




Washington Metrorail Safety Commission



ANNUAL REPORT ON
WMSC OPERATIONS
AND THE SAFETY OF
THE WMATA RAIL
SYSTEM IN 2024





TABLE OF CONTENTS



Letter from the WMSC Chair and CEO	1
Commissioners	2
Executive Summary	3
Introduction	6
Safety Certification Oversight	8
Audits, Directives and Other Findings	11
Audits	12
Other Findings, Directives and Actions	17
Corrective Action Plans	21
Safety Events	27
Inspections	34
Public Transportation Agency Safety Plan (PTASP)	38
Program Standard	39
Financial Independence	40
Continuing Education, Training and Awareness	41
Transparency, Public Input and External Safety Concerns	42
Conclusion	43
Appendices	44
Appendix A: Open Corrective Action Plans (CAPS) as of March 15, 2025	45
Appendix B: Final Investigation Reports Adopted by the WMSC in 2024	49
Appendix C: WMSC Staff Organization Chart	51
Appendix D: WMSC FY2025 Budget	52

Letter from the WMSC Chair and CEO

The Washington Metrorail Safety Commission's (WMSC) comprehensive oversight work continues to play an integral role in Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority's Metrorail system's continual safety improvement through audit activities, inspections, safety event investigations and collaborative work between the two organizations. To highlight this work, the WMSC combined into one comprehensive document the annual Report on WMSC Operations and The Safety of the WMATA Rail System in 2024.

In 2024, the WMSC issued four audit reports and conducted work on three additional safety audits that are scheduled to be issued in 2025. In 2024, for example, the WMSC audited Metrorail's power systems, and automatic train control and signals programs. The reports to be published in 2025 address emergency management and life safety, elevators and escalators, and control center and rail operations. As discussed later in this report, in April 2024, the WMSC submitted its initial document request to initiate the WMSC's audit of Metrorail's fitness for duty and occupational health programs. However, after WMATA's repeated refusals to provide most of the documents required for the WMSC to conduct a comprehensive assessment of those programs, the WMSC was compelled to issue a subpoena for the information. Through further negotiations, the WMSC obtained more of the requested documents, but none about worker safety, which is a focus area of the audit. In October, the WMSC filed a petition for subpoena enforcement in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia. The WMSC's staff stands ready to continue this important audit work as soon as those documents are provided.

The audits issued in 2024 identify safety deficiencies that Metrorail is required to address through corrective action plans. For example, these audits identified that Metrorail is not carrying out some of its key safety commitments, including identifying and mitigating hazards, and adhering to its own policies and procedures regarding maintenance, inspection and certification. Safety hazards also were successfully mitigated through corrective action plans. Metrorail implemented 42 corrective action plans in 2024, including those related to maintenance, document control, system safety, hazard management and training.

Sincerely,


Christopher A. Hart, Chair


David L. Mayer, CEO

The WMSC's ongoing safety oversight also led to the issuance of three WMSC orders in 2024, regarding roadway worker protection, train operator certification and the maintenance of automatic train control rooms. For example, the WMSC found that Metrorail is not performing its train operator certification activities reliably and consistently in accordance with its safety requirements, and is not conducting retraining of personnel who do not pass certification exams as required by its Performance Standardization Program Manual. These findings led to the issuance of a February 28, 2024, **order** requiring Metrorail to, among other steps, identify improvements to and implement those improvements to training and qualification processes for personnel responsible for train operator certification activities to ensure that these activities are conducted in accordance with Metrorail's safety requirements.


The WMSC continued work on oversight of Metrorail's safety certification of automation, leading to our concurrence that Metrorail had completed the steps required to activate Automatic Door Operation (ADO) and Automatic Train Operation (ATO) on the Red Line. We continue to oversee WMATA's automation efforts as it seeks to expand ATO on the system, by routinely providing our safety concerns and feedback, and attending testing, demonstrations, workshops and meetings.

We would like to thank the governors of Maryland and Virginia, the Virginia and Maryland General Assemblies, the Mayor of Washington, D.C., the D.C. Council, Congress, and the officials in numerous local and federal agencies, including the Federal Transit Administration, who continue to be vital partners in the WMSC's efforts to guide Metrorail towards meaningful and sustainable safety improvements.

On the following pages we detail the WMSC's operations and safety oversight work, outline our ongoing strategies for ensuring that Metrorail continuously improves its safety, provide the status of Metrorail safety in 2024, and discuss our future work.



Christopher A. Hart, Chair



David L. Mayer, CEO

Commissioners

CHRISTOPHER HART

(District of Columbia), Chair

Mr. Hart is chair of the Washington Metrorail Safety Commission. Chair Hart earned a Bachelor of Science in Engineering and a Master of Science in Engineering from Princeton University and a Juris Doctor from Harvard Law School. Chairman Hart has extensive experience working in transportation and specifically with transportation safety issues in both the public and private sectors. He served as an attorney for the Air Transport Association of America, as an associate attorney for the law firms Peabody, Rivlin, Lambert, and Meyers and Dickstein, Shapiro and Morin, and as a managing partner for the law firm Hart & Chavers. He also served as Deputy Administrator of the National Highway Traffic Administration and as Assistant Administrator of System Safety and Deputy Director of the Air Traffic Safety Oversight Service at the Federal Aviation Administration. Chairman Hart served two terms as a member of the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) from 1990 to 1993 and 2009 to 2018. He served as chairman of the NTSB from 2014 to 2017.



ROBERT LAUBY

(Commonwealth of Virginia), Vice Chair

Commissioner Rush is Vice Chair of the Washington Metrorail Safety Commission, Commissioner Lauby is the former Associate Administrator for Railroad Safety and Chief Safety Officer for the Federal Railroad Administration and is currently an independent consultant with RCL Rail Safety Consulting, LLC. He is a licensed mechanical engineer with more than 40 years of railroad and rail transit experience involving safety, security, accident investigation, and engineering. Mr. Lauby's career included positions at the National Transportation Safety Board, Knorr Brake Corporation (a railroad and rail transit brake supplier), and Conrail. He has led safety regulation initiatives and safety oversight programs, has been involved in the development of passenger rail safety standards, and has conducted railroad and rail transit accident investigations worldwide.



ROBERT BOBB

(District of Columbia)

Commissioner Bobb earned a Bachelor of Arts and Political Science from Grambling State University and a Master of Science degree in Business from Western Michigan University. He went on to earn a Certificate for Senior Executives in State and Local Governments from Harvard University's John F. Kennedy School of Government. Commissioner Bobb is known as a turnaround specialist. He stepped in as emergency financial manager of Detroit Public Schools. He also served as city administrator for the District of Columbia, among his many accomplishments.



DEBRA FARRAR-DYKE (State of Maryland), Secretary-Treasurer

Commissioner Farrar-Dyke is Secretary-Treasurer of the Washington Metrorail Safety Commission. She is a senior manager with over 30 years of successful, progressive leadership and transportation and procurement management. Commissioner Farrar-Dyke is also a Commissioner on the Maryland Transportation Commission. Previously she was responsible for the Disadvantaged Business and Small Business Programs at the Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority. She also led oversight of operating and capital budgets preparation and implementation at Metro.



DEVIN C. ROUSE (Commonwealth of Virginia)

Commissioner Rouse is the former Executive Officer of the Federal Railroad Administration's (FRA) Office of Railroad Systems, Technology and Innovation, and the former director of the Passenger Rail Division within the FRA's Office of Railroad Safety. He previously served on the board of directors of the Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority, as well as FRA's Railroad Safety Board, and chaired the Railroad Safety Advisory Committee's Passenger Safety Working Group and Engineering Task Force. He has served as a subject matter expert in areas related to passenger rail safety, passenger rail equipment, Positive Train Control and emerging technologies, high-speed rail, and the development and construction of new railroads. Mr. Rouse is the owner of DCRail Advisory, providing services to passenger railroads, public transit agencies, and railroad industry executives. He holds a master's degree in Civil and Transportation Engineering, and a bachelor's degree in Mechanical Engineering from Virginia Tech. Mr. Rouse is a registered Professional Engineer in Virginia.



KATHRYN O'LEARY HIGGINS (State of Maryland - Alternate)

Kathryn (Kitty) O'Leary Higgins is a former member of the National Transportation Safety Board. In addition to her work as a member of the NTSB, she served as Deputy Secretary of the U.S. Department of Labor and Chief of Staff to the Secretary of Labor, Vice Chair of the Presidential Commission on U.S. Coast Guard Roles and Missions, Acting Chair of the National Endowment for the Arts, and Vice President for Public Policy for the National Trust for Historic Preservation. Ms. Higgins previously served in various roles on White House staffs where she worked closely with the federal transportation agencies. She is the President of the Higgins Company, a government relations firm. Ms. Higgins holds a Bachelor of Science degree from the University of Nebraska.



CHRISTOPHER CONKLIN (State of Maryland)

Commissioner Christopher Conklin serves as the director of the Montgomery County Department of Transportation (MCDOT), and previously served as Deputy Director for Transportation Policy. He has guided the implementation of new transit services and worked to advance pedestrian safety and bicycle infrastructure projects. Prior to joining MCDOT, Conklin spent 23 years at the planning, engineering and environmental firm VHB, where he was managing director for the National Capital Region. Mr. Conklin holds a Bachelor of Civil Engineering from the Georgia Institute of Technology and two masters degrees in transportation and technology policy from the Massachusetts Institute of Technology. He is a licensed professional engineer in Maryland.






TIFFANY ROBINSON

(Commonwealth of Virginia - Alternate)

Tiffany Robinson is the Director for the Virginia Department of Rail and Public Transportation. She also serves as a member of the Commonwealth Transportation Board, chair of the Virginia Passenger Rail Authority board, and as a board member for several transit organizations around the Commonwealth. She previously served as Deputy Chief of Staff in the Virginia Governor's Office. Ms. Robinson also served as the Secretary of the Maryland Department of Labor, as a Deputy Chief of Staff in the Maryland Governor's Office and as Assistant Secretary in Maryland's Department of Housing and Community Development. Ms. Robinson holds a bachelor's degree in political science from the University of Maryland Baltimore County and a Juris Doctor from the University of Baltimore School of Law.



EXECUTIVE SUMMARY



Executive Summary


Under the Washington Metrorail Safety Commission's oversight, the Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority (WMATA) is working towards safety improvements that will provide for increased levels of safety for riders, employees, contractors and first responders who interact with the system. In 2024, the WMSC identified progress that Metrorail has made under the WMSC's oversight, but also identified new or recurring Metrorail safety issues that WMATA is required to address through corrective action plans and other safety improvements.

As its State Safety Oversight Agency (SSOA), the WMSC plays a pivotal role in driving Metrorail safety improvements through audits, safety event investigations, inspections, and oversight of CAPS, safety certification and emergency management. The WMSC issues directives and orders or takes other enforcement action when necessary. The WMSC's priority is the safety of riders, workers and all others who depend on the system's proper maintenance and operations.

This annual report on WMSC operations and the safety of the WMATA rail system in 2024 details the WMSC's programs, operations, and finances, and provides a status update of the WMATA Rail System in calendar year 2024.

Some of the most notable safety oversight work in 2024 included overseeing Metrorail's safety certification process for activation of automated systems, investigating safety events such as the near-miss collision of two trains near **Dupont Circle Station**, that demonstrated Metrorail personnel are not adhering to established policies and procedures, an issue that has also been identified in other areas, including as it related to Metrorail's Roadway Worker Protection (RWP) program. The WMSC also implemented a new risk-based inspection program, that enhances our previously existing program, as required by Federal Transit Administration **Special Directive 22-50**, which required the WMSC to develop and implement a risk-based inspection program as required by 49 U.S.C. § 5329(k).

The WMSC also oversees WMATA's safety certification process which is designed to identify and mitigate hazards to provide for the highest practicable level of safety. This required process



The WMSC implemented a new risk-based inspection program, that enhances our previously existing program.

must be completed prior to new elements and equipment being put into service. Following WMSC concurrence that Metrorail has met the requirements of WMATA's Safety and Security Certification Program Plan (SSCPP) and Metrorail's other written safety commitments. These commitments under the SSCPP are one element of Metrorail's Public Transportation Agency Safety Plan (PTASP). The PTASP requires a Safety Management System (SMS) approach that involves personnel at all levels and is focused on safety promotion, safety policy, safety assurance, and safety risk management. Full implementation of the PTASP is expected to take several years of continuous improvement. For example, the WMSC oversaw Metrorail's completion of the safety certification process required to identify and mitigate

hazards and after years of this oversight work, the WMSC provided concurrence with Metrorail's Temporary Use Notice and to activate Automatic Door Operation (ADO) and Automatic Train Operation (ATO) on the Red Line.

The WMSC completed four audit reports in 2024 and conducted work on four other audits to be published in 2025. One such audit issued in 2024, Roadway Worker Protection (RWP), found that Metrorail is not effectively ensuring that its personnel on and around the roadway are consistently following the Roadway Worker Protection rules designed for their safety. For each audit finding, Metrorail is required to develop and implement a corrective action plan that addresses the finding and thereby improves the safety of the Metrorail system. The audits issued in 2024 were:

- Audit of Roadway Worker Protection (RWP) Program
- Audit of Revenue Vehicles (Railcar) Program
- Audit of Power Systems
- Audit of Automatic Train Control (ATC) and Signals Program

Audit work was also conducted for the following programs in 2024, with final audit reports scheduled to be issued in 2025:

- Audit of Fitness for Duty and Occupational Health Programs
- Audit of Emergency Management and Fire Life Safety Programs
- Audit of Control Center and Rail Operations
- Audit of Elevators and Escalators

Under WMSC oversight, Metrorail has outlined and followed through on plans to address specific safety issues identified in recent years, which led to the closure of 42 corrective action plans in 2024. This is in addition to other safety issues Metrorail addressed through the WMSC's inspections, investigations and other oversight processes, and those actions Metrorail took as a

Under WMSC oversight, Metrorail has outlined and followed through on plans to address specific safety issues identified in recent years.



result of safety assurance measures required under its Public Transportation Agency Safety Plan (PTASP).

Fiscally, the WMSC operated within budget, and delivered effective oversight for the region. The WMSC continued in 2024 to strategically increase expertise and capacity to support our work. The WMSC completed Fiscal Year 2024 within budget of \$6,711,00 and developed the Fiscal Year 2025 budget of \$7,318,00 in accordance with the jurisdictional funding agreement among the District of Columbia, Maryland and Virginia. The WMSC's budget incorporates federal grants and local funds, making funding from the District of Columbia, Maryland, Virginia, and federal grants critical to the WMSC's important work overseeing Metrorail safety. This investment allows the WMSC to function as an effective independent oversight agency. The WMSC's FY 2024 annual independent financial statement audit included an unmodified or "clean" audit opinion, which demonstrates the WMSC is using these funds responsibly in accordance with the WMSC's requirements.



INTRODUCTION



Introduction

The Washington Metrorail Safety Commission (WMSC) is the State Safety Oversight Agency (SSOA) for the Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority's (WMATA) Metrorail system.

Maryland, Virginia and the District of Columbia created the WMSC with the approval of Congress and the president through an interstate compact that became law in August 2017. The WMSC's safety oversight program was certified by the Federal Transit Administration (FTA) in March 2019.

The WMSC is committed to the safety of every person who interacts with the Metrorail system including riders, employees, contractors and first responders. This annual status report on WMSC operations and the safety of the WMATA Rail System gives a high-level snapshot of the WMSC's safety oversight of Metrorail, as well as Metrorail's performance in 2024. This report satisfies WMSC Compact, Article V, which requires the WMSC to make and publish annually a report on its programs, operations, and finances, and provide a status report on the safety of the WMATA Rail System, which shall include, among other requirements established by the Commission and federal law, status updates of outstanding Corrective Action Plans, Commission directives, and on-going investigations.

The WMSC's safety oversight work includes conducting inspections, audits, and investigations, overseeing corrective action plans (CAPs), safety certification, emergency management, and conducting other activities that help Metrorail as it works to continuously improve the safety of its system. The WMSC carries out this work by focusing on data gathered from Metrorail systems and frequent interaction with personnel at all levels of the Metrorail organization.

Metrorail is required to comply with all WMSC directives, to implement corrective action plans to address WMSC findings, to provide timely access to all information required by the WMSC and to otherwise follow all requirements set by the WMSC in the WMSC State Safety Oversight Program Standard.

