HD34 - The Certification, Performance, and Deployment of Voting Equipment


Executive Summary:
Joint Subcommittee Studying the Certification, Performance, and Deployment of Voting Equipment (HJR 174, 2004; SJR 371, 2005)

House Joint Resolution 174, agreed to during the 2004 Session of the General Assembly, established a joint subcommittee to study the certification, performance, and deployment of voting equipment. Senate Joint Resolution 371, agreed to during the 2005 Session, continued the joint subcommittee with the addition of two members with computer expertise.

2004 Interim

The resolutions charged the joint subcommittee to "(i) review the procedures and processes for the certification of voting equipment, (ii) consider the comparative merits of alternative voting systems, (iii) examine procedures for the storage, set-up, deployment, handling and decertification of voting equipment, (iv) review processes for dealing with election day problems with voting equipment, and (v) study the proper procedure for handling voting equipment pending election recounts and contests." The joint subcommittee is required to complete its work in time for the 2006 Session of the General Assembly.

The joint subcommittee organized and met on August 16, 2004, and elected Delegate Timothy D. Hugo, Chair. Senator William C. Mims and then Senator Jeannemarie Devolites Davis served as Vice-Chair.

At its August 2004 meeting, members heard two presentations. The first covered the special study for the State Board of Elections on the Development of Security Policies, Standards, and Guidelines for Direct Recording Electronic (DRE) Voting Systems.

The second outlined the debate over the pros and cons of DRE voting systems and voter verified paper ballots or trails. This report uses the acronym VVPR (voter-verified paper record) to cover various forms of a paper trail associated with DREs. Michael I. Shamos, Institute for Software Research International, School of Computer Science, Carnegie Mellon University, emphasized that DRE systems have been in use for 25 years without a verified incident of tampering.

However, he noted that there is a public perception that DRE systems are subject to tampering as a result of well-publicized studies pointing to security problems with the equipment. He reviewed the pros and cons of the most frequently proposed cure for DRE security problems -- a VVPR or paper record of each vote that the voter can review and verify. The advantages are that the paper trail will demonstrate to the voter that the machine has captured his votes correctly and will create a sense of security among voters. He described the disadvantages of a VVPR: no guarantee the vote was counted or that the paper will be secured for a recount; major problems in handling and securing the paper ballots; delays in the election process; accessibility issues; possible voter confusion; and an increased demand for recounts. His advice was to await the outcome of the November 2004 election when VVPRs for DRE equipment will be used in California, Missouri, and Nevada.

The joint subcommittee reached the consensus that it would await the outcome of the November 2004 election for further evaluation of proposals to improve the present procedures in the Commonwealth that govern the certification, performance, and deployment of voting equipment and related issues.

2005 Interim

During its four meetings held in 2005, the joint subcommittee sought the opinions and advice of the technology community, elections experts and officials, and the public. The joint subcommittee received information in many forms from numerous parties:

• Background from the State Board of Elections and its staff on the current status of voting equipment purchases in Virginia, HAVA (the Help America Vote Act) compliance, and the fact that no VVPR has requested certification yet in Virginia. Two VVPRs have been certified nationally. These two systems are compatible with some but not all of the DREs in use in Virginia at this time. Of the 90 localities prompted by HAVA to replace punch card and lever equipment, 87 have purchased DREs and three have bought optical scan equipment that uses a paper ballot and scanning equipment to read and count the ballots.

• Testimony from a panel of computer experts and individual computer experts that pointed to vulnerabilities in DRE systems and, in some instances, to potential problems with VVPR equipment. The predominant view from computer experts was that DREs could be vulnerable to hacking or inadvertent programming error.

• Testimony from a number of local election officials expressing satisfaction with DRE equipment on the part of their staffs and voters in their localities and enumerating concerns about the costs and practical effects of mandating VVPR equipment at this time.

• Testimony from Chesterfield and Hanover that these localities chose optical scan equipment, in part, to avoid the VVPR controversy.

• Demonstrations of DRE equipment, optical scan equipment, and VVPR equipment.

• Testimony from representatives of the disabled with emphasis on the importance of accessibility for the various facets of the disabled community.

• Testimony from the Maryland Elections Administrator on that state's experience with DREs, the challenges by computer experts and in court to the state's decision to use DREs without any VVPR, the ultimate court decision to allow use of the DREs, and the state's current contract with the University of Maryland for a study of VVPR and various verification methods to determine the best technology.

• Presentations and statements by organized groups such as Virginia Verified Voting and numerous individuals questioning the security of DRE and other electronic voting equipment. The joint subcommittee heard a wide spectrum of opinions ranging from a detailed proposal for the immediate implementation of a VVPR requirement for DREs to more general expressions of concern about the vulnerability of DRE equipment and the need for some type of audit or paper trail.

At its final meeting, the joint subcommittee reviewed various specific proposals for possible approval and to present as recommendations to the General Assembly.

• The subcommittee approved a specific recommendation that the State Board of Elections design and implement a pilot program to test the use of DRE equipment with VVPR equipment, to take into account the concerns of the subcommittee as shown in its final report, and to report its progress and findings to the Committees on Privileges and Elections.

• The subcommittee reviewed a compromise paper presented by Cameron Quinn that would take a variety of steps to test and audit DRE and VVPR equipment prior to any mandate to provide VVPR capabilities with DREs. It approved the paper for consideration by the State Board of Elections in its design of the pilot program.

• The subcommittee reviewed the Chairman's Suggested List of Items which he presented to reflect the public's, computer community's, and many legislators' concerns with the safety and security of DRE equipment absent a VVPR. It approved the List for consideration by the State Board of Elections in its design of the pilot program.

It was noted that individual legislators would introduce legislation in the 2006 Session to reflect these recommendations and concerns.

A report of the joint subcommittee's activities and recommendations and the actions taken on its recommendations by the 2006 General Assembly will be submitted for publication as House Document No. 34 following the 2006 Regular Session.