (three eight-hour, seven-day posts).

In addition, the department may wish to reduce the number of personnel working in the mail room at Nottoway after it develops a standard for the number of mail personnel needed for a certain size of inmate population. Other prisons with similar sizes of inmate populations have fewer than three mail room staff.

Property Control. A corporal and a correctional officer operate the property control room at Nottoway. The posts are established on an eight-hour, seven-day basis. The main responsibilities of these personnel are to store, maintain, and issue inmates' personal clothing and other items. They also issue institutional clothing and personal hygiene items to inmates. According to the post orders, the officers are not responsible for supervising inmates.

Institutional staff indicated that security personnel are needed at these posts to ensure that contraband does not enter the institution. However, nonsecurity personnel with minimum training could perform these duties at less cost. Nottoway should employ two store managers or storekeeper supervisors (pay grades 3 and 5, respectively) to operate the property control room. The number of security staff should be reduced by 3.30 positions (two eight-hour, seven-day posts).

Overtime

From August to December 1984, Nottoway security staff worked a total of 20,266.9 hours of paid overtime. Data on overtime worked for compensatory leave was not available. If this rate of paid overtime continues at Nottoway, 60,000 hours of paid overtime could be worked by security staff (excluding compensatory time) within one year. This would place Nottoway second to the Penitentiary in overtime hours worked.

The warden and security chief attribute their high rate of overtime to the problems associated with opening a new institution --

personnel shortages and turnover of employees. Also, a portion of the overtime resulted from assigning staff to Mecklenburg.

During JLARC's visit to Nottoway a number of security staff were observed performing nonsecurity duties. The warden stated that these temporary assignments have also contributed to the total overtime hours worked. For instance, on the day of JLARC's visit, a corporal was working as the warden's secretary. The warden told JLARC that his secretary had resigned, so he had to assign a security officer to perform secretarial duties until a permanent secretary could be hired.

Other security personnel assigned temporarily to nonsecurity functions, according to the warden, included an officer working in food services, a grievance officer, an officer working in the records room, a clerk assigned to personnel, and an officer working in the treatment section.

No additional staff should be awarded to Nottoway to reduce overtime until DOC develops the overtime reporting method recommended in Chapter Two.

DOC's Budget Request

The 1984-86 Supplemental Amendment Proposal submitted by DOC requests 17 additional officers for Nottoway for additional work gangs. The proposal also states that the additional officers would allow Nottoway to reduce overtime. Each gang would have two officers and from 9 to 15 "B" custody inmates. The proposal states that the new work gangs would reduce inmate idleness and have a "positive effect upon unrest and tension."

This request would supplement the 11 personnel currently assigned to work gangs at Nottoway. All the gangs would routinely work outside the perimeter of the institution.

As noted earlier, staffing "B" custody work crews with two officers is a level higher than required by DOC policy. Also, adding work gangs is a system-wide policy decision. If these work gangs are added, consideration should be given to the specific recommendations of the warden and the recommendations of this report.

Staffing At Nottoway

As shown in Table 41, JLARC recommends a security staffing level of 253.20 for Nottoway. The changes included in this staffing level are:

- a reduction of 4.91 positions as a result of the JLARC analysis of the Sharp formula,

Table 41

STAFFING AT NOTTOWAY CORRECTIONAL CENTER

<u>Security Staff</u>	<u>Positions</u>
Staffing at time of review	268.01
<u>Recommended changes</u>	
Impact of revised Sharp formula	-4.91
Conversion from security to nonsecurity	-9.90
Correction for Sharp formula misapplication	0.00
New security positions	0.00
Deleted security positions	<u>0.00</u>
Total changes	<u>-14.81</u>
Recommended security staffing subtotal	253.20
<u>Nonsecurity Staff</u>	
FY 1985 funded nonsecurity positions*	87.75
Recommended conversion of security posts into nonsecurity positions	<u>+6.00</u>
Nonsecurity staffing subtotal	<u>93.75</u>
TOTAL STAFFING	346.95
<u>FY 1985 Funded Staffing Levels</u>	
Funded security positions	254.00
Funded nonsecurity positions	<u>87.75</u>
Total funded positions	341.75
DIFFERENCE BETWEEN JLARC TOTAL & FUNDED LEVEL	+5.20

*Nonsecurity staff scheduled for review in 1985.

Source: DOC; JLARC analysis.

- conversion of one trash-coal, three mail room, and two property control staff from security to nonsecurity positions. This represents a decrease of 9.90 security positions and an increase of six nonsecurity positions.

SECURITY PROCEDURES

Security procedures reviewed at Nottoway Correctional Center appeared to be well developed. However, it should be noted that JLARC's visit to Nottoway occurred after the Thanksgiving Day escape, when enhanced security practices were in effect.

Tool Control

The system of tool control at Nottoway was among the best observed by JLARC at DOC facilities. The tool room at the Nottoway Correctional Center was the only one visited by JLARC that met the division guidelines on tool control.

All tools were located in a single tool room under the control of a correctional officer. The officer was responsible for logging in new tools and dispensing them to enterprise and maintenance foremen. Only the correctional officer in charge of the tool room was allowed to go behind the room's dutch door. Other institutional staff were not allowed in the tool room. All tools were identified by number and had specified storage areas. A system of control books traced the tools' usage. Tools set aside for use by the enterprise shop were numbered differently than the tools used by the maintenance crews. Tools were not signed out to inmates, but to the enterprise foreman overseeing the inmates. Enterprise tools were accounted for twice daily -- once before lunch and once before the shop closed for the day.

Tools for the maintenance area were handled in two ways. Tools not used on a daily basis remained in the tool room until a foreman requested the tool. All tools were returned after they were used. Tools that were signed out to the maintenance crews for long-term usage (such as hammers, screwdrivers, and other common tools) were accounted for nightly by the foremen, who documented that they had inventoried their equipment. On Friday nights, the tools were returned to the central tool room where the officer conducted an independent inventory of the maintenance tools. They were then kept in secure storage over the weekend.

Medical Area

Security procedures in the medical area appeared generally good. Unlike some other facilities, however, inmates were not kept in a cordoned off area while waiting to see a nurse or doctor,

although there was a correctional officer posted in the general waiting area. In addition, controls over hypodermic needles had not yet been established. Needles were kept in a locked cabinet in the pill room, but no log book had been established to track usage and inventory. These controls should be improved by establishing an inventory control system.

Food Service

Security in the kitchen appeared sound. Knives and serving utensils were controlled by a correctional officer, who kept the tools in locked storage areas inside a small office.

Before an inmate was issued a knife, his food service supervisor had to personally tell the officer that the inmate needed the tool. The officer then closed the locked office door, removed the knife from its locked cabinet, recorded the issuance in a control book, and used a chit to mark that the tool was signed out. The officer then personally handed it to the inmate, making the inmate responsible for the return of the knife. A visual inventory of knives and serving utensils could easily be accomplished by anyone walking into the office.

Other Observations

At the time of the JLARC visit in mid-December, fencing material used in the construction of internal fences had been left in the recreation yard. These materials could provide sources for potential weapons and should be removed from the recreation grounds.

CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

The JLARC review of Nottoway Correctional Center, after approximately four months in operation, found that the institutional staff have taken a number of measures to improve security. No additional security positions should be approved for Nottoway at this time. Security personnel should not be used to perform duties that are primarily nonsecurity in function. Certain practices that infringe on the security of the institution should be changed.

Recommendation (62). The level of funded security positions at Nottoway Correctional Center should be set at 253.20 (compared with the current funded level of 254). Six nonsecurity positions should be added to carry out the mail room, property control, and trash truck functions.

Recommendation (63). Control of hypodermic needles at Nottoway should be improved. An inventory control system should be established to account for needles.

Recommendation (64). Materials used in fence construction should be removed from the yard when work crews are not in the process of constructing fences. Nottoway should employ the use of a metal detector to search for metal objects in the ground left over from the construction of the institution.

Recommendation (65). Implementation of physical improvements affecting security at Nottoway should be given a high priority with DOC.

Recommendation (66). Since Nottoway is the most recently completed MSI, problems with its design should be studied by a DOC task force. The task force should include representatives of the central office capital outlay staff, institutional staff, and regional office staff. A report should be made to the Director and Secretary of Public Safety. Recommendations for improving Nottoway's design should be considered for Augusta Correctional Center.

THE PENITENTIARY

The Penitentiary, located on Spring Street in the City of Richmond, is the State's oldest prison. It was established in 1800, although the physical structures currently in use were constructed between 1904 and 1959. The 1984 Appropriations Act calls for DOC to close the sprawling facility by 1990.

The Penitentiary holds the second largest number of inmates of all the adult prisons. It had an average daily population of 869 in FY 1984, which was second only to the Powhatan Complex. In the early 1970s, the Penitentiary held as many as 1200 inmates.


Along with Powhatan and Mecklenburg Correctional Centers, the Penitentiary is considered by the Department of Corrections to be a "super maximum" security facility. This is because it contains C-Building, a special-purpose facility designated for the most difficult "C" custody inmates and for other special uses.

In 1982, a group of inmates from the Penitentiary brought a civil suit in U.S. District Court against Secretary of Public Safety Franklin White and five officials in the Department of Corrections. The inmates alleged in Shrader et al. v. White et al. that conditions at the Penitentiary violated the Eighth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution, and that their rights had been denied under the Fourteenth Amendment. They charged, for example, that sanitation was poor, fire hazards existed, heating and ventilation were unsatisfactory, vocational and educational opportunities were inadequate, and protection from assaults was inadequate. The U.S. Magistrate who heard the case dismissed it, writing:

the physical conditions do not amount to the infliction of cruel and unusual punishment. The totality of the conditions of confinement, including the risk of violence, reveals life in the Virginia State Penitentiary to be less than pleasant, but hardly comparable to those condemned by other courts.

Facility Overview

The Penitentiary has some unique features. It has the most extensive enterprises operations of any facility, special medical facilities, and Virginia's electric chair. It also houses a greater proportion of "C" custody inmates than all other prisons except one.



Profile of State Penitentiary FY 1984

<u>Population:</u>	Budgeted Capacity: 868	"A" Custody: 2.8%	White: 26.4%
	Avg. Daily Pop: 869	"B" Custody: 24.0%	Nonwhite: 73.6%
		"C" Custody: 72.5%	Avg. Age: 28.1
<u>Ratios:</u>	Inmates per Security Position: 2.61-to-1	[9]	
	Inmates per Staff (total): 1.95-to-1	[9]	
	Total Expenditures per Inmate: \$16,648	[8]	
<u>Budgeted Staff:</u>	Security: 333	<u>Officers:</u> White: 26%	Avg. Age: 36
	Nonsecurity: 112	Nonwhite: 74%	Turnover: 38%
	Total: 445	Female: 10%	
<u>Serious Incidents:</u>	Assaults on Inmates: 33 [2]	Escapes: 4 [3t]	
	Assaults on Staff: 43 [3]	Total Serious Incidents: 144 [4]	

See Appendix B for sources.

Numbers in brackets [] indicate ranking of this facility compared to other major institutions. [t] indicates a tie with other facilities.

[1] has the most staff per inmate or highest number of reported incidents.

Mission and Population. The Penitentiary confines and provides services to some special categories of inmates as well as to a general inmate population. It has a 42-bed medical infirmary, which serves inmates from the Penitentiary, other adult prisons, and local jails. Inmates can be sent to this unit if they have undergone surgery and require a recuperative period, if they are awaiting surgery or an appointment with a medical specialist at the Medical College of Virginia, or if they have an illness which requires segregation from the population. Inmates who require major surgery are sent to MCV. (The Penitentiary has about twenty security staff assigned to the MCV security ward.) If only minor surgery is necessary, it can sometimes be performed at the Penitentiary.

The Penitentiary also has an intermediate care unit with 28 beds for inmates who have exhibited psychiatric problems. Inmates can be sent here (or to a similar unit at Powhatan Correctional Center) for evaluation and treatment. If the staff believes that transfer to Marion Correctional Treatment Center would be appropriate for an inmate, they consult with staff from Marion.

Inmates from the Penitentiary and other facilities who have caused serious problems are housed in one section of C-Building. The privileges of inmates who are confined in this building are very restricted. They stay in their cells at all times except for showers and recreation.

Virginia's electric chair is in the basement of A-Building. *Code of Virginia* §53.1-233 provides that the Director of DOC "provide and maintain a permanent death chamber within the Penitentiary," and that "the death chamber shall contain all the necessary appliances for the execution of prisoners by electrocution."

The Penitentiary's population consists mainly of "C" custody inmates (73% in May 1984). This proportion is higher than any other prison except Mecklenburg Correctional Center.

Programs. The Penitentiary has a large enterprises operation. In FY 1984, 247 inmates worked in the Penitentiary's enterprises, which was more than any other location. Its enterprises are a wood shop, chair factory, print shop, data services, metal shop, and machine shop. Other inmates work in institutional jobs, such as janitors and kitchen workers.

The Rehabilitative School Authority offers academic classes in adult basic education and general education development, and vocational classes in electricity, drafting, radio and television repair, printing, and furniture repair and upholstery. The RSA also provides library services. The average monthly enrollment in RSA classes in FY 1984 was 136.

Through the RSA, inmates can also enroll in apprenticeship programs and classes offered by J. Sargeant Reynolds Community College.

Physical Facilities. The Penitentiary, a sprawling facility consisting of many buildings, covers 17 acres. The 1984 Appropriations Act calls for DOC to close the Penitentiary by 1990. Since many of the buildings are deteriorating and it is in the middle of an urban area, its continued operation may no longer be desirable.

The major buildings at the Penitentiary are the three housing units, the recreation and hobby building, administration building, kitchen and mess hall, infirmary, power plant, service station, maintenance shops, and enterprises buildings. The school is located on the top floor of one of the enterprise buildings. A recreation field is also located within the perimeter.

The perimeter of the institution is formed by either a separate brick wall or part of one of the buildings. Nine towers are located along the perimeter to view inmate activity.

Each housing unit has four sections; each section consists of five tiers of cells. A-Building is the oldest housing unit and holds a general inmate population. The 316 cells each have about 41 square feet. The basement contains the electric chair and a few cells. Inmates whose execution dates are near are brought to these cells. In November 1984, the Penitentiary began to transfer inmates out of A-Building, which the department plans to close by January 1986.

B-Building houses inmates from the general population on the above-ground floors. Two sections each have 99 cells; two other sections each contain 134 cells. The cells are 54 square feet. Inmates who are emotionally disturbed are housed in the basement, which has 24 cells.

C-Building houses inmates who are being punished, segregated for administrative reasons, or segregated for protection from other inmates. It has 28 cells for inmates being punished and 72 cells for segregation.

SECURITY STAFFING AT THE PENITENTIARY

In the current fiscal year, the Penitentiary has 447 funded positions, of which 329 are security and 118 are nonsecurity. The ratio of inmates per funded security position in FY 1985 is 2.49-to-1. A post audit submitted to JLARC states a need for 60.77 additional security personnel.

During FY 1984 the Penitentiary lost a total of 13 positions, including four security positions. When A-Building is closed, 52 positions (including 41 security staff) will be abolished. However, the warden said that the phased closing of A-Building has not yet resulted in any staff reductions.

The JLARC review of security staffing at the Penitentiary focused on the Warden's formal request for additional positions, a review of the most recent post audit, comparisons to staffing practices at other major institutions, the use of overtime, the criteria listed earlier in Chapter Two, and DOC's 1984-86 Supplemental Amendment Proposal for additional staff.

Post Audit

The Penitentiary's post audit shows a level of 306.44 security positions. However, JLARC found during its review that the security staffing needs of the Penitentiary were not accurately calculated in this post audit because of arithmetical errors.

In addition, as at most other prisons, the Penitentiary has included several security posts that should not have been included in the staffing formula calculations.

Current Security Level. A post audit dated September 20, 1984, and revised October 15, 1984, shows a need for 144 security posts and 306.44 security personnel to fill the posts.

Arithmetical Errors. During JLARC's review of the warden's request for additional staff, it was revealed that the actual needs at the Penitentiary were not accurately reflected in the October post audit primarily because relief time for some posts was not factored into the audit. As explained under "Warden's Request," the warden made a request for only about 339 positions because his staff made an arithmetical error in calculating positions in the post audit. The warden should have requested 369.92 positions.

Misapplication of Sharp Formula. Although DOC has no policy about the proper application of the Sharp formula, posts which are not filled to cover absenteeism should not be included in Sharp calculations. The Penitentiary post audit applies the Sharp formula to eight posts which do not meet this test.

These posts, which include one training officer, two adjustment committee officers, two grievance officers, two count officers, and one notary services officer, should each be counted as requiring one employee. By misapplying the formula, the security staffing needs of the Penitentiary are overstated by 2.38 positions. The excess positions should be subtracted from the staffing level shown on the post audit. The JLARC recommendation for security staffing at the Penitentiary includes an adjustment for this misapplication.

Warden's Request

The Warden is requesting 30 additional corrections officers to eliminate overtime. However, due to the error in computing the

relief factor, the elimination of overtime at the Penitentiary would result in a need for approximately 61 positions, not 30 as initially indicated by the Warden. JLARC staff pointed out this arithmetic error to the Warden, who agreed that the actual request should be for 61 security positions.

During FY 1984, security personnel at the Penitentiary worked more overtime hours than at any other prison in Virginia: 125,287 hours of paid overtime and approximately 21,557 hours in exchange for compensatory leave, for a total of 146,844 overtime hours. This amount of overtime is equivalent to 82.9 FTEs, using the 1771-hour FTE standard developed in Chapter Two. The Penitentiary spent about \$1.3 million for overtime, more than any other prison in the State.

However, the 61 requested positions which the Penitentiary would use to offset overtime should not be considered until DOC has developed a reporting system which identifies how overtime is used at the facilities, as recommended in Chapter Two. Until the system is developed, DOC may want to continue using paid overtime and compensatory leave in exchange for overtime to fill essential security posts at the Penitentiary.

Questionable Posts

As at other institutions, the Penitentiary has a number of security staff performing functions which are essentially nonsecurity in nature (Table 42). Several posts were identified by the Warden as functions that could be performed by nonsecurity personnel.

Table 42

QUESTIONABLE SECURITY POSTS AT THE PENITENTIARY

<u>Number of Posts</u>	<u>Title</u>	<u>Type of Post</u>	<u>Positions</u>	
			<u>DOC Formula</u>	<u>JLARC Formula</u>
1	Sanitation Truck	8 hours, 5 days	1.20	1.18
3	Property Control	8 hours, 5 days	3.60	3.54
1	Fire Safety	8 hours, 5 days	1.20	1.18
1	Mail Room	8 hours, 6 days	1.44	1.41
1	PBX Operator	---	1.00	1.00
TOTAL			8.44	8.31

Source: Post audit -- September 19, 1984; JLARC analysis.

In most instances security personnel are assigned to these nonsecurity functions because the activity has been viewed as essential to the security of the institution. However, a PBX operator listed on the post audit should be removed from the post audit, because a Clerk C -- not a security employee -- is presently assigned that duty. Removing this post from the audit would reduce the Penitentiary's security staffing needs by one FTE and increase its level of nonsecurity staff by one FTE.

Sanitation Truck. The primary duty of the sanitation truck operator is to haul refuse from the institution to the Richmond City landfill. This function must be performed daily. However, it is not clear why a correctional officer has to perform this duty. The warden indicated that this officer primarily works alone and does not supervise inmates. When the officer is not transporting garbage, he performs maintenance on and washes the vehicle.

The Penitentiary should hire a nonsecurity employee such as a highway equipment operator (pay grade 3) to perform these duties. The State would achieve cost savings at no expense to the security of the Penitentiary.

Property Control. One sergeant and two corporals operate the property control room at the Penitentiary. Their primary responsibilities are to store and maintain inmates' personal clothing and other personal items. They also issue institutional clothing and personal hygiene items to inmates. According to the post orders, they do not supervise inmates.

Institutional staff indicated that security personnel are needed at these post to check for contraband coming into the institution. However, nonsecurity staffers could be trained to search for contraband. The Penitentiary should hire store managers or storekeeper supervisors (pay grades 3 and 5, respectively) to perform these duties. The State would achieve savings in salaries by taking this action. In addition, the department should adjust the number of property control officers at the Penitentiary after determining a standard for the number of property officers that a certain size of inmate population requires.

Fire Safety. The warden uses a corporal to inspect the facility for violations of fire and sanitation regulations, and other safety procedures. The warden indicated that since the Penitentiary was an old facility, inmates have sued over alleged fire hazards.