The WMSC conducts this work transparently through public meetings of the commissioners who guide the work of the WMSC staff and who take actions such as adopting the WMSC Program Standard, approving Metrorail's revisions to its Public Transportation Agency Safety Plan (PTASP), and adopting final safety event investigation reports. The District of Columbia, Virginia and Maryland each appoint two commissioners and one



alternate. Appointees are required to have backgrounds in transit safety, transportation, engineering or public finance. Each WMSC audit report, investigation report and inspection report is posted publicly on the commission's website, wmsc.gov.

Elected leaders, staff, and others including the governors of Virginia and Maryland, the Mayor of the District of Columbia, those in the D.C. Council, the Maryland and Virginia General Assemblies, local and regional bodies, U.S. House of Representatives, U.S. Senate, federal executive branch agencies, and state, regional and local bodies have provided and continued to provide the fundamental support necessary for the WMSC to help ensure continuous safety improvement for the safety of riders, workers and all others who depend on the WMATA Rail System's safe maintenance and operations. Funding from the governments of Maryland, Virginia, and the District of Columbia, along with federal grants from the FTA, enable the independent operations of the WMSC. This financial support permits the WMSC to continue to develop its staff and organization to ensure continuing effective safety oversight commensurate with the size, scale and complexity of the Metrorail system.

To help guide continued progress towards making Metrorail the safest possible system, and as required by the WMSC Compact, this report on WMSC operations and the safety of the WMATA Rail System in 2024 are provided to the Administrator of the Federal Transit Administration, the Governor of Virginia, the Governor of Maryland, the Mayor of the District of Columbia, the Chairman of the D.C. Council, the President of the Maryland Senate, the Speaker of the Maryland House of Delegates, the President of the Virginia Senate, the Speaker of the Virginia House of Delegates, WMATA's General Manager and each member of the WMATA Board.


The report is also published at wmsc.gov/annual-reports to provide an opportunity for the public to understand the independent safety oversight efforts of the WMSC, and the progress Metrorail has made on instituting the federally mandated top-to-bottom Safety Management System (SMS). Additional information about the WMSC's work, including audit reports, inspection reports, official actions, investigation reports, and public meetings is also available at wmsc.gov.

SAFETY CERTIFICATION OVERSIGHT

The WMSC oversees Metrorail's safety certification process which is designed to identify and mitigate hazards to provide for the highest practicable level of safety. Metrorail's safety certification process is a critical element of Metrorail's safety management system. This Metrorail process must be completed prior to new assets and systems being put into service.

Consistently identifying hazards and mitigating the likelihood and severity of those hazards in a systematic way as documented in Metrorail's policy and procedures is what provides for the overall safety of the Metrorail system. The WMSC oversees Metrorail's safety certification through field observations, document and data review, and regular meetings with Metrorail, as well as by observing the discussions by Metrorail safety certification committees and working groups.

The WMSC Program Standard provides for the WMSC to select specific projects for in-depth review. The WMSC uses these projects as a sample to conduct more detailed oversight of Metrorail's safety certification process. Projects selected for in-depth review require Metrorail to receive WMSC concurrence that it has properly carried out its safety certification process prior to utilizing or operating a system or asset in passenger service. Some of the projects the WMSC has selected for this level of review that were completed or had ongoing work in 2024 include the safety certification of the 8000 Series railcars, Metrorail's return to both Automatic Door Operations (ADO), and Automatic Train Control (ATO).



Automation

Automatic Train Operation and Return to Design Speed

Metrorail was originally designed and put into revenue service with the maximum authorized speed allowed on the system being 75 mph. There were also segments of the system that operated at lower speeds. In 1986, following a station overrun at Shady Grove, Metrorail instituted a rule lowering the maximum speed to 59 mph, which relied on the automatic train supervision system to regulate speeds. The automatic train supervision system is not a fail-safe system. In 1996 this reliance led to a fatal crash in which a train operator died when a Metrorail train collided with another stopped train at Shady Grove Station. The NTSB, following its investigation, recommended, amongst other changes, that Metrorail permanently suspend the use of this non-fail-safe system called automatic train supervision to regulate speeds. The WMSC, during its years of in-depth review, advised Metrorail that, in order to complete its safety certification and receive our concurrence, it could not rely on this non-fail-safe mode.

Metrorail's proposed solution was to return to the design speeds which would rely on the fail-safe Automatic Train Protection system. Metrorail conducted various validation activities to verify that these design speeds remained safe and that its fleet of railcars were able to operate within these parameters.

Automatic Train Operation refers to the automated movement of a train under the supervision of the operator and is a subsystem of the Automatic Train Control System, which provides critical safety protections for train movement and roadway workers. These include functions such as safe train separation, prevention of overspeed derailments, fail safe train detection, interlocking rules enforcement, hazard response and work zone protection.

After many years, Metrorail began work to initiate ATO. The WMSC assessed this work in the ATC Audit issued in 2021, required subsequent corrective action plans, and conducted ongoing oversight of Metrorail's safety certification. In August 2022, the WMSC issued an order related to train control rooms (TCRs) and selected Metrorail's Automatic Train Operation and Automatic Door Operation project for in-depth safety



certification review. On December 9, 2024, after years of oversight work, including before the projects were selected for in-depth review, the WMSC concurred that Metrorail met its safety certification requirement for activation of ATO and return to design speed on the Red Line.

Our work included guiding Metrorail to adopt a systems engineering approach to implement these projects starting from a concept of operations. Our work also included observing overnight testing, reviewing proposed training plans for operations personnel and rail traffic controllers, observing the delivery of training, observing various readiness demonstration activities, and reviewing safety certification materials. The WMSC team routinely communicated with the Metrorail project team and executives on safety issue identification.

Metrorail instituted rules to provide the ultimate discretion to train operators to switch to manual mode if they consider that would be the safest mode of operation when encountering safety conditions such as obstructions on the right of way, in low



The WMSC team routinely communicated with the Metrorail project team and executives on safety issue identification.



adhesion conditions such as ice, snow and heavy rains. When workers are on the roadway, advanced flaggers will be positioned at the 8-car marker of a station platform, in advance of the roadway workers to alert the train operators of personnel ahead and to direct train operators to switch the train operations to manual mode until they pass the next station.

As we have done with previous projects for which we have concurred, the WMSC continues to use its inspections, investigations and audits programs to assess if Metrorail is continuing to adhere to its automatic train control system inspection and maintenance practices, continuing to train its operations personnel to be knowledgeable and qualified to operate in ATO, and that Metrorail continues to conduct these automatic train operations using all applicable operations and safety rules.

As Metrorail seeks to expand ATO to other lines, the WMSC requires Metrorail to use safety management and engineering principles to determine the cause of station overruns and to address other key safety concerns the WMSC has identified and communicated to WMATA since Red Line ATO activation on December 15, 2024.

Since ATO activation on the Red Line on December 15, 2024, there have been numerous station overruns. As of March 15, 2025, Metrorail reported there have been 199 station overruns on the Red Line while in ATO. Station overruns occur when a train does not stop at the 8-car marker on the platform as designed when ATO is active and the train is unable to service

the station as intended. Although the number of overruns on the Red Line has declined, station overruns in ATO still continue to occur at a rate that outpaces the scale of station overruns when trains are operated by train operators in manual mode. Additionally, there are locations on the Red Line where Metrorail is unable to determine the cause of station overruns.

The WMSC has recommended that WMATA conduct a thorough, data-driven analysis of ATO-related station overruns, identify root causes, and then implement corrective actions that improve stopping accuracy. The WMSC has urged WMATA to conduct a comprehensive, systematic analysis of overrun causes. With demonstrated system reliability and reduced safety risks, the WMSC can consider concurrence for ATO expansion onto other Metrorail lines.

Automatic Door Operation

On June 27, 2024, the WMSC concurred that Metrorail had met its safety certification requirements to place the automatic door opening system into service on the Blue, Yellow, Green, Orange and Silver lines. The WMSC previously provided concurrence on the use of the system on the Red Line in 2023. This system is separate from Automatic Train Operation. Automatic Door Operation is now activated system-wide using a setting where the doors open automatically on the correct side when a train properly berths in a station, and the train operator then manually closes the doors by pressing the door close button when boarding is complete.

AUDITS, DIRECTIVES AND OTHER FINDINGS



Audits, Directives and Other Findings

The WMSC issued four safety audits in 2024 and conducted work on four other safety audits published or to be published in 2025. This included work on our second audit related to worker safety, which has been delayed due to Metrorail's refusal to provide the WMSC with requested documents necessary to conduct a full assessment of its fitness for duty and drug and alcohol programs. See Subpoena and Petition for Enforcement section below for more details.

The WMSC's audit schedule ensures there is always audit work in progress such as preparation, data review, on-site activities, or report development. Each of the reports mentioned below are part of the WMSC's second cycle of audits, therefore, in addition to the scopes described, each audit also focused on closed corrective action plans that were issued as part of the first cycle of audits. In accordance with the WMSC Compact, federal regulation, and the WMSC Program Standard, the WMSC audits each element of Metrorail's Agency Safety Plan through in-depth functional area audits that are conducted over three-year cycles.

The WMSC schedules these audits in advance and provides that schedule to WMATA each time it is updated. The audit schedule may be adjusted based on issues identified through the WMSC's other oversight work. These audits take time to complete, consequently some audits were initiated in 2023 and published in 2024, and other audits initiated in 2024 were published in early 2025.

These safety audits are based on information gathered through extensive reviews of documents, data, and recordings and in-depth interviews with Metrorail frontline and managerial personnel. In addition to extensive document and data review, audit work includes on-site inspections and observations and interviews with Metrorail personnel. The purpose of this audit work is to review Metrorail's policies and procedures and Metrorail's compliance with its policies, procedures or other requirements, and to identify deficiencies and hazards to improve the safety of riders and personnel. The WMSC also highlights positive practices that are identified in each audit. Drafts of each audit report are provided to WMATA for a 30-day technical review, and the WMSC incorporates any subsequent information provided in that review, as appropriate, prior to issuing a final report to WMATA and publishing the final report at [wmsc.gov](https://www.wmsc.gov).


The audits issued, initiated, and completed in 2024 demonstrate that while Metrorail has made positive strides in the safe operation and maintenance of its system, there are areas that require substantive improvement, including adherence to its own written policies and procedures, tracking and mitigating hazards,, and ensuring personnel at levels have the training necessary to safely carry out their roles and responsibilities.

AUDITS

EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT AND LIFE SAFETY PROGRAMS - JANUARY 29, 2025

Work on this audit was conducted in 2024, and the final report was published in January 2025.

SCOPE: This audit assessed all components of the as-designed/built rail or fixed-guideway system, system modifications, installed equipment, operational practices and procedures, maintenance, hazardous material events, regulations, and best practices related to emergency management and life safety.



Examples of positive practices identified included:

- Metrorail's ongoing work with jurisdictional partners was observed throughout the audit. Metrorail invites the jurisdictions to Metrorail facilities for reviews, tours, full scale exercises, and training. Metrorail also visits each jurisdiction.
- As part of corrective action plan C-0165, MTPD developed a documented process to compile and implement lessons learned from after action reports and incident debriefs relating to emergency response and management in the Metrorail system.

FINDINGS:

- **Finding 1:** Metrorail does not have a reliable communications system for operations or emergencies.
- **Finding 2:** Metrorail Emergency Trip Stations (ETS) located throughout the system are not treated as fire life safety assets.

- **Finding 3:** Metrorail fire and life safety inspections do not identify and resolve deficiencies with fire life safety equipment and assets within stations.
- **Finding 4:** Metrorail is using emergency radio operations channel 6 although the channel is not ready for use.
- **Finding 5:** Metrorail is not contacting jurisdictional emergency services immediately upon identification of fire and smoke on the Metrorail system.

At the time of this report, all CAPs related to this audit are in development with scheduled dates for completion between to be determined.

ROADWAY WORKER PROTECTION (RWP) PROGRAM - JULY 31, 2024

Work on this audit was conducted in November and December 2023, with additional follow-up and document reviews in January and February 2024.

SCOPE: This audit assessed Metrorail's safety protections for roadway/wayside workers, to include related rules, practices, procedures, policies, training, and internal oversight, as well as Metrorail's processes for developing and adopting revisions or updates.

Examples of positive practices identified included:


- The roadway job safety briefing given in the presence of WMSC personnel at Herndon Station prior to the start of work was conducted in full and the paperwork was accurately completed. Finding 1 of this report identifies inconsistencies with the roadway job safety briefings in other roadway crews.
- Metrorail has sufficient training facilities and indoor and outdoor spaces for conducting practical exercises for training personnel prior to entering the actual roadway.

FINDINGS:

- **Finding 1:** Metrorail is not effectively ensuring that its personnel on and around the roadway are consistently following the Roadway Worker Protection rules designed for their safety.

- **Finding 2:** Metrorail is not providing its personnel with up-to-date and accessible information about the locations where additional Roadway Worker Protection is required to prevent serious injury or death.
- **Finding 3:** Metrorail is not systematically identifying, tracking, and mitigating hazards related to Roadway Worker Protection as required by its Agency Safety Plan.
- **Finding 4:** Metrorail is training and qualifying personnel on outdated Roadway Worker Protection-related procedures and rules.
- **Finding 5:** Metrorail has no process to ensure that areas requiring additional Roadway Worker Protection are accurately identified on an ongoing basis.
- **Finding 6:** Metrorail directs its personnel to use forms of protection without training on the proper use of the protection. Specifically, Metrorail has no training or qualification related to local control. This contributes to an inconsistent application of Roadway Worker Protection rules.
- **Finding 7:** Metrorail is not following its existing safety rules and does not have adequate training and supervisory oversight to ensure safe operation under mobile command.
- **Finding 8:** Metrorail has no controls to ensure that rules being applied in areas it designates as an 'Authorized Construction Site' provide the same or greater level of protection for roadway workers as those workers have in other parts of the WMATA Rail System.
- **Finding 9:** Metrorail is providing RWP qualifications without following the listed requirements for those qualifications.
- **Finding 10:** Metrorail is not following its procedures regarding Roadway Worker Protection Training.
- **Finding 11:** Metrorail is not providing critical roadway worker-related safety information and training. Instructors do not follow the standardized curriculum and omit materials.
- **Finding 12:** Metrorail is providing incorrect information about cardinal rules and incomplete testing for non-English speaking contractors in Roadway Worker Protection Training.
- **Finding 13:** Metrorail requires on-the-job Roadway Worker Protection training without outlining the requirements or process for this training.

At the time of this report, all CAPs related to this audit are open with scheduled dates of completion between August 2025 and October 2028.



REVENUE VEHICLES (RAILCAR) PROGRAM - MAY 21, 2024

SCOPE: This audit assessed Metrorail's maintenance and engineering practices related to railcars, those vehicles designed to carry customers. The audit also includes associated shop equipment such as railcar movers.

Examples of positive practices identified included:

- Under the WMSC's orders related to the safe return to service of each 7000 Series railcar, Metrorail developed a digital indicator gauge along with associated procedures for performing accurate back-to-back measurements. Digital indicator gauges and calibration blocks have been manufactured and are being used, and have successfully detected railcars with wheelsets beyond Metrorail's safety requirements, allowing those wheelsets to be removed from service.
- Under the WMSC's oversight, Metrorail has made upgrades to its Vehicle-Track Interaction systems in place on some 7000 Series railcars to resume system functionality by upgrading 3G cellular communication systems to 4G systems. As part of Metrorail's return to service plan, Metrorail is now analyzing Vehicle Track Interaction (VTI) data on a regular basis, leading to actions to improve safety in the system.

FINDINGS:

- **Finding 1:** Metrorail is not carrying out railcar maintenance and inspection tasks as specified by its procedures.
- **Finding 2:** Metrorail is training railcar personnel on outdated procedures.
- **Finding 3:** Metrorail is not meeting life-safety and occupational safety and health requirements in railcar maintenance facilities.
- **Finding 4:** Metrorail is not identifying and mitigating hazards related to railcars and railcar personnel.
- **Finding 5:** Metrorail is not following its operational certification requirements for Car Maintenance Road Mechanics.



- **Finding 6:** Metrorail is not following industry standard electrostatic discharge protection practices for railcar components.
- **Finding 7:** Metrorail is using equipment that is not calibrated in accordance with its policies and procedures, including for inspection and maintenance of components with a direct impact on safety.

