HD18 - The Future of the Chesapeake Bay Bridge-Tunnel


Executive Summary:
The Chesapeake Bay Bridge-Tunnel (CBBT) is a 17.6-mile long facility consisting of highways, bridges, and tunnels connecting the Eastern Shore of Virginia with the Virginia mainland. The Bridge-Tunnel was opened to traffic in 1964, replacing the ferry service that had served the Eastern Shore for more than 30 years. The facility was expanded in the late 1990s to include parallel bridges, which were opened to traffic in April 1999. Being the longest combination of bridges and tunnels in the world, it stretches beyond the horizon, and offers motorists a drive across open ocean (see figure below). It is designated as U.S. Route 13, a primary arterial, and is part of Virginia's National Highway System. The CBBT is operated as a toll facility by the Chesapeake Bay Bridge and Tunnel District, a political subdivision of the Commonwealth of Virginia.

The district and its governing commission were created by the General Assembly, and the State provides almost $1.0 million annually in urban street funding for the facility. Yet, the General Assembly has never reviewed the operations of the Bridge-Tunnel in its 38-year history. With the recent controversy surrounding the toll structure and economic impact of the facility on the Eastern Shore, the 2002 General Assembly directed the Joint Legislative Audit and Review Commission (JLARC) to complete this study of the future of the Chesapeake Bay Bridge-Tunnel. HJR 210 specifically directed a review of: the appropriate role of the Bridge-Tunnel in the economic growth of the Eastern Shore and the Commonwealth; the appropriate toll structure to ensure proper funding for the facility; the efficiency and efficacy of the district's policies, practices, and operations; and the appropriate State role in determining the future of the Bridge-Tunnel.

Overall, this review found that the Chesapeake Bay Bridge-Tunnel has been a largely successful endeavor. It has fulfilled its original mission to provide a convenient connection between the Eastern Shore and the Virginia mainland that supports commerce in the region. The facility appears to be generally well maintained and operated, although this report recommends several improvements. The toll structure appears sound, providing adequate revenue for operations, maintenance, and debt service. Looking to the future, however, the Chesapeake Bay Bridge and Tunnel Commission will need to examine long-term capital requirements for the facility, and take the necessary actions to ensure that the district is financially prepared to meet those requirements. To further the role of the commission in meeting future challenges, the Virginia General Assembly will need to establish the commission as the permanent governing body for the district, and authorize the continued use of tolls for operation and maintenance of the facility.

Overview and History of the Chesapeake Bay Bridge-Tunnel

For more than 250 years, the Chesapeake Bay has posed an obstacle to travel to and from Virginia's Eastern Shore. Various packet ships and steamers provided passenger and freight service from the early 1700s, but in 1933 the Virginia Ferry Corporation began the first regular vehicular ferry service. By 1953, growing numbers of passengers and vehicles transported by ferry prompted the General Assembly to create the Chesapeake Bay Ferry District to purchase and operate the ferry service. The Chesapeake Bay Ferry Commission was established as the governing body for the district. Then, in response to the growing demands on the ferry service, the 1956 General Assembly authorized the ferry commission to finance and construct a bridge-tunnel for vehicular traffic from the Eastern Shore to the Virginia mainland. The ferries continued in operation until April 14, 1964, when the Bridge-Tunnel opened to traffic.

The Chesapeake Bay Bridge-Tunnel was constructed in two phases, spanning more than 39 years. The original facility, completed in the mid 1960s, consisted of two-lane trestle bridges and tunnels. Parallel trestles were completed in the late 1990s, making the facility a four-lane divided highway except for the two miles of tunnel and two miles of tunnel approaches, which remain two lanes.

The Chesapeake Bay Bridge and Tunnel Commission is the governing body for the district. Its 11 members include two members each from Northampton and Accomack counties; one member each from the cities of Virginia Beach, Norfolk, Portsmouth, Chesapeake, Hampton, and Newport News; and one member from the Commonwealth Transportation Board. Members are appointed by the Governor for four-year terms. Operation of the CBBT is the responsibility of 165 employees, including toll collectors, police officers, maintenance workers, administrators, and others. The staff organization is headed by an executive director, who reports to the CBBT commission.

In FY 2002, 3,294,480 vehicles used the Bridge-Tunnel. About 88.6 percent of that traffic was cars and light trucks. The remaining portion of traffic was from heavy trucks of various lengths and axle combinations. The largest single source of. revenue for the district is from tolls on use of the facility. The CBBT toll structure is based on the number of axles of the vehicles using the facility, and ranges from $10 for passenger cars to $36 for six-axle trucks. In FY 2002, toll revenue totaled $38.4 million.