Inspecting the facility for fire safety violations is an important function. The Penitentiary is one of the oldest facilities in the system, and its physical plant is in need of repair. However, it seem unnecessary to employ a full-time security staffer to perform this function. Inspections should be performed by utilizing other procedures. For example, a team could perform inspections on a part-time basis, or supervisors could be assigned the tasks on a rotating basis. This post, which represents 1.18 positions (using the revised Sharp formula), should be deleted from the Penitentiary.

Mail Room Officer. A correctional officer is assigned to supervise three nonsecurity staff in the mail room. The primary duties of the mail room staff are to sort mail, meter postage, and perform other nonsecurity functions. The nonsecurity staff as well as the officer are responsible for searching mail for contraband.

The fact that nonsecurity personnel are searching mail for contraband shows that all mail room duties can be performed by nonsecurity personnel. The Penitentiary should replace the mail room officer with another clerical position (pay grade 2).

Overtime

As discussed in a previous section, security personnel at the Penitentiary worked more overtime than at any other prison in Virginia during FY 1984. Overtime, including time worked for compensatory leave, amounted to 146,844 hours, or the equivalent of 82.9 FTEs.

According to the warden, most of the overtime was used to fill security posts inside the perimeter. However, based on the most recent listing of posts, and the specific posts the warden indicated he fills with overtime, JLARC found that only a few of these posts are classified as essential for control. The warden has authorized the payment of overtime necessary to fill these posts; however, DOC needs to develop the overtime monitoring mechanism discussed in Chapter Two before a request for full-time staff to reduce overtime can be considered.

DOC's Budget Request

The 1984-86 Supplemental Amendment Proposal submitted by DOC requests 35.50 additional staff for the Penitentiary -- 25 security positions and 10.5 nonsecurity positions.

The proposal states the additional security positions -- all correctional officers -- would allow the Penitentiary to reduce overtime. If these positions were added, the proposal maintains, the entire staff would be "more alert, motivated, and efficient in performing their duties."

The request for 10.5 nonsecurity staff -- all medical positions -- came out of a recent study by DOC and the Department of Mental Health and Mental Retardation. The study team examined the problems related to the provisions of mental health services to DOC inmates. They concluded that more psychiatric and other medical positions are needed to meet the expanding treatment needs of these inmates.

As discussed in the previous section, DOC should develop a method to monitor overtime use before the General Assembly grants new

positions to reduce overtime. JLARC did not assess the adequacy of nonsecurity staffing or requests for new nonsecurity positions.

Staffing At The Penitentiary

As shown in Table 43, the JLARC recommendation of 289.88 security positions for the Penitentiary includes the following changes:

- reduction of 5.87 positions as a result of the JLARC analysis of the Sharp formula,
- conversion of one mail room officer, one sanitation truck operator, and three property control officers from security to nonsecurity positions. This represents a deletion of 6.13 security positions and an increase of five nonsecurity positions,
- deletion of the fire safety officer post. This represents a deletion of 1.18 security positions,
- reduction of 2.38 security positions as a result of excluding seven administrative positions from the Sharp formula, and
- removal of the PBX operator from the post audit listing. This represents a reduction of one security position and an addition of one nonsecurity position.

SECURITY PROCEDURES

The JLARC review of security procedures at the Penitentiary focused on the enterprises, maintenance tool control, medical supplies, food service and other areas. Several areas, mostly in the enterprises, were identified as requiring closer attention.

Enterprise Areas

There are four enterprises inside the perimeter wall: the print shop, the furniture shop, the metal shop, and the wood shop. Due to a number of factors, they comprise a very weak area of security at the Penitentiary. Problems in the shops include:

- the physical layout of the enterprise shops,
- the large amount of raw or scrap material stored and lying about, and
- the number of correctional officers assigned.

Table 43

STAFFING AT THE PENITENTIARY

<u>Security Staff</u>	<u>Positions</u>
Staffing at time of review	306.44
Recommended changes	
Impact of revised Sharp formula	-5.87
Conversion from security to nonsecurity	-6.13
Correction for Sharp formula misapplication	-2.38
New security positions	0.00
Deleted security positions	<u>-2.18</u>
Total changes	<u>-16.56</u>
Recommended security staffing subtotal	289.88
<u>Nonsecurity Staff</u>	
FY 1985 funded nonsecurity positions*	118.00
Recommended conversion of security posts into nonsecurity positions	<u>+6.00</u>
Nonsecurity staffing subtotal	<u>124.00</u>
TOTAL STAFFING	413.88
<u>FY 1985 funded staffing levels</u>	
Funded security positions	329.00
Funded nonsecurity positions	<u>118.00</u>
Total funded positions	447.00
DIFFERENCE BETWEEN JLARC TOTAL & FUNDED LEVEL	-33.12

*Nonsecurity staff scheduled for review in 1985.

Source: DOC; JLARC analysis.

The physical layout of the enterprises shops allows inmate workers to move about the shop for significant amounts of time unobserved by either enterprise staff or correctional officers. Furthermore, control of raw and scrap materials appeared to be weak. In addition, because the enterprise division pays the salaries of correctional officers working in the shops, the division may be placing only enough officers in a shop to provide minimal security and still make the shops's targeted profit. As a result, some facilities like the Penitentiary may not have as much security as institutional managers would like to have.

The furniture shop, which occupies an entire floor of a building, had 75 inmates supervised by five enterprise foremen and three correctional officers. Due to the layout of the enterprises shop inmates sometimes work unsupervised. A large wood storage area was left unlocked to allow inmates to pull stock from the shelves. Tool control appeared weak. These procedures varied within the shop depending on which foreman oversaw which tool room. None of the tool rooms or lockers observed had shadow boards. Storage of tools was unorganized. Each tool room had a checkout list, but it was impossible to tell if all of the tools were properly accounted for.

The print shop is located in the same building as the furniture shop, but on a different floor. This shop employs approximately 50 inmates. There are five enterprise staff and one correctional officer to supervise these inmates. The officer sits in an elevated platform overlooking the two press rooms. The security post is stationary, which does not allow the officer to move about the rest of the shop. According to the Assistant Warden, illicit activities including counterfeiting have occurred in these areas because of this lack of adequate protection.

The wood shop is located in a separate building and is surrounded by 40-foot walls. Although security in some parts of the wood shop appeared adequate, approximately eight "C" custody inmates worked completely unsupervised with tools, wood, and metal in the basement area. No enterprises or security staff were assigned to this area. The enterprises staff made periodic checks on these inmates.

Security in the enterprise areas should be tightened. Control over tools, raw materials, and scrap material needs to be improved. Supervision of inmate workers by enterprise employees and correctional officers needs to be tighter.

Maintenance Tool Control. Maintenance tool control appeared to lack appropriate controls. The tool room is located within the perimeter of the facility. The tool room is behind a steel door and an officer was posted there to sign tools in and out. The tools were sorted into bins, but there were no shadow boards. The inmates, however, were permitted to go into the tool room unsupervised to pick up tools, which is against division policy. The inmates told the officer in charge of the tool room what they took

from the room, and the officer recorded the withdrawal on his daily usage sheet. The maintenance tool room should be brought into conformity with division policy.

Medical Area. The inventory system for hypodermic needles and drugs appeared to be good. Both a continuous and a periodic inventory were taken of needles. Daily counts were taken of the needles dispensed and used, with needles used marked on an inmate's medical record for accountability. During a JLARC visit of the medical area, however, an inmate was observed alone in the dental treatment room. A number of dental instruments were observed lying next to the dental chairs and in a cabinet.

Dental instruments should be securely locked when not in use, and inmates should not be permitted to go into treatment rooms unsupervised.

CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

The JLARC review of the Penitentiary indicates that the warden's request for additional security positions should not be approved. These positions would reduce the amount of overtime worked at the facility. Although this objective is laudable, DOC needs to revise its overtime reporting system in the manner recommended in Chapter Two prior to submitting staffing requests based on overtime.

Some practices which infringe on the security of the institution should be corrected.

Recommendation (67). The level of funded security positions at the Penitentiary should be set at 289.88 (compared with the current funded level of 329). Six nonsecurity positions should be added to carry out the mail room, property control, trash truck, and PBX operator duties.

Recommendation (68). Supervision of inmates in the enterprise shops should be increased. Existing security staff should routinely patrol the shops to check for misuse of tools and other instruments by inmates. Controls over raw and scrap materials should be instituted.

Recommendation (69). The operation of the maintenance tool room should be carried out in conformance with division guidelines.

Recommendation (70). Dental instruments should be kept locked when not in use. Unescorted inmates should not be permitted to go into the treatment room.

POWHATAN CORRECTIONAL CENTER

The Powhatan Complex, which includes the Powhatan Reception and Classification Center (PRCC), the north housing unit, and the Powhatan Main Compound, is located in Powhatan County on the south bank of the James River. The average daily population of the complex in FY 1984 was 923, which was the highest of all the correctional institutions in the State. This chapter excludes PRCC from analysis as it is a special purpose facility with a transient population, in most respects dissimilar from other DOC institutions. PRCC's population averaged 228 in FY 1984.


Previously, James River Correctional Center was administered as part of the Powhatan Complex. In the late 1970s it was separated, although some links still exist between the facilities. Staff from James River Correctional Center farm the land surrounding the Powhatan Complex. Powhatan officers are sometimes called upon to work at James River.

Powhatan Correctional Center, including the main compound and north housing, has some features that distinguish it from most other prisons in the State. Along with the Penitentiary and Mecklenburg Correctional Center, Powhatan receives "C" custody inmates who are considered by DOC to require "close custody." Powhatan also has extensive medical facilities, including specialized staff and cells for mentally disturbed inmates.

Powhatan is currently operating under a 1981 consent decree from the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia. The civil case which led to this decree, Cagle v. Hutto, charged that living conditions at Powhatan were unsuitable and the level of safety and services was inadequate. The department agreed to take several actions as a part of the consent decree, including hiring 70 additional security employees, making various improvements in buildings, hiring additional medical and other treatment staff, increasing the capacity of vocational training programs, and limiting the number of inmates in each of four dorms in the main compound.

Facility Overview

Powhatan Correctional Center began operations in 1894. However, all of Powhatan's existing buildings were built after 1952. Inmates have various employment and educational opportunities. Its large physical plant contains facilities to house special groups of inmates.



Profile of Powhatan Correctional Center FY 1984

<u>Population:</u>	Budgeted Capacity: 688	"A" Custody: 16.6%	White: 35.6%
	Avg. Daily Pop: 685	"B" Custody: 43.4%	Nonwhite: 64.4%
		"C" Custody: 38.7%	Avg. Age: 28.3
<u>Ratios:</u>	Inmates per Security Position: 1.94-to-1 [5]		
	Inmates per Staff (total): 1.19-to-1 [4]		
	Total Expenditures per Inmate: \$21,394 [4]		
<u>Budgeted Staff:</u>	Security: 354	<u>Officers:</u> White: 44%	Avg. Age: 34
	Nonsecurity: 224.5	Nonwhite: 56%	Turnover: 20%
	Total: 578.5	Female: 14%	
<u>Serious Incidents:</u>	Assaults on Inmates: 11 [7t]	Escapes: 0 [14t]	
	Assaults on Staff: 6 [9t]	Total Serious Incidents: 29 [10]	

See Appendix B for sources.

Numbers in brackets [] indicate ranking of this facility compared to other major institutions. [t] indicates a tie with other facilities.

[1] has the most staff per inmate or highest number of reported incidents.

Mission and Population. Like all other adult prisons in Virginia, the primary mission of Powhatan Correctional Center is to confine offenders and provide appropriate services to them. But Powhatan also has some special functions.

M-Building houses inmates from Powhatan who have not been able to adjust to the general population and inmates who have caused serious problems at other adult prisons. For example, it held the recaptured death row inmates who escaped from Mecklenburg Correctional Center in May 1984.

Powhatan has special quarters for inmates with medical problems. The north housing unit has some inmates who are physically handicapped. The medical building contains an intermediate-level mental health unit, where inmates from other prisons can be evaluated if they have exhibited mental problems. After evaluation, some inmates are sent for long-term confinement to Marion Correctional Treatment Center.

Powhatan Correctional Center operates the Powhatan County Jail. In FY 1985, 14 Powhatan security staff are assigned to the jail.

Programs. In FY 1984, 226 inmates were employed in six enterprises at Powhatan. More inmates were employed in enterprises than at any other prison except the Penitentiary. Enterprises include a clothing shop, laundry, tag shop, meat processing and silkscreening operations, and a wood assembly shop. Other inmates are employed in institutional jobs such as maintenance and food service.

The Rehabilitative School Authority offers academic classes in Adult Basic Education (ABE) and General Education Development (GED), vocational programs, library services, and apprenticeship programs. In addition to the regular daytime academic classes that are held in the school, RSA also offers one night class, and one teacher instructs inmates in M-Building and the reception center. RSA vocational programs include welding, auto mechanics, barbering, and masonry. The FY 1984 average monthly enrollment was 173.

Physical Facilities. Powhatan Correctional Center contains 17 major buildings, plus farm and utility shops. The main compound is enclosed by a double perimeter fence topped with razor wire. Eight towers are located on the main compound's perimeter, and another tower overlooks the yard of M-Building.

Powhatan has four main housing units: (1) the main compound, which has 325 cells for "C" custody inmates and four dorms which each house 50 inmates; (2) M-Building, with 98 single cells, including 28 for isolation, segregation, and detention; (3) the north housing unit, a dormitory with a capacity of 90 (45 for the inmate construction crew, 39 for the inmates who work outside the compound, and six for physically handicapped inmates); and (4) the medical

unit, which has a capacity of 54, including 12 cells for inmates with psychiatric problems, 28 beds for recuperating inmates, and 14 other cells. The other major structures inside the fence include the medical facility, kitchen/mess hall, and several enterprises buildings.

The north housing unit contains about 77 square feet per inmate. The dorms in the main compound provide about 97 square feet per person. This number is high compared to other prisons in the State because the department agreed to limit the number of inmates in these dorms under the consent decree. All cells at Powhatan contain 60 to 69 square feet. No inmates at Powhatan are double-bunked.

The department has made some changes to the facilities in recent years. A new medical building was built in 1981. The west housing unit, which held parole violators, was closed in 1983. A bachelor officers' quarters is currently under construction.

SECURITY STAFFING AT POWHATAN

At 505 funded staff positions, Powhatan has the largest staff of any DOC institution. In FY 1984, Powhatan was highly staffed, with the fourth highest ratio of inmates to total budgeted staff, at 1.19-to-1.

The 1981 Cagle v. Hutto consent decree established certain staffing patterns at Powhatan. In this decree, DOC agreed to assign at least one officer to each dormitory at all times. DOC also hired an additional 70 officers at Powhatan as a result of this case, and took a variety of other measures.

During FY 1984 Powhatan lost 120 positions, including 95 security positions. Most of these positions were eliminated when the west housing unit was closed and the inmates transferred to other facilities. Security staffing in the main compound was not reduced as a result of these changes, according to the warden.

The JLARC review focused on the warden's request for additional positions, the performance by security staff of any duties not directly related to security, the use of overtime, comparisons to staffing practices at other major institutions, the utilization of security staff, the criteria listed in Chapter Two, and the facility's post audit listings.

Post Audit

The post audit submitted to JLARC shows a need for 152 posts, and for 362.49 security employees to fill these posts. Although DOC has no policy about the proper application of the Sharp formula, posts which are not filled to cover absenteeism should not

be included in Sharp calculations. The Powhatan post audit applies the Sharp formula to three posts which do not meet this test.

These posts, which include the security chief, a training coordinator, and an adjustment committee post, should each be counted as requiring one employee. By misapplying the formula, the security staffing needs of Powhatan are overstated by 0.54 positions (based on the revised Sharp formula). These excess positions should be subtracted from the staffing level shown on the post audit. The JLARC recommendation for security staffing at Powhatan includes an adjustment for this misapplication.

Warden's Request

The warden is requesting 55 additional correctional officers. Of this total, 35 positions would offset the amount of overtime used at the facility in FY 1984, according to the warden. These positions are discussed in the "Overtime" section later in this report. The other 20 positions would be used for two purposes: (1) to establish two new 24-hour, seven-day sentry posts requiring a total of 10.10 new positions, and (2) to add an officer to each work crew which contains "B" custody inmates, for a total of eight requested eight-hour, five-day posts, or (using DOC's Sharp formula) 9.6 officers.

Sentries. The two sentry posts would be established on the road that runs through the Powhatan-James River Complex and crosses the river. The warden indicated that traffic through the complex is a continual problem, passing along the perimeter of the main compound at Powhatan and through the grounds of James River. This poses a risk to security, in the warden's view, and some escapes from the facility have involved vehicles using the road. However, less staff-intensive methods of controlling vehicular access, such as remotely controlled gates, have not to date been installed.

According to the warden, sentries would be able to identify vehicles using the road, and would determine more quickly than at present that an escape by vehicle has occurred. Currently there is a procedure for persons routinely using the road to request a permit from the warden, and permits are periodically checked by officers stationed on the road.

Although the new permanent sentry posts would enhance facility security in these ways, the warden estimated that no more than four escapes had used cars on the road in the last four years. Consequently, two 24-hour posts may be an expensive remedy to the escape problem. DOC should explore less staff-intensive means of limiting access, such as using remotely controlled gates.

Work crews. As at several other locations, the warden wants to strengthen security on the work crews which go outside the perimeter. Powhatan would do this by adding an officer to each crew

containing "B" custody inmates, for a total of eight new posts or 9.6 new positions. This would permit one foreman and one gun-carrying officer for each crew.

While it is a common practice at major institutions to assign two officers to each crew of "B" custody inmates working outside the perimeter, the appropriate staffing level should be set based on department-wide policy. Current policy does not require two officers per "B" crew, although it permits this level.

DOC should specify whether this increased level of staffing on "B" custody work crews is required. In addition, the question of work crew staffing should be addressed as part of the department's total request for work crew staffing.

Questionable Posts

As at other institutions, Powhatan has a number of security staff who are performing duties that are essentially nonsecurity in nature. Several of these were identified by the warden, who emphasized that it was unnecessary for correctional officers to fill these posts. Clerks, receptionists, and other nonsecurity personnel should perform these duties in the warden's view. Table 44 lists the positions.

Table 44

QUESTIONABLE SECURITY POSTS AT POWHATAN

<u>Number of Posts</u>	<u>Title</u>	<u>Type of Post</u>	<u>Positions</u>	
			<u>DOC Formula</u>	<u>JLARC Formula</u>
1	Dog Handler	8 hours, 5 days	1.20	1.18
1	Switchboard Operator	24 hours, 7 days	5.05	4.95
3	Mail Room Officer	8 hours, 6 days	4.32	4.23
1	Radio Operator	8 hours, 5 days	1.20	1.18
1	Staff Mess Hall Officer	24 hours, 7 days	5.05	4.95
2	Canteen Officer	8 hours, 7 days	3.36	3.30
2	Clothing Room Officer (1)	8 hours, 7 days	1.68	1.65
	(1)	8 hours, 5 days	1.20	1.18
2	Personal Property Officer	8 hours, 5 days	2.40	2.36
TOTAL			25.46	24.98

Source: post audit.

As at some other locations, officers are being utilized because the duties are viewed as essential and the nonsecurity staff who previously performed some of these duties have been cut in the last several years. The basic problem, according to the warden, is that staff have been cut but the need for the duties has persisted.

Switchboard & Radio Operators. The warden told JLARC that he had to use officers for these duties because no other staff were available, and because these positions are responsible for the armory located in the administration building (which is outside the perimeter). He also indicated that receptionists or other nonsecurity employees should be handling the switchboard and radio duties.

If the warden's suggestion were implemented, the switchboard and radio duties could be carried out less expensively. A clerk "C", for example, is assigned switchboard duties at the Penitentiary, and is on 'pay grade 4 (\$10,587-14,454) instead of pay grade 6 (\$12,644-17,273) which is paid to correctional officers.

Mail Room Officers. Powhatan has three mail room posts. The mail room positions should be certified correctional officers, according to DOC staff, because they screen incoming inmate mail for contraband, as specified in division guidelines. However, this function could be performed in a less costly manner by nonsecurity staff. Several other State agencies use a clerk or a clerk-messenger position (pay grade 2, \$8,853-12,102) to sort mail. If a clerk-messenger was trained to search for contraband, DOC would realize a significant savings in personnel expenditures, since the correctional officers currently sorting mail are at pay grade 6 (\$12,644-17,273).