RECOMMENDATIONS:

- **Recommendation 1:** Metrorail is not tracking the shelf life of railcar parts that decay over time and therefore have a limited shelf life.
- **Recommendation 2:** Metrorail could improve the effectiveness of its maintenance tasks by proactively providing training records to supervisors of employees newly assigned to their shift or location.
- **Recommendation 3:** Metrorail should update its railcar maintenance staffing assessment to account for current facilities, railcars, maintenance requirements, and other operational changes.


At the time of this report, CAPs C-0275 and C-0279 had been approved for closure following WMSC verification of completion. As detailed later in this report, WMATA Metrorail, has refused to provide the WMSC with a corrective action plan to address Finding 3. As a result, on October 18, 2024, the WMSC issued a **notice of non-compliance for CAP C-0272**. All other CAPs related to this audit are open with scheduled dates of completion between July 2025 and August 2026.

POWER SYSTEMS - FEBRUARY 7, 2024

Work on this audit was conducted in 2023, and the final report was published in February 2024.

SCOPE: This audit assessed high-voltage power and low-voltage power. High-voltage power includes all aspects from the utility connection through and including the wayside cables that connect to the third rail, as well as the negative return system.

Low-voltage power systems (defined by Metrorail as 480-volt



and lower voltage electrical systems) provide power to rail stations, rail yards, chiller plants, tunnels and fan shafts.

Examples of positive practices identified included:

- Metrorail has consolidated Preventive Maintenance Instructions (PMIs) to manufacturer specific PMIs, improving document control and making it easier for frontline workers to use and follow. Previously, there were over 40 PMIs, some of which contributed to confusion about the required procedures for different types of similar equipment.
- Comprehensive job safety briefings, personal protective equipment compliance checks and Roadway Worker Protection certification checks were conducted prior to all onsite work observed by the WMSC. All personnel were in compliance, demonstrating effective supervisory oversight and safety promotion related to personal safety.

FINDINGS:


- **Finding 1:** Metrorail is not consistently identifying, addressing, and preventing water intrusion in power rooms.
- **Finding 2:** Metrorail is not ensuring that adequate egress paths are maintained for Power facilities.
- **Finding 3:** Metrorail Office of Power personnel are performing maintenance work using torque wrenches that are out of calibration (Closed prior to issuance of report).

At the time of this report, CAP C-0267 had been approved for closure following WMSC verification of completion. All other remaining CAPs are open with scheduled completion dates between November 2025 and August 2027.

AUTOMATIC TRAIN CONTROL (ATC) AND SIGNALS PROGRAM - JANUARY 18, 2024

Work on this audit was conducted in 2023, and the final report was published in January 2024.

SCOPE: This audit assessed Metrorail's automatic train control and signaling program, including all associated automatic train control and signaling




facilities, equipment, systems, and software on both mainline and in yards such as but not limited to remote terminal units (RTU); train control rooms (TCR) and constituent parts; communication lines, devices, and any associated cabling; and the Advanced Information Management (AIM) system (but excluding how the Rail Operations Control Center uses the information typically provided by AIM). This audit also focuses on closed corrective action plans that were issued as part of the WMSC's Automatic Train Control, Signals and Signal Machines Audit that was issued on May 12, 2021.

Examples of positive practices identified included:

- Following the WMSC's August 2022 Train Control Room order and finding, Metrorail has improved conditions in some Train Control Rooms.
- Metrorail has developed and begun offering refresher training for AA, A, and B ATC mechanics.

FINDINGS:

- **Finding 1:** Metrorail ATC Maintenance personnel do not have a uniform understanding of Metrorail procedures, which leads to inadequate completion of safety tasks, such as inspections and handling of vital systems, that are required to ensure that track circuits and other elements of the ATC system function properly as required to prevent train collisions and to provide other designed safety protections.
- **Finding 2:** Metrorail does not review, analyze, and act upon available safety data about the health and functionality of the Automatic Train Control system and subsystems as required by Metrorail's Agency Safety Plan. Therefore, Metrorail's ATC Engineering cannot reliably or proactively determine whether or not the ATC system and subsystems are or will be functioning as designed to provide for the safety of riders and workers.
- **Finding 3:** Metrorail is putting its personnel at risk due to health hazards such as damaged and repositioned materials marked as containing asbestos that are not being identified and managed as required by its Agency Safety Plan.
- **Finding 4:** Metrorail is not systematically identifying, tracking, and mitigating hazards related to automatic train control and signaling as required by its Agency Safety Plan.
- **Finding 5:** Metrorail is not maintaining its books of plans in accordance with its requirements.



the WMSC examines the ongoing project to replace that system. More on the study is explained below.

The WMSC's third triennial audit cycle is scheduled to begin in 2025 with an audit of Metrorail's Track and Structures programs. The WMSC will continue to conduct these audits on an ongoing basis as specified in the WMSC Program Standard to provide for the appropriate depth of review in each area.

Other Oversight Work

In early 2025, the WMSC notified Metrorail that the WMSC would be conducting a special study of safety impacts of WMATA's radio replacement project to examine WMATA's long-planned project to replace the present 450-490-megahertz system with the future 700-megahertz frequency radio system. Work on the radio replacement project began in 2017 before the WMSC's certification by the FTA. Similar to our audit work, the WMSC requested related documents and conducted interviews with WMATA personnel with responsibilities related to the project.

Several safety event investigations have demonstrated deficiencies in Metrorail's radio communications systems that resulted in personnel experiencing difficulties transmitting and receiving critical information during emergencies. A review of WMSC investigations reports between April 2019 and July 2024 showed that 64 reports cited radio or communications issues. During some events, personnel had to rely on the use of cellphones or have information relayed by designated personnel on the scene. Utilizing these methods led to ineffective information sharing, confusion, slower response time and the inability to record and review pertinent conversations and information needed to conduct thorough investigations.

The WMSC also identified these issues in our 2022 communications system audit, which included 9 findings and 2 recommendations, including that Metrorail is closing preventative maintenance work orders without correcting known deficiencies, which does not comply with its Systems Maintenance (SMNT) Maintenance Control Policy. The audit also found that Metrorail personnel are not effectively communicating, responding to and identifying issues related to trouble calls pertaining to communications systems. Metrorail closes communications-related "corrective maintenance" (repair) tickets without effectively identifying, documenting and addressing issues. Several safety event

RECOMMENDATIONS:

- **Recommendation 1:** Metrorail has not determined the required staffing for ATC and Signals.
- **Recommendation 2:** Metrorail does not ensure that lessons learned from prior projects are consistently shared with all relevant personnel responsible for ATC and Signals.
- **Recommendation 3:** Metrorail does not have a procedure for the removal of hang tags in Train Control Rooms that indicate temporary modifications. This has led to many rooms having such "temporary" hang tags in place for decades.

As detailed later in this report, WMATA Metrorail, has refused to provide the WMSC with a corrective action plan to address Finding 3. As a result, on October 18, 2024, the WMSC issued a **notice of non-compliance for CAP C-0255**. All other CAPs related to this audit are open with scheduled dates of completion between August 2025 and January 2028.

Future Audit Work

The WMSC conducted preparations for and conducted on-site activities for safety audits of Metrorail's control center and rail operations programs, as well as its elevator and escalator and communication systems programs beginning in late 2024, with work continuing into 2025. Additionally, the WMSC began work on its second audit related to Metrorail's communication systems. The audit pertains to Metrorail's existing communication system, while a special study also conducted by



investigations in 2023 further confirmed these issues, with communications personnel performing inspections and reporting no issues, despite personnel reporting experiencing radio communication issues during an emergency. Metrorail is implementing the corrective action plans it developed and the WMSC approved, with expected completion dates in 2024 and 2025.

When the special study is complete, the WMSC will provide its full report to WMATA and make the report available at wmsc.gov.

FTA audit of the WMSC

In 2024, the Federal Transit Administration (FTA) conducted its triennial audit of the Washington Metrorail Safety Commission's compliance with 49 CFR Part 674, which pertains to state safety oversight of rail fixed guideway public transportation systems. During the onsite portion of the audit, the WMSC had the opportunity to provide the FTA audit team with insight and evidence on our safety oversight program. The final audit, which the FTA issued on September 20, 2024, resulted in one finding. The FTA found that the WMSC did not ensure that WMATA's CAPs included an accurate schedule. To address this finding, the WMSC created a Corrective Action Plan Approval and Disposition which was approved by the FTA on January 22, 2025.

The WMSC updated its CAP tracking log to add new data fields for the date the WMSC approved CAPs for implementation and for the anticipated closure date. This captures the 60 days that the WMSC must respond to WMATA's CAP closure request. The WMSC provided the updated CAP Tracker to the FTA as evidence of implementation.

OTHER FINDINGS, DIRECTIVES AND ACTIONS

In 2024, the WMSC issued three orders regarding roadway worker protection, train operator certification and the use of trend analysis in identifying and mitigating safety risks.

ROADWAY WORKER PROTECTION REVISIONS

In September 27, 2024, the WMSC issued an order requiring that Metrorail maintain its RWP program as it was written and implemented as of October 1, 2024. The WMSC has observed that WMATA makes numerous, separate updates to its RWP Program, including numerous and frequent changes in early 2024 that were adopted or planned for adoption. WMATA has not demonstrated the ability to ensure its workers know and are utilizing the current rules. The WMSC's **Audit of Metrorail's Roadway Worker Protection Program** found that WMATA has been training and qualifying personnel on outdated RWP-related procedures and rules, which can be partly attributed to these frequent rule changes. Ultimately, these frequent changes make it hard for workers on the track to know and follow the very rules designed to protect them.

The intended goal of this order is for Metrorail to create an annual predictable revision cycle, with exceptions to address safety risks meeting certain conditions, and for any changes resulting from WMSC-required CAPs. Complying with this order will allow Metrorail to focus on ensuring that employees are properly trained on rules that remain stable and for Metrorail to assess compliance for a reasonable duration of time before additional changes take effect.

This order requires Metrorail to:

- Maintain the existing RWP Program as implemented on October 1, 2024
- Propose for WMSC review and approval, revisions to its RWP Program and demonstrate how training will be updated, provided to transit workers, and tracked
- Provide all information gathered, including all data, that was reviewed and that supports the development and approval of Permanent Orders 24-05, 24-08, and 24-10, set to take effect October 1, 2024
- Ensure appropriate safety promotion and awareness for personnel to understand the safety implications of unauthorized deviations from documented roadway worker protection requirements and develop and implement a systematic process that ensures compliance with roadway worker protection rules



The WMSC determined that Metrorail is designating train operators as certified despite their certification documents indicating that those individuals had not attempted or successfully completed required tasks.

Metrorail Submitted to the WMSC its RWP program updates on April 14, 2025 for review and approval. At the time of this report the updates were still under review by the WMSC.

TRAIN OPERATOR CERTIFICATION

The WMSC issued an order in February 2024 regarding Metrorail's noncompliance with its train operator certification requirements. The WMSC identified in 2023 that Metrorail is not following its certification process as provided for in its Public Transportation Agency Safety Plan (PTASP) and Performance Standardization Program Manual. The WMSC communicated these deficiencies to Metrorail on multiple occasions in 2023, and in 2024. However, Metrorail allowed personnel who were not properly certified to continue to operate trains.

The WMSC reviewed 2023 train operator certification records for railcar maintenance road mechanics, who are required by Metrorail to maintain this certification due to their responsibilities, which include operating trains. Our review found deficiencies and omissions in the train operator certification process. The WMSC reviewed certification records for train operators, including records for newly certified operators and for train operators who were recertified (this recertification process includes all personnel in positions that require train operator certification such as train operators, rail supervisors and interlocking operators). The WMSC identified that Metrorail is not following its train operator certification procedures and requirements that Metrorail designed to ensure that train operators have the required skills to safely operate trains.

The WMSC determined that Metrorail is designating train operators as certified despite their certification documents indicating that those individuals had not attempted or successfully completed required tasks that are specifically included in Metrorail's Performance Standardization Program that Metrorail has developed to provide for the safety of Metrorail riders and personnel. Among other things, these tasks not attempted or successfully completed included specific certification requirements to address deficiencies identified during the 2015 fatal smoke accident near L'Enfant Plaza Station.

On October 11, 2024, Metrorail submitted a petition for reconsideration of the RWP Order to the WMSC Chief Executive Officer. Our CEO denied the petition citing Metrorail's failure to demonstrate that the WMSC lacks authority to issue or enforce the RWP Order, failure to provide facts that demonstrate that the Order is not needed, and failure to provide a viable alternative to the order. As allowed by the WMSC Program Standard, Metrorail submitted a subsequent petition for reconsideration to the WMSC commissioners. After careful evaluation, the WMSC commissioners denied WMATA's petition.

The WMSC review demonstrated that further action is required to ensure Metrorail follows its operator certification processes, and to ensure that Metrorail only uses personnel who have demonstrated their ability to operate trains safely and properly.

This order requires Metrorail to:

- Identify within 30 days employees that Metrorail has designated as certified but who have not in fact been properly certified
- Conduct proper certifications of those employees within 90 days
- Develop corrective action plans to ensure that, moving forward, certification is consistently conducted in accordance with its safety requirements

To address this order, Metrorail developed and is in the process of implementing CAPs C-0268 and C-0269. These CAPs have scheduled completion dates in February and May 2026. The WMSC continues to monitor Metrorail's progress on these CAPs through review of schedule deliverables leading up to implementation and CAP completion.



NTSB SAFETY RECOMMENDATION R-23-28

The WMSC participated as a party to the NTSB investigation into the **October 12, 2021**, derailment between Rosslyn and Arlington Cemetery stations. The WMSC's work



included responding to the scene of the final derailment, participating in track and vehicle inspections, work at other locations such as the wheelset manufacturer facility, data identification and analysis, working group meetings, and other activities. As a result of that investigation the NTSB recommended in **Safety Recommendation R-23-28** that Metrorail "implement processes and resources to expand

the role of trend analysis in identifying and mitigating safety risks."

As Metrorail's safety regulator, the WMSC has the authority and responsibility under the WMSC Compact and federal regulation to determine whether the NTSB's findings and recommendations require Metrorail to develop a corrective action plan. For the reasons listed by the NTSB in Railroad

Investigation Report **RIR-23-15** (dated December 12, 2023, released on January 4, 2023), the WMSC determined that the recommendation requires Metrorail to develop a corrective action plan. Therefore, on January 17, 2024, the WMSC issued **an order** requiring Metrorail to develop a corrective action plan (CAP) to address Safety Recommendation R-23-28. Under this order Metrorail is required to develop the corrective action plan in accordance with the WMSC Program Standard.



The WMSC started implementation of the NTSB's recommendation (**R-23-29**), that the WMSC "Develop and implement a program to support and monitor the Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority's use of trend analysis within its safety management system" as part of our ongoing oversight program. We expect to incorporate Metrorail's improved data processes into our assessments.



SUBPEONA AND PETITION FOR ENFORCEMENT

On April 8, 2024, the WMSC was compelled to issue a subpoena (SCT-2024-0001) to WMATA Metrorail due to Metrorail's refusal to provide the WMSC with all documents and records required by the WMSC to initiate our triennial audit of Metrorail's fitness for duty and occupational health programs. The WMSC sent its Initial Request for Documents on February 9, 2024. The **WMSC Compact** provides clear authority to conduct this audit and receive these records. Further, FTA regulation 49 CFR 674.27 requires the WMSC to audit WMATA's compliance with its **Public Agency Safety Plan (PTASP)**. WMATA's PTASP, Version 4.0, which was effective on December 31, 2023, at the time of the document request and the subpoena, includes the Department of Safety and Readiness. Metrorail's Department of Safety and Readiness functions include occupational health and wellness and within that subgroup there are programs aligned with Occupational Health, Employee Health and Wellness, and Health Quality and Compliance.

Specific to drug and alcohol testing, the Office of Occupational Health and Wellness administers the Substance Abuse Testing Program, which includes drug and alcohol testing. Safety investigations, for example, also must be conducted in compliance with Metrorail's Drug and Alcohol Policy and Testing Program, and drug and alcohol compliance programs are sources of data that Metrorail departments must monitor to reduce safety risks.

The WMSC is responsible for ensuring Metrorail complies with its safety commitments and requirements. Conducting audits is a key part of how the WMSC fulfills this responsibility. The requested documents are the information the WMSC needs to inform and initiate this audit, and the WMSC has made similar document requests and received responsive documents as part of the 22 other audits it had conducted of Metrorail prior to this one.