The Appropriate Role for the CBBT in Economic Growth Is to Ensure a Safe, Convenient, Low-Cost Link Between the Eastern Shore and the Virginia Mainland

HJR 210 directed JLARC to determine ''the appropriate role of the CBBT in the economic growth and development generally in the Commonwealth and especially on the Eastern Shore." This requirement arose in the context of the controversy over modification of the Bridge-Tunnel toll structure, which some saw as an action intended to promote the development of the lower end of Northampton County. Those who favor development view the toll as a barrier, and seek to reduce tolls and implement commuter discounts, which would make daily travel across the bay more economical for those who might want to live on the Eastern Shore and work on the Virginia mainland. Those who do not favor development prefer to retain a toll structure without reductions and without commuter discounts. In other words, they agree that the toll is a barrier to development, and want that barrier to remain in place. Their concern is that development will be detrimental to the rural quality of life for current residents.

Based on the JLARC staff review, it appears that the CSST is essential to the economic well being of the Eastern Shore, and plays an important role in tourism in Virginia Beach. However, a JLARC staff analysis indicates that there is little measurable impact of changes in Bridge-Tunnel traffic on the economies either of the Eastern Shore or of Hampton Roads. Further, government and business leaders interviewed by JLARC staff for this review have concluded that CBBT tolls have little direct impact on employment, business decisions, or the future of economic growth. Instead, the overwhelming consensus was that the importance of the CBBT is in its presence as an essential link between the Eastern Shore and the Virginia mainland.

Moreover, the Acts of Assembly explicitly authorize the CBBT commission to "fix, revise, charge and collect tolls" for two purposes: (a) to pay the cost of maintaining, repairing, and operating the facility, and (b) to pay the principal of and interest on bonds issued by the commission, and to create reserves for those purposes. Therefore, the commission is not authorized to revise the toll structure for the purpose of either promoting or discouraging economic development. Rather, the obligation of the commission is to collect the lowest possible toll which provides sufficient funds for the purposes set out in law. Accordingly, the appropriate role for the CBBT in the economic growth of the Eastern Shore and the Commonwealth is to ensure a safe, convenient, low-cost link to the Virginia mainland.

Based on this review, the expectation is that local governments on the Eastern Shore will need to manage economic growth and development, not the Chesapeake Bay Bridge and Tunnel Commission. Therefore, the question of the appropriateness of the toll structure can be narrowly focused. An appropriate toll structure for the Chesapeake Bay Bridge-Tunnel is one which provides sufficient revenue to support the lowest practical costs for operations, maintenance, debt service, and future capital requirements.

The CBBT Toll Structure Is Adequate for Operations, Maintenance, and Debt Service

To assess the adequacy of toll revenues for the Chesapeake Bay Bridge-Tunnel, JLARC staff examined the district's revenues and expenses over the short, intermediate, and long term. The short-term analysis focused on FY 2002. In that year, toll revenues totaled $38.4 million. Total expenses, including ordinary maintenance, maintenance reserve projects, operations, and debt service, totaled $26.8 million. This resulted in net toll revenue of $11.6 million, which is accumulated in the district's general fund. Currently then, toll revenues are adequate to cover CBBT costs, even without other sources of income such as returns on investments or the urban street payments from VDOT.

The intermediate-term assessment was based on a CBBT staff projection of revenues to assess whether the district's bonds could be defeased early. Over the ten years in the CBBT projection, toll and other revenues are estimated to total almost $468 million. Operating expenses, reserve maintenance, debt service, and other costs are projected at $359 million. Thus, the CBBT intermediate-term projections demonstrate that toll revenues are more than adequate through 2012.

JLARC staff also completed a long-term analysis of the adequacy of toll revenues through 2025, the year that the district's current debt service requirements will be satisfied. The analysis involved a projection of CSST traffic, estimates of toll revenue based on the traffic projections, and estimates of costs for operating, maintenance, and debt service. JLARC staff also made projections of other revenue sources, such as urban street payments from VDOT and interest on investments. The traffic projections were based on a series of regression models designed to explain the seasonal and long-term trends in the traffic data from prior years.

The long-term projection of costs and revenues indicates that the CBBT revenue stream is more than adequate for the period well beyond 2025. Over the 23-year period of the projection, there is no year in which revenues are less than estimated expenses. Toll revenue for the entire period is estimated to total just over $1.0 billion, and the total of all revenue is estimated at $1.3 billion. Total expenses are estimated to total about $900 million for the period. As a result, the CBBT general fund could accumulate a cash balance of about $450 million.