Staff Mess Hall Officer. According to the warden, the employees' mess hall is kept open to provide meals to staff on the night shift. The cafeteria is staffed with a correctional officer on a 24-hour basis. Of course, all correctional centers have staff on duty around the clock, but Powhatan is the only correctional center with an all-night cafeteria for employees.

As noted in Chapter Two, staffing at employee cafeterias varies widely. While it is laudable that the warden wants to provide hot meals and coffee to the night shift, the need for an officer to take meal tickets is clearly marginal. This post should be eliminated. Other less staff-intensive practices should also be considered. For example, supervisors could check a meal sign-in roster when getting their own meals.

Canteen Officers. According to the post orders, the two canteen posts supervise inmate workers, ensure the canteen's proper operation, take inventory, monitor sales, maintain stocks, and perform other related duties. The warden stated that these posts primarily perform nonsecurity duties, and that nonsecurity staff

should be assigned to them. However, the warden assigned security staff to the duties when the positions were eliminated in recent budget cuts.

The nonsecurity classification of storekeeper supervisor or store manager (pay grades 5 and 3, respectively) should handle the stocking and merchandising duties. These positions could carry out the canteen function at Powhatan more economically.

Dog Handler. Powhatan has one correctional officer serving as dog handler. The primary duty of the dog handler is to train and work with tracking dogs used in locating escapees. Security staff are needed for this job, in the department's view, because they are trained in handling weapons and in how to deal with the escaped inmate when he is apprehended. These officers are sometimes used to make transportation runs as well as a variety of other security duties.

James River Correctional Center, located within a mile of Powhatan, also has a dog handler post. As recommended in Chapter Two, DOC should review the number and location of dog handlers at adult institutions and determine whether efficiencies could be achieved. The placement of dog handlers should probably be tied to where escapes are most likely to occur -- and most escapes occur at the field units, not major institutions. Moreover, the number of dog handlers in the James River-Powhatan Complex may be excessive.

Clothing Room. One security officer works in the inmate clothing room. This eight-hour, seven-day post is primarily responsible for inventorying, stocking, and dispensing clothing to inmates. Powhatan has another eight-hour, five-day post called a "central clothing officer."

A nonsecurity position such as a store manager or storekeeper supervisor should be used instead of a security employee to operate the clothing room. Costs would be reduced by making this change.

Personal Property. Powhatan has two eight-hour, five-day posts established for the personal property room. The security staff who fill these positions search inmates' personal property and keep related records. As with the clothing room posts, the property functions should be carried out by nonsecurity staff.

Conclusion. The recommended staffing level reflects a conversion of the switchboard and radio operators, mail handlers, personal property officers, canteen officers, and clothing officers into 15 nonsecurity positions. On Powhatan's post audit these positions generate a need for 19.21 security positions. Using the revised Sharp formula, these posts total 18.85 positions. In addition, the 24-hour, seven-day employee mess hall post is eliminated in the recommended level, for a deletion of 4.95 positions.

Overtime

Officers at Powhatan work a significant amount of overtime. In FY 1984 a total of 77,734.75 hours of additional time was logged at Powhatan, second in magnitude only to the Penitentiary. The additional time was equivalent to 43.9 FTEs. Of these total hours, 61,299.75 were paid overtime, and 16,435 were compensated by leave time.

According to the warden, most of this overtime was worked to fill essential security posts. The warden has specified which posts within the compound must be filled to ensure security, and has authorized the payment of overtime necessary to meet this objective. However, DOC needs to develop the overtime monitoring mechanism discussed in Chapter Two before a request for full-time staff to reduce overtime should be considered.

DOC's Budget Request

The 1984-86 Supplemental Amendment Proposal submitted by DOC requests 15 additional correctional officer positions for Powhatan. Five of these positions would provide 24-hour, seven-day coverage of a perimeter tower at the entrance to the medical facility, and ten would be assigned to eight-hour, five-day outside "B" custody work crews.

The new tower constructed near the gate to Powhatan's medical center should be staffed in accordance with the policy on tower staffing recommended in Chapter Two, and in accordance with several other factors. Hours of access through the gate should be considered, as should the presence of a 24-hour control room post stationed just inside the front door of the facility. Additionally, the medical center perimeter can be partially viewed from a tower on M-Building's yard, which should also be considered. There is a need to staff the medical center tower, but the exact hours should be tied to these factors and to the recommended policy.

The ten requested work crew positions, for eight crews and two relief positions, should be tied to a system-wide decision about the extent to which inmates should work outside security perimeters. Adding work crews does not directly address security needs inside the institution. If these positions are added, consideration should still be given to the specific recommendations of this report.

Staffing at Powhatan

The staffing recommendation for Powhatan is shown in Table 45. The recommended staffing level incorporates the following changes:

Table 45

STAFFING AT POWHATAN CORRECTIONAL CENTER

<u>Security Staff</u>	<u>Positions</u>
Staffing at time of review	362.49
Recommended changes	
Impact of revised Sharp formula	-6.73
Conversion from security to nonsecurity	-18.85
Correction for Sharp formula misapplication	-0.54
New security positions	0.00
Deleted security positions	<u>-4.95</u>
Total changes	<u>-31.07</u>
Recommended security staffing subtotal	331.42
<u>Nonsecurity Staff</u>	
FY 1985 funded nonsecurity positions*	148.00
Recommended conversion of security posts into nonsecurity positions	<u>+15.00</u>
Nonsecurity staffing subtotal	<u>163.00</u>
TOTAL STAFFING	494.42
<u>FY 1985 funded staffing levels</u>	
Funded security positions	357.00
Funded nonsecurity positions	<u>148.00</u>
Total funded positions	505.00
DIFFERENCE BETWEEN JLARC TOTAL & FUNDED LEVEL	-10.58

*Nonsecurity staff scheduled for review in 1985.

Source: DOC; JLARC analysis.

- reduction of 6.73 positions as a result of the JLARC analysis of the Sharp formula,
- deletion of 18.85 nonsecurity positions and a corresponding addition of 15 nonsecurity positions,
- deletion of 4.95 employees' mess hall positions, and
- reduction of 0.54 positions to compensate for three posts where the Sharp formula was misapplied.

Based on the JLARC review, 331.42 security positions appear warranted at Powhatan. Fifteen nonsecurity positions should be added to cover duties not assigned to security staff.

SECURITY PROCEDURES

JLARC reviewed security procedures for the control of the food services area, the medical area, and in the maintenance and enterprise areas.

For the most part, security procedures were adequate. The food service personnel maintained reasonable control of kitchen items, procedures in the medical area were reasonable, and the main maintenance tool room appeared to be in appropriate order.

In one area, however, control should be improved. In the tailor shop, control over tools used by the maintenance staff appeared inadequate. The maintenance staff who check out tools from the tailor tool room did not log out the tools. An inventory was apparently not taken of these tools. The shadows on the shadow board did not reflect the current inventory of tools. "Tool missing" was written over one of the shadows.

The inadequate control of tools in the tailor shop violates division policy. Under the current system, if a staff member took a tool and did not return it, the officer who oversees the tool room might not realize that it is missing, and might not remember who took the tool.

CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Based on the JLARC review of Powhatan Correctional Center, no additional security positions should be added at this time. Security staff should not be used to perform nonsecurity duties. Control of tools should be strengthened.

Recommendation (71). The level of funded security positions at Powhatan Correctional Center should be set at 331.42

(compared with the current funded level of 357). Fifteen positions should be added to nonsecurity staff for switchboard and radio, mail, canteen, and clothing duties.

Recommendation (72). Control of tools in the tailor shop should be strengthened to comply with division guidelines.

ST. BRIDES CORRECTIONAL CENTER

St. Brides Correctional Center, located in Chesapeake, has been operated by DOC since 1976. Previously the facility served as the Norfolk City Jail Farm. As a result, St. Brides has several multiple-occupancy cells that are more typical of local jails than of a State prison. Several buildings and a housing unit have been constructed since the department acquired the location.

Compared to other prisons in the State, St. Brides' size is close to the mean, with an average daily population of 421 in FY 1984. Most of the inmates housed here are in "A" or "B" custody status, and are mostly under 30 years of age.

Facility Overview

Numerous changes have been made to the physical plant since DOC took over the facility. Two housing units, an administration building, and four towers have been constructed. Other changes, including the building of additional fencing, have been made.


Mission and Population. St. Brides houses a younger population than any other DOC adult facility except the Youthful Offender Center. Inmates placed at St. Brides generally have sentences of 25 years or less, which also distinguishes the facility from others in DOC.

St. Brides uses a progressive housing program, which consists of moving an inmate through four types of housing units. The initial placement is in the dormitory designated Building AB1, and restricts the inmate's movement about the facility. No amenities, such as television, are provided in AB1.

The second level is placement in Building AB2, which is identical in design (open dormitory) to AB1. Placement in AB2 entails less restriction on movement about the facility. Amenities here include a television and a weight machine in the building.

The third level of the progressive housing scheme is a building with multiple occupancy cells. These cells house fewer inmates than the open dorms of Buildings AB1 and AB2. Inmates are permitted freedom of movement within the building, and can have more personal items than in the lower housing levels.

The final step in the program is the honor unit, which consists of single occupancy cells. Each inmate has his own cell, and greater privacy, than in the other three levels of the program.



Profile of St. Brides Correctional Center FY 1984

<u>Population:</u>	Budgeted Capacity:	423	"A" Custody:	21.8%	White:	39.1%	
	Avg. Daily Pop:	421	"B" Custody:	71.8%	Nonwhite:	60.9%	
			"C" Custody:	1.9%	Avg. Age:	21.9	
<u>Ratios:</u>	Inmates per Security Position:	3.11-to-1	[11]				
	Inmates per Staff (total):	2.41-to-1	[13]				
	Total Expenditures per Inmate:	\$11,945	[14]				
<u>Budgeted Staff:</u>	Security:	136	<u>Officers:</u>	White:	34%	Avg. Age:	37
	Nonsecurity:	39		Nonwhite:	66%	Turnover:	44%
	Total:	175		Female:	25%		
<u>Serious Incidents:</u>	Assaults on Inmates:	4	[8]	Escapes:	1	[6t]	
	Assaults on Staff:	7	[8]	Total Serious Incidents:	25	[13]	

See Appendix B for sources.

Numbers in brackets [] indicate ranking of this facility compared to other major institutions. [t] indicates a tie with other facilities.

[1] has the most staff per inmate or highest number of reported incidents.

Inmates can lock their cells when they leave them, thus decreasing the chance that their personal property may be stolen. In addition, inmates in this unit can have small televisions and stereos in their cells.

Programs. The Rehabilitative School Authority plays an important role in inmate activities at St. Brides. In FY 1984 the average monthly enrollment in RSA programs here was 258 inmates. In most months of FY 1984, over 70 percent of the available inmate population was enrolled in RSA classes. This proportion was higher than any other prison except the Youthful Offender Center.

RSA offers library services, academic classes, and eight vocational classes -- auto mechanics, sheet metal fabrication, plumbing, auto body repair, offset printing, power mechanics, brick masonry, and carpentry.

No enterprise programs are operated at St. Brides. However, the inmates can hold various institutional jobs, such as groundskeepers, maintenance workers, and farm workers.

Physical Facilities. St. Brides is enclosed by a single perimeter fence topped with a strand of electrified barbed wire. At about 12 feet, the fence is shorter than fences around most DOC facilities. Four towers are stationed along the perimeter.

Within the perimeter are the housing units, recreation yard, kitchen and mess hall, the RSA and support services buildings, and other smaller buildings. The administration building sits just outside the front gate and sally port.

There are 197 beds in the dorms, and 210 beds in general population cells. In addition, 42 beds are used for isolation and segregation. On the average, each inmate at St. Brides has 60 - 69 square feet of housing space.

SECURITY STAFFING AT ST. BRIDES

St. Brides is one of the more leanly staffed institutions. With an inmate-to-security staff ratio of 3.11-to-1, St. Brides ranked 11th of the 15 prisons in FY 1984. In terms of inmates per total budgeted staff, St. Brides ranked 13th, at 2.41-to-1. For FY 1985, St. Brides has 171 budgeted positions, of which approximately 135 are security and the remaining 36 are nonsecurity.

Several changes have been made to security staffing in the last few years. Nine posts were eliminated, four were added, and various other changes in assignments were made between FY 1982 and FY 1985.

In determining the number of security staff needed at St. Brides, JLARC considered post audits dated July 1984, the warden's request for additional positions, comparisons to staffing practices at other major institutions, the criteria listed earlier in Chapter Two, and DOC's 1984-86 Supplemental Amendment Proposal for additional resources.

Post Audit

St. Brides' staff provided two post audits to JLARC. One dated July 11, 1984, shows a need for 128 security positions, with a note that 12 posts were not filled due to insufficient staff. A post audit dated August 24, 1984, showed a need for 162 security positions, which according to attached documentation incorporated 35 new requested positions. A footnote on the August post audit also stated that "many posts are not consistently manned or require overtime and/or compensatory time to provide necessary services."

Current Staffing Level. The July 11 post audit was used to establish the current staffing level for the JLARC analysis, because it did not include requested positions. It identifies 47 eight-hour, seven-day posts and 42 eight-hour, five-day posts, for a total need for 129.36 security positions.

Arithmetical Errors. Personnel at St. Brides made an error in calculating their security staffing needs from the July post audit. They computed a need for 128 employees, but the correct number is 129.36. JLARC used the corrected figure.

Misapplication of Sharp Formula. Although DOC has no policy about the proper application of the Sharp formula, posts which are not filled to cover absenteeism should not be included in Sharp calculations. The post audit applies the Sharp formula to seven eight-hour, five-day posts which do not meet this test.

These posts, which include a training officer, a count officer, two grievance coordinators, and three adjustment committee officers, should each be counted as requiring one employee. Through misapplication of the formula, the security staffing needs of St. Brides are overstated by 1.26 positions (based on the revised Sharp formula). These excess positions should be subtracted from the staffing level shown on the post audit. The JLARC recommendation for security staffing at St. Brides includes an adjustment for this misapplication.

Warden's Request

The warden is requesting 35 additional security positions. One of these positions is for an additional work crew, and another is for a recreation officer. The remaining 33 positions are needed to staff 20 eight-hour, seven-day posts which are not currently filled.

Fifteen of these posts are in housing units, two are in the front control room at the administration building, two are located in towers, and one is in the kitchen.

Increased staffing is needed, according to documentation prepared by the warden, due to changes in the inmate population and to respond to the level of serious incidents in the housing units:

Over the past 2-3 years, St. Brides has begun to house inmates with longer sentences (maximum sentence was adjusted from 15 to 25 years), more serious prior criminal histories, and more serious offenses. Moreover, the number of inmates with psychiatric and mental health problems has increased significantly. Careful review and investigation of serious incidents in the housing units indicates that increased security surveillance on the requested shifts would have prevented many of these incidents.

Housing Units AB1 & AB2. Basically, the warden wishes to strengthen security staffing on the second and third shifts in each of the five housing units, and to add staff to the first shift in three of the housing units.

In housing units AB1 and AB2, the warden wants to increase staff from 3-2-3 to 3-3-4 officers on the first, second, and third shifts, respectively. This would require a total of two additional eight-hour, seven-day posts in each housing unit, for a total of four additional such posts and 6.60 positions. According to the post audit, these posts are considered essential to security. The warden notes that the increased staff should help stem the number of serious incidents in the units. Seven serious incidents, ranging from assaults to an explosion, occurred in AB1 and AB2 during these shifts in FY 1984.

Units AB1 and AB2 are nearly identical in design and capacity to north housing unit at Powhatan, and to the annex unit at Halifax Field Unit. Although these facilities have somewhat different programs, and assign different types of inmates to the housing units, the number of inmates in each of the three locations is similar. Powhatan staffs its north housing unit on a 3-3-4 pattern, not counting a shift commander assigned to the unit. Halifax also staffs on a 3-3-4 pattern, not counting a 24-hour sergeant post who serves as building supervisor.

St. Brides is thus the only one of the three similar structures with a 3-2-3 staffing pattern -- two posts during the second shift, and three posts on the first and third shifts -- instead of a 3-3-4 pattern. St. Brides' post audit also indicates that these posts are not consistently filled.

Because two similarly-designed facilities staff on the 3-3-4 pattern, it does not seem unreasonable for St. Brides to achieve a

comparable staffing pattern, particularly if the population housed here continues to harden, as the warden suggests it will. Consequently the four additional posts in AB1 and AB2 appear warranted.

Housing Units A3 & B3. The eight additional posts in A3 and B3 are requested by the warden for nearly identical reasons as the AB1 and AB2 positions. The positions are considered essential to security on a post audit listing. Five assaults and "numerous other reported incidents not serious enough to generate a serious incident report" occurred on these shifts during FY 1984.

The design of A3 and B3 includes two long hallways each with a total of 15 multiple occupancy cells alongside the corridors. One officer is assigned to the building. The officer patrols and can see down the hallway but not into the showers or the large cells where inmates are located.

During a JLARC visit to these units on a Saturday evening, the shift commander stated that he discouraged the officer on duty from being too aggressive in looking for contraband or other illicit activities, for fear that the officer's personal safety would be jeopardized. Inmates could readily jump the officer in an out-of-the-way area along the long hallway, according to the shift commander, and no other employee would be aware of the situation for some time.

While the requested staff positions may be reasonable enhancements of security, technological solutions should first be considered. Television cameras located in the hallways or strategically located near the showers or certain cells could improve the current staff's ability to monitor movement and activity. A body alert system for officers stationed in these housing units -- which would electronically notify a central control station when an officer was in distress -- may also address the shift commander's concern. In addition, since these units represent the next to the last step of the St. Brides progressive housing system, staff could be more selective about which inmates are placed in these units. DOC should assess whether these alternatives may be more cost-effective than adding staff to A3 and B3 housing units.

Housing Unit AB4. The warden is requesting one additional post on each shift for AB4, which is the honor building and consists of 34 single occupancy cells along a long corridor. This building is currently not staffed on a full-time basis. An officer assigned to the segregation unit in the rear of AB4 patrols the honor unit.

Although the warden makes the same general case for needing a position in AB4, whether incidents occur in this building to the same extent as in the other housing units is uncertain from the documentation. Because this is the final step of St. Brides' progressive housing system, inmates housed here are likely to present

the least problem. In addition, fewer inmates are housed here than in the other buildings. Consequently, the requested position appears unsupported.

Tower posts. St. Brides has four perimeter towers, two of which are not currently staffed on the day shift. The warden wants two additional eight-hour, seven-day posts to staff these two towers.

Perimeter towers are generally considered to be essential to the security of a facility. The warden pointed out in documentation submitted to JLARC that four of five successful escapes from St. Brides between 1979 and 1984 occurred during the day shift, when two towers were not staffed. In discussions with facility staff it was learned, however, that not all of the successful escapees went over or through the fence. Thus, even if all towers had been staffed, the escapes might still have occurred.

Perimeter towers at virtually all other major institutions are staffed on a 24-hour, seven-day basis. The reason for not staffing the St. Brides towers on a similar basis is not clear. The warden noted that during the day, with more nonsecurity staff present and most inmates in school or at work, escapes and attempts could be held in check. However, the same conditions exist at most other institutions during the day, yet their towers are fully staffed.

One option to consider at St. Brides concerns the nature of the perimeter fence. It is a single fence approximately 12 feet high, topped with an electrified strand of barbed wire. Most other major institutions have a double fence around the perimeter that is 15 feet high, with razor wire. DOC should consider similar fencing for St. Brides, and determine whether this enhanced level of physical security may compensate for staffing the towers on a less-than-24-hour basis.

If a second fence does not provide adequate security, then the towers should be staffed more fully, which would mean adding two eight-hour, seven-day posts. At this time, JLARC recommends that the additional positions be given to staff the towers.

Control Room. The warden is requesting an additional post in the control room on the day and evening shifts. Currently the control room is managed by one position.

This room controls access to the administration building and, through the sally port, to the inside of the compound. The officer in the control room also handles key control, the armory, radio dispatching, and related duties.

The warden notes that lengthy and extended delays in accounting for keys and a failure to account for ammunition and security equipment have resulted from the lack of these positions. The position will also see increased duty in the near future, as the

warden states that electronically controlled sally port gates will soon be installed.

Staffing of control rooms varies among the major institutions. Buckingham, for example, has two control room posts, although the posts do not control the sally port at that facility. Sally ports at most facilities are controlled electronically from the nearest tower. Although there is a tower within a few yards of the St. Brides sally port, the gates are controlled from the control room in the administration building, which is equally close.