Although some progress was made on some of the requests, WMATA refused to produce documents concerning worker safety. Therefore, on October 31, 2024, following WMATA Metrorail's refusal to comply with the WMSC's subpoena, the WMSC filed a petition for summary enforcement of the administrative subpoena and an order to show cause with the United States District Court for the District of Columbia. At the time of this report, the case has been assigned to a magistrate judge and both the WMSC and WMATA are awaiting further direction from that magistrate judge. Subsequently, WMATA has refused to provide the WMSC with additional documents requested for audit work in other subject areas covered under its PTASP and has ceased communication with the WMSC regarding work on corrective action plan development and implementation in areas they now asserted are related to occupational health, worker safety and the ongoing legal proceedings. In some cases, WMATA's stance has led the WMSC to issue **notices of non-compliance**, which are detailed in the next section of this report.



CORRECTIVE ACTION PLANS



Corrective Action Plans

After the WMSC issues findings, Metrorail must develop and implement Corrective Action Plans (CAPs) to resolve the issues and reduce the risk of future safety events.

Metrorail submits proposed CAPs to the WMSC for review so the WMSC can ensure that the plans, when fully and properly implemented, will address the finding. In the event any adjustments to the plans are needed, Metrorail submits proposed modifications to the WMSC for review and approval.

The WMSC approved 49 CAPs for implementation and 42 CAPs for closure in 2024, including those related to maintenance, document control, system safety, hazard management and training. In addition to developing 47 corrective action plans to address findings and recommendations from WMSC audit reports, WMATA developed 2 corrective action plans to address WMSC orders.


Examples of CAPs Closed in 2024

CAP C-0138 was created to address the **2021 Revenue Vehicles Audit** finding that Metrorail did not receive all necessary original equipment manufacturer documentation, parts, or tools. Metrorail developed new procedures and processes to require vendors to provide documentation and special tool and part lists at the time of procurement. Metrorail also created a list of all required tools in each shop, conducted an inventory of shops to determine what tools were needed, and provided a follow up inventory to show progress towards acquisition of any tools identified as missing.


During the **2020 Rail Operations Control Center audit**, the WMSC found that Metrorail did not have a standardized training program for personnel working as Maintenance Operations Controllers or Rail Operations Information Controllers in the Rail Operations Control Center (now the Metrorail Integrated Command and Communications Center or MICC). As part of CAP C-0068, Metrorail developed and provided the WMSC with the materials and documentation verifying the use of that training curriculum to train active personnel for their roles.

CAP C-0165 addressed a finding from our **2022 Emergency Management and Fire Life Safety Programs audit** that Metro Transit Police General Orders did not reflect current operational realities and procedures, or evaluations from prior events. Metro

Transit Police reviewed and updated General Orders on their Incident Command System and re-trained personnel. Metrorail also created a work instruction for compiling, sharing, and implementing Lessons Learned and information from After-Action Reports and debriefs. The WMSC also approved closure of another corrective action plan from the same audit, CAP C-0166. This CAP addressed the finding that Metrorail's calls to public safety answering points (911 call centers) were inconsistent, incomplete and contribute to delayed or ineffective emergency response. In response to this, Metrorail consulted with the Metropolitan Washington Council of Governments to review current practices and procedures. Metrorail updated its Control Center 911 call scripts to include the required information and instituted a more standardized incident type specific format. Control Center personnel were trained on the updated procedures/scripts and drills were completed for Metrorail personnel to ensure proper ongoing usage. Relatedly in our second triennial **Audit of Metrorail's Emergency Management and Life Safety Programs**, which was conducted in 2024 and issued in January 2025, the WMSC found that Metrorail is not contacting jurisdictional emergency services immediately upon notification of fire and smoke on the Metrorail system. At the time of this report, the CAP to address this finding, CAP C-0297, was in development.



On April 30, 2021, following several safety event investigations, including a collision involving a track geometry vehicle at Branch Avenue Rail Yard and a red signal overrun at West Falls Church Rail Yard, and subsequent inspections, the **WMSC issued an order** related to radio communication and uncoordinated movement in rail yards. CAP C-0101 addressed one of the order's findings that Metrorail does not have, provide training on, or otherwise follow specific rules related to rail vehicle and switch movement in non-signalized territory. As part of the corrective action, Metrorail issued a permanent order to define non-powered storage tracks, list the locations of these tracks, and govern rail vehicle operation for these locations. Metrorail issued a separate permanent order to note that the Interlocking Operator is to be



contacted for all collisions, emergencies, derailments, and near misses within non-controlled storage tracks. Training for relevant personnel was updated to incorporate these permanent orders.

In September 2024, the WMSC approved for closure CAP C-0084, which addressed the **2021 Roadway Maintenance Machine audit** finding that Metrorail was not following and did not have effective safety certification and acceptance procedures for new Roadway Maintenance Machines (RMMs). There was no Metro-wide safety certification procedure to implement the Safety and Security Certification Plan (SSCP). To mitigate the hazard for vehicles already at Metrorail that had been obtained in the time leading up to the 2021 audit, Metrorail developed occupational hazard analyses for 21 rail maintenance machines that had not undergone appropriate certification processes at the time of the audit and mitigated identified hazards. Metrorail also developed an acceptance procedure and improved their Safety and Security Certification Program Plan. Metrorail developed training curricula for contract representatives and relevant project managers to ensure they are aware of safety certification requirements.

C-0185 was created to address the **2022 Rail Operations audit** finding that Metrorail was not effectively training and certifying personnel authorized to operate trains on all active railcar fleets. This corrective action focused on personnel having training on each type of revenue vehicle. We are continuing to monitor **Metrorail's Train Operator Certification Program** through our February 2024 order and the two related CAPs, C-0268 and C-0269 that are in the process of being implemented with completion dates scheduled between February and May 2026.

Ongoing CAP Implementation and Oversight

Submittal Verification and Closure Requests

Once the WMSC approves a CAP for implementation, Metrorail must carry out the plan. When the plan is complete, Metrorail submits a detailed request to close the corrective action plan including evidence of completion for WMSC review. The WMSC monitors implementation of the corrective action plan and closes the corrective action plan once WMATA has shown that it has been fully completed. Corrective action plan closures show that WMATA is following through with its plans and commitments to improve identified deficiencies within the Metrorail system.

When Metrorail submits requests for CAP closure the WMSC reviews supporting documentation provided by WMATA and conducts oversight activities to ensure that each aspect of the CAP has been carried out and addresses the finding it was created to remedy.

In some instances, the WMSC's oversight activities conducted to verify implementation of a CAP lead to rejection of Metrorail's request for closure. For example, on October 30, 2024, during onsite verification activities related to CAP C-0222, WMSC personnel identified an active water leak in the B01 Gallery Place communications room. The CAP was created to address a finding from the **2022 communications system audit** that Metrorail communications rooms have signs of recurring water, dirt and dust intrusion. During the verification activities, a bucket which was nearly full was observed being used to catch water.

The water had splashed onto the floor and was pooling, encroaching on equipment and connectors on the ground attached to rack equipment. Additional documentation provided by WMATA also indicated 26 work orders had been created related to this issue over the past five years, with one still open. Additionally, a December 19, 2024, WMATA memorandum confirmed there was currently “no projected timeline for completion” of this work, and that “this mitigation is not included in the capital improvement plan.” Therefore, the WMSC required Metrorail to provide a CAP modification request that ensures water intrusion is identified and addressed on an ongoing basis in order to meet the CAP requirement. On February 24, 2025, Metrorail submitted a modification request that the WMSC reviewed and determined was insufficient. While it outlined the additional procedural and process steps that Metrorail would institute, it did not include steps to provide evidence of verification that the water intrusion issues that have been identified at present had been addressed, and evidence that similar locations of issue that will be identified during the process of this CAP will be addressed. After resubmission, the WMSC approved the CAP modification request, which included an extension. The CAP now has a scheduled completion date of June 2026.

CAP Modification

In some cases, as provided for in the WMSC Program Standard, Section 9.C.4, CAP Modifications, the WMSC may identify existing corrective action plans that require modifications. For example, under CAP C-0171, Metrorail was required to develop a procedure for regular inspection and maintenance of their station medical cabinets. This CAP was created to address a finding from the **2022 Emergency Management and Fire and Life Safety Programs audit** that Emergency Equipment in station medical cabinets was expired and covered in dirt. There was no inspection procedure or responsible party assigned to inspect and maintain this safety equipment. In July 2024, while implementing the CAP, Metrorail discovered the presence of lead in the cabinets. This new hazard



resulted in an extension request by WMATA that was granted by the WMSC as a modification to the existing CAP to allow time for lead remediation. Metrorail completed the specific task of remediating the medical cabinets identified in C-0171 via a contracted hazardous materials vendor and equipment previously stored in the cabinets was transferred to cases in mezzanine fire equipment closets, leading to CAP closure. Metrorail continues to refuse communication with the WMSC on the lead issue based on their challenge of the WMSC’s oversight of occupational safety as mentioned earlier in this report.


Even after CAPs are closed the WMSC continues its oversight to ensure that corrective action plans remain implemented and effective as intended, in accordance with WMATA’s responsibility to maintain safety improvements long-term. Implementing and completing a corrective action plan is a demonstration of continuous safety improvement, as each corrective action plan helps to make Metrorail safer.

Notices of Non-compliance

WMSC Program Standard, Section 11.B, Notice, allows the WMSC to issue a notice of non-compliance in the event WMATA fails to comply with any provision of the Program Standard. While monitoring WMATA’s progress on addressing identified hazards through our oversight work, the WMSC has determined that WMATA is not complying with the requirements of their corrective action plans in some instances. In 2024, these failures led the WMSC to issue four notices of non-compliance.

NOTICE OF NON-COMPLIANCE FOR CAP C-0272, ISSUED OCTOBER 18, 2024

As part of the **2024 WMSC audit of Metrorail’s Revenue Vehicles (Railcar) Program**, the WMSC found that Metrorail is putting its personnel at risk by not meeting its life-safety and occupational safety and health requirements in railcar maintenance facilities.





NOTICE OF NON-COMPLIANCE FOR CAP C-0255, ISSUED OCTOBER 18, 2024

During the **2024 WMSC audit of Metrorail's Automatic Train Control (ATC) and Signals Program**, the WMSC found that

Metrorail is putting its personnel at risk due to health hazards such as damaged and repositioned materials marked as containing asbestos that are not being identified and managed as required by its Agency Safety Plan.



Metrorail drafted a corrective action plan for C-0255 on February 20, 2024, and the CAP development process was progressing as required. A new revision of this draft CAP was expected to be provided by Metrorail by April 19, 2024, however, on April 18, 2024, Metrorail informed the WMSC that a CAP would not be provided to address this finding. The WMSC has not received any revised CAP as required since that April 2024 submission.

NOTICE OF NON-COMPLIANCE FOR CAP C-0072, ISSUED OCTOBER 15, 2024

As part of the **2021 Audit of Elevated Structures Inspection, Maintenance and Repair**, the WMSC


identified that Metrorail does not have basic load ratings for its elevated structures to confirm the number or type of trains or size of equipment that can safely traverse the bridges or stations, which creates a risk that, among other risks, the structures could be inadvertently overloaded or delay in determining whether a structure is safe for train traffic if an inspector identifies a potential concern. Load ratings are an industry standard and basic engineering information that Metrorail should have.



The major issues identified by this finding, and for which C-0272 must address, include:

- Not complying with its hot works program related to metal grinding
- Improper NFPA signage
- Issues with required fall protection in place around repair pits
- Personnel have differing understandings of the personal protective equipment and safety practices required during lifting operations
- Hazards related to grease control and compressed gas.
- Issues with eyewash stations that were past due for cartridge replacement

Program Standard Section 9.C.3.a requires that Metrorail propose a suitable CAP 30 days from the date the WMSC issues a finding or recommendation. The draft CAP for C-0272 was due no later than June 20, 2024, however, on that date, Metrorail informed the WMSC that a CAP would not be provided to address this finding.




This deficiency is of particular relevance because Metrorail is contemplating speed increases for its trains. Vehicle speed is a direct factor in determining the dynamic load placed on an aerial structure. Consequently, to safely increase maximum vehicle speed, it is necessary to know the load rating of all structures over which trains travel.

As a result of identifying Metrorail's lack of load ratings in the 2021 Elevated Structures audit, the WMSC required the implementation of corrective action plan C-0072, which was over a year behind the approved schedule at the time the notice of non-compliance was issued. Metrorail indicated it expects its efforts to require an additional 10 months, with a completion date in May 2025.

In order for Metrorail to return to compliance with C-0072, it must complete all elevated structures load ratings as required by this CAP.

NOTICE OF NON-COMPLIANCE FOR CAPC-0146, ISSUED AUGUST 22, 2024

CAP C-0146 was created to address a recommendation from the **2021 Revenue Vehicles (Railcar) audit**. The WMSC identified that Metrorail railcars do not include inward and outward-facing audio and image recorders in all operating compartments. The report noted that Metrorail would benefit from including audio recordings as recommended by the National Transportation Safety Board safety recommendation R-17-013 and the **Federal**



Transit Administration Safety Bulletin 20-2. More recently, in 2023, the Federal Railroad Administration announced a final rule requiring the installation of inward- and outward-facing image recording devices on all passenger train lead locomotives providing scheduled intercity rail passenger or commuter service.





On August 9, 2024, the approved project plan was due for camera and audio recording equipment procurement, installation, and testing for 6000 and 7000 series railcars. Instead, Metrorail submitted a memorandum on August 12, 2024, stating that Metrorail currently has no clear timeline or plan for the execution of C-0146.

Based on WMSC Program Standard, Section 11.B, the WMSC issued a notice of non-compliance to Metrorail on August 22, 2024. In the notice, the WMSC required Metrorail to submit the project plan, which is Actionable Item 1 of the CAP, by September 12, 2024, to return to compliance. The WMSC received the project plan on September 9, 2024. That project plan indicates the completion of camera and audio recording equipment testing, procurement, and installation for all 6000 and 7000 series railcars, which was initially scheduled to be completed by July 15, 2026, will now not be completed until September 2028.

As stated in each notice of non-compliance, for Metrorail to return to compliance for these CAPs, Metrorail must follow all processes regarding Corrective Action Plans as outlined in WMSC Program Standard Section 9.C.

A full list of CAPs WMATA is working to complete can be found on our website at wmata.wmsc.gov.

SAFETY EVENTS



Safety Events

Overall, Metrorail reported 1,071 safety events to the WMSC in 2024, an increase from the 859 total safety events reported in 2023. The WMSC Program Standard defines events that are formally reportable to the WMSC as either an accident, incident, or occurrence. Investigations are required to be conducted on events that may have broader safety implications, and the WMSC Program Standard requires that certain investigations be documented in a final report for WMSC adoption. These requirements are based on FTA regulations and WMSC operational experience.

Some of the most common safety events to occur in 2024 were related to customer injury (minor) that required transport and collisions involving a rail vehicle on the mainline, yard or shop that did not result in a fatality, serious injury or substantial property damage. Not all reported events require a final investigation report. In 2024, the WMSC adopted 102 final safety event investigation reports. Notable safety events in 2024 included a **July 22, 2024**, evacuation for life safety reasons event at Benning Road Station, further detailed below, where several deficiencies were identified including those related to operational decisions, logistical collaboration, power de-energization and restoration, adherence to policies

and procedures, fan configuration and communication.

Other investigations included red signal overruns, improper roadway worker protection and improper train movement, some of which are highlighted below. Complete final safety event investigation reports are available at wmsc.gov/reports.

Improper Roadway Worker Protection Events


The WMSC has identified several safety concerns related to Metrorail's Roadway Worker Protection (RWP) program and the program's implementation, including repeated issues with training and adherence to established procedures. There were 34 improper roadway worker protection safety events reported to the WMSC in 2024. This is a decrease from the 51 improper RWP events that required final investigation reports last year.

W-0335 - Unauthorized Roadway Entry - near College Park-UMD Station - July 4, 2023 -

Two Power Department Low Voltage Technicians entered the roadway near College Park-UMD Station on track 1

without permission or protection against roadway vehicle collision. An Office of Rail Transportation Supervisor who was operating Train 502, identified the personnel on the roadway and transmitted an emergency communication via radio notifying a Rail Traffic Controller in the Rail

Operations Control Center of the personnel on the roadway.