Future Capital Improvements Will Depend on Available Funding

While the toll structure is more than adequate for the current and future cost of operations, maintenance, and debt service, it may be inadequate to fund future capital improvements. Specifically, the costs to construct parallel tunnels may exceed the funds the district will have available, depending on when those additional facilities will be needed. To assess the adequacy of the toll structure to support construction of the tunnels, JLARC staff first examined the need for, and timing of, construction of the tunnels based on four criteria: increases in traffic, improvements to safety, tunnel maintenance, and the future need for deeper shipping channels in the bay.

The traffic models developed by JLARC staff were used to project monthly traffic volume through the year 2025. Based on those projections, it appears that traffic congestion and unstable traffic flow will become a significant problem by 2020. The analysis of accident data, maintenance requirements, and a study of channel depths by the Virginia Port Authority found no justification for advancing the completion of tunnel construction prior to the year 2020. Engineering and construction of the parallel tunnels is estimated by CBBT staff to take approximately six to eight years. Therefore, to have the tunnels open to traffic by 2020, the planning and engineering would need to begin by 2012, and construction by 2014.

The district's ability to fund construction of the tunnels is dependent on two factors: the general fund balance (cash), and the capacity to issue debt. Both the general fund balance and the district's bonding capacity are dependent on toll revenues. To assess the adequacy of CBBT revenues to fund the construction of the parallel tunnels, JLARC staff: (1) estimated the cost of engineering and construction of the tunnels in future years, (2) projected general fund balances and bonding capacity for the district, and (3) compared the estimated costs of construction to the available funding.

The table below shows the availability of funding for construction of the tunnels in five-year increments through 2025, as well as in 2014 -- the year construction would need to begin in order for the tunnels to be open to traffic by 2020. In 2014, the district will likely have insufficient funds available to begin construction of the tunnels, with a shortfall of cash and bonding capacity of about $103 million. With the current revenue stream, sufficient funding will not likely be available until 2020. The shortfall in revenue is due to the general inadequacy of toll rates, as well as the 24-hour round trip discount implemented in March 2002. A survey of motorists by JLARC staff found that few of the motorists using the discount were induced by the lower toll, but rather would have made the trips on the CBBT regardless. Using the JLARC staff projections of monthly traffic in FY 2003, the 24-hour discount will likely result in a loss of revenue of about $2 million annually.

The District Needs to Develop a Long-Range Capital Plan

In interviews with JLARC staff, several members of the CBBT commission raised concerns about the implementation of the 24-hour round trip discount in the absence of a long-range capital plan. They also expressed concern about the expansion of the discount to vehicles making round trips within 72 hours, a proposal now under consideration by the commission. The specific concern was that the discount could mean that the decision regarding when the parallel tunnels should be built would be driven solely by the availability of funds, rather than by a careful consideration of traffic, safety, and other requirements.

Since the analysis for this report shows that parallel tunnels may be needed by 2020 and that current revenues are likely insufficient to fund such a project, the commission should begin the process to evaluate alternatives to address future capital needs. In developing a long-range capital plan the commission could consider at least three alternatives:

• Do not build the tunnels for the next 25 to 35 years, and implement toll reductions over time.

• Build the tunnels when revenues are sufficient, probably in the year 2020.

• Increase tolls to advance construction to an earlier date, such as 2014.

The full report examines how toll increases can be used to provide the funding necessary for construction of the tunnels. Recommendations in the report call for the CBBT commission to develop a long-range capital plan which includes a financial analysis of alternatives to fund future capital requirements. Pending completion of the capital plan, it is recommended that the commission delay further consideration of toll discounts.

CBBT Operations Are Generally Sound, But Some Staffing Efficiencies Are Possible

Overall, this review found that Bridge-Tunnel operations are generally effective with regard to toll collections, law enforcement, and emergency response. Appropriate policies and procedures are in use to ensure that toll receipts are collected, secured, and accounted for properly. Police officers appear to be properly trained and are certified by the Department of Criminal Justice Services. Comprehensive policies related to law enforcement have been developed and the district has necessary equipment and vehicles to implement the law enforcement function. The district has also developed an appropriate emergency response function, with staff who appear adequately trained, and with the necessary equipment to respond to accidents, fires, and other emergencies.

Some staffing efficiencies in toll collections and emergency response are possible, however. For example, toll collections staffing could be improved by greater use of part-time positions to better match staffing to workload. JLARC staff completed a detailed analysis of traffic entering the plazas in each hour for one full week in each of the past 12 months of operation. Based on that analysis, it appears that toll collection staffing is inadequate during peak summer months. In fact, during some peak traffic days on the weekends in July and August, the CBBT has too few toll lanes to handle the traffic, even if additional staff were available. On the other hand, toll collections staffing appears to be excessive for most of the rest of the year, when traffic is much less than in the peak summer months. The district needs to restructure staffing for toll collections and also be more flexible in its scheduling of work shifts to better match staffing with the daily changes in traffic volume.