DOC should consider realigning some of the duties assigned to the St. Brides control room officer. Radio dispatching, for example, is basically a nonsecurity duty and could be performed during the day shift (when radio traffic is greatest) by clerical staff located in the same building as the control room. Consideration should also be given to relocating the sally port controls to the tower which is located near the gates. The need for additional staff in the control room should then be reassessed.

Kitchen post. An additional position on the day shift is requested to help supervise inmates who work in the kitchen. The largest number of inmates who work are assigned to the kitchen, and they typically are relatively new to the institution. Food theft, property damage, and fights are cited by the warden as a concern in the kitchen.

Although the potential for serious incidents is relatively high in kitchen areas, with access to knives, foodstuffs, and numerous other things, the warden did not identify the extent of these problems in documentation submitted with the request. In addition, the kitchen adjoins the inmate mess hall where additional officers are posted during meals and could assist in the kitchen if necessary during at least part of the shift. Consequently, it is not clear that this additional position is warranted.

Work crew post. The warden is requesting one additional eight-hour, five-day post as a work gang supervisor. This request would staff the crew at a level higher than required under DOC policy, although at a level consistent with that used by other institutions.

This post should be linked to the system-wide policy issue of whether to increase the number of work crews outside the perimeter of major institutions. If an increase is desired by the General Assembly or Governor, then this request should be considered. Until then, it should be held in abeyance.

Recreation post. The warden is requesting one additional eight-hour, five-day post to expand recreation hours at the facility and to provide additional coverage of current recreational activities. Although in documentation the warden refers to the need to prevent escapes, it is unclear whether this post alone would be

sufficient to prevent an escape, especially if the requested tower posts are granted. Consequently, the recreation post does not appear warranted.

Questionable Posts

St. Brides has two posts whose duties are primarily nonsecurity; the duties should be transferred to nonsecurity staff. St. Brides has another post whose duties are clearly security-oriented, but the need for this position should be reviewed in the context of system-wide needs. These posts are listed in Table 46.

Table 46

QUESTIONABLE SECURITY POSTS
AT ST. BRIDES CORRECTIONAL CENTER

<u>Number of Posts</u>	<u>Title</u>	<u>Type of Post</u>	<u>Positions</u>	
			<u>DOC Formula</u>	<u>JLARC Formula</u>
1	Mail Clerk/ Switchboard	8 hours, 6 days	1.44	1.41
1	Property Control	8 hours, 7 days	1.68	1.65
1	Dog Handler	8 hours, 5 days	1.20	N.A.
TOTAL			4.32	3.06

SOURCE: July 11, 1984, post audit.

Two posts appear to be primarily nonsecurity in nature. A mail and switchboard officer performs duties which could be carried out by a clerk or clerk messenger (pay grade 2) at a savings in salaries. A property control office inventories and maintains inmates' property, a function which could be carried out by nonsecurity staff such as a store manager or storekeeper supervisor (pay grades 3 and 5, respectively). These two positions should be converted to nonsecurity staff.

According to a July post audit listing and a post order, St. Brides has an eight-hour, five-day dog handler position. As discussed in Chapter Two, DOC should review this position and other dog handlers throughout the system to ensure that the number and placement of dog handlers are appropriate.

Overtime

Security staff at St. Brides worked a total of 17,281.55 hours of overtime during FY 1984. This is equivalent to approximately 10 FTEs. The staff received compensatory time for 9,192.3 of these hours and overtime pay for 8,089.25 hours. DOC should develop the overtime monitoring mechanism discussed in Chapter Two before conversion of overtime into full-time staff is considered.

DOC's Budget Request

The 1984-86 Supplemental Amendment Proposal requests 15.12 security staff for St. Brides. The requested posts include two for perimeter towers, four in housing units AB1 and AB2, two in housing units A3 and B3, and one to strengthen security on an existing work crew which goes outside the facility perimeter.

As discussed above, JLARC agrees with the need for four additional posts in AB1 and AB2, and for two additional posts for perimeter towers. Adding staff to A3 and B3 should be considered after technological improvements such as television cameras with remote monitors are installed.

The additional work crew position would staff the crew at a level higher than required under DOC policy. While it is a common practice to assign two officers to each crew of "B" custody inmates working outside the perimeter, this staffing level should be set based on Department-wide policy. Thus this position should be considered in conjunction with DOC's total request for work crew staffing.

Staffing at St. Brides

The staffing level recommended by JLARC is shown in Table 47 and incorporates these changes:

- addition of four eight-hour, seven-day posts (6.60 positions) in housing units AB1 and AB2,
- addition of two eight-hour, seven-day posts (3.30 positions) to staff perimeter towers, if additional fencing is determined to be inadequate to compensate for unstaffed towers,
- a reduction of 2.25 positions as a result of the JLARC analysis of the Sharp formula,
- conversion of one eight-hour, seven-day post and one eight-hour, six-day post assigned to mail and property

- control into two nonsecurity positions. The change requires a subtraction of 3.06 security positions, and
- elimination of 1.26 security positions which resulted from a misapplication of the Sharp formula.

The recommendation is for a total of 132.69 funded security positions at St. Brides, and for two additional nonsecurity positions.

SECURITY PROCEDURES

The JLARC review of security procedures at St. Brides focused on control over tools, medical supplies, food services, housing units, and other areas. Except for some concerns about tool control, the areas reviewed appeared reasonably secure.

Maintenance Tool Control

Maintenance tool control was one of the weaker areas of control at the institution. Although the tool room appeared well organized and had a shadow board, inmates were left in charge of signing tools in and out. This is a clear violation of department policy. The maintenance foreman was in the process of adopting Federal Bureau of Prisons Standards which classifies tools according to their potential for problems in a prison setting. The maintenance supervisor should also further limit access to the tool control area.

Food Service

The food service area appeared to be secure. Yeast, coffee, and nutmeg, which are commonly pilfered items, were under triple lock. Knives were kept in a locked see-through cage. Although the post audit listing provided for staff coverage, there apparently was no officer in the kitchen area between 12:00 noon and 3:00 p.m. The practice of leaving the area unsupervised appears questionable.

Other Observations

Division guidelines call for security lighting in the compound. Security lighting at St. Brides consists mostly of floodlights. During a night visit to St. Brides, it was noted that three sets of floodlights along one section were all out. Lighting should be checked regularly and light bulbs replaced when they are burned out.

On a separate visit, an inmate was observed stepping into the control booth inside one of the housing units. This compromised the security of the booth, and represented a potential major breach

Table 47

STAFFING AT ST. BRIDES CORRECTIONAL CENTER

<u>Security Staff</u>	<u>Positions</u>
Staffing at time of review	129.36
Recommended changes	
Impact of revised sharp formula	-2.25
Conversion from security to nonsecurity	-3.06
Correction for Sharp formula misapplication	-1.26
New security positions *	+9.90
Deleted security positions	0.00
Other adjustments	<u>0.00</u>
Total changes	<u>+3.33</u>
Recommended security staffing subtotal	132.69
<u>Nonsecurity Staff</u>	
FY 1985 funded nonsecurity positions **	36.00
Recommended conversion of security posts into nonsecurity positions	<u>+2.00</u>
Nonsecurity staffing subtotal	<u>38.00</u>
TOTAL STAFFING	170.69
<u>FY 1985 Funded Staffing Levels</u>	
Funded security positions	135.00
Funded nonsecurity positions	<u>36.00</u>
Total funded positions	171.00
DIFFERENCE BETWEEN JLARC TOTAL & FUNDED LEVEL	-0.31

*3.30 of these positions may be unnecessary if additional perimeter fencing is added. See text.

**Nonsecurity staff scheduled for review in 1985.

Source: DOC; JLARC analysis.

of security. St. Brides staff should ensure that inmates do not have access to housing unit control booths.

CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Based on the JLARC review of St. Brides Correctional Center, 9.90 additional security positions should be funded at St. Brides. The addition of four posts in housing units AB1 and AB2 should increase the level of security in these units, and two additional tower posts should enhance perimeter security. Another staffing practice which prevails throughout the system -- the use of security staff for nonsecurity duties -- should be terminated. Staff should also take measures to ensure that security procedures are strictly followed.

Recommendation (73). The level of funded security positions at St. Brides Correctional Center should be set at 132.69 (compared to the current level of 135). Two nonsecurity positions should be added at St. Brides to perform duties currently assigned to security staff.

Recommendation (74). DOC should assess whether television cameras located in the hallways or strategically located near the showers or certain of the cells may adequately address security concerns in housing units A3 and B3. Cameras with remote monitors may improve current staff's ability to monitor movement and activity. A body alert system for officers stationed in these housing units should also be considered.

Recommendation (75). DOC should consider installing perimeter fencing at St. Brides which is similar to that used at other major institutions. DOC should also determine whether this enhanced level of physical security may compensate for staffing the towers on a less-than 24 hour basis. If not, then the towers should be fully staffed.

Recommendation (76). DOC should consider realigning some of the many duties assigned to the St. Brides control room officer. Radio dispatching, for example, could perhaps be performed during the day shift (when radio traffic is greatest) by clerical staff located in the same building as the control room. Consideration should also be given to relocating the sally port controls to the tower which is located near the gates.

Recommendation (77). St. Brides should strengthen its tool control procedures to conform with the revised division guidelines.

Recommendation (78). The perimeter and interior yard lighting should be maintained in proper working condition.

Recommendation (79). Staff at St. Brides should ensure that inmates do not gain entry to housing unit control booths.

SOUTHAMPTON CORRECTIONAL CENTER

Southampton Correctional Center was established in 1937 to provide confinement of young adult offenders. It is a part of the Southampton Complex, which also includes the Youthful Offender Center and the Southampton Reception and Classification Center. The entire complex occupies 2,527 acres near Capron in Southampton County. One warden oversees the operations of all three of these facilities.

This analysis concerns only Southampton Correctional Center. The Youthful Offender Center is analyzed in a separate section. The reception center was not included in this JLARC study.


Compared to the other major correctional institutions in the State, Southampton is lightly staffed and is a less expensive institution, in terms of costs per inmate. In FY 1984, it ranked 12th of the 15 prisons in the number of inmates to budgeted staff (2.4-to-1).

Facility Overview

Southampton Correctional Center had an average daily population of 473 in FY 1984. It has extensive farming and industries operations, and many inmates are involved in work and education programs.

Mission and Population. Inmates who are sent to Southampton are between the ages of 18 and 23, and have been convicted of a first felony. The average age of the inmate population was 20.3 years in FY 1984. However, Southampton has some inmates who are serving long terms -- it holds about 50 offenders who have received life sentences.

Programs. Southampton offers a variety of educational and employment opportunities for inmates. Enrollment in programs offered by the Rehabilitative School Authority is high -- an average of 246 inmates, or 62% of the available population, were enrolled in RSA each month in FY 1984. Enrollment and behavior in RSA classes is one factor that determines an inmate's upward movement in the honor housing system. RSA offers academic classes (adult basic education and general education development), library services, and vocational classes. Its vocational classes are in masonry, refrigeration, barbering, welding, auto mechanics, building maintenance, carpentry, and heavy equipment operation. Through the RSA, inmates can also enroll in community college classes.



**Profile of
Southampton
Correctional
Center
FY 1984**

<u>Population:</u>	Budgeted Capacity: 474	"A" Custody: 6.8%	White: 37.0%
	Avg. Daily Pop: 473	"B" Custody: 39.3%	Nonwhite: 63.0%
		"C" Custody: 50.6%	Avg. Age: 20.3
<u>Ratios:</u>	Inmates per Security Position: 3.70-to-1 [13]		
	Inmates per Staff (total): 2.40-to-1 [12]		
	Total Expenditures per Inmate: \$13,119 [12]		
<u>Budgeted Staff:</u>	Security: 128	<u>Officers:</u> White: 72%	Avg. Age: 37
	Nonsecurity: 69	Nonwhite: 28%	Turnover: 18%
	Total: 197	Female: 5%	
<u>Serious Incidents:</u>	Assaults on Inmates: 30 [3]	Escapes: 4 [3t]	
	Assaults on Staff: 18 [6]	Total Serious Incidents: 81 [5]	

See Appendix B for sources.
 Numbers in brackets [] indicate ranking of this facility compared to other major institutions. [t] indicates a tie with other facilities.
 [1] has the most staff per inmate or highest number of reported incidents.

A large proportion of inmates at Southampton are employed in the extensive farming operations. Inmates and staff are involved in the production of grains and vegetables and in raising beef and dairy cattle and hogs. Other inmates have institutional jobs such as bakers, painters, and carpenters. Finally, some inmates are employed in enterprises. In FY 1984, 106 inmates worked in the shoe shop, dental lab, and laundry enterprises.

Physical Facilities. The facilities at Southampton were originally designed to hold minimum security inmates. However, Southampton has recently received an increased proportion of "C" custody inmates (52% in May 1984), so in 1984 DOC "hardened" the facility by adding a second perimeter fence and installing new external security lighting.

The major buildings inside the perimeter fence are five housing units, an administration building, a kitchen and mess hall, RSA academic and vocational buildings, an enterprises building, and a gymnasium. The medical department is in the basement of one housing unit. A recreation yard is also inside the perimeter. Four towers are stationed around the perimeter to view inmate activity. A power plant and sewage treatment plant sit outside the perimeter fence.

Southampton has an honor housing system. In the honor units, two two-story buildings with individual rooms, the inmates are supervised less closely and have more privileges than in the other housing units. When an inmate arrives at Southampton, he is assigned to one of the other three housing units, which have cells. The cells in these buildings are stacked in two tiers, with a catwalk along the upper tier. Twenty-two isolation and segregation cells are in one of these housing units. An inmate can eventually move to one of the honor units if he behaves according to the incentives system that Southampton has implemented.

SECURITY STAFFING AT SOUTHAMPTON CORRECTIONAL CENTER

For the current fiscal year, Southampton has 193 funded positions -- 129 security personnel and 64 nonsecurity staff. Southampton's average daily inmate population for FY 1984 was 473, making its ratio of inmates to budgeted security staff 3.7-to-1. This ratio placed Southampton 13th among the 15 facilities in FY 1984 (it was leanly staffed).

In determining the number of security staff needed at Southampton, JLARC considered a post audit that was prepared in August 1984, the warden's request for additional security positions, the use of overtime, comparisons with other major institutions, the criteria listed in Chapter Two, and DOC's 1984-86 Supplemental Amendment Proposal for additional staff.

Post Audit

The post audit submitted to JLARC shows a need for 188.52 security staff. However, as explained below, the number of security positions at Southampton is substantially under this number.

Current Staffing Level. The August 15, 1984, post audit submitted to JLARC by the warden indicates a need for 75 security posts and 188.52 security personnel to fill those posts. This total includes 17.76 supervisory positions (sergeants and above). Southampton's current staffing level is 129 security positions. Thus, Southampton is not funded for the number of security positions reflected in the current post audit. The warden wants to increase the number of security positions by 59.52.

Misapplication of Sharp Formula. Although DOC has no policy about the proper application of the Sharp formula, posts which are not filled to cover absenteeism should not be included in Sharp calculations. The Southampton post audit applies the Sharp formula to three posts which do not meet this test.

These posts, which include the training officer, the security chief, and the adjustment committee officer, should each be counted as requiring one employee. By misapplying the formula, the security staffing needs of Southampton are overstated by .54 positions (based on the revised Sharp formula). These excess positions should be subtracted from the staffing level shown on the post audit. The JLARC recommendation for security staffing at Southampton includes an adjustment for this misapplication.

Arithmetic Errors. During JLARC's visit to Southampton the warden indicated that the current security staffing level was 129 positions, and that the August 1984 post audit showed a total need of 180.72 positions. Thus, 51.72 positions were needed to erase this difference.

JLARC found a number of errors in the post audit. First, in several instances the Sharp formula was not applied correctly, resulting in an incorrect increase in the number of staff needed. Second, the post audit did not correctly calculate the staffing level which the warden said was needed. JLARC's analysis of the August post audit showed that proper calculation would have yielded a need for 188.52 positions, not 180.72. Thus, the warden should have requested 59.52 additional positions rather than 51.72.

When developing post audits, institutional staff at Southampton should devise a more systematic method for identifying the additional positions. The present method combines existing and requested positions, which makes it difficult to determine actual needs:-

Warden's Request

The warden wants to use the additional 59.52 security positions for several purposes. He wants to add positions in the housing units and the industries building, and for inmate work crews, yard patrols, fence patrols, and recreation. The warden also wants to add officers to carry out adjustment committee, training, shakedown, count, transportation, canteen, property control, and trash truck functions. Finally, he wants to extend the times that some other posts are filled.

The warden emphasized that the steadily increasing proportions of violent, long-sentence offenders housed at Southampton has meant that additional security measures and staff are now necessary to ensure that the population is kept sufficiently secure.

Work Crews. The warden would add seven posts for inmate work crews. The posts would require a total of 8.40 FTEs.

Presently two maintenance work crews perform general maintenance duties inside and outside the institution. The warden would add two more maintenance work crews, requiring an additional 2.40 FTEs.

Southampton currently has two gun gangs. Inmates assigned to these gangs are under constant supervision by two officers, one of whom is armed. The warden wants to add four more gun gangs, requiring four additional posts and 4.80 FTEs.

Finally, the warden would add one farm gang post, requiring 1.20 additional FTEs.

The request for these new positions should be linked to the system-wide policy issue of whether to increase security on work crews which operate outside of the institution's perimeter. If an increase is desired by the General Assembly or Governor, this request should be considered. If it is not, the positions should not be funded.

Housing Posts. The warden would add a total of eight new posts in the housing units, and increase the hours for three posts. The changes would require 16.15 additional positions. The additional staff would provide at least two officers in each housing unit during the evening and night shifts. The warden indicated that current staffing patterns on these shifts are inadequate and have resulted in an increased number of serious incidents.

In housing unit C-1 the warden would add one eight-hour, seven-day post during the evening shift (Table 48). The post would require 1.68 FTEs. The warden would also change an eight-hour, four-day post to an eight-hour, seven-day post. The two changes in C-1 would require 2.40 positions.

In housing unit C-2 the warden would increase the number of eight-hour, seven-day posts during the evening shift from two to three. He would also increase the night post from an eight-hour, three-day post to an eight-hour, seven-day post (Table 48). These changes in post assignments would require an additional 2.67 positions.

Table 48

REQUESTED POSTS IN THE HOUSING UNITS AT SOUTHAMPTON

<u>Location</u>	<u>Number of New Posts Requested</u>			<u>Total Positions</u>
	<u>Day Shift</u>	<u>Evening Shift</u>	<u>Night Shift</u>	
C-1 Building	0	1 (8 hours, 7 days)	1 (8 hours, 3 days)*	2.40
C-2 Building	0	1 (8 hours, 7 days)	1 (8 hours, 4 days)**	2.67
C-3 Building	0	1 (8 hours, 7 days)	1 (8 hours, 4 days)**	2.67
R-1 Building	1 (8 hours, 7 days)	1 (8 hours, 7 days)	1 (8 hours, 7 days)	5.05
R-3 Building	0	1 (8 hours, 7 days)	1 (8 hours, 7 days)	3.36
TOTAL				16.15

*Change post from 8 hours, 4 days per week to 8 hours, 7 days per week.

**Change post from 8 hours, 3 days per week to 8 hours, 7 days per week.

Source: Post audit -- September 19, 1984; interview with warden; JLARC analysis.

In housing unit C-3 the warden would add one eight-hour, seven-day post during the evening shift and would change an eight-hour, three-day post to an eight-hour, seven-day post on the night shift. Adding these posts would require 2.67 FTEs.

Building R-1 is the first level of honor housing. However, because of the large number of high risk inmates housed at Southampton, some inmates assigned to R-1 are not "honor" inmates.

The assistant warden for operations and security said that this occurs due to a lack of housing space in the general population buildings. The warden would add one post for each shift in R-1. To do so would require 5.05 FTEs.

Building R-3 is the final phase in Southampton's progressive housing program. Inmates housed in this unit are considered to present the least risk. As Table 48 shows, the warden would add one post during the evening and night shifts, requiring 3.36 additional FTEs.

The changed nature of Southampton's population may justify some additional staff in the housing units. The number of serious incidents at Southampton has increased from 21 in FY 1980 to 81 in FY 1984 -- an increase of 286 percent. According to the warden, the inmate population has also changed -- and contains a greater number of "C" custody inmates. However, Southampton was originally designed to provide a medium level of security -- it had a single perimeter fence until the late summer of 1984.