Some of the Most Common Safety Events of 2024




The Technicians had been granted Foul Time on track 2 to conduct tunnel light inspections by the Rail Traffic Controller. The Technicians accessed the roadway through a fan shaft, without the required permission from both the Maintenance Operations Control Center Power Desk and the Rail Traffic Controller. The Rail Supervisor stated to the Assistant Operations Manager in the ROCC that the crew was standing on the catwalk on track 1 holding onto cables on the wall as the train the Supervisor was operating approached them. The Supervisor stated they sounded their horn, stopped the train and reported the near-miss event to the Rail Traffic Controller.

During an investigative interview, the Low Voltage Technicians reported experiencing intermittent radio communications transmission issue throughout the night. Subsequent radio checks conducted by Office of Radio Communication personnel could not duplicate the issues described. The WMSC began conducting its second audit of WMATA's communication systems in spring 2025.

► **W-0345 - Improper Roadway Worker Protection - Deanwood Station**


March 21, 2024 -

Miscommunication between an Automatic Train Control (ATC) Roadway Worker In Charge (RWIC) and a Radio Rail Traffic Controller in the Metro Integrated Command and



Communications Center (MICC) lead to an improper roadway worker protection event at Deanwood Station. An ATC mobile work crew had been conducting shunt verifications on the Orange Line when the crew's Roadway Worker In Charge requested Foul Time protection from the Radio Rail Traffic Controller to continue their work at Deanwood Station. It was not until the RWIC relinquished Foul Time that the Controller realized the crew had entered the roadway without the proper form of protection, at which time the Controller directed the crew to stand clear of the roadway and notified the MICC Assistant Operations Manager.

The WMSC issued an order regarding Metrorail's Roadway Worker Protection (RWP) Program, requiring WMATA to maintain its RWP Program until it can develop a process for making annual revisions.



The investigation into the event determined the Controller understood the request to be for AMF protection, not Foul Time, and therefore, the Controller failed to put protections in place required under Foul Time to protect the crew, including blue blocks and red signals. This error could have resulted in a collision with a rail vehicle. This event demonstrates the necessity for repeating back radio communications to ensure intended messages are conveyed correctly and understood.

As mentioned earlier in the report, on September 27, 2024, the **WMSC issued an order regarding Metrorail's Roadway Worker Protection (RWP) Program**, requiring WMATA to maintain its RWP Program until it can develop a process for making annual revisions, including appropriate training updates. WMATA is in the process of implementing CAPs C-0280 through C-0292 (Scheduled completion dates between June 2025 and August 2028).




to contact the Interlocking Operator at the Brentwood Yard Tower for permission to enter the rail yard. Minutes later, the Button Rail Traffic Controller identified that PM-39 had passed Signal B99-06, a red (stop) signal.

This event highlights the need for territory familiarization training. While the majority of signals on the roadway throughout the Metrorail system are located on the right side of the track, signal B99-06 is located on the left side. During an investigative interview, the Equipment Operator, who had less than one year of experience in the position, stated they were unfamiliar with the Red Line due to limited on-the-job training.

► **W-0352 - Anacostia Station - April 19, 2024**

- A Train Operator moved Green Line Train 528 past a red signal at Anacostia Station on track 2. Prior to the event, Green Line trains were passing red signals at Naylor Road Station due to a down track circuit. The Train Operator notified the Rail Traffic Controller that their train lost speed commands in the center of the platform at Anacostia Station. The Rail Traffic Controller granted the Train Operator a permissive block to berth the train on the platform at the 8-car marker, advised that signal F06-08 was red and instructed the Train Operator to standby. The Train Operator repeated the instructions as required by Metrorail rules. The Train Operator then entered Stop and Proceed, a mode that enables train operators to take a point of power in the absence of speed commands. Stop and Proceed mode does not reset after a door operation until the train gets speed commands. After the Train Operator serviced the station, the mode remained active, allowing the Train operator to continue on despite the red signal and contrary to the direction provided by the Rail Traffic Controller.




Red Signal Overruns

Metrorail reported 14 red signal overruns in 2024, an increase from nine in 2023, and eight in 2022. As of March 15, 2025, there have been 5 such events reported in 2025. The causes of and contributing factors to the red signal overrun events described in more detail below included non-compliance with operational rules, procedures and instructions, inadequate training and loss of situational awareness.

► **W-0351 - Brentwood Rail Yard - April 11, 2024**

- While being transported from the mainline to the Brentwood Rail Yard following, Prime Mover 39 (PM-39) moved past a red signal without permission. Just prior to this improper movement, the Radio Rail Traffic Controller in Metrorail's Control Center granted PM-39's Equipment

Operator an absolute block to no closer than 10 feet of signal B99-06 red and instructed the Equipment Operator




This created a near-miss of a head on collision with another train that reversed ends outside the station platform limits on the same track and had just crossed over to opposite track as the Train Operator of Train 528 overran the red signal.

As part of the **WMSC's order regarding Metrorail's noncompliance with its train operator certification requirements** issued in February 2024, Metrorail identified that the Train Operator, who completed their certification exam in December 2023, was only tested on one of the required types of scenarios.

The WMSC and Metrorail's Safety Department continue to discuss with Railcar Engineering the opportunity to improve engineering controls, such as Stop and Proceed Mode on existing railcars or the next generation of railcars, the 8000 Series, so that it resets after actions such as door operation or key up/key down if feasible. Metrorail designed Stop and Proceed Mode (Mode Awareness Tool) to ensure that operators acknowledged that they would be moving a train with zero speed commands prior to doing so, as this is only allowed with specific permission from the control point due to the risk of collision or derailment.

Metrorail is implementing related corrective action plan CAP C-0183, which addresses the 2022 WMSC rail operations audit finding that Metrorail creates safety risks by not requiring and conducting territory familiarization and physical characteristics training, and not assessing knowledge of physical characteristics prior to assigning personnel work on a line, in a terminal or in a yard. WMATA did not initially begin on January 23, 2023, as required under its corrective action plan. After two revisions to the plan in 2023, an extension was granted in 2024 for action items 4 and 5. The WMSC approved a third CAP modification request from WMATA in April 2025, with a new scheduled completion date of October 16, 2026. This is an example of the iterative process sometimes necessary to ensure a corrective action plan is effectively created and implemented to address the identified program deficiency. In this case, the




Metrorail creates safety risks by not requiring and conducting territory familiarization and physical characteristics training.

initial training method created to address the finding was insufficient and required modifications to ensure adequate training curriculum and delivery.

Additionally, Metrorail is continuing work on implement CAP C-0268, which addresses the 2020 Train Operator Certification Order finding addresses that Metrorail is not performing its train operator certification activities reliably and consistently in accordance with its safety requirements specified in its Agency Safety Plan and the associated Performance Standardization on Program Manual. Therefore, Metrorail is not

ensuring that its trains are only operated by personnel who have demonstrated the skills required to do so safely (Scheduled CAP completion March 2026, interim steps required by the order were implemented between March and July 2024.

Improper Train Movement



► W-0366 - Improper Vehicle Movement - Dupont Circle Station - July 21, 2024 -

On Sunday, July 21, 2024, the Train Operator of Red Line Train 124 misunderstood instructions provided by a Rail Traffic Controller in the Control Center and moved their train against the normal flow of traffic toward a passenger-occupied train, causing a near-miss event that could have resulted in a head-on train collision. At the time, trains were passing red signals with permission from the Control Center and single tracking due to a track circuit malfunction and disabled train at Friendship Heights Station.

Several deficiencies were identified during the investigation into this event, including the Rail Traffic Controller's failure to include specific station names or direction of travel in their instructions and the Train Operator's failure to follow established policies and procedures. With zero speed commands indicated, Metrorail policy requires the Train



Operator to contact the Controller for authorization. However, the Train Operator improperly placed the train in Stop and Proceed mode without permission and proceeded approximately 815 feet against the normal flow of traffic toward Farragut North Station, directly toward


passenger-occupied Train 126. After repeated unsuccessful attempts to contact the Train Operator, the Rail Traffic Controller finally made contact and instructed the Train Operator to stop immediately. The Operator stopped the train approximately 420 feet from Train 126, narrowly avoiding a head-on collision.

As a result of this event, Metrorail issued a staff notice instructing Control Center personnel that, whenever a train's operating end moves opposite the normal direction of traffic, the Rail Traffic Controller must verify and confirm the Train Operator's correct positioning at the proper operating end using terminal names before authorizing movement.

Metrorail is implementing related corrective action plan CAP C-0183, which addresses the 2022 WMSC rail operations audit finding that Metrorail creates safety risks by not requiring and conducting territory familiarization and physical characteristics training, and not assessing knowledge of physical characteristics prior to assigning personnel work on a line, in a terminal or in a yard (Scheduled completion date of October 16, 2026).

► W-0367 - Pentagon Station - August 17, 2024 - A

Train Operator boarded the operator's cab at the incorrect end of the train during an operator change-off, and with no speed commands present, entered Stop and Proceed mode without the required permission or protection against collision from the Control Center. The Train



Operator then began operating the train against the normal flow of train traffic. Train Operator #1 had not conducted the required visual and verbal change-off with Train Operator #2, who had been operating the train on the opposite end of the train. Train Operator #2, who had been waiting for the change-off with Train Operator #1, identified the improper movement and notified a Rail Traffic Controller in the Control Center. The Rail Traffic Controller instructed Train Operator #1 to stop the train. The train came to a stop after traveling approximately 144 feet.

At the beginning of the event, the Button Rail Traffic Controller was working alone, performing duties of both the Radio and Button Rail Traffic Controller, as the Radio Rail Traffic Controller had left the console for approximately 10 minutes on a personal break.

Metrorail is implementing related corrective action plan CAP C-0056, which addresses the 2020 ROCC Audit finding that Metrorail’s ROCC recruitment and retention approach is failing (Scheduled completion date October 2025).

Customer Evacuation for Life Safety Reasons

There were 9 customer evacuation for life safety reasons event reports adopted in 2024.


For example, on **July 22, 2024**, Benning Road Station and passengers on multiple trains were evacuated due to heavy smoke later determined to be caused by an arcing insulator. The investigation identified several deficiencies related to the response during this event, including those related to adherence to established policies and procedures, logistical collaboration, operational decisions, power de-energization and restoration, radio transmission quality, communication and fan configuration, which caused delays and hampered efforts to quickly resolve the event.



The deficiencies identified during the investigation included:


- Radio transmission challenges reported by MTPD personnel several times throughout the safety event, resulting in the use of cellphones to communicate.
- Initial confusion between the Train Operator who reported smoke and the Rail Traffic Controller regarding the location of the train.
- Confusion regarding power reconfiguration delayed confirmation that power was de-energized and caused trains to be rerouted twice.
- The required power restoration process was not followed, including restoration prior to proper authorization, due to inadequate training and safety promotion.
- The ineffectiveness of the Emergency Fan Playbook led to multiple requests for fan reconfiguration.
- At the time the event began the Rail Traffic Controller who received the report of smoke was working alone, conducting the duties of both the Radio Rail Traffic Controller and a Buttons Rail Traffic Controller.

Metrorail is revising its Incident Management Framework for reporting and communication protocols to address response and communication issues. In addition to previously mentioned CAP C-0056. Metrorail is in the process of implementing CAP C-0170, which addresses the finding from the **2022 Audit of Emergency Management and Fire Life Safety Programs**, that Metrorail does not routinely conduct hazard assessments to evaluate and prioritize fire and life safety and emergency management issues (Scheduled completion date June 2025).





INSPECTIONS




Inspections

WMSC experts regularly inspect various aspects of the Metrorail system. The WMSC has been conducting inspections of the WMATA Rail System since 2019. On October 21, 2022, the Federal Transit Administration issued **Special Directive 22-50**, which required the WMSC to develop and implement a risk-based inspection program as required by 49 U.S.C. § 5329(k). The WMSC codified the integration of the FTA-approved risk-based aspects into our already approved inspection program by issuing an interim revision to our **Program Standard on November 15, 2024**. Prior to the implementation of these updates, the WMSC provided WMATA several opportunities to provide feedback through joint meetings as well as written comment. The WMSC carefully reviewed that feedback and incorporated changes where appropriate.

The WMSC began implementation of the new program in December 2024. These inspections and related oversight work include onsite activities such as training observations, walking the Metrorail right of way, riding trains or maintenance vehicles, observing activities in rail yards and maintenance facilities, data and document analysis, communications monitoring and review, video review, and frequent discussions with Metrorail personnel from frontline workers to the General Manager and Chief Safety Officer.

The work includes frequent interaction with frontline and supervisory personnel and inspections of track and structures, signaling equipment, traction power equipment, railcars, rail yards, elevators and escalators, and the Metro Integrated Command and Communications Center (MICC). The WMSC also monitors Metrorail's emergency preparedness and emergency drills that are conducted in coordination with local, state and federal first responder agencies.

At the conclusion of each inspection, a written summary is provided or an oral debrief occurs. This serves to share any concerns, defects, or non-compliance issues, which are conveyed to the relevant WMATA personnel responsible as well as to WMATA's Department of Safety. WMSC Inspectors prepare inspection reports that are posted at wmata.gov/wmsc. The WMSC's website contains 91 reports pertaining to inspections that were conducted in 2024.



Emergency Exercises

In 2024, WMSC personnel observed full-scale emergency exercises conducted at WMATA, including one that took place at **Benning Road Station on April 27, 2024**.

During the exercise, WMSC personnel identified what they believed to be a possible Roadway Worker Protection (RWP) violation.

WMATA personnel participating in the exercise did not report to mobile command for a safety briefing as required by Metrorail policy, but instead reported directly to the station to begin work on the roadway, installing safety equipment.

The **investigation into this event** found incomplete and inaccurate documentation and information. For example, the Employee-In-Charge (EIC) signed the Roadway Job Safety Briefing (RJSB) form despite assigning this responsibility to a



crew member. Members of the crew did not sign the Roadway Job Safety Briefing form, as required by Metrorail policy. The crew was granted permission by Mobile Command, who did not confirm that the EIC attended a job safety briefing, to enter the roadway at Benning Road Station to conduct their work. During an investigative interview, the EIC stated that they had on previous occasions set up safety equipment before conducting a job safety briefing, demonstrating a pattern of non-compliance and unsafe practices.

RWP rules and procedures vary during shutdowns when Mobile Command is activated and these rules sometime contradict rules in the Metrorail Operating Rulebook, which can lead to confusion and inconsistent practices. The WMSC's 2023 audit of Metrorail's Roadway Worker Protection Program found that Metrorail is not following its existing safety rules and does not have adequate training and supervisory oversight to ensure safe operation under mobile command. Metrorail will address this finding under CAP C-0286, which is due for completion in February 2026. As mentioned earlier in the report, the WMSC issued an **RWP-related order** on September 27, 2024 requiring WMATA to maintain its RWP Program until it can develop a process for making annual revisions, including appropriate training updates.


Train Control Rooms

On December 5, 2024, the WMSC conducted a risk-based inspection of Train Control Rooms (TCR) on the Red Line at 13 stations to verify CAP-0213, which was created to address the 2022 **WMSC Train**


Control Room Order finding that Metrorail has an ineffective and insufficient inspection, maintenance and cleaning program for the Automatic Train Control equipment, particularly including a lack of required tools, procedural compliance, and supervisory oversight for care of vital equipment housed in train control rooms and is not maintaining the structural integrity of these ancillary rooms.

WMSC Inspection Report 20241205B identified seven potential defects:

- Lead acid batteries without metallic leads guarded, stored within metal lockers near accelerants
- Fire extinguishers at two stations had not been signed off as having their condition check/confirmed as required



- In 9 of the 13 TCRs inspected, hazardous materials or chemicals were observed, including combustibles, flammables and corrosives
- Damaged or missing flooring, posing a slip or trip hazard
- Cable jumpers and various copper interconnect cable heads were observed hanging from racks that were blue tagged to indicate their status
- Outdated copies of pre-printed data sheets from various revisions of the ATC 1000 Instructions for Testing and Inspection of ATC Apparatus System were observed in multiple TCRs
- An extender board, which was modified without the required approval, was found sitting atop a box on improperly stored cans in a cabinet with other discarded equipment



As a result of this inspection Metrorail issued a memo outlining seven remedial actions that were taken because of this inspection. All remedial actions were completed in December 2024. However, the damage or missing flooring in TCR rooms is an ongoing remedial project Metrorail is undertaking for all TCR rooms throughout the Metrorail system. This is an ongoing process. Follow-up inspections are scheduled in 2025.


