Since 1974, the Virginia Department of Corrections has used a shift relief factor formula to determine the number of full-time security staff needed within its correctional facilities. In the decades since establishing, the relief factor calculation has been refined from its origination in efforts to fairly predict the security staffing needs of each institution. The last formal calculation of record was conducted in 2006 by MGT of America, LLC and resulted in a state-wide average calculation of 5.13, meaning the Department required 5.13 full-time equivalents (FTEs) to fill one security post 24 hours per day, 7 days per week.

In April 2024, The Virginia Department of Corrections retained CGL Management Group, LLC (CGL) to complete a state-wide security staffing assessment. The primary objective of the study was to recalculate and update the relief factors for each institution.

MAJOR FINDINGS

The 2024 updated state-wide calculation rose 21 percent over the relief factors currently used by the Department, meaning, with the Department’s current staffing approach, it will take an additional 21 percent of security staff (1,353 FTEs) to fill its authorized posts. Exhibit 1 (see page 5 of the report) provides a comparison of the 2024 3-year average relief factor calculation to the recorded historic relief factors.

On a state-wide level, Exhibit 2 (see page 5 of the report) provides a summary of all relief calculations on a regional basis and by institution type. Complete calculations for each institution are included within this report and individual institution calculations can be found in the Appendices.

The remainder of this study includes CGL’s assessment of current security staffing within the Department’s institutions and provides recommendations to lessen the impact of the staffing need identified with the updated relief calculations. CGL was contracted to visit at least 20 percent of its correctional centers and field units to observe security staffing practices and provide recommendations to assist the Department in identifying opportunities for change. CGL was tasked with providing a comparative assessment from its experience with staffing models in other state prison systems to evaluate how the Virginia DOC approached security staffing and to identify opportunities for improvement or change. There is not a large variety of different staffing models observed in prison settings. Within this assessment, CGL explored three staffing models and complemented this with comparative approaches and benchmarking with other prison systems. Within this assessment, we reference the practices and benchmarks from the:

• Pennsylvania DOC
• Washington DOC
• Iowa DOC
• Minnesota DOC
• Ohio DOC
• South Dakota
• New Jersey Women’s Prison

Chapter 6 – Conclusions and Recommendations provides a complete summary and list of findings and recommendations. Below is a summary of our major findings.

Security staffing of a state correctional system has changed drastically in the past couple decades. Once, security officers were assigned to indirect supervision housing facilities with one officer in a control center and another (or two) assigned to tour through housing units periodically to conduct counts, wellness checks, conduct security integrity inspections, and ensure the safety of those in the housing units. As the industry evolves, it is safer and more important for officers to have more contact and longer presence in housing units to deter poor behavior. With the implementation of direct supervision philosophies, more officers are required in staffing allotments to have a continuous presence in housing units. Officer roles have expanded to include counseling and involvement in an individual’s programming needs. And, with the growing special needs populations who require additional attention, extensive medical care, and more supervision, the number of corrections officers needs to grow. Adequate security staffing of an institution is no longer an easy task and finding the right staff to put in the right environment is becoming increasingly more challenging.

The Virginia Department of Corrections is currently funded for a level of security staff to support its operation and fill identified posts on each facility’s Post Audit. Over the last decade, the Department has only been able to fill an average of 84 percent of its security staff.

The Virginia DOC is critically and, in many cases, dangerously short-staffed. Short-staffed not due to lack of funding, but lack of the ability to hire, train, and retain enough staff to fill positions within the institution. The lack of security staff impacts every aspect of facility operations and results in facilities that are unsafe and inefficient.

• The low staffing levels are causing good, existing staff to work tirelessly extra hours, lowering morale and creating burnout. Without addressing, the Department will continue to experience turnover of staff.

• Non-security staff performing functions that are normally relegated to a corrections officer.

• Supervisory staff, up to captain levels, performing line officer responsibilities.

• Post Audits that have not been updated regularly and adjusted to compensate for low staffing levels, in essence, invalidating the security staffing plans.

• Housing units without supervision.

• High levels of external transportation that strain facility staffing levels.

• Unconventional posts that are not commonly observed in state prison systems.

• Duplicative roles of supervisor/management positions.

• Compromised security due to lack of staffing.

• Differences in management philosophy (direct supervision versus indirect supervision.

• A higher-than-average number of new officer training hours that is driving the relief factors up, coupled with a high number of new hires.

• Although the Staffing Committee has conducted Post Audit assessments every two years and identified staffing needs, the DOC has often been unsuccessful with its requests for additional staffing.

While dangerously short staffed in some facilities, the VADOC staff and leadership have done an excellent job in maintaining safety and security, especially considering the trend of increasing violent offenders and individuals with behavioral disorders observed throughout the industry.