The more balanced staffing pattern in housing units C-1, C-2, and C-3 achieved by adding the requested positions may help address these significant changes and enhance security at Southampton. These requested positions should be approved. The need for additional staff in housing units R-1 and R-3 is less pressing, and should not be approved at this time.

However, the need for these housing posts reflects a tradeoff with the requested positions for work crews. The warden's justification for adding crews is to create jobs for inmates during the day. By putting more inmates to work, fewer inmates would remain inside the perimeter during the day, and fewer staff would be needed in the housing units. If the work crew posts were established, then the need for extra housing unit staff would be reduced, if not eliminated entirely.

Yard Posts. The warden would add six more yard posts, requiring a total of 10.08 FTEs. Southampton presently has two yard posts on both the day and evening shifts, and one on the night shift. The warden would add two eight-hour, seven-day posts on the day shift; three eight-hour, seven-day posts on the evening shift; and one eight-hour, seven-day post on the night shift. His justification for adding these posts is that the number of serious incidents on the yard has increased and that the inmate population has become "tougher."

The need for additional yard posts on the night shift seems unnecessary, as very few inmates are on the yard during this shift. On the day shift, the need for more yard posts seems more reasonable. However, if the warden's request to add more work crews is granted, then there will be less need for more yard supervision during the day because more inmates will be out of the institution. On the evening shift (when inmates are allowed to be on the yard for

two to three hours), the additional officers given to the housing units should be used to supplement yard security. When the inmates return to the housing units, the housing officers should resume their normal duty assignments. Many other prisons deploy their staff in this manner on the evening shift during the warm months.

Fence Patrols. The warden wants to add two fence patrol posts, which would require 3.36 FTEs. One eight-hour, seven-day post would be established on the day shift and one would be established for the evening shift.

DOC has recently made enhancements to Southampton's physical security, so the need for new fence patrol posts may have diminished. An additional perimeter fence was installed in 1984, as was razor wire at the top and bottom of both perimeter fences. New external security lights have also been installed. According to the warden, the only successful escape from Southampton occurred from an outside work crew.

Adjustment Committee. The warden would add one corporal to assist a lieutenant presently assigned this task. Adding this post would require 1.20 FTEs. The warden indicated that the corporal would escort inmates to committee hearings and perform other administrative duties.

The number of inmate adjustment committee hearings has increased system-wide. However, Southampton officials did not provide evidence that their committee's workload has increased to such a level that the establishment of a new post is warranted.

Transportation Officer. Southampton has three transportation posts. The warden would add two additional eight-hour, seven-day transportation posts, requiring 3.36 FTEs. No documentation of the need for these posts was provided to JLARC. A transportation pool at Deerfield Correctional Center, less than a mile from Southampton, is also available to meet peak transportation needs at Southampton.

The need to establish additional transportation posts does not appear pressing. Southampton has a level of transportation staffing comparable to other prisons. In the transportation staffing section of Chapter Two, Southampton is shown to fall around the middle in terms of the number of inmates (118) per transportation post. Five other prisons have more inmates per transportation post than Southampton.

Training Officer. The warden wants to increase his present training staff from one lieutenant to two. The change would require 1.20 FTEs. In-service training at the Southampton Complex is provided by the lieutenant assigned to Southampton. According to the warden, the lieutenant is currently responsible for overseeing training for 219.5 security personnel at three institutions: Southampton, the Youthful Offender Center, and the Southampton Recep-

tion and Classification Center. The warden maintains that an additional lieutenant would improve the training program at the Southampton Complex significantly.

However, the workload at the Complex does not appear to warrant an additional trainer. For example, the State Penitentiary (with over 300 security personnel) has only one training officer. Powhatan, which also has responsibility for James River's training needs, has only two training officers for a combined security force of 451.

The warden's request for an additional training position does not appear necessary and should not be granted.

Shakedown Officer and Count Officer. The shakedown officer would be responsible for directing searches of inmates' personal property, cells, and other buildings within the institution. The count officer would direct the tallying of the counts of the inmate population. To fill these two posts would require 3.36 FTEs.

The warden told JLARC that he currently utilizes existing security personnel to perform these functions. Neither function is now carried out by a full-time post. The warden has not used overtime to fill these posts, nor has he requested staff for these posts during prior budget amendments.

As indicated in Chapter Two, some institutions have established full-time count officer posts and shakedown posts, while others have not. The wide variations among the institutions in establishing these posts makes it difficult to identify whether the function is being performed, and by whom. For example, one warden stated that he called his count officer a "records officer." Since shakedowns and counts must be carried out by all of the institutions, DOC should develop a uniform method of identifying these functions on the post audits and a standard for establishing the number of these posts.

The shakedown officer and count officer should not be approved until DOC has taken the appropriate steps to establish standards for staffing these functions.

Increase Posts' Workdays. The warden would increase the number of workdays of 13 established posts. Eight are supervisory and five are non-supervisory posts. Table 49 provides a listing of the posts, the number of days the posts would be extended, and the additional personnel needed to fill the posts.

Three of the five non-supervisory posts have been categorized by Southampton personnel as "not essential to control" of the institution. These are the treatment section control post, the dispensary post, and the kitchen officer post. The warden indicated he would add more hours to these posts because staff frequently work on weekends to fill the three posts.

Table 49

INCREASED HOURS OF POSTS REQUESTED
BY WARDEN OF SOUTHAMPTON

<u>Post</u>	<u>Present Hours (hours/days)</u>	<u>New Hours</u>	<u>Additional Staff</u>
<u>Non-supervisory</u>			
Kitchen Officer	8/5	8/7	8/2 = .48
K-9 Officer	8/3	8/7	8/4 = .99
Treatment Section Control	8/5	8/7	8/2 = .48
Dispensary Control	8/5	8/7	8/2 = .48
Key and Weapons	8/5	8/7	8/2 = .48
SUBTOTAL			2.91
<u>Supervisory</u>			
Laundry Room Supervisor	8/5	8/7	8/2 = .48
Internal Security	8/5	8/7	8/2 = .48
External Security	8/5	8/7	8/2 = .48
Security Supervisor #1	8/5	8/7	8/2 = .48
Security Supervisor #2	8/6	8/7	8/1 = .24
Officer-In-Charge #1	8/5	8/7	8/2 = .48
Security Supervisor #3	8/5	8/7	8/2 = .48
Officer-In-Charge #2	8/5	8/7	8/2 = .48
SUBTOTAL			3.60
TOTAL			6.51

Source: Southampton post audit -- September 19, 1984; JLARC analysis.

The key and weapons post, located in the sally port control building, is responsible for issuing weapons and keys. The warden indicated that this function is presently performed by assigned staff as needed. No overtime is currently being used to staff this post.

The warden did not provide JLARC with documentation on the number of additional hours worked to carry out the functions of these posts. Additional staff to fill these posts should not be approved at this time.

The fifth non-supervisory post, the canine handler, is discussed under the "Questionable Posts" section below.

The warden would increase the number of days that eight supervisory posts are filled. Most of these changes would mean that posts that are now filled only on weekdays would be filled seven days a week. As Table 49 indicates, the increase in the number of days that these posts would be filled would require 3.60 additional FTEs.

As discussed in Chapter Two, DOC has no staffing standards on the number of days per week that supervisory posts in the prisons should be established. As a result, variation exists among and between the institutions in the hours that supervisory posts are established -- some of these posts are established for five days a week, while others are established for six or seven. Until the Department writes guidelines on the hours that these posts should be established, the additional hours for the supervisory posts at Southampton should be held in abeyance.

Industries Post. One new post is requested for duty in the enterprises building, which houses the shoe factory, the dental prosthesis laboratory, and the RSA barber shop. One officer is presently assigned to the building. To staff this additional post, 1.20 FTEs would be required.

Inmates in the enterprises building have access to many sharp tools. Access to tools is especially great in the shoe factory. The officer in the building has to roam from one area to another to monitor inmate activities.

The need for an additional officer in this building appears to be a reasonable request because of the inmates' easy access to tools and the current lack of adequate supervision in the building.

Recreation. The warden would add one recreation post on the day shift. This post is not currently being staffed through overtime or any other means. The post would require 1.68 FTEs. Southampton currently has no recreation post on the day shift.

JLARC applied the same criteria to this post as for the yard and housing posts on the day shift. The additional work crew posts which the warden has requested would remove a large segment of the population from the institution during the day. Therefore, approval of this post should be tied to consideration of the work crew posts.

Canteen Officer. The warden would add an additional officer in the canteen during the evening shift. The post would be established on an eight-hour, seven-day basis. Currently a correctional officer is assigned to the canteen eight hours, seven days per week during the day shift.

The primary duties of the canteen officer are to operate the cash register, inventory and order supplies, and monitor inmate and other financial accounts. As discussed below in the "Questionable Posts" section, utilizing security personnel to work in the canteen is not appropriate. JLARC recommends that a store manager or storekeeper supervisor be employed to perform this duty.

Consequently, the addition of another security officer in the canteen should not be approved. If the department determines that the additional canteen post is needed, then another nonsecurity position should be utilized to perform these duties.

Property Control Officer. The warden would add a property control officer (eight hours, seven days per week) to operate the inmate property room at Southampton. This post's primary responsibilities would be to store and maintain inmates' personal clothing and other items. The person assigned would also issue institutional clothing and personal hygiene items to inmates.

Institutional staff maintain that they need a security officer at this post to check for contraband coming into the institution. However, there are several other institutional check points for contraband before personal items are stored in the property room.

As recommended at other institutions where security staff are used to perform this function, a nonsecurity employee such as a store manager or storekeeper supervisor should perform this duty. Therefore, the request for security personnel to work in the property room should not be approved. If the department determines that this position is needed, then a store manager should be employed to perform the duties.

Trash Truck Operator. The primary duty of the trash truck operator would be to haul refuse from the institution to the county landfill. Institutional staff indicated that the officer assigned to this post would work eight hours, seven days per week, and would not directly supervise inmates. When not transporting refuse, the officer would be required to maintain the vehicle and be assigned other duties.

Consistent with JLARC's recommendations for other institutions in this report, the utilization of security personnel to collect and transport garbage is inappropriate.

Consequently, the request for this position should not be approved. If the department determines that a full-time position is required to perform this function, then a highway equipment operator should be employed.

Questionable Posts

JLARC found three posts at Southampton that make a questionable contribution to the security of the institution (Table 50). The canteen and post office duties are necessary, but they could be performed as effectively and at less cost by utilizing nonsecurity personnel. The department should review the other position -- the dog handler -- in the context of statewide needs.

Post Office. A correctional officer sorts mail and performs other nonsecurity functions in the mailroom. The post order indicates that the officer must also search all persons entering the institution.

Table 50

QUESTIONABLE SECURITY POSTS
AT SOUTHAMPTON CORRECTIONAL CENTER

Number of Posts	Title	Type of Post	Positions	
			DOC Formula	JLARC Formula
1	Post Office	8 hours, 6 days	1.44	1.41
1	Canine Handler	8 hours, 3 days	.72	N.A.
1	Canteen Officer	8 hours, 7 days	1.68	1.65
TOTAL			3.84	3.06

Source: Post audit - September 19, 1984; JLARC analysis.

Except for the search requirement, the duties of this post are nonsecurity in nature and could be performed by nonsecurity personnel. A clerk or clerk messenger (pay grade 2) could be trained to perform all of the nonsecurity functions presently carried out by the correctional officer. As for the search requirement, a review by JLARC of other institutional post orders showed that the sally port officer-in-charge and the administration sally port officer are both responsible for searching persons entering the institution.

Canine Handler. The canine handler works a regular security post until 1:00 PM. During the rest of his shift, he works with the tracking dogs in Southampton's kennel. The post is currently established on an eight-hour, three-day basis. The warden wants to expand the post's days from three to seven. The dogs are trained to track escapees. The department uses trained security staff as canine handlers because they are trained in handling weapons and in how to deal with escapees once they have been apprehended.

As discussed in Chapter Two, the number and placement of tracking dogs in the State's prisons does not currently appear to be based on standards, such as previous experience with escapes in the area. The present arrangement at Southampton -- having an officer carry out the canine duties on a part-time basis -- appears to be a more efficient use of the officer's time compared to dog handlers in other prisons. Most other prisons with dog handlers have these individuals spend their entire shifts with the dogs. The hours and days of this post should remain the same until the department establishes criteria on the number and placement of canines and canine handlers in the prisons.

Canteen Officer. The primary duties of the canteen officer are to operate the cash register, inventory and order supplies, and monitor inmate and other financial accounts. The need to have a security officer carry out these duties is questionable.

This function could be performed at less cost by replacing the officer with a nonsecurity staff position -- a store manager or storekeeper supervisor.

Overtime

During FY 1984, Southampton's security staff worked 19,653.25 hours of overtime, including 14,856.75 hours of compensatory time and 4,796.5 hours for which they were paid. The total overtime worked by the security staff was equivalent to 11.1 FTEs. A large proportion of Southampton's overtime occurred during June 1984. This was probably due to the Mecklenburg escape.

During an interview, the warden listed a number of reasons his staff has worked overtime: for emergencies at Southampton and other institutions, to transport inmates, and because of excessive use of sick leave by some staff.

No additional staff should be awarded to Southampton to reduce overtime until DOC develops the overtime reporting method recommended in Chapter Two.

DOC's Budget Request

The 1984-86 Supplemental Amendment Proposal submitted by DOC requests 21.85 additional officers for Southampton, for the purpose of adding housing officers, yard officers, and perimeter patrols. The proposal also states that "if the additional officers are not approved, overtime must be used to see that the posts are manned." The proposal would add 15.13 FTEs in the housing units, 5.04 FTEs for yard surveillance, and 1.68 FTEs for a perimeter patrol.

As discussed in the "Warden's Request" section, JLARC concurs that some new housing unit posts should be granted at Southampton. The warden's request for new positions in housing units C-1, C-2, and C-3 should be approved. However, the additional positions to staff the yard and fence patrols should not be approved for Southampton until the General Assembly or the Governor decide on a policy for the security of work crews outside of the institutions' perimeters. If the warden's original request to add positions on work crews is granted, then the need for additional staff for yard and fence patrols may be reduced.

Staffing at Southampton

The staffing level recommended by JLARC is shown in Table 51 and incorporated in these changes:

- addition of three eight-hour, seven-day posts (4.95 positions) in housing units C1, C2, and C3,

- addition of two eight-hour, four-day posts (1.88 positions) in housing units C2 and C3,
- addition of one eight-hour, three-day post (.70 position) in housing unit C1,
- addition of one eight-hour, five-day post (1.18 positions) in the enterprise building,
- reduction of 2.28 positions as a result of the JLARC analysis of the Sharp formula,
- conversion of the post office and canteen posts (3.06 positions) into two nonsecurity positions, and
- reduction of 0.54 security position which resulted from a misapplication of the Sharp formula.

The recommendation is for a total of 131.83 funded security positions at Southampton, and for two additional nonsecurity positions.

SECURITY PROCEDURES

The JLARC review of security procedures at Southampton Correctional Center focused on control over tools, medical supplies, housing units, and maintenance items. Overall, adherence to security at Southampton appeared sound.

Maintenance Tool Control

The maintenance shops at Southampton are all located in old barns and sheds outside the perimeter of the institution. Each maintenance shop had its own tool room, and each foreman was required to have an inventory for tools. Although access to the individual shops was limited by locked doors, access to the tools inside the tool room was not limited. In addition, some tools were permanently assigned to maintenance trucks. No formal inventory was taken of the tools because in the maintenance supervisor's words, "each foreman knows what he has."

Southampton should develop a tool control policy that would include a daily accounting of inventory, as well as a sign-out log to indicate who checked out individual tools.

Enterprise Tool Control

Southampton has two enterprise shops which utilize tools: a large shoe manufacturing shop and a small dental prosthesis shop.

Table 51

STAFFING AT SOUTHAMPTON CORRECTIONAL CENTER

<u>Security Staff</u>		<u>Positions</u>
Staffing at time of review		129.00
Recommended changes		
Impact of revised Sharp formula	-2.28	
Conversion from security to nonsecurity	-3.06	
Correction for Sharp formula misapplication	-0.54	
New security positions	+8.71	
Deleted security positions	<u>0.00</u>	
Total changes		<u>+2.83</u>
Recommended security staffing subtotal		131.83
<u>Nonsecurity Staff</u>		
FY 1985 funded nonsecurity positions*	64.00	
Recommended conversion of security posts into nonsecurity positions	<u>+2.00</u>	
Nonsecurity staffing subtotal		<u>66.00</u>
TOTAL STAFFING		197.83
<u>FY 1985 Funded Staffing Levels</u>		
Funded security positions	129.00	
Funded nonsecurity positions	<u>64.00</u>	
Total funded positions		193.00
DIFFERENCE BETWEEN JLARC TOTAL & FUNDED LEVEL		+4.83

*Nonsecurity staff scheduled for review in 1985.

Source: DOC; JLARC analysis.

Tool control for the shoe shop appeared to be good. The tools were stored in a locked room with a steel door. Only the correctional officer had a key to the door, and only the correctional officer could sign tools out to inmates. The tools were not organized according to policy, but an effort was being made to reorganize the tool area. The foremen appeared to be security-oriented. They were aware of potential problems and routinely shook down inmates.

Medical Area

Bulk storage of hypodermic needles, syringes, and medicines was good. The system for storing small supplies of needles and pills appeared reasonable but was breached during the JLARC visit. A small supply of needles set out for daily use was usually left in the pill room, according to the head nurse. During the JLARC review, however, the cabinet containing needles had been left unlocked and was ajar. The staff should adhere to prescribed security practices.

Food Service

Security in the kitchen appeared to be reasonable. Kitchen knives were kept in a locked box in a locked storage area. The only person with a key was a correctional officer.

Access to the food storage area was limited, with one exception. During the JLARC visit an inmate was locked into a bulk food storage area for the purpose of cleaning the floor. While locked into the storage area, the inmate had unsupervised access to sugar which could be used for making alcohol. Either the sugar should be secured in a different manner or this practice should be reconsidered.

Housing Units

Two housing units were reviewed during the JLARC visit. They were the third and fourth level units of the five-level progressive housing system. The officer in the third level housing unit appeared to be very knowledgeable about his daily responsibilities and emergency procedures. The officer in the other housing unit was the relief officer for that post. While the officer was knowledgeable about the daily routine of the housing unit, he did not know how often searches were conducted or what exact procedures should be followed in case of an emergency.

CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Institutional staff appear to have taken a number of measures to improve security at Southampton Correctional Center. The

warden's requests for additional security staff reflect some of these measures. Certain other staffing practices which prevail throughout the corrections system and are also in evidence at Southampton should be altered. These practices include the use of security personnel for nonsecurity functions.

Recommendation (80). The level of funded security positions at Southampton Correctional Center should be set at 131.83 (compared with the current funded level of 129). The mail and canteen posts should be carried out by two new nonsecurity positions.

Recommendation (81). Southampton should develop a tool control policy that includes daily accounting by maintenance supervisors.

Recommendation (82). The storage of sugar in an area where unsupervised inmates are permitted to work should be reconsidered. Either the sugar should be secured in a different manner or the practice of permitting unsupervised inmates to enter the area should be reconsidered.

STAUNTON CORRECTIONAL CENTER

The facility now used as Staunton Correctional Center previously served as Western State Hospital operated by the Department of Mental Health & Mental Retardation. The facility was acquired by DOC in 1975. DOC made renovations such as installing towers, perimeter fencing, and security locks on doors to prepare the facility for use as a correctional center. The facility was reopened in 1976.

The current budgeted capacity of Staunton is 527 inmates. Although the facility once housed more than 2,200 mental patients, several buildings previously used as housing units have been demolished, and many others are no longer suitable for such use.


Facility Overview

Several of the buildings used for administrative and support services were constructed in the 1830s and 40s. Housing units and other buildings are of more recent vintage.

The administration building and three other major buildings still in use are registered as Virginia Historic Landmarks, and are on the National Register of Historic Places. Modifications to these structures must consequently be reviewed by the Virginia Historic Landmarks Commission. Modifications must in general be in keeping with the character of existing buildings. Several towers, for example, have been constructed of brick with ornamental iron grillwork.

Since the facility was opened as a correctional center, several major buildings have been declared unfit for use and have been demolished. Additional buildings are scheduled for demolition, including one that serves as part of the perimeter and directly abuts Route 250. This highway also divides the main part of the facility from the power plant.