Yard Switch Inspection

On March 13, 2024, WMSC inspectors performed an inspection at Greenbelt Rail Yard, observing WMATA's Automation Train Control Maintenance personnel as they performed the ATC 1007A Alstom Model 6 (monthly) Switch Inspection. The purpose of this monthly inspection is for personnel to perform the visual inspection of the exterior and interior of the switch machine layout, perform indication and correspondence verification, ensure correct contact configuration, check operating voltage, and ensure the voltage reading is within operating tolerance, and to perform dynamic snubbing testing.

Inspectors identified non-compliance issues and concerns including:

- Not following Roadway Job Safety Briefing requirements
- Not carrying out all steps specified in inspection procedures
- Records showing measurements taken outside of defined tolerances, with no work order recorded to address the detected out-of-tolerance
- Availability of outdated rules in Yard Tower co-located with current version of rules
- Non-functioning CCTV screen in Yard Tower
- The presence of handheld radio on Yard Tower console that was out of calibration
- On the Interlocking Control Panel board there are two Switch Position(s) switches which are broken

WMSC Inspectors also noted radio communications transmissions quality issues intermittently throughout the yard. Metrorail is in the process of implementing related CAP C-0100, which was created to address the finding that Metrorail is not maintaining a fully functioning radio communications system in all rail yards and shops (Scheduled completion date December 2026).



PUBLIC TRANSPORTATION AGENCY SAFETY PLAN (PTASP)

As required by the WMSC Program Standard and Federal Transit Administration (FTA) regulations, WMATA's Public Transportation Agency Safety Plan (PTASP) includes Metrorail's commitment to and process for implementation of Safety Management System (SMS). This is a proactive, data driven approach to safety management emphasizing continuous improvement through commitments from each member of the organization.

The Public Transportation Agency Safety Plan is intended as a living document, subject to regular updates as part of continuous safety improvement. In accordance with the WMSC Program Standard and Federal Regulation, Metrorail must review its plan at least annually. Metrorail completed its fifth revision of its PTASP in 2024.

WMSC staff provided detailed feedback to Metrorail regarding its proposed 2024 revisions before Metrorail presented its revisions to its board of directors. The WMSC Board considered and approved the revision on December 10, 2024.

The 2024 revisions to WMATA's PTASP included revision of performance targets, adding provisions for major events. WMATA also updated its employee safety reporting program by outlining the five reporting categories, including reports made to the Office of the Inspector General and the safety hotline. Additionally, WMATA added language to expressly state that it has and will continue to provide the WMSC direct electronic data system access as required by the WMSC Program Standard.

The WMSC assessed this revision in accordance with WMSC processes utilizing an FTA-recommended checklist and the WMSC's experience and expertise. The WMSC is focused on ensuring that Metrorail is proactive, acts on, tracks and investigates hazards and risks as required by the SMS approach,

and allows easy reporting of concerns from frontline workers, along with providing proper feedback and protections for those reports.

Metrorail's other documented policies and procedures are also implemented using this high-level document. Overseeing and verifying Metrorail's implementation of these documented safety commitments is a basic element of the WMSC Program Standard, and a basic responsibility specified in the WMSC Compact. If the WMSC identifies that Metrorail is not following its safety requirements we take the necessary action to require Metrorail to correct that safety issue.

The WMSC will continue to oversee implementation of the PTASP through our audits, inspections, and other oversight.



PROGRAM STANDARD

The WMSC will continue to oversee implementation of the PTASP through our audits, inspections, and other oversight.



The WMSC regularly examines ways to continually improve its oversight work, including through updates to the Program Standard, the document that establishes the requirements and expectations for WMATA's interactions with the WMSC.

In accordance with our responsibilities under the WMSC Compact, the process set out in our Program Standard, and federal regulations, we update the Program Standard at least once each year as part of our continuous improvement process.

As scheduled, the WMSC made its annual revision to the Program Standard in July 2024.

There is also the ability to enact interim revisions when needed. As mentioned earlier in the report, in November 2024, the WMSC made an interim change to incorporate the approved risk-based inspection program that is mandated by the Federal Transit Administration Special Directive 22-50. This revision also includes the addition of Section 1.E.3, New Protections and Access, which includes policies regarding required personnel protective equipment and other protections, as well as general and roadway access while in the Metrorail system and facilities for WMSC personnel.





FINANCIAL INDEPENDENCE

Funding from Virginia, Maryland, and the District of Columbia, along with federal grants from the FTA, enable fully independent operations of the WMSC. The WMSC is meeting all budgeting and financial reporting requirements. Fiscal year 2024 ended June 30, 2024, with the WMSC operating within its approved budget. The approved budget for fiscal year 2025, which began on July 1, 2024, is \$7.318 million, the majority of which covers staff costs such as salaries and benefits (see Appendix B for approved FY25 budget).

To be good financial stewards and to provide predictability for Maryland, Virginia, and the District of Columbia, the WMSC utilizes multi-year spending plans for FTA grant awards. Any amounts in a particular year not covered by FTA grant awards are divided equally among the three jurisdictions. In fiscal year 2024, the FTA awarded the WMSC a \$4.584 million grant through the federal fiscal year 2023 safety oversight apportionments. The WMSC is spreading these funds over a multi-year period, as it does for each other federal award, so that the WMSC maintains all active FTA awards and maximizes the benefits of this federal funding for effective safety oversight and for the responsible use of available local and federal funds.

Expanding Oversight Capacity

The WMSC added key positions in 2024 including Inspection Program Manager (Data Analytics) and Program Specialist – Train Control & Signals. As the WMSC regularly assesses its workload requirements in accordance with the WMSC Program Standard, the WMSC determines the need for any additional positions or services based on the size, complexity and oversight needs of the WMATA Metrorail system.

Continuing Clean Financial Audits

The WMSC received another unmodified (“clean”) financial statement audit opinion for fiscal year 2024. The report, and the similar reports covering previous fiscal years are available at wmsc.gov.

The draft fiscal year 2026 budget and work plan was developed in fall 2024. A final fiscal year 2026 budget will be approved by the Commissioners no later than June 1, 2025, in accordance with the jurisdictional funding agreement.

Title VI



The WMSC continued to effectively carry out our Title VI plan regarding nondiscrimination and to carry out the WMSC’s Disadvantaged Business Enterprise (DBE) program. For the two-year period ending September 30, 2024, the WMSC’s DBE participation rate was 6.1%. The WMSC’s reporting period runs from October 1, 2022, through September 30, 2025.

CONTINUING EDUCATION, TRAINING AND AWARENESS

Safety requires constant learning and the incorporation of new information to drive incremental improvements to safety performance.

WMSC staff are meeting all requirements to demonstrate that they are qualified to perform their functions based on appropriate training. Over the course of 2024, staff made progress towards training credentials required by FTA regulation, which includes individual progress on the Public Transportation Safety Certification Training Program (PTSCTP). As of March 15, 2025, 11 WMSC staff members have completed the PTSCTP program (three in 2024), and four staff members are making considerable progress towards completing the program as soon as 2025. WMSC contractors performing relevant work also participate in this training program. Some WMSC personnel have also completed the training requirements for Transit Safety and Security Program (TSSP) certification. Completion of this training program indicates that the individual has a broad-based knowledge of the safety and security principles applicable to transit system safety, operations and management.

WMSC staff also participated in workshops and forums including the FTA’s Joint State Safety Oversight and Rail Transit Agency Workshop.



As required by the WMSC Compact, the WMSC commissioners appointed by Virginia, Maryland and the District of Columbia have expertise in transportation safety, transportation, engineering and public finance.

TRANSPARENCY, PUBLIC INPUT AND EXTERNAL SAFETY CONCERNS

The WMSC is committed to transparency and inclusive public participation in carrying out every aspect of its program. For example, in addition to safety concerns identified by WMSC inspections, audits or investigations, the WMSC solicits, receives, and responds to safety concerns submitted by members of the public.


The WMSC provides an opportunity for public comments at each of our public meetings. In conjunction with the WMSC's other robust information sharing methods such as social media and [wmsc.gov](https://www.wmsc.gov), these public meetings continued to allow substantial public awareness of the WMSC's safety oversight work. As part of video streaming of these meetings, the WMSC provides closed captioning to further increase accessibility.

The WMSC also receives input and information about safety concerns through our website, social media and email. The WMSC reviews and appropriately addresses every safety concern that it receives, demonstrating the importance and the effectiveness of the WMSC interacting directly with riders, personnel, data, and documentation throughout all levels and all departments of Metrorail to ensure that safety events, hazards and other issues are properly identified, and, most importantly, to ensure that Metrorail identifies mitigations that can help prevent similar issues in the future.

For example, on September 26, 2024, the WMSC received a safety concern regarding an Emergency Egress Shaft FB-08, located on Georgia Avenue between Wheaton and Glenmont stations that had been closed

and was not being maintained in a state of good repair as required by Metrorail policy. The WMSC conducted an inspection to verify that the emergency egress shaft was closed and observed a sign indicating the shaft was partially closed. The WMSC notified Metrorail of the safety concern and requested information regarding the assets closure, including hazard analysis, maintenance records, safety promotion and communication, wayfinding signage and mitigations. Due to a suggestion made by the WMSC regarding the AIMS displays rail traffic controllers use to monitor the system, Metrorail created an icon to notate closed shafts on the system. Additionally, Metrorail updated the document MICC-ALL-PRO-12, MICC Maximo & Defect Reporting. It was updated to add the "out of service" notification process. WMATA hopes to enact the mitigation by Friday, May 2, 2025.

The WMSC encourages Metrorail employees and contractors to report any safety concerns to WMATA's safety hotline, and encourages employees, contractors and members of the public to continue to report safety concerns to us at the WMSC via phone, via social media ([@MetrorailSafety](https://twitter.com/MetrorailSafety)), via [wmsc.gov](https://www.wmsc.gov) or via email at safetyconcern@wmsc.gov.





Conclusion


Metrorail continues to progress toward a safer system under the oversight of the WMSC and is required to make continuous progress to that end as required the WMSC's oversight and the commitment WMATA has made to its PTASP. The WMSC will continue to guide that work using a fact-based and data driven approach.

In 2024, the WMSC's audits, regular and risk-based inspections, and oversight of Metrorail's safety certification process identified areas where safety improvements are required for Metrorail to meet its documented commitments to safety. The WMSC's oversight work also identified positive practices, and led to Metrorail implementing new safety improvements, many of which are described above. Safety is not a destination with an endpoint; it is instead a never-ending journey on a road towards continuous improvement. The WMSC remains committed to effective oversight of and collaboration with Metrorail along this journey.

In 2025, the WMSC is continuing its safety oversight work with a continued focus on the safety of riders, workers and first responders. That includes oversight of WMATA's rollout of its new RWP program and automated systems, as well conducting safety certification work on the new 8000 Series Railcars so that the WMSC is able to provide timely concurrence when Metrorail is ready to put the fleet into passenger service. The WMSC will also continue to hold Metrorail accountable for its commitment to creating and systemically implementing corrective action plans required by the WMSC. Sustaining adherence to those improved changes is critical to the safety of the WMATA Rail System in the future.



APPENDICES



Appendix A

OPEN CORRECTIVE ACTION PLANS (CAPs)

AS OF MARCH 15, 2025

CAP ID	Finding/Recommendation	Expected Completion	Source
NTSB R-8-004-A	Promptly implement appropriate technology that will automatically alert wayside workers of approaching trains and will automatically alert train operators when approaching areas with workers on or near the tracks.	03/01/23	Safety Directive 16-2 (12/15/2015)
WMSC-20-C0042	Finding 5. WMATA employees are not consistently following RWP Rule 5.12 for equipment calibration.	11/23/26	RWP Audit (6/18/2020)
WMSC-20-C0049	Finding 1. ROCC management contributes to a chaotic environment. Use of profanities, threats and racial, sexual or other forms of harassment are regular features of the control centers environment, which makes it difficult for controllers to do their jobs and drives low morale and significant turnover.	10/13/25	ROCC Audit (9/8/2020)
WMSC-20-C0056	Finding 8. Metrorail's ROCC recruitment and retention approach is failing. Some controller trainees have left the ROCC immediately after or shortly after the training course, which is scheduled to last nine months.	10/13/25	ROCC Audit (9/8/2020)
WMSC-21-C0072	WMATA does not have load ratings for its bridges and aerial structures.	03/17/25	Elevated Structures Audit (1/25/2021)
WMSC-21-C0083	Ten Metrorail structures have steel rocker bearings, which created a seismic risk in the event of an earthquake other seismic events.	01/12/26	Elevated Structures Audit (1/25/2021)
WMSC-21-C0098	Several Metrorail preventive maintenance instructions do not include acceptable tolerances for required measurements.	08/04/25	Roadway Maintenance Machine (RMM) Audit (3/9/2021)
WMSC-21-C0099	A lack of an Intrusion Detection Warning (IDW) system where WMATA's own criteria require it.	06/05/28	WMSC Directive (3/31/2021)
WMSC-21-C0100	Metrorail is not maintaining a fully functioning radio communications system in all rail yards and shops.	12/28/26	WMSC Directive (4/30/2021)
WMSC-21-C0120	Finding 2. Metrorail ignores the minimum daily release period (rest period) requirements in its Fatigue Risk Management Policy.	09/15/25	Fitness for Duty Audit (8/31/2021)
WMSC-21-C0129	Finding 11. WMATA does not have a documented procedure for and training to carry out fitness for duty checks prior to or during shifts on a regular basis for all covered employees as specified in the APTA fitness for Duty Standard.	12/22/25	Fitness for Duty Audit (8/31/2021)
WMSC-21-C0130	Recommendation 1. Metrorail does not collect fitness for duty data in a manner that allows for identification, tracking and trending of issues.	05/26/25	Fitness for Duty Audit (8/31/2021)
WMSC-21-C0131	Recommendation 2. Metrorail is not providing medical oversight of contractors and does not include any requirement in contracts that contractors meet WMATA medical, fatigue or hours of service standards.	02/16/26	Fitness for Duty Audit (8/31/2021)
WMSC-21-C0134	Metrorail's 6000-Series rehabilitation program, including coupler overhaul work, was implemented by CMOR, CENV and CMNT without safety certification and approvals required by WMATA's SSCPP.	02/19/28	Revenue Vehicle (Railcar) Programs Audit (9/14/2021)
WMSC-21-C0136	6000 Series cars that underwent rehabilitation were put into service without SAFE approval.	05/09/26	Revenue Vehicle (Railcar) Programs Audit (9/14/2021)
WMSC-21-C0137	Metrorail removed the coupler overhaul from the 6000 Series SMP process without documenting that change or completing a review of that change by the SCRC.	05/09/26	Revenue Vehicle (Railcar) Programs Audit (9/14/2021)
WMSC-21-C0139	The 7000 Series rehabilitation and subsystems overhaul program is being developed without full SAFE coordination, involvement or approval.	11/24/25	Revenue Vehicle (Railcar) Programs Audit (9/14/2021)
WMSC-21-C0143	Metrorail does not consistently follow a standard process to address wheels out-of-round, to prevent cars with wheels out-of-round from operating, and to identify and address the root causes of wheels out-of-round.	09/26/26	Revenue Vehicle (Railcar) Programs Audit (9/14/2021)
WMSC-21-C0146	Metrorail railcars do not include inward-and outward-facing audio and image recorders in all operating compartments.	10/17/26	Revenue Vehicle (Railcar) Programs Audit (9/14/2021)
WMSC-21-C0154	Traction Power Maintenance employees do not get all required information and training to maintain equipment that they are directed to work on, and there is no process in place to ensure that personnel are trained on specific equipment prior to working on that equipment.	04/12/27	High Voltage Traction Power Audit (10/27/2021)
WMSC-21-C0155	Metrorail is not effectively identifying, tracking and mitigating hazards related to high voltage and traction power.	05/03/25	High Voltage Traction Power Audit (10/27/2021)
WMSC-21-C0156	Metrorail is behind schedule on its floating slab testing to monitor for deterioration due to stray current.	03/25/25	High Voltage Traction Power Audit (10/27/2021)
WMSC-22-C0167	Finding 6. Metrorail has not clearly defined and communicated the authority and duties of its Fire Marshal and any other fire prevention roles or positions, and does not have effective continuity plans in the event the Fire Marshal is unavailable.	06/02/25	Emergency Management and Fire Life Safety Programs (2/22/22)
WMSC-22-C0168	Finding 7. Metrorail does not ensure that experts in fire and life safety are included in and have a documented role in Metrorail project development, planning, review and approvals, which contributes to hazards being introduced into the Metrorail system or hazards being allowed to continue to exist without adequate mitigation.	01/10/26	Emergency Management and Fire Life Safety Programs (2/22/22)
WMSC-22-C0170	Finding 9. Metrorail does not routinely conduct hazard assessments to evaluate and prioritize fire and life safety and emergency management issues. Further, Metrorail has not established a fire and life safety and emergency management hazard identification, tracking and open item resolution process for prioritizing and implementing safety improvements.	06/02/25	Emergency Management and Fire Life Safety Programs (2/22/22)
WMSC-22-C0173	Finding 12. The exit stairwell from Rosslyn Station is not protected from obstructions, which creates a risk that the hatch will not be able to be opened in an emergency, trapping customers inside.	10/05/26	Emergency Management and Fire Life Safety Programs (2/22/22)