RECOMMENDATIONS TO LOWER THE RELIEF FACTOR CALCULATION

There are a few ways in which to reduce the identified FTE need in Virginia, but each will take time to realize the impact after implementation.

• Reduce the new hire training hours – work with the state corrections academy to reduce the wait time between Phase 2 and Phase 3. For our calculations, we used an estimated 200 hours of delay before a new hire receives a seat in an academy. This estimate is generously low given the poll of wardens that reflected some wait up to 400 hours. Reducing this wait time would reduce the overall training hours used in the relief factor calculations.

• Move portions of the Field Training Program earlier – Some state prisons have achieved minor improvements by moving the Field Training Program, or the control room and report writing portions, earlier and before attendance at the academy. If wait times between Phase 2 and Phase 3 cannot be reduced, advancing portions of the Field Training Program could reduce the total training hours and reduce the training hours used in the relief factor.

• Similarly, if the Department chose to hire non-security personnel to fill current security positions, as suggested above, and these individuals became candidates for correctional officer positions, a portion of the Field Training Program could already be completed as part of the non-security new hire training, again reducing the hours from Phase 4.

• Revisit and update all Post Audits – the Virginia Post Audits have been in place for many years and receive amendments upon request from wardens or pursuant to Department initiatives. CGL recommends having a complete overhaul of Post Audits to re-establish necessary security posts. Throughout the remainder of this study, we make several recommendations to reconsider existing posts, and the level of employee required. Re-aligning Post Audits to meet current needs in the Department would reduce the number of FTEs required.

• Reducing vacancies throughout the state – vacancies are a challenge in most state prison systems. The answer to filling vacancies is complicated as it requires understanding the reason for the vacancies. Some reasons learned in Virginia – Salaries compared to surrounding employment opportunities (other correctional agencies at the county and federal levels); work environment compared to opportunities outside of corrections; staff retention; facility cultures; and individual employment priorities of the new hires.

• CGL recommends a state-wide study of its external transportation needs and development of a Centralized Transportation Unit to lessen the burden on individual facilities.

• In exploring methods to minimize transportation, CGL recommends the Department explore opportunities to repurpose existing or closed facilities to create a centralized special needs institution which will have an impact to the volume of external transportation activity.

• CGL recommends a state-wide study of its implementation and use of Unit Management to align it with industry practices that support a unified facility culture. Within this recommendation, we suggest evaluating the need for two managers who might have conflicting roles in unifying staff of a building.

The following is a list of CGL’s recommendations to consider replacing current security posts with non-security employees to alleviate the pressure on security staffing:

• Investigations and Intelligence Posts – in many facilities, we observed ranking staff dedicated to an investigations office and staffed with multiple supervisors and officers. Security staff are essential to these posts. However, other DOC systems have non-security analysts assigned to pull videos, listen to telephones, watch video visitation, read e-mails, and handle administrative functions; enabling the security staff to conduct investigations. Facilities that have just security staff spend inordinate amounts of time handling the administrative aspects of this unit. Additionally, the ranking staff (captains and lieutenants) are generally responsible for the unit, but not directly involved in the day-to-day processing and investigating of information.

• Property Units – in several facilities, we observed sergeants and officers assigned to handle inmate property. As mentioned earlier, many DOCs have relegated this responsibility to non-security staff or third-party vendors.

• Laundry Units - in several facilities, we observed sergeants and officers assigned to handle inmate laundry. As mentioned earlier, many DOCs have relegated this responsibility to non-security staff or third-party vendors.

• Control Room Gun Posts – in the higher custody facilities, we observed a second corrections officer assigned to control rooms, designated as the “Gun Post". These officers are responsible for observing interactions in the units and have less lethal munitions to be used for control if necessary. These posts are not unique to Virginia, but not often staffed in every control room.

• Canine Unit – Canine Units are an exceptional tool within corrections for deterrence and in contraband detection. Distinctly, the Virginia Canine Unit is comprised of narcotic detection dogs and patrol dogs. Patrol canine dogs are rare in correctional systems, but have proven effective in the Virginia DOC.

SAFE POPULATION LEVELS

With the newly calculated relief factors and updated security staffing levels, CGL was tasked with calculating safe population levels of each institution given different correctional officer staffing levels of 100 percent, 75 percent, 50 percent, and 35 percent. The authorized staffing level for each institution’s security Post Audit is based upon the full bed capacity of the facility. To calculate the safe population levels for each staffing scenario, CGL calculated a staff to inmate ratio using the authorized staffing levels and provided our methodology for determining the calculations. Exhibit 3 is CGL’s calculation for safe population levels of each institution.