Mission and Population. Staunton's mission distinguishes it from many of the other correctional facilities operated by DOC, in that it is staffed and equipped to handle the needs of several categories of inmates: older inmates, inmates with a record of substance abuse, mentally retarded inmates, and inmates with psychological problems who do not require close supervision by psychiatric staff. Staunton is also equipped to deal with a general population of inmates.



Profile of Staunton Correctional Center FY 1984

<u>Population:</u>	Budgeted Capacity: 527	"A" Custody: 25.6%	White: 57.4%
	Avg. Daily Pop: 514	"B" Custody: 67.2%	Nonwhite: 42.6%
		"C" Custody: 3.7%	Avg. Age: 32.9
<u>Ratios:</u>	Inmates per Security Position: 2.54-to-1 [8]		
	Inmates per Staff (total): 1.73-to-1 [7t]		
	Total Expenditures per Inmate: \$14,485 [10]		
<u>Budgeted Staff:</u>	Security: 207	<u>Officers:</u> White: 87%	Avg. Age: 34
	Nonsecurity: 98	Nonwhite: 13%	Turnover: 20%
	Total: 305	Female: 14%	
<u>Serious Incidents:</u>	Assaults on Inmates: 11 [7t]	Escapes: 3 [4t]	
	Assaults on Staff: 6 [9t]	Total Serious Incidents: 35 [9]	

See Appendix B for sources.
 Numbers in brackets [] indicate ranking of this facility compared to other major institutions. [t] indicates a tie with other facilities.
 [1] has the most staff per inmate or highest number of reported incidents.

About 50 percent of the inmates at Staunton are in special-purpose housing units. Approximately 255 inmates reside in these housing units, which are linked either to treatment programs or to the individual inmate's special medical needs, as shown in Table 52.

Table 52

INMATES IN SPECIAL HOUSING UNITS
AT STAUNTON CORRECTIONAL CENTER
FY 1984

Behavioral Services Unit	75
Medical Unit	75
Geriatric Unit	42
Substance Abuse Unit	42
Mentally Retarded Unit	<u>21</u>
Sub-total	255
General Population	<u>271</u>
TOTAL	526

Source: Staunton Correctional Center.

Programs. While special housing programs are a distinct characteristic of Staunton, other programs and opportunities are also available to inmates at the facility.

The Rehabilitative School Authority operates five vocational education programs at Staunton, including furniture repair, upholstery, welding, carpentry, and electronics. In addition, the RSA operates adult basic education classes up through a GED program and library services. Average monthly enrollment in FY 1984 was 125.

Enterprises operates a clothing shop at Staunton in which approximately 105 inmates are employed. Other work opportunities for inmates include cadre assignments (duties such as meal preparation and maintenance).

Physical Facilities. The facility is enclosed by a single perimeter fence topped with barbed wire. Seven towers are stationed along the perimeter to view inmate activity and to observe the fence. An eighth tower is under construction along the back recreation yard fence, at the site of a recent escape. Given the staff-intensive nature of perimeter towers, consideration should be given to building additional physical barriers to supplement the single fence. DOC should give serious consideration to double fencing, placing sensors and razor wire on the fences, and other similar measures.

Within the perimeter fence are three housing units, a support services and treatment building, the main kitchen and chapel building, buildings housing the RSA and enterprise activities, and numerous other smaller buildings.

The housing units are located in three buildings. One building houses the geriatric and substance abuse dorms. Beds in this building are clustered in open bays separated by low walls. A second building (called Building 37) contains three floors, each with 75 beds. Each of these floors has an 18-20 bed dorm on each end, with two-bed rooms off a long central corridor in typical hospital fashion. The third housing unit consists of two 100-bed floors, each of which is divided into two 50-bed dorms with dayrooms between them.

SECURITY STAFFING AT STAUNTON

Staunton is staffed with 291 funded positions -- 205 security positions and 86 nonsecurity positions. The budgeted inmate population in FY 1985 is 527, making the ratio of inmates to security staff 2.6-to-1.

Since FY 1980 four security positions have been cut. A lieutenant position was dropped in FY 1981, and three security positions were deleted in July 1984.

In determining the number of security staff needed at Staunton, JLARC considered a post audit completed in October 1984, the warden's request for additional positions, comparisons to staffing practices at other major institutions, the criteria listed in Chapter Two, and DOC's 1984-86 Supplemental Amendment Proposal for additional resources.

Staunton's Post Audit

The October 1984 post audit submitted to JLARC shows a need for 82 existing security posts, and for 206.63 security employees to fill these posts. It also shows six requested new posts, and a total of 20.91 requested positions to fill these posts. For comparison, Staunton has 205 funded security positions.

Misapplication of Sharp Formula. Although DOC has no policy about the proper application of the Sharp formula, posts which are not filled to cover absenteeism should not be included in Sharp calculations. The Staunton post audit applies the Sharp formula to one post which does not meet this test.

--The count officer should be shown as requiring one employee. By misapplying the formula, the security staffing needs of Staunton are overstated by 0.18 position (based on the revised Sharp formula). This excess should be subtracted from the staffing level

shown on the post audit. The JLARC recommendation for security staffing at Staunton includes an adjustment for this misapplication.

Warden's Request

During the JLARC visit to Staunton the warden indicated a need for an additional 20.91 correctional officers to fill six new posts. Three housing unit posts would be created, requiring 13.46 new positions. A perimeter tower now under construction would require 5.05 new positions, and two RSA vocational class areas would each receive 1.20 new positions. At the time of the JLARC visit none of these positions were filled through the use of overtime.

Housing Units. New posts are requested for each of three floors in Building 37. One 24-hour, seven-day patrol officer post is requested for the behavioral services unit, and another such post is requested for the medical unit. These requested posts would require 10.10 new positions. Each unit has a capacity of 75 inmates. Currently, one officer fills a fixed post in the center of each floor. From this location the hallway can be observed, but not the beds in the dorms at each end of the hallway, or the beds in the rooms located along the hallway.

According to the warden and chief of security, the requested positions would permit one officer to patrol the floor at all times, thus improving staff's ability to monitor inmate activities. In addition, the special needs of inmates with documented psychological and medical problems require a higher level of supervision than one officer can provide, according to the warden.

The third requested housing unit post is a 16-hour, seven-day post (3.36 positions) for the third floor of Building 37, which houses 75 general population inmates. Currently this floor also has one 24-hour post. As on the other floors of this building, the warden wants to establish a patrol officer who can move around the floor, monitoring inmate activity in areas not visible to the fixed post.

These three housing unit posts are apparently not so essential to security that the warden is willing to pay overtime, a strategy used at other institutions, to fill them. However, the nature and number of inmates in the behavioral services and medical units may justify the need for the additional patrol post. The staffing ratio in the other Staunton housing units is approximately 50 general population inmates per officer, while the requested level in Building 37 would be about 37 special population inmates per officer. This level does not appear excessive, given the special problems of the inmates on two of the three floors in this building. In addition, visibility in Building 37 is more limited than in the 100-man dorms where two security posts are already located. Consequently, the added staffing should be approved for the building.

New Tower. Staunton has a jigsaw-like perimeter, which has required more towers than a conventional rectangular perimeter. Several towers and additional fencing have been installed since the facility opened. A tower under construction during 1984 will overlook the recreation yard. The tower is being built at the spot where two inmates went over the fence. The new tower will permit observation of a portion of the fence not previously visible from existing towers. The staffing request is for 5.05 officer positions to fill the 24-hour, seven-day tower post.

The positions requested for the new tower on the back recreation yard are clearly required if the tower is to be used. The decision to build the tower would seem to involve a commitment to staff the tower. The general practice at major institutions is to staff towers whenever inmates are in areas visible to the tower, although this practice is not always followed. Because this new tower will monitor activity on the recreation yard, the request to staff the tower would seem most reasonable during daylight hours or on a 16-hour basis, instead of the requested 24-hour basis. Thus, 3.30 new security positions should be given to Staunton for this purpose.

RSA Posts. Two new posts (2.40 positions) are requested for duty in the RSA furniture repair and upholstery shops. Each of these shops occupies a separate floor of one building. Currently no security staff are assigned to these shops. Approximately ten inmates are on each floor for six hours each weekday.

Inmates learn the trade by working on individual pieces of furniture in small rooms off the main hall. Consequently, most inmate activity cannot be observed without actually looking into the rooms. A large dayroom in the center of each floor serves as a workroom, containing table saws, power tools, and other equipment needed to work on furniture.

The need for patrol officers in these shops may be unnecessary. The number of inmates attending classes at any one time is fairly small (about ten on each floor), and the security chief reported that relatively few incidents have occurred in the shops. A more efficient means of controlling the flow of metal may be to assign a yard officer to occasionally patrol the shops, and station an officer with a hand-held metal detector at the building exit. He would shake down the inmates when they leave class. This alternative should be considered prior to staffing patrol posts.

Questionable Posts

As at other institutions, Staunton's post audit lists some security posts that are basically nonsecurity in nature. These posts are shown in Table 53. The post audit provided to JLARC indicates that two mailroom posts (one eight-hour, five-day, and one eight-hour, six-day), one commissary post (only one position is

Table 53

QUESTIONABLE SECURITY POSTS
AT STAUNTON CORRECTIONAL CENTER

Number of Posts	Title	Type of Post	Positions	
			DOC Formula	JLARC Formula
1	Mail Room	8 hours, 5 days	1.20	1.18
1	Mail Room	8 hours, 6 days	1.44	1.41
1	Commissary	*	1.00	1.00
2	Property Control	8 hours, 5 days	<u>2.40</u>	<u>2.36</u>
TOTAL			6.04	5.95

*Staunton did not apply Sharp formula to this position.

Source: Post audit.

allocated -- the Sharp formula was not applied to it), and two property control posts (both eight-hour, five-day), are filled by correctional officers.

Although this is the practice at most other major institutions, these are essentially nonsecurity duties which should be filled by nonsecurity positions such as clerk messengers, storekeepers, or store managers. This would eliminate the need for 5.95 officer positions, and create a need for five nonsecurity positions. A net savings would result from this action because the nonsecurity jobs would be paid at a rate less than the officers.

Overtime

During FY 1984, 19,168.25 hours of overtime were used at Staunton. This included 2,120.25 hours of paid overtime and 17,048 hours which were compensated by awarding leave. This is equivalent to a total of 10.8 FTEs, using the 1771-hours-per-FTE standard. A large proportion (1239.75 hours or 58 percent) of the paid overtime occurred in June 1984, much of which was probably the conversion of compensatory leave into overtime payments.

According to the warden, most overtime at Staunton was due to assisting with the Mecklenburg escape, ensuring that posts were filled when staff members took leaves of absence, and transporting inmates to and from the Richmond area.

DOC's Budget Request

The 1984-86 Supplemental Amendment Proposal submitted by DOC requests ten additional correctional officers for Staunton, and

14.50 additional nonsecurity positions. The justification for the new positions derives from DOC's desire to meet certification standards for psychiatric treatment set by the Department of Mental Health and Mental Retardation. The justification does not explicitly state the duties for which the officer positions are requested, except that they would be funded from the medical and clinical services subprogram.

A recent report issued jointly by staff of DMHMR and DOC recommended ten additional correctional officers for the third floor of Building 37. The DOC budget request apparently derives directly from this report. Although JLARC did not consider this joint report in the review of Staunton's staffing needs, two additional 24-hour posts, and one additional 16-hour post in Building 37 are recommended, as discussed above.

Staffing at Staunton

Four new security posts should be added to make the changes discussed above. The specific changes encompassed by the JLARC recommendations (shown in Table 54) include:

- addition of two 24-hour, seven-day posts, and one 16-hour, seven-day post in Building 37, for an increase of 13.20 security positions,
- addition of one 16-hour, seven-day post for the new tower, for an increase of 3.30 security positions,
- reduction of 3.68 positions due to application of the revised Sharp formula,
- elimination of 5.95 security positions which are assigned to nonsecurity duties, and the addition of five nonsecurity positions to cover these duties, and
- reduction of 0.18 security positions to compensate for the misapplication of the Sharp formula to one position.

The recommended security staffing level for Staunton is thus 213.32 positions. Five nonsecurity positions should be added to perform duties currently assigned to security staff.

SECURITY PROCEDURES

The JLARC review of security procedures at the Staunton Correctional Center focused on security controls in the enterprise and RSA shops, the medical area, and the kitchen area. Security procedures in the medical and kitchen areas appeared reasonable. However, control over tools appeared lax.

Table 54

STAFFING AT STAUNTON CORRECTIONAL CENTER

<u>Security Staff</u>	<u>Positions</u>
Staffing at time of review	206.63
<u>Recommended changes</u>	
Impact of revised sharp formula	- 3.68
Conversion from security to nonsecurity	- 5.95
Correction for Sharp formula misapplication	- 0.18
New security positions	+16.50
Deleted security positions	0.00
Other adjustments	<u>0.00</u>
Total changes	<u>+6.69</u>
Recommended security staffing subtotal	213.32
<u>Nonsecurity Staff</u>	
FY 1985 funded nonsecurity positions*	86.00
Recommended conversion of security posts into nonsecurity positions	<u>+5.00</u>
Nonsecurity staffing subtotal	<u>91.00</u>
TOTAL STAFFING	304.32
<u>FY 1985 Funded Staffing Levels</u>	
Funded security positions	205.00
Funded nonsecurity positions	<u>86.00</u>
Total funded positions	291.00
DIFFERENCE BETWEEN JLARC TOTAL & FUNDED LEVEL	+13.32

*Nonsecurity staff scheduled for review in 1985.

Source: DOC; JLARC analysis.

In two areas -- enterprises and the RSA furniture and upholstery shops -- tool controls should be strengthened. The enterprise shop at Staunton makes inmate clothing. Control over scissors in the shop consisted of storing them on a shadow board. The tool room, however, was operated by several inmates. These inmates were chosen because they were considered trustworthy and they had the necessary skills to help keep the machinery running. As a result, the inmates had unsupervised access to the tool room, which is against DOC policy.

Tool control in the RSA vocational shop was looser than in the enterprise shop. During JLARC's visit inmates were observed using a metal grinding machine without supervision. The RSA teacher was down the hallway in another room. In addition, tools were observed lying around the area in an unorganized fashion.

Steps should be taken to limit inmate access to the grinder and to tools and materials in the classes. Use of a metal detector to check inmates as they leave the classes would also seem reasonable, as discussed earlier.

CONCLUSION & RECOMMENDATIONS

Based on the JLARC review of Staunton Correctional Center, the warden's request for additional security positions appears in part to provide reasonable enhancements of security. Certain other staffing practices which prevail throughout the corrections system, which are also in evidence at Staunton, should be altered. These practices include the use of security posts for nonsecurity duties. Finally, some specific practices which infringe on the overall security of the facility should be terminated.

Recommendation (83). The level of funded security positions at Staunton Correctional Center should be set at 213.32 (compared with the current funded level of 205). Five nonsecurity positions should be added to handle mail, commissary, and property control duties.

Recommendation (84). Steps should be taken to limit inmate access to the grinding wheels, tools, and materials in RSA classes and in the clothing shop. Tool control procedures should be developed to conform with division guidelines.

Recommendation (85). Structural changes to Staunton's perimeter security, including double fencing, should be considered as alternatives to more staff-intensive measures, such as additional security towers.

Recommendation (86). A yard or other officer should occasionally patrol the RSA furniture and upholstery shops when inmates are in the shops. The officer should shake down inmates with a hand-held metal detector when they leave the shops.

VIRGINIA CORRECTIONAL CENTER FOR WOMEN

The Virginia Correctional Center for Women is the only State-operated correctional institution for female inmates. Located in Goochland County on the bank of the James River, the facility offers a picturesque, campus-like setting. Compared with the adult male institutions in Virginia, the Women's Center falls at or near the bottom in the number of inmates per staff, total staffing, and the number of serious incidents.

Facility Overview


The Women's Center was originally established as a local jail farm in 1931 to house women convicted of misdemeanors. Women convicted of felonies were housed in a separate building at the Penitentiary. In 1938 the General Assembly closed the Women's building at the Penitentiary and directed that all women convicted of any offense be housed at the Women's Center. Housing female misdemeanants and felons in the same facility continued until 1979, when the misdemeanants were directed to be housed in local jails.

The Women's Center is unique among correctional institutions in Virginia. Unlike the other major adult institutions, the Center has no perimeter fences or tower posts. It has no armed officers on duty. Moreover, because no other prison in the State houses women, the Women's Center is not able to transfer inmates out to other prisons for medical, disciplinary, and other reasons.

Mission and Population. The Women's Center houses general and special population inmates, and inmates in all security classifications.

By an agreement with the counties of Goochland, Powhatan, and Louisa, the Women's Center houses female inmates from these counties. Women charged with offenses to be tried in the counties and those serving time for minor offenses are housed in the maximum security unit at the facility. In FY 1984 the Center housed an average of four women for these localities.

Programs. Inmates incarcerated at VCCW can participate in various work and educational programs. The inmates operate a greenhouse, from which State institutions can obtain flowers and plants. In FY 1984, 124 inmates worked in enterprises at VCCW. The enterprises are industrial sewing, data services, laundry services, and bookkeeping and clerical services. Other inmates can work in institutional jobs, such as in food and janitorial services.



Profile of Virginia Correctional Center for Women FY 1984

Population:	Budgeted Capacity: 325	"A" Custody: 22.6%	White: 39.2%
	Avg. Daily Pop: 329	"B" Custody: 44.3%	Nonwhite: 60.8%
		"C" Custody: 7.2%	Avg. Age: 29.1
Ratios:	Inmates per Security Position: 3.82-to-1 [14]		
	Inmates per Staff (total): 2.23-to-1 [11]		
	Total Expenditures per Inmate: \$12,942 [13]		
Budgeted Staff:	Security: 85	Officers: White: 52%	Avg. Age: 41
	Nonsecurity: 61	Nonwhite: 48%	Turnover: 46%
	Total: 146	Female: 84%	
Serious Incidents:	Assaults on Inmates: 2 [9]	Escapes: 4 [3t]	
	Assaults on Staff: 1 [11t]	Total Serious Incidents: 28 [11]	

See Appendix B for sources.
 Numbers in brackets [] indicate ranking of this facility compared to other major institutions. [t] indicates a tie with other facilities.
 [1] has the most staff per inmate or highest number of reported incidents.

Enrollment in classes offered by the Rehabilitative School Authority in FY 1984 was higher than most other general population prisons in the State. In every month in FY 1984, enrollment at VCCW totalled over 50 percent of the available population. RSA offers library services, adult basic education and general education development classes, and vocational courses in commercial sewing, cosmetology, and business education. Inmates can also enroll in apprenticeship programs through the RSA.

Physical Facilities. Over the past 45 years the institution's physical plant has expanded to 12 major buildings. It has six housing units and cottages, and six other support services buildings - a chapel, a gymnasium, a housing unit for staff, and others. The Center occupies 266.5 acres of land, and it is adjacent to several thousand acres of DOC farmland. The facility has no perimeter fence or towers. Persons entering or exiting the institution do so without being challenged.

The six housing units have varying capacities. All of the cottages, except the maximum security cottage, have individual rooms. The maximum security cottage has 26 cells; approximately 13 are on each floor. Fourteen rooms have also been set aside for a clinic.

SECURITY STAFFING AT THE VIRGINIA CORRECTIONAL CENTER FOR WOMEN

The Women's Center is the most leanly staffed of Virginia's correctional institutions. In FY 1984 the Women's Center had 146 funded positions -- 85 security and 61 nonsecurity staff. The FY 1984 budgeted inmate capacity was 325, making the ratio of inmates to budgeted security staff 3.82-to-1. In FY 1985, the Center has 89 security positions and 58 nonsecurity.

Over the past four years, the Center has experienced some changes in security personnel. In FY 1981 three correctional officer positions were deleted. In FY 1983, one correctional officer position was deleted. However, in FY 1984 the General Assembly appropriated special funding for four additional security positions to staff the new treatment housing unit.

JLARC's assessment of the staffing needs at the Center was based on a review of the institution's most recent post audit, the warden's request for additional staff, the criteria listed earlier in Chapter Two, and DOC's 1984-86 Supplemental Amendment Proposal for additional resources.

Post Audit

The post audit submitted to JLARC showed a staffing level of 103.66 positions. However, subsequent research indicated that the

Center's staffing level is actually lower. The discrepancy occurred at least partly because administrators at the Center use the Sharp formula inconsistently.