Appendix A

OPEN CORRECTIVE ACTION PLANS (CAPs)

AS OF MARCH 15, 2025

CAP ID	Finding/Recommendation	Expected Completion	Source
WMSC-22-C0182	Finding 2. Metrorail does not effectively identify, track, communicate and address operational hazards as required by its Agency Safety Plan.	11/15/25	Rail Operations (4/7/22)
WMSC-22-C0183	Finding 3. Metrorail creates safety risks by not requiring and conducting territory familiarization and physical characteristics training, and not assessing knowledge of physical characteristics prior to assigning operations personnel work on a line, in a terminal or in a yard.	11/10/25	Rail Operations (4/7/22)
WMSC-22-C0189	Finding 9. Metrorail does not ensure personnel serving as on-the-job training instructors, including those personnel described as line platform instructors (LPIs), are effective and have specific training and direction on what to teach and how to assess their assigned students.	09/22/25	Rail Operations (4/7/22)
WMSC-22-C0193	Finding 13. With frequent modifications due to temporary and permanent orders, and outdated versions of Metrorail's rulebook being distributed to personnel when hard copies are available, the latest Metrorail rules are not easily accessible to train operators. This creates document control issues and makes a rule requiring personnel to carry the latest version of the Metrorail Safety Rules and Procedures Handbook (MSRPH) unrealistic.	07/20/26	Rail Operations (4/7/22)
WMSC-22-C0199	Finding 1. Metrorail has not developed and implemented a comprehensive water intrusion and remediation program covering stations, elevators and escalators, which contributes to damage and deterioration of structures and other assets, to electrical hazards and to other safety risks.	04/23/28	Station Maint., Elevator/Escalator Audit (5/25/22)
WMSC-22-C0212	This CAP builds on C-0037, which was originally issued on May 12, 2020: Third rail power restoration is routinely rushed by ROCC management with a focus on restoring train service rather than a focus on following safety procedures.	05/12/25	Improper Power Restoration Order (5/17/2022)
WMSC-22-C0213	Metrorail has an ineffective and insufficient inspection, maintenance and cleaning program for Automatic Train Control equipment, particularly including a lack of required tools, procedural compliance, and supervisory oversight for care of vital equipment housed in train control rooms, and is not maintaining the structural integrity of these ancillary rooms.	12/19/26	ATC Room inspection, maintenance and cleaning program (8/4/2022)
WMSC-22-C0214	Finding 1. Metrorail does not have adequate supervisory oversight and safety promotion to ensure that approved preventative maintenance inspections (PMI) are properly completed to ensure the safety of the rail system. Communications personnel are not using correct and current forms and processes necessary to ensure that safety-critical communications systems are appropriately and safely maintained.	07/21/25	Communications Systems (9/29/2022)
WMSC-22-C0215	Finding 2. Metrorail does not have sufficiently detailed instructions and procedures specifying how to inspect and maintain each communications asset. For some assets, there are no instructions or procedures at all.	07/07/25	Communications Systems (9/29/2022)
WMSC-22-C0216	Finding 3. Metrorail is closing preventative maintenance work orders without correcting known deficiencies, which does not comply with its Systems Maintenance (SMNT) Maintenance Control Policy.	03/02/26	Communications Systems (9/29/2022)
WMSC-22-C0217	Finding 4. Metrorail personnel are not effectively communicating, responding to and identifying issues related to trouble calls pertaining to communications systems. Metrorail closes communications related "corrective maintenance" (repair) tickets without effectively identifying, documenting and addressing issues.	03/08/27	Communications Systems (9/29/2022)
WMSC-22-C0219	Finding 6. Metrorail has insufficient training for communications personnel, including on-the-job training (OJT) that SMNT itself describes as deficient, and a lack of requirements to ensure that personnel only work on equipment they are trained on and capable of maintaining as required by the PTASP.	08/04/25	Communications Systems (9/29/2022)
WMSC-22-C0220	Finding 7. Metrorail does not have schematics, manuals, and other materials in each Communications Room required by Metrorail's Communications Room Bi-weekly Cleaning and Inspection PMI.	08/11/26	Communications Systems (9/29/2022)
WMSC-22-C0221	Finding 8. Metrorail lacks the safety assurance and safety promotion activities required to ensure that only current and calibrated radios are in use as required by Metrorail instruction and procedure, creating a risk that this safety equipment will not properly function when needed.	06/09/25	Communications Systems (9/29/2022)
WMSC-22-C0222	Finding 9. Metrorail communications rooms have signs of recurring water, dirt and dust intrusion. Metrorail is also improperly storing equipment in these rooms. Components in these rooms therefore may not function as required for the safety of riders, workers and first responders.	01/04/25	Communications Systems (9/29/2022)
WMSC-22-C0224	Recommendation 2. Some job descriptions have not been updated since the 1970s and 1980s and do not reflect current job responsibilities and necessary qualifications.	03/07/26	Communications Systems (9/29/2022)
WMSC-22-C0225	Finding 1: Metrorail's organizational structure prevents Metrorail from effectively ensuring that its track is maintained in a state of good repair as specified by Metrorail policies, procedures and standards.	05/10/25	Track Maintenance and Training (12/14/2022)
WMSC-22-C0226	Finding 2: Metrorail is not maintaining track infrastructure in rail yards in accordance with TRST-1000 requirements and related standards. This has introduced operational hazards.	09/08/25	Track Maintenance and Training (12/14/2022)
WMSC-22-C0230	Finding 6: Metrorail lacks the capability to complete required rail grinding activities across the system to ensure safe operations.	10/11/25	Track Maintenance and Training (12/14/2022)
WMSC-23-C0238	Finding 1: Metrorail is not carrying out the safety risk management, safety assurance and safety promotion for the structures program required by Metrorail's Agency Safety Plan to ensure safe and effective structural engineering, maintenance, and operation.	06/16/25	Structures Program (7/25/2023)
WMSC-23-C0239	Finding 2: Metrorail's Structures Maintenance and Inspections department has not formalized and documented its on-the-job training process for structural inspection.	05/31/25	Structures Program (7/25/2023)
WMSC-23-C0240	Finding 1. Metrorail does not ensure the use of adequate fall protection when working on or around RMM.	10/20/25	Roadway Maintenance Machines (10/18/2023)
WMSC-23-C0241	Finding 2. Metrorail is not effectively tracking and mitigating hazards related to RMM maintenance and operations in accordance with its PTASP.	02/09/26	Roadway Maintenance Machines (10/18/2023)
WMSC-23-C0242	Finding 3. Metrorail has not documented its practices regarding adjustments to its contractor RMM inspection procedures.	08/18/25	Roadway Maintenance Machines (10/18/2023)

Appendix A

OPEN CORRECTIVE ACTION PLANS (CAPs)

AS OF MARCH 15, 2025

CAP ID	Finding/Recommendation	Expected Completion	Source
WMSC-23-C0243	Finding 4. Metrorail does not have a process and assigned resources to inspect and maintain the hi-rail gear on hi-rail vehicles owned by WMATA as required to ensure the vehicles' safe operation.	05/24/25	Roadway Maintenance Machines (10/18/2023)
WMSC-23-C0244	Finding 5. Metrorail is not reviewing its RMM-related procedures as required.	09/15/25	Roadway Maintenance Machines (10/18/2023)
WMSC-23-C0245	Recommendation 1. Metrorail has the opportunity to more effectively collect and proactively utilize reliability data to ensure safe and effective operations.	05/06/25	Roadway Maintenance Machines (10/18/2023)
WMSC-23-C0249	Recommendation 5. Metrorail can improve the effectiveness of training and available operational manuals by providing a consistent, complete format that documents operational restrictions and allows personnel to identify where to look for such information, and by incorporating these improvements into a recurring troubleshooting training.	08/25/25	Roadway Maintenance Machines (10/18/2023)
WMSC-23-C0250	Recommendation 6. Metrorail has an opportunity to improve safety through effective interdepartmental coordination to fully utilize available safety data, technology, and contracts.	07/07/25	Roadway Maintenance Machines (10/18/2023)
WMSC-24-C0251	Finding 1: Metrorail ATC Maintenance personnel do not have a uniform understanding of Metrorail procedures, which leads to inadequate completion of safety tasks, such as inspections and handling of vital systems, that are required to ensure that track circuits and other elements of the ATC system function properly as required to prevent train collisions and to provide other designed safety protections.	01/10/28	ATC and Signals Program (1/18/2024)
WMSC-24-C0252	Finding 1: Metrorail ATC Maintenance personnel do not have a uniform understanding of Metrorail procedures, which leads to inadequate completion of safety tasks, such as inspections and handling of vital systems, that are required to ensure that track circuits and other elements of the ATC system function properly as required to prevent train collisions and to provide other designed safety protections.	02/08/27	ATC and Signals Program (1/18/2024)
WMSC-24-C0253	Finding 1: Metrorail ATC Maintenance personnel do not have a uniform understanding of Metrorail procedures, which leads to inadequate completion of safety tasks, such as inspections and handling of vital systems, that are required to ensure that track circuits and other elements of the ATC system function properly as required to prevent train collisions and to provide other designed safety protections.	07/20/26	ATC and Signals Program (1/18/2024)
WMSC-24-C0254	Finding 2: Metrorail does not review, analyze, and act upon available safety data about the health and functionality of the Automatic Train Control system and subsystems as required by Metrorail's Agency Safety Plan. Therefore, Metrorail's ATC Engineering cannot reliably or proactively determine whether or not the ATC system and subsystems are or will be functioning as designed to provide for the safety of riders and workers.	04/12/27	ATC and Signals Program (1/18/2024)
WMSC-24-C0255	Finding 3: Metrorail is putting its personnel at risk due to health hazards such as damaged and repositioned materials marked as containing asbestos that are not being identified and managed as required by its Agency Safety Plan.	TBD	ATC and Signals Program (1/18/2024)
WMSC-24-C0256	Finding 4: Metrorail is not systematically identifying, tracking, and mitigating hazards related to automatic train control and signaling as required by its Agency Safety Plan.	08/11/25	ATC and Signals Program (1/18/2024)
WMSC-24-C0257	Finding 5: Metrorail is not maintaining its books of plans in accordance with its requirements.	10/24/26	ATC and Signals Program (1/18/2024)
WMSC-24-C0258	Recommendation 1: Metrorail has not determined the required staffing for ATC and Signals.	10/12/26	ATC and Signals Program (1/18/2024)
WMSC-24-C0259	Recommendation 2. Metrorail does not ensure that lessons learned from prior projects are consistently shared with all relevant personnel responsible for ATC and Signals.	11/17/25	ATC and Signals Program (1/18/2024)
WMSC-24-C0260	Recommendation 3: Metrorail does not have a procedure for the removal of hang tags in Train Control Rooms that indicate temporary modifications. This has led to many rooms having such "temporary" hang tags in place for decades.	02/15/27	ATC and Signals Program (1/18/2024)
WMSC-24-C0261	Develop and implement a corrective action plan in accordance with the requirements of WMSC Program Standard Section 9.C to address Safety Recommendation R-23-28.	03/15/27	Order re NTSB Safety Recommendation R-23-28 (1/17/2024)
WMSC-24-C0262	Develop and implement a corrective action plan in accordance with the requirements of WMSC Program Standard Section 9.C to address Safety Recommendation R-23-28.	07/19/27	Order re NTSB Safety Recommendation R-23-28 (1/17/2024)
WMSC-24-C0263	Develop and implement a corrective action plan in accordance with the requirements of WMSC Program Standard Section 9.C to address Safety Recommendation R-23-28.	02/02/26	Order re NTSB Safety Recommendation R-23-28 (1/17/2024)
WMSC-24-C0264	Develop and implement a corrective action plan in accordance with the requirements of WMSC Program Standard Section 9.C to address Safety Recommendation R-23-28.	11/17/25	Order re NTSB Safety Recommendation R-23-28 (1/17/2024)
WMSC-24-C0265	Finding 1: Metrorail is not consistently identifying, addressing, and preventing water intrusion in power rooms.	08/23/27	Power Systems (2/7/2024)
WMSC-24-C0266	Finding 2: Metrorail is not ensuring that adequate egress paths are maintained for Power facilities.	11/17/25	Power Systems (2/7/2024)
WMSC-24-C0268	Finding 1: Metrorail is not performing its train operator certification activities reliably and consistently in accordance with its safety requirements specified in its Agency Safety Plan and the associated Performance Standardization on Program Manual. Therefore, Metrorail is not ensuring that its trains are only operated by personnel who have demonstrated the skills required to do so safely.	05/11/26	Train Operator Certification Order (2/28/2024)
WMSC-24-C0269	Finding 2: Metrorail is not conducting retraining of personnel who do not pass certification exams as required by its Performance Standardization Program Manual, and is not consistently retesting these personnel as specified in its safety procedures.	02/02/26	Train Operator Certification Order (2/28/2024)

Appendix A

OPEN CORRECTIVE ACTION PLANS (CAPs)