Based on the current duties of emergency crew workers, use of leave, and requirements for training, the district appears to need 24 full-time equivalent emergency crew positions, instead of the 26 positions in the current organization. Since three of the 26 positions are currently vacant, the district can adjust the authorized number of positions without having to reduce the actual number of emergency workers employed. Installation of modern video surveillance cameras in the tunnels could also eliminate the need for emergency crew workers to patrol the tunnels and would improve the district's monitoring of traffic. With the installation of cameras, an additional five FTE positions could be redeployed to other duties or eliminated.

An analysis of police staffing found that it appears reasonable, with appropriate levels of supervision for toll, emergency, and law enforcement functions. Based on the current duties of officers, use of leave, requirements for training and court attendance, and the level of traffic on the Bridge-Tunnel, the district appears to need a minimum of 43 full-time equivalent police positions. While some minimal reduction in police positions is possible, the current overall level of staffing will be necessary as long as the existing toll collections, emergency response, and law enforcement functions are needed. Moreover, if the district is to address the current situation with excessive speeds, greater patrol visibility may be appropriate. Therefore, no changes in the overall level of police staffing are recommended at this time.

Improvements Are Needed in Enforcement of Speed Limits, Facility Security, and Disaster Response

Three areas of concern were identified in the review of CBBT operations. First, the parallel trestles appear to have resulted in increased speeds which could endanger motorists using the Bridge-Tunnel. This finding is based on a JLARC staff analysis of traffic summonses issued by CBBT police officers before and after the parallel bridges were built. In calendar year 1994, the last full year of operation prior to construction of the parallel bridges, CBBT police officers cited 428 motorists for reckless driving for speeds in excess of 75 miles per hour. In contrast, in calendar year 2000, the first full year of operation after the parallel bridges were opened, police wrote 2,030 summonses for reckless driving. Of those, 203 were for speeds in excess of 90 miles per hour, and 36 were for speeds in excess of 100. The report recommends that the district take steps to reduce speeds, including enhanced and more visible police patrols, the use of radar/speed signs which warn motorists of their actual speeds in comparison to the posted speed limit and reduction of the tolerance above the posted speed limit.

Second, a review of the Bridge-Tunnel's security strategy found that little has been done to secure the facility despite its status as a major transportation system and its location near several military installations. No formal risk assessment has been completed by the district. Because risks have not been evaluated, the district has not examined countermeasures appropriate to various threat levels. It is recommended that the commission develop a comprehensive security strategy.

Third, the most recent revision of the CBBT emergency action plan provides general guidance in the event of a natural disaster, such as a hurricane, or an accident, such as a ship collision with the facility. The plan does a good job of outlining the general responsibilities of the divisions in responding to emergencies, contains a comprehensive directory of contacts in various public safety, emergency, and military organizations, and outlines how the public should be notified of a closure. However, the plan is silent on emerging threats, such as the intentional release of chemical, biological, or radiological agents. How employees respond to such hazards could be critical in reducing casualties among district employees and users of the facility. This review also found that CBBT staff have not participated in disaster or other emergency action plan training or exercises. The report recommends that the district revise its emergency action plan to address emerging threats, and train employees on implementation of the plan.

Capital Improvements Are Needed to Improve Operations

While the toll plaza buildings appeared generally adequate for toll operations, they are inadequate for police operations. There is no office area for the shift supervisor, who is responsible for all toll, emergency, and police operations for the facility. The general layout of the buildings is also a problem, with the vault and workroom for toll collectors accessible only through the control room, and the vaults opening into public view at the entrance to the control rooms. Also of particular concern is the lack of secure holding areas for persons placed under arrest by CBBT police officers pending transfer to a local jail. As a result, police officers reported that persons under arrest are sometimes held in the toll plaza buildings in the lobby area or the employee break rooms. Officers reported that this can be a serious problem if more than one person is under custody. The report recommends that replacement or renovation of the toll plaza buildings be considered as part of the long-range capital plan. The renovation of the toll plaza areas should include additional lanes and installation of the Smart Tag electronic toll collection system.

The CBBT Maintenance Program Is Adequate, But Some Reserve Maintenance Projects Should Be Accelerated

The JLARC staff examination of district assets confirmed that the maintenance program keeps the facility in generally good repair. Roadway surfaces are smooth and well maintained, ventilation and pump equipment appeared in good condition, and with a few exceptions, buildings appeared clean and well maintained. In interviews with CBBT commissioners, all considered the maintenance program to be successful in keeping the district's facilities in good condition.