Current Staffing Level. At the time of JLARC's visit to the Women's Center, the security staffing level was 88.92 positions. The warden provided a post audit that showed a level of 103.66 positions and a duty roster that showed 100.6 positions. After a series of follow-up interviews, the staffing level was determined to be 88.92.

Calculation of Need. The warden provided JLARC a number of documents, each showing a different level of staffing to fill the same number of posts.

Institutional personnel at the Women's Center used a method other than the Sharp formula to determine their staffing level. For example, the method used on the duty rosters provided to JLARC indicates a need for 100.6 security personnel. However, applying the Sharp formula to these same rosters shows a need for 99.1 positions.

Institutional personnel should change their method for determining the Center's current staffing level. The factors developed in the Sharp formula should be used when determining the total number of relief personnel needed.

Warden's Request

The warden is requesting 11.78 security positions to fill three posts. A new housing officer post in the institution's new Intensive Care Unit (ICU) would require 5.05 FIEs. A new front gate post would require 5.05 FIEs, and an additional officer in the mailroom would require 1.68 FIEs. According to the warden, none of these posts is currently being filled through overtime or by shifting personnel from other post assignments.

ICU Post. The warden wants to add one 24-hour, seven-day post in the ICU. The ICU is on the top (third) floor of a housing building. One officer is currently assigned to the third floor.

The ICU was created in 1983 to house mentally and emotionally disturbed inmates. Prior to the establishment of the ICU, inmates were sent to Central State Hospital. This arrangement proved unsatisfactory for both DOC and the Department of Mental Health and Mental Retardation. The General Assembly appropriated funding to renovate a building at the Women's Center for this special purpose, and during the 1984 Session approved the addition of four correctional officers to staff the ICU. However, according to the warden, the number of "C" custody inmates in the ICU was not considered when deciding to assign one security post on this floor.

The second floor of this building houses general population inmates. One security officer is assigned to the second floor. The first floor is used for visitation and craft activities. Institutional treatment personnel assigned to the first floor provide the only supervision on a regular basis. During an emergency the officer on the second floor must leave to provide assistance on the first floor.

The warden has not utilized overtime as a means of filling this post, mainly due to budget constraints, nor has she shifted personnel from other posts to fill the post. However, the nature of the inmates housed in the ICU, and the fact that a number of them are classified "C" custody appears to be a reasonable justification to request additional officers in the unit.

Front Gate. Because the Women's Center has no perimeter fencing or towers, the only means of surveillance is provided by a roving patrol officer. The warden indicated that outsiders frequently drive on to the grounds unchallenged because of the lack of front gate security. The Women's Center clearly has a much less secure perimeter than the other Virginia prisons.

In the past, DOC has not considered perimeter security at the Women's Center a priority. The Center has only had six escapes since FY 1978.

Posting an officer at the entrance to the institution, without any perimeter fencing or towers, would be a limited means of preventing outsiders from entering the institution, or inmates from escaping. If DOC and the warden are concerned about perimeter security at the Center, then consideration should be given to installing fencing around the institution. DOC should conduct a study of perimeter security at the Women's Center, including the benefits of installing perimeter or interior fencing, before approving the warden's request for the front gate post.

Mail Room. The warden wants to add an additional correctional officer position in the mailroom. This position would assist the corporal presently assigned to the mailroom. The warden indicated that workload has increased and that one officer cannot do the job effectively. The addition of one eight-hour, seven-day post would require 1.68 FTEs.

The major responsibilities of this post would include sorting mail, delivering mail, checking postage, and checking mail for contraband.

This position should not be granted for two reasons. First, as discussed in Chapter Two, the workload of mail officers among Virginia's prisons appears to vary substantially, from 79 to 473 inmates per mail officer. At the Women's Center there are approximately 329 inmates per mail officer. This may not be an unreasonable workload. Second, the major responsibilities of the

post appear to be nonsecurity in nature. As discussed in the next section, security employees should not staff nonsecurity jobs.

Questionable Posts

The post audit lists two security posts whose functions should be carried out by nonsecurity personnel -- a canteen officer and a mailroom officer.

Canteen. This officer operates the cash register, inventories and orders supplies, and monitors inmate and other financial accounts. The canteen is opened to inmates during certain hours of the day. The remainder of the officer's time is spent on other nonsecurity functions. This is an eight-hour, five-day post.

The warden indicated that she needs security personnel on this post to control for contraband and to supervise inmates in the canteen. However, this function could be performed as effectively and at less cost by a nonsecurity employee. The Center should hire a store manager or storekeeper supervisor (pay grades 3 and 5, respectively) to work in the canteen. One nonsecurity position should be added and 1.18 security positions deleted at the Center to make this change.

Mail Room. One corporal is currently assigned to work in the mail room. The duties of this post, as explained in the "Warden's Request" section, are nonsecurity in nature. Personnel at the Center maintain that mail room personnel should be officers trained in security procedures because they screen inmate mail for contraband.

However, these duties could be carried out at less cost by nonsecurity personnel who have been trained to search for contraband. The Center should delete 1.65 security positions (one eight-hour, seven-day post) and add one nonsecurity position. The new position should be a clerk or clerk messenger (pay grade 2).

Overtime

During FY 1984, the Women's Center security staff worked a total of 1,822.5 hours of paid overtime and earned 5,719.5 hours of compensatory time, for a total of 7,542 overtime hours worked, or the equivalent of 4.3 FTEs. Compared to other institutions, the Center utilizes a minimal amount of overtime, and apparently uses none to fill essential security posts. In FY 1984, security staff at the Women's Center worked fewer overtime hours than any other prison except for the Youthful Offender Center.

During an interview the warden said that most of their overtime occurs when inmates are transported to the Medical College of Virginia hospital.

DOC's Budget Request

The 1984-86 Supplemental Amendment Proposal submitted by DOC requests 5.00 additional officers for the Women's Center for the purpose of increasing security staff in the ICU building. The proposal states that the additional officers would allow for one full-time officer on each of the three floors of the building plus a roving patrol officer for the building.

The proposal and the justification for additional staff parallel JLARC's recommendation for additional staff at the Center. As indicated, JLARC agrees that the request for additional staff is reasonable, and should increase security at the institution.

Staffing at the Women's Center

JLARC's recommendation of 89.35 security positions at the Center, shown in Table 55, includes the following changes:

- addition of one 24-hour, seven-day post (4.95 positions) in the ICU Building,
- reduction of 1.69 positions as a result of the JLARC analysis of the Sharp formula, and
- conversion of one canteen officer and one mail room officer from security to nonsecurity positions. This represents a deletion of 2.83 security positions (based on the revised Sharp formula) and an increase of two nonsecurity positions.

SECURITY PROCEDURES

JLARC reviewed security procedures concerning food services, the medical area, enterprises and maintenance tool control. Several of the areas reviewed raised concerns and require further attention.

Tool Control

The system of tool control at the Center appeared extremely lax. There was no established system to account for tools. All tools were located in a single tool room under the control of a maintenance supervisor. There was no shadow board or method for signing out tools to maintenance and security personnel. The tool room was open, and had no security doors. Tools were not identified by number and did not appear to have specified storage areas. A system of control books was not available for tracing tool usage.

Table 55

STAFFING AT THE VIRGINIA CORRECTIONAL CENTER FOR WOMEN

<u>Security Staff</u>	<u>Positions</u>
Staffing at time of review	88.92
<u>Recommended changes</u>	
Impact of revised Sharp formula	-1.69
Conversion from security to nonsecurity	-2.83
Correction for sharp formula misapplication	0.00
New security positions	+4.95
Deleted security positions	<u>0.00</u>
Total Changes	+ <u>.43</u>
Recommended security staffing subtotal	89.35
<u>Nonsecurity Staff</u>	
FY 1985 funded nonsecurity positions*	58.00
Recommended conversion of security posts into nonsecurity positions	<u>+2.00</u>
Nonsecurity staffing subtotal	<u>60.00</u>
TOTAL STAFFING	149.35
<u>FY 1985 Funded Staffing Levels</u>	
Funded security positions	89.00
Funded nonsecurity positions	<u>58.00</u>
Total funded positions	147.00
DIFFERENCE BETWEEN JLARC TOTAL & FUNDED LEVEL	+2.35

*Nonsecurity staff scheduled for review in 1985.

Source: DOC; JLARC analysis

Staff at the Center should take immediate steps to strengthen the control of tools by conforming with division policy on tool control.

Medical Area

Security over hypodermic needles and medical supplies at the Women's Center was lax. Unlike other facilities, inmate workers were allowed to prepare syringes that were to be used by the medical staff. In addition, these inmate workers were not searched when they left, thus compromising security.

Access to medical instruments and needles should be more tightly controlled.

Food Service

Security in the kitchen areas was the weakest observed by JLARC in the major institutions. Each cottage has its own kitchen and dining hall. JLARC toured two of the kitchens and observed that knives and other serving utensils were readily accessible. In one kitchen, metal knives were observed in the sink, while an unsupervised inmate worked there.

Control of and access to kitchen utensils should be improved. Inmates should not be given access to knives, forks, can openers and other instruments without appropriate supervision and control. An inventory and control system should be developed at the Women's Center similar to ones already in place at other institutions.

CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

The JLARC review of the Women's Center indicates that a portion of the warden's request for additional security staff should be approved. These positions would strengthen security in the Intensive Care Unit. Additional steps should be taken to strengthen security at the Center.

Recommendation (87). The level of funded security positions at the Virginia Correctional Center for Women should be set at 89.35 (compared with the current funded level of 89). Two nonsecurity positions should be added at the Center to work in the canteen and the mail room.

Recommendation (88). DOC should assess the benefits of perimeter and interior fencing at the Women's Center. This assessment should be made prior to approving additional security staff for the front gate.

Recommendation (89). Staff should take steps immediately to ensure that procedures for the issuance and control of tools are in full compliance with division guidelines.

Recommendation (90). Control of and access to medical instruments should be improved. Unsupervised inmates should not be allowed to work in the treatment rooms.

Recommendation (91). Control of and access to kitchen utensils should be improved. Inmates should not be given access to knives, forks, can openers and other instruments without appropriate supervision and control. An inventory and control system should be developed at the Women's Center similar to ones already in place at other institutions.

YOUTHFUL OFFENDER CENTER

The Youthful Offender Center (YOC), located near Capron in Southampton County, began operations in November 1981. It holds the smallest inmate population of all the adult facilities, with a FY 1984 average daily population of 79. Even though it is a separate facility, it is considered to be a part of the "Southampton Complex," which also includes Southampton Correctional Center and the Southampton Reception and Classification Center. An assistant warden is responsible for overseeing the daily operations of the YOC. He in turn reports to the warden of Southampton Correctional Center.


The YOC is unique among the State's adult facilities in that it houses young offenders who are sentenced under a special provision of the *Code of Virginia* (§19.2-311). DOC is required by the *Code* (§53.1-63) to establish facilities to confine and treat these young offenders. The department is also required by statute to provide programs for counseling, education, and vocational training at this facility (§53.1-64).

Facility Overview

Young offenders who have been sentenced under the Youthful Offender Statute (§19.2-311) are sent to the Youthful Offender Center, which had a budgeted capacity of 100 in FY 1984. The idea behind the YOC is to provide confinement for young, first-time offenders away from the corrupting influence of adult felons, and to provide the individuals with vocational and other special programs.

Mission and Population. Inmates who are confined at the YOC have been sentenced under the Youthful Offender Statute, which applies to persons who have been convicted for their first offenses. After a finding of guilt, the judge may fix punishment under this statute if the person:

1. was convicted for the offense after reaching the age of eighteen but before reaching twenty-one, or was a juvenile certified as an adult; and
2. was convicted of an offense which is either (a) a felony not punishable by the mandatory death penalty, or (b) a misdemeanor involving injury to a person or damage to or destruction of property; and



Profile of Southampton Youthful Offender Center FY 1984

<u>Population:</u>	Budgeted Capacity:	100	"A" Custody:	9.5%	White:	42.7%	
	Avg. Daily Pop:	79	"B" Custody:	71.4%	Nonwhite:	57.3%	
			"C" Custody:	0	Avg. Age:	18.9	
<u>Ratios:</u>	Inmates per Security Position:	2-to-1	[6]				
	Inmates per Staff (total):	1.09-to-1	[3]				
	Total Expenditures per Inmate:	\$24,187	[3]				
<u>Budgeted Staff:</u>	Security:	50	<u>Officers:</u>	White:	60%	Avg. Age:	31
	Nonsecurity:	41		Nonwhite:	40%	Turnover:	14%
	Total:	91		Female:	11%		
<u>Serious Incidents:</u>	Assaults on Inmates:	14	[6t]	Escapes:	0	[14t]	
	Assaults on Staff:	5	[10]	Total Serious Incidents:	27	[12]	

See Appendix B for sources.
 Numbers in brackets [] indicate ranking of this facility compared to other major institutions. [t] indicates a tie with other facilities.
 [1] has the most staff per inmate or highest number of reported incidents.

3. is considered by the judge to be capable of returning to society as a productive citizen (§19.2-311).

The *Code* further provides that after a finding of guilt, the department and the Parole Board must concur that committing a youth to the YOC is in the best interests of the youth and the State. If facilities are available, then the youth is committed to the YOC for a period of no more than three years (§19.2-311). If an inmate does not behave according to the rules at the YOC, the *Code* provides that the department can transfer him to another adult facility (§53.1-66).

Programs. Since the *Code* specifies that the goal of a commitment here is for the offender to "return to society as a productive citizen following a reasonable amount of rehabilitation," the YOC provides extensive school and work programs. YOC policies require the inmates to work one-half day and attend school one-half day.

Some inmates work on the farms of the Southampton Complex or on road gangs. Others have institutional jobs such as food preparation and building maintenance. The YOC does not have enterprises.

The Rehabilitative School Authority offers library services, academic classes (adult basic education and general education development), and three vocational programs (building maintenance, welding, and major appliance repair). If an inmate does not have a high school diploma or a GED certificate, YOC policies require that he enroll in the academic program as well as in a vocational class. If he has a diploma or GED, he must enroll in a vocational class. When an inmate finishes one vocational class, he must enroll in another one. Average monthly enrollment in FY 1984 was 75, which was close to the average daily population.

Physical Facilities. The YOC was built in 1980-81 with funds raised from general revenue bonds. The bonds were issued under the Correctional Facilities Bond Act, which was passed by the 1977 session of the General Assembly and approved by the voters in the general election that year. The Act specified that \$1 million of the \$21.5 million bond issue be used to construct a youthful offender facility.

The YOC consists of six major buildings. A housing unit, a school, a gatehouse, and a building which houses the medical unit, treatment staff, kitchen, and mess hall are inside the single perimeter fence. A recreation yard is also inside the fence. An administration building and a maintenance shack are outside the fence. Two low towers are located at opposite corners of the compound.

The housing unit has one floor and is divided into two major sections. The sections contain open dormitories. Each inmate has approximately 69 square feet of living space. The only individual cells are in the isolation and segregation area, which is located between the two sections.

Some staff in the department have expressed concerns about the current physical facilities and location of the YOC. The buildings are made of cinder block and can be easily damaged by the inmates. The buildings are located in a low-lying area which occasionally floods.

SECURITY STAFFING AT THE YOUTHFUL OFFENDER CENTER

In fiscal year 1985, the Youthful Offender Center has 87 funded staff positions, of which 51 are security and 36 are nonsecurity. The budgeted capacity of the YOC is 100. This makes the ratio of inmates to staff 1.15-to-1 -- that is, the YOC is relatively heavily staffed.

During FY 1984 the YOC lost two positions. These were an inmate hearings officer and a clerk stenographer B. The loss of the inmate hearings officer has meant that other security staff are now performing these duties.

In determining the number of security staff at the YOC, JLARC considered the assistant warden's request for additional positions, the latest post audit, staffing practices at other major institutions, and the criteria listed in Chapter Two.

Post Audit

The number of positions called for by the YOC's post audit is almost the same as its funded level in FY 1985 (51.41 and 51, respectively).

As at most other prisons, the Youthful Offender Center has a few security posts which should not have been included in the staffing formula calculations.

Current Security Level. The post audit submitted to JLARC shows a need for 20 security posts, and for 51.41 (YOC has rounded the figure to 51) employees to fill these posts. This number includes all the supervisors as well as the corporals and correctional officers. Thus, YOC's funded level (51) is the same as the number of positions shown to be needed in the most recent post audit.

YOC has also established several other posts that are needed only a few hours per week, such as a canteen clerk and an inmate clothing/supply officer. Many other institutions have a full-time officer filling these "posts." Since YOC is a small facility, an officer temporarily comes off another post to carry out these part-time tasks. These posts are not included in the YOC post audit, so the current post audit does not take into account the time it takes for these duties to be performed.

Misapplication of Sharp Formula. Although DOC has no policy about the proper application of the Sharp formula, posts which are not filled to cover absenteeism should not be included in Sharp calculations. The YOC post audit applies the Sharp formula to three posts which do not meet this test.

The posts, which include one inmate affairs officer, one adjustment committee officer, and one security chief, should each be counted as requiring one employee. By misapplying the formula, the security staffing needs of the YOC are overstated by .54 positions (based on the revised Sharp formula). These excess positions should be subtracted from the staffing level shown on the post audit. The JLARC recommendation for security staffing at the YOC includes an adjustment for this misapplication.

Assistant Warden's Request

The assistant warden told JLARC that he planned to request approximately two additional correctional officers. This was the smallest request of the 15 adult institutions visited by JLARC. He added, however, that the warden of Southampton Correctional Center would make the final decision on the need for these positions.

Work Crews. The new positions would be used as gun officers on one new work crew. They would be needed from two to eight hours per day, five days a week. The assistant warden believes that the size of some of the current work crews is too large. He stated that if he could pull a small number of inmates from existing crews and make a new crew, the inmates would work more effectively. He said that security could also be enhanced by making the existing crews smaller.

This request should be linked to the system-wide policy issue of whether to increase security on work crews which operate outside of the institution's perimeter. If an increase is desired by the General Assembly or Governor, this request should be considered. If it is not, the two positions should not be funded.

Questionable Posts

The YOC has one full-time post which is primarily nonsecurity in nature. A correctional officer, however, carries out

the post's duties. As discussed in Chapter Two, nonsecurity personnel could carry out these duties at less expense to the Commonwealth.

The officer in question oversees the mail room and the gun locker. This post is established on an eight-hour, five-day basis. The gun locker is next to the mailroom in the administration building. The officer sorts and delivers inmate and facility mail, searches for contraband in mail, maintains records, and receives and checks out all weapons and security equipment from the gun locker. Most of the officer's time is devoted to mail duties. The officer has to check guns in and out during three short periods -- in the early morning, before lunch, and at the end of the afternoon.

If a clerk or clerk messenger (pay grade 2) took over the mail duties, personnel costs could be reduced. The mail officer duties should be transferred to a new nonsecurity position at the YOC, and 1.18 security positions should then be abolished. The YOC could assign the gun locker duties to a security staffer on the day shift.

Overtime

Security staff at the YOC worked a total of 5,195 overtime hours in FY 1984, which was the lowest of the major institutions that year. The staff received overtime pay for only 592.25 of these hours, for a cost of \$9,175. The staff obtained compensatory time for the remaining 4,602.75 hours.

DOC needs to develop the overtime monitoring mechanism discussed in Chapter Two before any request for full-time staff to reduce overtime should be considered.

DOC's Budget Request

The 1984-86 Supplemental Amendment Proposal submitted by DOC requests no additional staff for the Youthful Offender Center.

Total Staffing at the YOC

JLARC recommends that the YOC have 48.73 security positions and 37 nonsecurity positions. These recommendations are shown in Table 56, and include the following changes:

- reduction of .96 positions as a result of the JLARC analysis of the Sharp formula,
- conversion of the post office and gun locker post from a security to a nonsecurity position. This represents a

Table 56

STAFFING AT YOUTHFUL OFFENDER CENTER

<u>Security Staff</u>	<u>Positions</u>
Staffing at time of review	51.41
Recommended changes	
Impact of revised Sharp formula	-0.96
Conversion from security to nonsecurity	-1.18
Correction for Sharp formula misapplication	-0.54
New security positions	0.00
Deleted security positions	<u>0.00</u>
Total changes	<u>-2.68</u>
Recommended security staffing subtotal	-48.73
<u>Nonsecurity Staff</u>	
FY 1985 funded nonsecurity positions*	36.00
Recommended conversion of security posts into nonsecurity positions	<u>+1.00</u>
Nonsecurity staffing subtotal	<u>37.00</u>
TOTAL STAFFING	85.73
<u>FY 1985 Funded Staffing Levels</u>	
Funded security positions	51.00
Funded nonsecurity positions	<u>36.00</u>
Total funded positions	87.00
DIFFERENCE BETWEEN JLARC TOTAL & FUNDED LEVEL	-1.27

*Nonsecurity staff scheduled for review in 1985.