AS OF MARCH 15, 2025

CAP ID	Finding/Recommendation	Expected Completion	Source
WMSC-24-C0270	Finding 1: Metrorail is not carrying out railcar maintenance and inspection tasks as specified by its procedures.	08/10/26	Revenue Vehicles Audit (5/21/24)
WMSC-24-C0271	Finding 2: Metrorail is training railcar personnel on outdated procedures.	07/13/26	Revenue Vehicles Audit (5/21/24)
WMSC-24-C0272	Finding 3: Metrorail is not meeting life-safety and occupational safety and health requirements in railcar maintenance facilities.	TBD	Revenue Vehicles Audit (5/21/24)
WMSC-24-C0273	Finding 4: Metrorail is not identifying and mitigating hazards related to railcars and railcar personnel.	03/16/26	Revenue Vehicles Audit (5/21/24)
WMSC-24-C0274	Finding 5: Metrorail is not following its operational certification requirements for Car Maintenance Road Mechanics.	08/04/25	Revenue Vehicles Audit (5/21/24)
WMSC-24-C0276	Finding 7: Metrorail is using equipment that is not calibrated in accordance with its policies and procedures, including for inspection and maintenance of components with a direct impact on safety.	10/06/25	Revenue Vehicles Audit (5/21/24)
WMSC-24-C0277	Recommendation 1: Metrorail is not tracking the shelf life of railcar parts that decay over time and therefore have a limited shelf life	01/12/26	Revenue Vehicles Audit (5/21/24)
WMSC-24-C0278	Recommendation 2: Metrorail could improve the effectiveness of its maintenance tasks by proactively providing training records to supervisors of employees newly assigned to their shift or location.	07/28/25	Revenue Vehicles Audit (5/21/24)
WMSC-24-C0280	Finding 1: Metrorail is not effectively ensuring that its personnel on and around the roadway are consistently following the Roadway Worker Protection rules designed for their safety.	10/26/26	Roadway Worker Protection Audit (7/31/24)
WMSC-24-C0281	Finding 2: Metrorail is not providing its personnel with up-to-date and accessible information about the locations where additional Roadway Worker Protection is required to prevent serious injury or death.	07/18/26	Roadway Worker Protection Audit (7/31/24)
WMSC-24-C0282	Finding 3: Metrorail is not systematically identifying, tracking, and mitigating hazards related to Roadway Worker Protection as required by its Agency Safety Plan.	11/18/25	Roadway Worker Protection Audit (7/31/24)
WMSC-24-C0283	Finding 4: Metrorail is training and qualifying personnel on outdated Roadway Worker Protection-related procedures and rules	08/04/25	Roadway Worker Protection Audit (7/31/24)
WMSC-24-C0284	Finding 5: Metrorail has no process to ensure that areas requiring additional Roadway Worker Protection are accurately identified on an ongoing basis.	01/19/27	Roadway Worker Protection Audit (7/31/24)
WMSC-24-C0285	Finding 6: Metrorail directs its personnel to use forms of protection without training on the proper use of the protection. Specifically, Metrorail has no training or qualification related to local control. This contributes to an inconsistent application of Roadway Worker Protection rules.	10/11/27	Roadway Worker Protection Audit (7/31/24)
WMSC-24-C0286	Finding 7: Metrorail is not following its existing safety rules and does not have adequate training and supervisory oversight to ensure safe operation under mobile command.	2/3/26	Roadway Worker Protection Audit (7/31/24)
WMSC-24-C0287	Finding 8: Metrorail has no controls to ensure that rules being applied in areas it designates as an 'Authorized Construction Site' provide the same or greater level of protection for roadway workers as those workers have in other parts of the WMATA Rail System.	12/15/26	Roadway Worker Protection Audit (7/31/24)
WMSC-24-C0288	Finding 9: Metrorail is providing RWP qualifications without following the listed requirements for those qualifications.	07/17/27	Roadway Worker Protection Audit (7/31/24)
WMSC-24-C0289	Finding 10: Metrorail is not following its procedures regarding Roadway Worker Protection Training.	07/13/26	Roadway Worker Protection Audit (7/31/24)
WMSC-24-C0290	Finding 11: Metrorail is not providing critical roadway worker-related safety information and training. Instructors do not follow the standardized curriculum and omit materials.	01/19/26	Roadway Worker Protection Audit (7/31/24)
WMSC-24-C0291	Finding 12: Metrorail is providing incorrect information about cardinal rules and incomplete testing for non-English speaking contractors in Roadway Worker Protection Training.	02/02/26	Roadway Worker Protection Audit (7/31/24)
WMSC-24-C0292	Finding 13: Metrorail requires on-the-job Roadway Worker Protection training without outlining the requirements or process for this training.	10/24/28	Roadway Worker Protection Audit (7/31/24)
WMSC-25-C0293	Finding 1: Metrorail does not have a reliable communication system for operations or emergencies.	TBD	Emergency Management and Life Safety Audit (1/29/25)
WMSC-25-C0294	Finding 2: Metrorail Emergency Trip Stations (ETS) located throughout the system are not treated as fire life safety assets.	TBD	Emergency Management and Life Safety Audit (1/29/25)
WMSC-25-C0295	Finding 3: Metrorail fire and life safety inspections do not identify and resolve deficiencies with fire life safety equipment and assets within stations.	TBD	Emergency Management and Life Safety Audit (1/29/25)
WMSC-25-C0296	Finding 4: Metrorail is using emergency radio operations channel 6 although the channel is not ready for use.	TBD	Emergency Management and Life Safety Audit (1/29/25)
WMSC-25-C0297	Finding 5: Metrorail is not contacting jurisdictional emergency services immediately upon identification of fire and smoke on the Metrorail system.	TBD	Emergency Management and Life Safety Audit (1/29/25)

Appendix B

FINAL INVESTIGATION REPORTS

Each final safety event investigation report adopted by the WMSC is available at [WMSC.gov/reports](https://wmsc.gov/reports).

ADOPTED BY THE WMSC
IN 2024

Report Number	Date of Adoption	Report Title
W-0251	January 23, 2024	Collision at Metro Center Station
W-0252	January 23, 2024	Evacuation for Life Safety Reasons at Ronald Reagan Washington National Airport Station
W-0253	January 23, 2024	Evacuation for Life Safety Reasons at Wheaton Station
W-0254	January 23, 2024	Collision at Rhode Island Ave Station
W-0255	January 23, 2024	Evacuation for Life Safety Reasons at Shaw-Howard University Station
W-0256	January 23, 2024	Derailments on Blue Line
W-0257	March 5, 2024	Red Signal Overrun at Ballston Station
W-0258	March 5, 2024	Red Signal Overrun at Ballston Station
W-0259	March 5, 2024	Collision near East Falls Church Station
W-0260	March 5, 2024	Derailment – near Potomac Yard Station
W-0261	March 5, 2024	Collision at Greenbelt Yard
W-0262	March 5, 2024	Collision at Minnesota Avenue Station
W-0263	April 9, 2024	Serious Injury at D&G Junction
W-0264	April 9, 2024	Improper Roadway Worker Protection – Foggy Bottom-GWU Station
W-0265	April 9, 2024	Evacuation for Life Safety Reasons at Foggy Bottom-GWU Station
W-0266	April 9, 2024	Derailment near East Falls Church Station
W-0267	April 9, 2024	Derailment at Greenbelt Station
W-0268	April 9, 2024	Improper Rail Vehicle Movement at Federal Triangle Station
W-0269	April 9, 2024	Red Signal Overrun at Mount Vernon Sq. Station
W-0270	April 9, 2024	Improper Door Operation – Green Line between U St. And Columbia Heights stations
W-0271	April 9, 2024	Collision at Alexandria Rail Yard
W-0272	May 14, 2024	Derailment near Farragut North Station
W-0273	May 14, 2024	Improper Rail Vehicle Movement – D&G Junction
W-0274	May 14, 2024	Improper Rail Vehicle Movement – Addison Road Station
W-0275	May 14, 2024	Improper Vehicle Movement near Van Dorn Street Station
W-0276	May 14, 2024	Red Signal Overrun at L'Enfant Plaza Station

Report Number	Date of Adoption	Report Title
W-0277	May 14, 2024	Red Signal Overrun at West Falls Church Rail Yard
W-0278	May 14, 2024	Improper Roadway Worker Protection at Columbia Heights Station
W-0279	May 14, 2024	Improper Roadway Worker Protection at Rockville Station
W-0280	May 14, 2024	Improper Roadway Worker Protection on Red Line
W-0281	May 14, 2024	Improper Roadway Worker Protection at Stadium-Armory Station
W-0282	May 14, 2024	Improper Roadway Worker Protection near McPherson Square Station
W-0283	May 14, 2024	Improper Roadway Worker Protection near Spring Hill Station
W-0284	May 14, 2024	Improper Roadway Worker Protection near Capitol South Station
W-0285	May 14, 2024	Improper Roadway Worker Protection near Van Dorn Street Station
W-0286	May 14, 2024	Improper Roadway Worker Protection near Arlington Cemetery Station
W-0287	May 14, 2024	Improper Roadway Worker Protection near Eisenhower Avenue Station
W-0288	May 14, 2024	Improper Roadway Worker Protection at Medical Center Station
W-0289	May 14, 2024	Improper Roadway Worker Protection on Blue and Yellow Line
W-0290	May 14, 2024	Improper Roadway Worker Protection at Georgia Ave-Petworth Station
W-0291	May 14, 2024	Improper Roadway Worker Protection at Georgia Ave-Petworth Station
W-0292	May 14, 2024	Improper Roadway Worker Protection at Medical Center Station
W-0293	May 14, 2024	Improper Door Operation at Archives Station
W-0294	May 14, 2024	Evacuation for Life Safety Reasons at Greenbelt Rail Yard
W-0295	June 11, 2024	Collision at Twinbrook Station
W-0296	June 11, 2024	Improper Roadway Worker Protection at Branch Ave. Station
W-0297	June 11, 2024	Improper Roadway Worker Protection at D&G Junction
W-0298	June 11, 2024	Improper Roadway Worker Protection at Federal Center SW Station
W-0299	June 11, 2024	Improper Roadway Worker Protection at Rosslyn Station
W-0300	June 11, 2024	Improper Door Operation at West Hyattsville Station
W-0301	June 11, 2024	Improper Door Operation at Downtown Largo Station
W-0302	June 11, 2024	Improper Door Operation at Deanwood Station

Appendix B

FINAL INVESTIGATION REPORTS

Each final safety event investigation report adopted by the WMSC is available at [WMSC.gov/reports](https://wmsc.gov/reports).


ADOPTED BY THE WMSC
IN 2024

Report Number	Date of Adoption	Report Title
W-0303	June 11, 2024	Improper Door Operation at Smithsonian Station
W-0304	August 6, 2024	Derailment near Ronald Reagan Washington National Airport Station
W-0305	August 6, 2024	Train Operator Removed for Fatigue, Drug and Alcohol – Orange Line
W-0306	August 6, 2024	Red Signal Overrun near Ronald Reagan Washington National Airport Station
W-0307	August 6, 2024	Red Signal Overrun in West Falls Church Rail Yard
W-0308	August 6, 2024	Red Signal Overrun near Spring Hill Station
W-0309	August 6, 2024	Improper Rail Vehicle Movement from Federal Center SW Station
W-0310	August 6, 2024	Improper Rail Vehicle Movement near McPherson Square Station
W-0311	August 6, 2024	Improper Rail Vehicle Movement from Federal Center SW Station
W-0312	August 6, 2024	Improper Rail Vehicle Movement outside Huntington Station
W-0313	August 6, 2024	Improper Roadway Worker Protection near College Park-UMD Station
W-0314	August 6, 2024	Improper Roadway Worker Protection near Forest Glen Station
W-0315	August 6, 2024	Improper Roadway Worker Protection near Potomac Avenue Station
W-0316	August 6, 2024	Improper Roadway Worker Protection at Ballston-MU Station
W-0317	August 6, 2024	Improper Roadway Worker Protection near Wiehle-Reston East Station
W-0318	August 6, 2024	Improper Roadway Worker Protection at Metro Center Station
W-0319	August 6, 2024	Improper Roadway Worker Protection near Morgan Boulevard Station
W-0320	August 6, 2024	Improper Roadway Worker Protection near Southern Avenue Station
W-0321	August 6, 2024	Improper Door Operation at Glenmont Station
W-0322	August 6, 2024	Improper Door Operation at Alexandria Rail Yard Crew Platform
W-0323	August 6, 2024	Improper Door Operation at Glenmont Station
W-0324	August 6, 2024	Improper Door Operation at Stadium-Armory Station
W-0325	August 6, 2024	Hazardous Materials Spill on Green Line
W-0326	August 6, 2024	Hazardous Materials Spill at Medical Center Station
W-0327	August 6, 2024	Evacuation for Life Safety Reasons at Foggy Bottom- GWU Station
W-0328	August 6, 2024	Collision at Forest Glen Station

Report Number	Date of Adoption	Report Title
W-0329	September 17, 2024	Red Signal Overruns at New Carrollton Rail Yard
W-0330	September 17, 2024	Red Signal Overruns at Rhode Island Ave-Brentwood Station
W-0331	September 17, 2024	Red Signal Overruns at West Falls Church Station
W-0332	September 17, 2024	Improper Roadway Worker Protection at Smithsonian Station
W-0333	September 17, 2024	Improper Roadway Worker Protection near Spring Hill Station
W-0334	September 17, 2024	Improper Roadway Worker Protection at Rhode Island Av-Brentwood Station
W-0335	September 17, 2024	Improper Roadway Worker Protection near College Park-UMD Station
W-0336	September 17, 2024	Improper Roadway Worker Protection at Glenmont Station
W-0337	September 17, 2024	Improper Door Operation at Columbia Heights Station
W-0338	September 17, 2024	Improper Door Operation at Federal Center SW Station
W-0339	September 17, 2024	Improper Door Operation at Rhode Island Ave-Brentwood Station
W-0340	September 17, 2024	Collision at Spring Hill Station
W-0341	December 10, 2024	Evacuation for Life Safety Reasons at Farragut West Station
W-0342	December 10, 2024	Evacuation at for Life Safety Reasons at Dupont Circle
W-0343	December 10, 2024	Evacuation for Life Safety Reasons at Stadium-Armory Station
W-0345	October 22, 2024	Improper Roadway Worker Protection at Deanwood Station
W-0346	October 22, 2024	Improper Door Operation at Farragut West Station
W-0347	October 22, 2024	Improper Door Operation at Vienna Station
W-0348	October 22, 2024	Automatic Train Operation Violation and Station Overrun at Innovation Station
W-0349	October 22, 2024	Automatic Train Operation Violation at Huntington Station
W-0350	December 10, 2024	Improper Roadway Worker Protection at Benning Road Station
W-0351	December 10, 2024	Red Signal Overruns near Brentwood Rail Yard
W-0352	December 10, 2024	Red Signal Overruns at Anacostia Station
W-0353	December 10, 2024	Derailment near Stadium-Armory Station
W-0354	December 10, 2024	Serious Injury at College Park Station

Appendix C


WMSC ORGANIZATION CHART




Appendix D

WMSC FY2025 BUDGET:


STAFF, OFFICE SPACE AND RELATED COSTS - SUBTOTAL: \$6,033,000



- Staff compensation (salaries, benefits) - \$5,571,000**
 Cost reflects salary and benefits for 28 full-time employees along with a benefits factor of 22.5 percent and annual performance and market adjustments to ensure retention of core staff. Staff numbers reflect personnel and organizational manpower necessary to ensure the WMSC can carry out its mission and maintain the level of effort required by the FTA's certification.
- Commission meetings (stipends, expenses) - \$35,000**
 Cost reflects statutorily obligated stipends and travel expenses, fees, meeting space, and meeting materials.
- Office equipment and supplies - \$34,000**
 Purchase and depreciation of office equipment (e.g. laptops, monitors, and printers), office collaboration equipment, and office supplies.
- Office space lease - \$210,000**
 Cost reflects annual lease of office space, access control, and operating expenses.
- Business insurance - \$183,000**
 Cost reflects annual premiums for cybersecurity, liability, property, and acts and omissions insurance policies.



CONTRACTORS - SUBTOTAL: \$1,070,000



IT support services - \$165,000

Cost reflects support for general IT services, including laptop configuration and maintenance, website maintenance, email domain management, computer security, and disaster recovery planning.

SSOA staffing support - \$500,000

Cost reflects contracted staffing support for non-permanent personnel necessary to provide specialized, uniquely focused technical expertise, staffing augmentation when resignations and retirements occur, and staffing augmentation for special large-scale audits and high-profile investigations.


Legal Services - \$150,000

Cost reflects annual outsourced legal services. Legal services are necessary to address voluminous issues related to business concerns and complex questions.

Organizational management - \$255,000

Cost reflects outside contract support for human resources, audit and accounting services, procurement, graphics, performance metrics design, managerial development, and employee benefits management services.

TRAVEL AND TRAINING - SUBTOTAL: \$90,000




Training (e.g., TSI, industry workshops, conferences) - \$55,000

Cost reflects training for commissioners and staff to obtain required certifications, as well as training on oversight of drug and alcohol requirements, fatigue and human factors in transportation, accident investigations, investigation interview techniques, project management, and related topics. Training is offered through DOT, FTA, NTSB and other entities.

Staff travel for field work (inspections and meetings) - \$35,000

Cost reflects reimbursement for travel associated with field work, inspections, and meetings.

EQUIPMENT AND MAINTENANCE - SUBTOTAL: \$125,000



IT software and maintenance - \$100,000

Cost reflects acquisition and maintenance, support, and licensing fees for software and data systems to support WMSC's mission and IT infrastructure. This includes legal databases, media monitoring, office productivity and other related software, and website domain renewal. Cost also includes office internet and telephone services.

Publications and memberships - \$10,000


Cost reflects maintaining staff professional licenses and memberships, purchases of various industry technical publications and subscriptions.

Personal protective equipment - \$10,000

Cost reflects purchase of weather-related personal protective equipment required for staff to work safely in the rail system.

Tools and instruments - \$5,000

Cost reflects acquisition and testing of speed monitoring equipment, track measuring tools, cameras, and other electronic devices and specialized work equipment that are needed to conduct field inspection activities.



TOTAL FY2025 BUDGET - \$7,318,000

FY2025 FUNDING SOURCES

The WMSC is funded by federal grants, carryover funds, and the equal support of the District of Columbia, state of Maryland and Commonwealth of Virginia. After federal grants and carryover funds, each jurisdiction supported the FY25 budget with \$1,176,341.



750 First St. NE, Ste. 900
Washington, D.C. 20002
202-384-1520
www.wmsc.gov