In several on-site assessments of CBBT facilities, however, JLARC staff confirmed the need for several major maintenance projects. The need for these repairs was identified by the district's consulting engineer, but have not been addressed because of the construction of the parallel bridges. With that construction completed, the district needs to refocus its attention on maintenance projects too long delayed. Among the most critical of the needed maintenance projects are: (1) repairs to the pilings on the southern-most portion of the trestle between the Virginia Beach shoreline and the first island; (2) renovation of the tunnel interiors, including repairs to concrete, replacement of broken tile, replacement of metal frames, doors, handrails, and other components, and repaving of the asphalt road surfaces; and (3) repairs to the interior concrete and exterior brick in the ventilation building walls. The current condition of some of these assets is shown in the photographs below.

The district has significant funds available to complete needed repairs. The reserve maintenance fund had a balance of approximately $4.5 million at the end of FY 2002, which is insufficient for the projects which should be accelerated. However, the commission can transfer additional funds from the CBBT general fund to the reserve maintenance fund at any time. The FY 2002 balance of the general fund was approximately $65 million, which is available for transfer as needed. Since toll revenues exceed operating costs and debt service, additional funds will be available over the course of the major reserve maintenance projects. The report recommends that the commission accelerate completion of critical maintenance projects.

The District Does Not Have an Employee Evaluation Process

With 165 employees, across a broad range of occupations, skill levels, and responsibilities, the district faces a significant challenge to evaluate work performance. In addressing the challenge, the district has chosen to decentralize the process, relying on individual supervisors. As a result, it is not clear that employee performance is evaluated on a regular, consistent basis, if at all. To implement an employee performance system and to improve personnel management generally, a new focus on human resources management by the district may be needed. The report recommends development of a written evaluation system for all employees, to be implemented by a new human resources division.

Salaries and Benefits Are Comparable to Other Public Agencies

JLARC staff undertook a limited comparison of salaries for several positions in the administrative, operational, and maintenance areas. Non-law enforcement positions were compared with similar positions at the Hampton Roads Bridge-Tunnel (VDOT), and the Richmond Metropolitan Authority (RMA). Those comparisons confirmed that salaries are generally in line with other public agencies. For CBBT police officers, a comparison was made with the salary scale authorized by the State Compensation Board for deputy sheriffs with law enforcement responsibilities. Specifically, the salary scale as used for supervisory and other deputies in Northampton County were the basis for the analysis. As with the salaries for other positions, the comparison found that the salaries for police officers are comparable to those of deputy sheriffs.

Employee benefits also appear adequate and comparable to those for employees of other public agencies, except that CSST police officers have not been provided the enhanced benefits provided by the Local Enforcement Officers Retirement System (LEOS) administered by VRS. The enhanced benefit consists of unreduced retirement at age 50 with 25 years of service, rather than 30 years of service as required in the regular VRS program, as well as a supplement currently valued at about $9,800 annually. A review by VRS found that most police officers in Virginia receive the enhanced benefits. The incremental cost for the district to implement LEOS coverage for uniformed police officers is estimated by JLARC staff to be about $359,000 annually.

The Commission Could Enhance Public Participation

A review of CBBT commission minutes for meetings since January 2000 showed that the commission has regularly provided the opportunity for public comment at each of its monthly meetings. However, in considering changes to the operation of the facility that could generate significant public concern, the commission may need to do more to facilitate public participation. For example, the commission might want to hold public hearings for all changes in the toll structure or traffic regulations, such as speed limits. To maximize public participation, the commission should consider conducting the hearings in the evening, at convenient locations on the Eastern Shore and in Hampton Roads.

The State Role Regarding the CBBT Should Be Limited

This review found that the Bridge-Tunnel is generally well maintained and operated. The evidence suggests that the commission and its staff have discharged their duties only in the interests of the facility and its users. While this review found the need for some improvements to certain operational and administrative functions, the findings of this report do not point to any failure of the commission to carry out the responsibilities delegated to it by the General Assembly. In the absence of any evidence that the State needs to intervene in the operation of the facility or to provide additional funding, there appears to be no compelling reason for the General Assembly to change the nature of the State role vis-à-vis the Bridge-Tunnel.

Accordingly, the primary State role with regard to the Chesapeake Bay Bridge-Tunnel should be limited to providing the statutory framework for the CBBT commission and staff to carry out essential functions related to finance, maintenance, and operations.

Given the inability of the State to fund future capital requirements of the CBBT, the district and commission should be retained to operate and maintain the Bridge-Tunnel as a toll facility in perpetuity.