Source: DOC; JLARC analysis.

- deletion of 1.18 security positions and an increase of one nonsecurity position, and
- reduction of .54 positions as a result of eliminating three administrative posts from the Sharp formula.

SECURITY PROCEDURES

JLARC reviewed security procedures in the control of maintenance tools, medical supplies, and kitchen items. Security procedures for the food service and medical areas appeared to be satisfactory. However, the YOC should make some improvements in its tool control procedures.

Control of tools in the maintenance tool shack was lax. The staff was not maintaining a logbook to record the use of tools and had not taken an inventory of the tools since 1982. At the time of JLARC's visit, no one was working in the maintenance shack, and some tools were scattered around the room. Inmates have access to this room if they are accompanied by a maintenance staff person.

The inadequate control of tools violates division policy. Under the present system, if an inmate takes a tool and does not return it, its absence may not be realized by the staff.

CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

JLARC's analysis of security staffing at the YOC indicates that the number of budgeted security positions should be reduced from 51 to 48.73. A staffing practice which prevails throughout the system -- the use of security personnel to perform nonsecurity duties -- should be stopped. JLARC's review of security procedures found that certain practices infringe on the facility's security, and should be terminated.

Recommendation (92). The level of funded security positions at the Youthful Offender Center should be set at 48.73 (compared with the current funded level of 51). One nonsecurity position should be added at the YOC to work in the mail room.

Recommendation (93). Control of tools in the maintenance shack should be improved. The YOC should conform with division policy on tool control.

APPENDIXES

	<u>Page</u>
Appendix A: JLARC's Method for Replication of Sharp Formula .	286
Appendix B: Sources for Correctional Center Profiles	292
Appendix C: Agency Responses	293

APPENDIX A
JLARC'S METHOD FOR REPLICATION OF SHARP FORMULA

To replicate and update the Sharp formula, JLARC drew a sample of names from a DOC computer listing of all security personnel at the major institutions and field units. The listing contained all security personnel, from the rank of correctional officer through captain, who worked for DOC at least six months during FY 1984.

JLARC randomly selected 650 individual records from the listing. The size of this sample was chosen in order to produce a sampling error of approximately ten hours at the 95 percent confidence level. With this many records, this error rate could be expected, depending on the amount of variation in the sample.

The intention of the sample was to produce a system-wide estimate of available work hours for an individual security employee. There were 41 adult institutions of varying sizes operating in FY 1984. Therefore, the number of individuals included in the sample varied with the size of the institution. Adult institutions with larger numbers of employees were thus more heavily represented in the sample than smaller institutions. Table 1 shows the relative proportions of each major institution's security staff which was included in the sample.

One institution, Deep Meadow, closed during the summer of 1984. Its employees and their personnel records were distributed across the system to other adult facilities. Because of this situation, the Director of Personnel for DOC requested that the 29 names selected from Deep Meadow be eliminated from the sample. The Director felt it would be difficult and time-consuming to track down these records.

The precision of the results decreased because there were fewer cases to make estimates. However, JLARC's sample design was large enough to allow for this modification, as we overselected by 35 names in order to allow for missing data and a low number of responses. Also, the randomness of the survey would not be affected by eliminating these names. Every employee in the system still had an equal chance of being selected and included in the sample.

Table 1 displays the number of security personnel as JLARC defines them (i.e., correctional officers through captains) by major institutions. The last two columns show the number and relative percentages of security personnel included in JLARC's sample. Comparing the relative percentages for the major institutions' actual number with the sampled percentages shows that the percentages closely parallel each other. Only Brunswick's sampled percentage is

Table 1

MAJOR INSTITUTIONS*				
June 30, 1984				
<u>Institution</u>	<u>Actual Security Staff</u>	<u>% Actual</u>	<u>Sampled Staff</u>	<u>% Sample</u>
Bland	152	5.6	27	5.7
Brunswick	283	10.5	42	8.9
Buckingham	261	9.7	47	9.9
Deerfield	144	6.4	26	5.5
James River	92	3.4	17	3.6
Marion	131	4.9	25	5.3
Mecklenburg	237	8.8	43	9.1
Penitentiary	312	11.6	53	11.3
Powhatan Complex (includes R&C)	471	17.5	86	18.3
St. Bride's	123	4.6	21	4.5
Southampton Complex (includes R&C, YOC)	213	7.9	33	7.0
Staunton	197	7.3	36	7.6
VCCW	82	3.0	15	3.1
TOTAL	2698	101.2	471	99.8

*Does not include Deep Meadow at the request of DOC
Nottoway not opened in FY 1984

Source: JLARC Analysis.

more than a percentage point away from its actual percentage (turnover rate might explain this difference).

Overall, the major institutions employ 78 percent of security personnel in DOC. In JLARC's sample the identical proportion - 78 percent -- of the records are from major institutions. Thus, the JLARC sample appears representative of the population of security staff.

The records were compiled by staff at each institution. The records were then assembled by DOC's Personnel Director and given to JLARC. The analysis of the records was performed using a Lotus 1-2-3 spreadsheet package.

In addition, in order to crosscheck the process that DOC used in developing the sample returns, JLARC called back directly to five institutions to verify the process used to compile the records. Five major institutions (one from each region) were called: Bland, Staunton, St. Brides, Powhatan, and Mecklenburg. Each of these

institutions used a similar process in developing the records and each was able to verify all of the records submitted to JLARC. Therefore the data used in the analysis accurately reflects the leave time experience of the sampled employees.

Aggregation of Numbers

Each record contained information on FY 1984 time allocation for an individual. A breakdown of seven different categories of leave taken was included along with the amount of overtime earned. The categories were:

- (1) annual leave taken,
- (2) sick leave taken,
- (3) leave without pay taken,
- (4) training leave taken,
- (5) compensatory leave taken,
- (6) military leave taken,
- (7) workman's compensation leave taken, and
- (8) overtime hours earned.

Compensatory leave taken and overtime hours earned were not used in the analysis. Compensatory time is received for working on state holidays or under extraordinary circumstances such as during snow storms. The former condition is already included in the formula in the state holiday element. The latter condition need not be included because the individual expands the number of hours he is available to work. This goes beyond the minimum requirements and can not be expected of every employee. Similarly, overtime is not included because employees likewise expand their number of available work hours.

All of these elements were actual hours taken for FY 1984. The six elements were combined with two additional elements that were assumed as constant for all individuals -- rest days (two per week) and State holidays (11 per year). Together, all of these variables were included in JLARC's replication of DOC's Sharp formula. (The Sharp Formula as DOC uses it only accounts for five of the eight elements that JLARC uses: military leave, leave without pay, and workman's compensation leave are not included in DOC's version).

Each record was developed and treated individually and then combined into an overall system-wide average. That is, available work hours for FY 1984 were developed for each individual and then combined into an overall average.

The replication started from a base of 2920 hours for each individual (based on eight hours per day multiplied by 365 days per year). The hours an individual was available for work were then subtracted off. From each individual's 2920 hour base, 832 hours were subtracted because of rest days (two days per week multiplied by 52 weeks per year multiplied by eight hours). An additional 88 hours

were subtracted off for State holidays (eight hours multiplied by 11 days per year). After these two constants were taken from each record, the variable amounts of leave taken for each of the six remaining elements were subtracted for each record. This produced available work hours for each individual. The average of all the individual results produced the overall Sharp formula estimate.

The Sharp formula estimate developed by this process was a system-wide average of 1786 available work hours. Associated with this estimate was a sampling error of 14 hours on either side of the normally distributed estimate. The calculation of the sampling error was based on individual records. Available work hours were calculated for each individual and the average of all of these records was used as the system-wide estimate. The sampling error was developed from the variance of the records according to the following formula:

$$[s^2/n]^{.5} \times [1.96]$$

Where s^2 = sample variance
n = number of cases
1.96 = t - statistic at 95% confidence level.

Special Actions

Several variables required additional work before being included in the calculation of the overall estimate.

Military Leave. Thirty-nine records (from the northern region's field units) did not include military leave hours taken by the individual. Instead of returning these records to the institutions, JLARC applied the system-wide average for the 565 records that included military leave. Thus, instead of actual hours taken for military leave in the northern region, JLARC used an estimate of the actual hours taken. (None of the records using the military leave estimate were annualized - i.e., none of these employees had worked less than a year for DOC).

Annualized Records. The sample included 32 records for individuals who worked less than a year. The elements in these records were not equivalent to the remaining records. Therefore, these were annualized in order to make the entire data series equivalent.

The procedure used was to divide each record by the proportion of the year the individual worked. This assumed that the individual would continue to use each type of leave at the same rate through the remainder of the year. If an individual took no leave during his employment, there was no basis to extrapolate to the full year.

Secondly, for the training element, the minimum requirement for basic training is 200 hours per year. Unchecked, JLARC's extrapolation method extended training hours taken for some individuals far beyond the minimum. Because this was unnecessary and inflated the training time an individual would take, most records were constrained to the 200 hour minimum. However, because this is a minimum requirement, if the 'actual' hours taken were above 200 hours, that number was used. No record was extrapolated to a level above 200 hours.

Training Variable. The annual training levels required of security personnel vary by the rank and experience of the individual. Training is divided into 'basic' and 'in-service' training. Basic training is required of each individual if he is to be certified as a correctional officer. This amounts to 200 hours that must be completed within a year of the individual's starting. In-service training is required of all other security personnel, with the actual amount depending on rank. Twenty-four hours of training is required of all certified correctional officers, corporals, and sergeants every two years. Forty hours is required of all security

Figure 1

CALCULATION OF IN-SERVICE COMPOSITE

$$\begin{aligned}
 & ((2941/3074) \times (24/2)) + ((133/3074) \times (40/2)) \\
 & (.956 \times 12) + (.043 \times 20) \\
 & 11.5 \quad + \quad .86 \quad = \quad 12.5 \text{ hours per year (rounded)}
 \end{aligned}$$

personnel above the rank of sergeant, which also must be completed every two years.

In order to measure whether DOC is achieving the minimum training standards, two composites were developed. The first combined the two types of in-service training; the second combined in-service training with basic training.

The first composite was based on the proportion of security personnel above the rank of sergeant, multiplied by the annual amount of training expected (40 hours divided by 2 years = 20 hours per year), plus the proportion of personnel below lieutenant multiplied by the annual amount of training expected (24 hours divided by 2 years = 12 hours per year).

The second composite combined basic with in-service training. An estimate of turnover rates for the year was needed to combine these two elements. The turnover rate was assumed to equal

the percentage of security officers who need basic training. All other security personnel require in-service training. Based on this assumption, the equation produced the result in Figure 2. (The turnover rate for FY 1984 was calculated from Department of Personnel and Training reports on the number of separations for security personnel -- the turnover rate for major institutions was 19 percent).

Figure 2

CALCULATION OF TRAINING COMPOSITE

$$(19\% \times 200 \text{ hours}) + (81\% \times 12.5 \text{ hours}) = 48 \text{ hours}$$

The average annual training requirement hours for security personnel is 48 hours. This is based on minimum standards established by the Criminal Justice Services Board. The actual level of 33 hours reflected in the sampled results indicates a large gap between actual and required training.

Treatment of Training in Sharp Calculation. In determining an adequate FTE standard for security personnel, JLARC made an adjustment in order to allow for adequate training levels. As discussed in the previous section, a 48 hour system-wide average was expected in the sample results for DOC to achieve the minimum standards required by the Criminal Justice Services Board. DOC did not achieve this standard in FY 1984, achieving only 33 hours system-wide.

JLARC's replication of the Sharp formula using this substandard training element produced a 1786-hour standard. However, in order to bring DOC up to the minimum standard and provide an FTE estimate that is closely related to DOC's FY 1984 experience, JLARC reduced the 1786 standard to 1771 in order to allow for the 15-hour shortfall in training. This should provide an adequate level of security staff plus a sufficient time allocation for training.

APPENDIX B
SOURCES FOR CORRECTIONAL CENTER PROFILES

KEY FOR INFORMATION (FY 1984)
PRESENTED IN PRISON PROFILES

<u>Population:</u>	Budgeted Capacity ¹ Avg. Daily Population ²	"A" Custody ³ "B" Custody ³ "C" Custody ³	White ⁴ Nonwhite ⁴ Avg. Age ⁴
<u>Ratios:</u>	Inmates per Budgeted Security Position ⁵ Inmates per Total Budgeted Staff ⁶ Total Expenditures per Inmate ⁷		
<u>Budgeted Staff:</u>	Security ⁸ Nonsecurity ⁹ Total ¹⁰	<u>Officers:</u> White ¹¹ Nonwhite ¹¹ Female ¹¹	Avg. Age ¹¹ Turnover ¹²
<u>Serious Incidents:</u> ¹³	Assaults on Inmates Assaults on Staff	Escapes: Total Incidents:	

¹Operational Capacity as of 6/30/84. Summary of Average Daily Population by Location for Fiscal Year ending June 30, 1984, "June 1984 Population Summary," (DOC Publication).

²Total average daily population. Summary of Average Daily Population by Location for Fiscal Year ending June 30, 1984, "June 1984 Population Summary," (DOC Publication).

³Monthly Population Management Report Format as of May 1984, (DOC printout AH84100).

⁴Information on Active Inmates as of June 30, 1984, (DOC printout AH841423).

⁵Budgeted inmate capacity divided by budgeted security staff.

⁶Budgeted inmate capacity divided by the total budgeted staff.

⁷Per capita statement of Adult Facilities year ended June 30, 1984, "Fiscal Year 1983-84 Per Capita Statement for Adult and Juvenile Facilities," (DOC Publication).

⁸Approved staffing levels for security personnel as determined by the Division of Adult Services. DOC Employee Relations Unit.

⁹The difference between the approved staffing levels for security personnel and the employment level for the institution as set in the 1984-86 Appropriations Act.

¹⁰The funded employment level for the institution as set in the 1984-86 Appropriations Act.

¹¹Summary of Filled Correctional Officer positions as of June 30, 1984, (DOC printout AH84148).

¹²DPT Turnover Report by Agency by Class for 7/1/83 to 6/30/84.

¹³Data on annual counts of serious incidents by category for FY 1980-84 supplied by DOC's Research and Reporting Unit. Data does not include Nottoway Correctional Center.

APPENDIX C
AGENCY RESPONSES

As part of an extensive data validation process, each State agency involved in JLARC's review and evaluation efforts is given the opportunity to comment on an exposure draft of the report. This appendix contains the full responses of the Department of Corrections and the Secretary of Transportation and Public Safety.

MAY 15 1985



COMMONWEALTH of VIRGINIA

ALLYN R. SIELAFF
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May 13, 1985

Mr. Ray D. Pethtel, Director
Joint Legislative Audit & Review
Commission
Suite 1100
910 Capital Street
Richmond, VA 23219

Dear Mr. Pethtel:

Thank you for the opportunity to review your report "Security Staffing and Practices at Virginia Prisons." Overall, I found the document to contain helpful suggestions and ideas for security improvement.

As you know, the Department has been focusing a great deal of attention on the issues you present. In the last year, studies have been conducted by the Board of Corrections and outside consultants providing useful information on enhancing security and better use of resources. As a result of these assessments, the Department has instituted reforms by initiating the development of a Security Operations Manual, Security Enhancement Plans for major institutions, and a Self-Evaluation model for Security Enhancement. The latter is a product of an extensive analysis by Wackenhut Advanced Technologies of all security practices at one MSI. The model will be used to improve security practices at all institutions. These efforts are in addition to the deployment of 132 new security positions throughout our institutions and ongoing progressive refinement of operational procedures occurring as the restructuring of the Department's organization is implemented. For example, the recent appointment of an Inspector General for the Department provides a perpetual audit resource that will provide recommendations to appropriately modify institutional practices.

On a practical level, several changes have been made to improve security at all institutions. These modifications include mobile patrol around the perimeter; searches of visitors and staff entering the institutions; upgrade of post orders at each permanent post; and improved on-site security training for all officers.

I appreciate your comments regarding security practices, especially in the area of tool control. The Department is approaching the resolution of the issues you

Mr. Ray D. Pethel
May 13, 1985
Page Two

present from two major angles: (1) written policy clarification and revision and (2) improving communication of policy through training. I also agree with your comments that the Department conduct a documented security audit of the perimeter and internal security controls on each shift every day. I am still reviewing the suggestion that management staff also conduct weekly institutional inspections and provide the warden with a written report. The concept of timely inspections by management is valid, but the impact on staff resources may not make this a feasible option. The Inspector General's audit team may provide some resolution to the issues of concern you address. It might also be possible to schedule the operational managers' inspections on a monthly or quarterly basis, so that institutional operations are not disrupted more often than necessary. It is an important issue that will be resolved as staff definition is completed through the restructuring process.

The concerns expressed in the areas relating to security management issues are recognized by the Department. We have established priorities for these issues and work on these problems will be ongoing until resolution is reached. For example, the Department is exploring physical improvements through a high technology contract that begins at Buckingham. Mecklenburg is redefining its mission. The management change due to the restructuring of our Regional Office System should provide changes in decision-making. We will continue to modify our operations to accommodate our increasing population and changing inmate profile.

As you know, the Governor has created an interagency task force led by the Department of Planning and Budget to explore issues relating to staffing needs. The methodological approach to the study has been completed and the work group's objectives have been proposed as follows:


1. To survey the kinds of methodologies, standards, and criteria used nationally to determine need for security and selected non-security staffing in adult institutions.
2. To assess the impact of DOC and state policies/practices on security and non-security staffing.
3. To develop uniform criteria for determining the need for existing and potential security posts in adult institutions.
4. To analyze the validity of the Sharp Formula for determining security staffing needs.
5. To assess the impact of non-security staff activity on security staffing needs.

As soon as the report is finalized from this group, I would like to meet with you to discuss the integration of your issues and recommendations with those of the task force.

Mr. Ray D. Pethel
May 13, 1985
Page Three

Thank you for providing a comprehensive report that is aimed at offering suggestions for improving the Department's staffing patterns and security practices. I look forward to meeting with you to discuss the remaining issues still under study by the Governor's Task Force.

Sincerely,



Allyn R. Sielaff

/jp



APR 16 1985

COMMONWEALTH of VIRGINIA

Office of the Governor

Richmond 23219

Franklin E. White
Secretary of Transportation
and Public Safety

April 12, 1985

Mr. Ray D. Pethtel, Director
Joint Legislative Audit and
Review Commission
910 Capitol Street, Suite 1100
Richmond, Virginia 23219

Dear Ray:

I appreciate the opportunity to review the exposure draft of JLARC's report entitled Security Staffing and Practices at Virginia's Prisons.

As you know, at the Governor's direction, the Departments of Planning and Budget, Information Technology, Criminal Justice Services and Corrections are engaged in a detailed survey and analysis of the resource requirements of DOC. This study will more fully examine many of the same areas and issues touched on by JLARC, including staffing levels and deployment, use of overtime, policies and procedures, and security procedures, among others.

It is my expectation that this study will produce detailed recommendations for staffing of each adult prison and a methodology for maintaining and evaluating staffing needs over time. These should be available for use as we develop the 1986-88 budget to be submitted to the legislature in January. Clearly, the work of your staff will benefit our study team as they proceed. The report contains a large amount of information which will prove very useful.

In addition to our resource allocation study, you may also be aware that the Department of Criminal Justice Services has been directed, by an amendment to the Appropriations Act, to develop a strategy to improve the training of corrections personnel. This is to include a job task analysis for correctional officers and a review of training requirements.

Mr. Fay D. Pachtel
April 12, 1985
Page 2

In view of the foregoing efforts, my only comment pertaining to a specific recommendation in the exposure draft concerns Recommendation (24). I do not believe that the DOC Inspector General should be responsible solely to this office or to the Board of Corrections, as suggested in the recommendations. The candidate pool was screened, and the current inspector general interviewed and selected by the Secretary and the Director. While he reports to the Director, he also has special reporting responsibilities to the Secretary and the Board. The position is new and we need not rush to judgment on a statutory arrangement. I prefer, after a period of time, to evaluate how the present arrangement has worked before deciding whether or how to change it.

Again, I appreciate the opportunity to comment on the report.

Sincerely,



Franklin E. White

/dch

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